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Preface
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the peak of the era of Western
imperialist expansion and the rise of nationalism in Asia. By the middle of the century,
the high tide of world communism had arrived. However, toward the later part of the
century, communism began to collapse. Mongolia, even though located in the heartland
of Asia, landlocked between Russia and China, found it impossible to avoid the impact of
these great world events.
In the winter of 1911, just before the collapse of the Manchu Empire and the
formation of the Republic of China, Outer Mongolia declared its independence, but be
cause of the changing world political climate, it soon had to give up its independence and
accept autonomy within China. Under Chinese pressure, even autonomy was soon abro
gated. In 1921, Outer Mongolia expelled the Chinese military occupation force and de
clared its independence a second time. Soon, however, due to the infiltration of interna
tional communism and outside pressure, Mongolia transformed its traditional nomadic,
feudalistic institutions into a communistic-style society, and in 1924, it established the
world’s first people’s republic. After the Second World War, the Chinese Kuomintang
government, and later the communist regime, recognized Outer Mongolia’s independ
ence. Eventually, following the world-wide current sweeping away socialism, the Mon
gol people awoke and Outer Mongolia was able to avoid violence and bloodshed to be
come the first Asian country to transform a communist regime into a free, democratic,
peaceful, independent state.
Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, because of its geopolitical situation and the
international balance of power, had to accept the slogan “ the commonwealth of five na
tionalities” (Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans), and became a part of
the Republic of China. During this period, movements to unify the two Mongolias were
tried and abandoned. Not only did these movements all fail, but Inner Mongolia also
came under the maladministration and extortion of Chinese warlords and suffered Japa
nese occupation. After the Second World War, the Mongolian unification movement was
revived. Because of the Yalta Agreement and the shifting international balance of power,
however, the Mongols again failed to achieve their goal. At present. Inner Mongolia is a
kind of province within the People’s Republic of China— the Inner Mongolian Autono
mous Region. Outwardly and politically, it seems to fulfill the desire of the Inner Mon
golian people to enjoy a unified, autonomous governing structure. But the Inner Mon
gols are now a minority in this large part of their own original native land, representing
only twelve percent of the population.
The political impulses of Irmer Mongolia in the first half of this century were to
protect its own territory, and under Chinese suzerainty, to avoid non-Mongolian rule and
establish a unified Inner Mongolian political body. The leader of this movement was
Demchugdongrob (1902-1966), the thirty-first generation descendant of Chinggis Khan.
His life embodies the history of the Inner Mongolian struggle for national survival during
this century. Of course, no truly important historical event can be the creation of just one
person. Any movement must also have the general support of the people. Nevertheless,
even today, a discussion of modem Iimer Mongolian history, no matter what its political
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slant, cannot neglect the existence of Demchugdongrob and his contribution to modem
Mongolian history. Moreover, a discussion of this great man that emphasizes one kind of
political propaganda over another and deliberately distorts history will have the opposite
of the effect intended. It can only increase the honor paid to and the reputation of this
tragic national hero in the hearts of the Mongolian people.
According to the accepted version of Mongolian history, from the day that
Chinggis Khan ascended the throne in 1206 until the last day of Demchugdongrob’s po
litical leadership—seven and a half centuries—^the “ Golden Descendants” of Chinggis
Khan ruled Mongolia. This extended historical period witnessed the downfall of the
Mongolian empire, internal feudalistic wars, the Ming Chinese invasions, the several
centuries of Manchu domination, Russian communist control of northern Mongolia, and
Japanese occupation of southern Mongolia. However, the western half of southern Mon
golia, or Inner Mongolia, was continually ruled by the clan of Chinggis Khan. Conse
quently, the day when Demchugdongrob lost his freedom was also the end of the leader
ship of the Chinggisids.
The goal of the historian is to be objective and faithful; history must be recorded
in an environment of free thought and free speech. However, in China, from ancient
times to the present, literary inquisitions and persecutions have usually begun with the
supposed “ crimes” of the historians; hence students of Chinese history must leam to read
between the lines. The historians of Outer Mongolia, now that they have been liberated
from the yoke of despotic communist control, have already forsaken the fabricated his
tory that was invented during the dark days, and started to rewrite Mongolian history
from the perspective of free Mongols.
As for Inner Mongolia, regardless of whether it was under Chinese warlords or
Kuomintang domination, and especially after the establishment of communist mle, all
historical records had to be written within definite political guidelines. Even the so-called
autobiographies, or personal memoirs, had—without exception—to fit political ortho
doxy’s requirements. Authors, writers, and editors, in order to protect themselves, dared
not ask what the real truth was. The circumstances of these writers warrant our compas
sion, but from the perspective of honest historical work, what they were forced to do was
regrettable. The work they produced could mislead readers who had not personally expe
rienced the historical events in question. Unfortunately, many eyewitnesses of these
events have passed away without leaving their testimonies, a fact lamentable to those
dedicated to writing the history of the time.
I, fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, personally experienced the great histori
cal drama of the Mongols’ struggle for survival in this century, not only observing but
also following the leading players throughout their performances, while playing a minor
role myself. Today, after the curtain has fallen on these sad events, I have survived.
Even after all the years that have passed, I still feel the pains of yesteryear. At the same
time, I feel that since I now enjoy liberty in a free world, I am obliged to record the true
story that I myself experienced, and hence this life of Demchugdongrob. In order to rec
ord the truth of the past so that future historians will not be misled by fabricated writings,
I have written my story from the first person point-of-view. Though nearly half a century
has gone by since these events occurred, I still cannot overcome the emotions evoked by
my memories. For this, I apologize.
To avoid confusing the non-specialist reader I have employed a kind of lowest
common denominator transliteration of Mongolian language words into the Latin alpha-
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bet. I have also omitted all umlauts and the “h” following some instances of “g” in trans
literated Mongolian words. The task of transliterating Chinese and Mongolian proper
names is complicated. One problem is that during the tumultuous period under discussion
here, many place names underwent changes, often more than once. I have tried to stick to
one name per place even for times when a place was known by another name. For exam
ple, I have mostly referred to the Khalkha region as Outer Mongolia, even though it has
not been officially called by that name since 1924. Nor have I routinely employed the
name Mongolian People’s Republic (1924-1990) nor the subsequent label, Mongolian
Republic as it has been known since then.
Similarly, I have employed the current official spelling, Hohhot, for the capital
of Inner Mongolia, rather than a more elaborate transliteration (Koke-khota, or Kokekhota) or the city’s somewhat condescending old Chinese name, Kueihua (Guihua). For
the name of the capital of Outer Mongolia and sometimes as a shorthand reference to the
whole country, I consistently employ Ulaanbaatar (not Ulaanbaator or Ulan Bator) or its
pre-1924 names Ikh Khuree, or Urga. Wherever possible, my editors and I have settled
on a single spelling for any given locality.
Chinese names often have three or more alternative spellings. The case of the
present Chinese capital is typical. English-language publications will have Peking (the
so-called postal spelling introduced during the time of Western imperialism in China),
Pei-ching (Wade-Giles spelling), and lately Beijing (Chinese Communist pinyin spell
ing).
To compensate for these somewhat arbitrary and sometimes ahistorical simplifi
cations and to ward off the objections of the specialists, we have cross-referenced many
of these alternate spellings of names in the index. My thanks for their hard work in pre
paring the manuscript for publication to the editorial staff of Western Washington Uni
versity’s Center for East Asian Studies, Henry Schwarz, Wayne Richter and Edward
Kaplan.
Sechin Jagchid
San Jose, California
June, 1999
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HISTORICAL PROLOGUE
The Land and the People

Demchugdongrob, commonly known as De Wang (Prince De in Chinese), was a
thirty-first generation descendant of Chinggis Khan and the last ruler of Mongolia from
the altan urag, the Golden Clan of the Chinggisids. The only son of Prince Namjilwangchug, Demchugdongrob was bom in the Sunid Right Banner of Inner Mongolia in 1902
and died in Hohhot, the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, in 1966.
The Sunid was one of the tribes that initially supported Chinggis Khan (r. 12061227). In the sixteenth century, Dayan Khan reunified Mongolia and put this tribe under
the control of his eldest son, Torubolod. Thereafter, the descendants of Torubolod be
came the rulers not only of the Sunid but also of the Chahar (Chakhar), Ujumuchin, and
Khauchid tribes. The Chahar tribe was always under the direct control of the khan him
self During the Manchu domination, the Sunid was divided into the Right Flank and Left
Flank Banners, and both were part of the group of banners placed under the Shilingol
League.
During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Manchus expanded to the
southern parts of Manchuria and began to compete with the Ming Chinese. Realizing the
danger in the rise of the Manchus, Ligdan Khan, the last Mongolian Grand Khan, aban
doned his people’s traditional hostility toward the Chinese and formed an alliance with
the Ming court to fight the Manchus. Although this policy was prudent, it was unaccept
able to most Mongolian tribal leaders, who subsequently rebelled and joined the Manchu
camp. Those who were the khan’s blood relatives but hesitated to rebel against his
authority migrated with their people north to Outer Mongolia, beyond the reach of the
khan’s power. Among the tribes that migrated were the Sunid, Ujumuchin, and
Khauchid. Because of the unpopularity of this alliance with the Chinese, Ligdan Khan’s
struggle against the Manchus ended in failure. After the overall situation calmed down,
the tribes moved back to the area south of the Gobi and surrendered to the Manchus.
In 1638, the Right Flank of the Sunid tribe, led by a man named Susai, submit
ted to the Manchus. In 1642, the Manchu leader, Abahai (later called Taizong by the
Chinese), conferred upon Susai the hereditary title ofJasag toroyin junwang, or secondranking prince and ruler of the Right Flank of the Sunid tribe. In 1639, Tenggis, the
nephew of Susai, also surrendered, together with the Sunid Left Flank. The next year,
Abahai is said to have given Tenggis his own daughter in marriage as a gesture of good
will. In 1641, Tenggis received the same rank and title as Susai, and the two Sunid ban
ners were formed in accordance with the Manchu organizational system of leagues and
banners. Also in 1641, the Ujumuchin tribe submitted to the Manchus and was divided
into two banners. The ruler of the Ujumuchin Right Banner received the title of firstranking prince, Khoshoi Sechin Chin Wang. The submission of the Khauchid tribe oc
curred in the year 1651, seven years after the Manchus occupied Beijing. In addition, the
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Abaga and Abkhanar tribes of the descendants of Belgutei, a brother of Chinggis Khan,
also surrendered to the Manchus. The Manchu court then divided the five tribes into ten
banners and later united them to form the Shilingol League.
During the Manchu period, Shilingol was one of six leagues in Inner Mongolia;
its territory was located approximately 110-120 degrees east and 43-47 degrees north,
mostly on steppe lands. The eastern section was rich in water and grass, but the western
section was comparatively dry due to the climate of the Gobi. The Sunid Right Banner
occupied the western edge of the league. From its formation until the present, this league
has been famous for having the best pastures. Ujumuchin in the east and Sunid in the
west are especially famous for their excellent horses. Both banners possess salt lakes. The
salt lake of Sunid is the Ere’en (Erlian)-dabsu, located along the border with Outer Mon
golia. According to Manchu practice, the ten banners of the five tribes had to convene a
chigulgan, or convention, every three years on the banks of the Shilingol River, and that
river lent its name to the banners of the Shilingol League.
Initially, when a league convention was held, the emperor would dispatch an
envoy to supervise it. Later, in 1751, the Manchu court stopped sending supervisors and
ordered the ruling princes of the banners to elect a primary and deputy chief to preside
over the conventions. Finally, in 1787, the court decided to appoint the most prestigious
nobles of the leagues as darugas (heads) and ded-darugas (deputy heads) to administer
the league. The positions of all nobles ruling over the banners were hereditary. The heads
and deputy heads of the leagues, however, were appointed by Beijing. These positions,
except in the case of resignation or dismissal, were lifelong jobs. Usually, becoming a
deputy head was a necessary step toward being selected as head of a league. The posts of
league head and deputy head were mostly filled by princes and other nobles.
The Mongol banners, though originally derived from traditional tribal group
ings, were institutionalized by the Manchu rulers in accordance with the principle of di
vide and rule to prevent the unification of Mongol power. The Manchus fragmented the
Mongol tribes into many banners, making each a feudalistic administrative and military
unit running a piece of Mongolian territory. The feudal banner head was commonly re
ferred to as a noyan, or ruling prince. But regardless of the hereditary rank and title he
possessed, he had to be appointed jasag (ruler) of his banner by the Manchus in order to
actually rule that banner. Those nobles who possessed higher ranks and titles but were
not assigned as jasags were known in Mongolian as sula noyad, or nobles at leisure.
Some of them possessed a personal staff of khariyad, or underlings, but they still had no
administrative authority.
Although jasags had small courts in their own banners, the horizontal relation
ships between banners were very limited. Even the relationship between the two Sunid
banners, the Right and the Left, was distant. The vertical relations between the banners
and the Beijing court, however, were quite intimate. The head of a league was merely a
mediator among its constituent banners. His power over the banners was much weaker
than that of a governor over the districts under his jurisdiction.
The administrative units under the banner were called sumus. According to
Manchu law, each sumu contained approximately one hundred and fifty families, from
which fifty khuyag, or active duty (lit. standing) soldiers, and one hundred ere, or ablebodied men, were carried on the military rosters. The Shilingol League had ten banners
and one hundred thirteen sumus: the Khauchid Right Banner had five sumus\ the Sunid

I: Historical Prologue

3

Right Banner, thirteen; and the Sunid Left Banner, twenty. These figures indicate that the
Sunid Right Banner was a banner of medium size.
Early on in the Mongol empire, a class distinction between aristocrats and com
moners emerged. In later Mongolian society, most nobles or aristocrats were Chinggisids
and blood relatives of the Borjigin clan. These people were called taiji. All those under
their jurisdiction were known as albatu. People with duties, and personal underlings,
were called khariyatu. The people who belonged to a banner, regardless of their status as
aristocrat or commoner, belonged permanently to that banner and were forbidden to
transfer to, or serve in, other banners. This feudalistic restriction prevented the unifica
tion and development of the Mongols as a united people. The pernicious practice contin
ued to exist, especially in Inner Mongolia, until the fourth decade of this century. The
Manchu rulers used these Mongolian nomadic-pastoral feudalistic institutions to their
advantage and also placed geographical limitations upon the sphere of relationships
among Mongolian banners. In effect, the Manchus shrewdly added an element of local
ism to the basic structure of Mongolian tribalism, thereby keeping the Mongols frag
mented for almost three centuries.
The aristocrats were divided into two groups: lay nobles and ecclesiastical lead
ers. Following the development of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia during the latter half
of the sixteenth century, the high lamas gradually evolved into an aristocratic class. Some
of them were even granted land as fiefdoms and people as shabinar, or lay disciples or
underlings. Although there were many temples in the Sunid Right Banner, no ecclesiasti
cal aristocrat was powerful enough to challenge the lay ruling prince. Nevertheless, since
all of Mongolia had been thoroughly converted to Tibetan Buddhism, and the oath of the
Law of Buddha was faithfully kept, the prestige and influence of the high lamas in
creased, even though Manchu regulations prohibited the interference of religious sects in
politics. Because the ecclesiastics were exempt fi-om taxes, military conscription, and
other duties, the ratio of lamas to lay persons increased. This hindered the growth of the
Mongolian population because of the celibacy required of the lamas.
Upon the submission of Tenggis, the noyan of the Sunid Left Flank, Abahai
gave him his own daughter in marriage, as mentioned earlier. Although Tenggis’s loyalty
to his Manchu lord was unquestionable, he did not relinquish his Chinggisid pride. After
the emperor’s death, Tenggis’s relations with Prince Dorgon, the Manchu regent, deterio
rated. In 1646, two years after the Manchus established their court in Beijing, Tenggis
took his Manchu wife and his people north to Khalkha (Outer Mongolia). Dorgon
launched a military campaign against Tenggis, but his Khalkha allies shielded him. Two
years later, in 1648, Tenggis returned to Beijing. To appease the Sunids and show good
will to the Khalkhas, the Manchu court did not punish Tenggis, thereby peacefully end
ing what might be labeled the first Mongol rebellion against Manchu domination. Those
non-Sunid Mongols who had remained absolutely loyal to the Manchu court called the
Sunids Sunid khugaichi, or Sunid traitors. In reality, the rebellion of Tenggis and the Left
Banner was an isolated incident, but even so, the Sunids of the Right Banner could not
escape its consequences. Many people in the Shilingol League mocked the Sunids as
koke Sunid, or green Sunid, ridiculing them for their stubborn, unruly nature. But much
later, reflecting the high nationalistic spirit of the 1930s, slander turned into high praise
for the brave Sunid people.
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Demchugdongrob’s Father and His Times
Prince Namjilwangchug, the father of Demchugdongrob, inherited the rank and
position of jasag of the Sunid Right Banner in 1863 and died in 1902. The lifetime of
Namjilwangchug, the latter half of the nineteenth century, was also the era of the West
ern imperialist invasion of East Asia. During the Anglo-French invasion of northern
China (1856-60), Emperor Wenzong (also known as the Xianfeng Emperor) fled Beijing
and took refuge in Rehe, where he later died. This invasion also affected Mongolia, espe
cially the region south of the Gobi. Taking advantage of this turmoil, the Russians began
to encroach on Manchuria. The Manchu court, feeling that its northern territory was too
weakly defended, encouraged people in northern China to move into Mongolia to combat
the Russian infiltration.
At this time there also occurred a series of rebellions within China. The Taiping
(1850-1864), the Nian (1852-1868), and various lesser insurrections severely depressed
the economy, the Nian especially affecting the rural areas of northern China, where many
people became vagrants. The best solution to this crisis, the Manchu court reasoned, was
to send these homeless Chinese to Mongolia as well and open still more Mongolian land
to agricultural cultivation. This influx had a negative impact on the pastoral economy,
and severely damaged southeastern Inner Mongolia. In 1891 a bitter struggle between the
local Mongols and the Chinese settlers precipitated the Jindan dao (The Way of the
Golden Pill) rebellion. Fanatically superstitious Chinese rebels, known as Hong maozi, or
Red Caps, indiscriminately butchered all the Mongols they encountered in the Juu Uda
and Josotu Leagues.
The Mongols had been the main allies of the Manchus during the period of
Manchu unification and expansion in the seventeenth century. The major policy of the
Manchu leaders then was to unite with the Mongols to check the power of the Chinese.
Later, following the sinicization of the Manchu ruling class, the Manchus adopted China
as their main territory and came to consider Mongolia, and even their own Manchuria, as
merely secondary frontier lands. Development of the borderlands was to be only for the
sake of protecting China. To Chinese court officials, Mongolia was nothing but a subor
dinate sphere of the Middle Kingdom. The Manchus assumed that superficial gestures of
appeasement would satisfy the Mongols, and that it would not be necessary to contribute
to their progress or to the development of the other subordinate peoples of the north.
Before this shift in policy, Manchu domination of Mongolia had been quite suc
cessful. Feudalistic arrangements within and intermarriage with Manchu aristocrats in
hibited internal conflict. These were complemented by less conciliatory policies, such as
enforced limitations of movement by individuals to make the Mongolian nobles uncon
ditionally loyal to the Manchu court. The common people were unaware that they were
under alien domination because there was no direct Manchu or other non-Mongolian
intervention in their banner or local governments. If some unsatisfactory situation arose,
they would complain about their own Mongolian feudal lords, not the Manchus.
Even in the nineteenth century, when the Manchus were confronted with inter
nal rebellion and foreign invasion. Prince Namjilwangchug and other Mongolian feudal
lords felt they could not stand complacently by and offer them no assistance. Prince
Senggerinchin of the Khorchin Mongols of eastern Inner Mongolia organized Mongolian
volunteers to fight the Chinese Taiping rebels, the Anglo-French forces, and the Nian

I: Historical Prologue

5

rebels. Mongolian blood was shed and Senggerinchin himself also died in these cam
paigns which allowed Manchu rule to continue for another half century. As a reward to
Senggerinchin for his magnificent merit, an imperial decree was issued ordering that his
name tablet be erected in the Imperial Ancestral Temple.'
After these unfortunate events, the Moslem rebellion in northwest China broke
out in the later half of the nineteenth century. Although this uprising did not originate in
Mongolia, it affected the entire Yekejuu (or Yeke) League, the Alashan Banner, part of
the Ulanchab League, and the northwestern regions of Outer Mongolia. Soldiers from
Mongolian banners were drafted to fight the rebellious Moslems on horseback. Because
the Sunid Right Banner of Namjilwangchug was located on the western edge of the
Shilingol League, occupying the main transportation line from Kalgan to Ulaanbaatar, it
was inevitable that it be involved in this struggle. The Chahar region was given the cru
cial assignment of supplying soldiers and horses to put down the rebellion.
The unfavorable effects of subsequent changes in Manchu policy toward Mon
golia caused the Mongols to change their minds and gradually break away from unques
tioned allegiance to their Manchu rulers. Furthermore, the degeneration of the Mongolian
ruling class and its collaboration with corrupt Manchu officials led to open, armed rebel
lion among the herdsmen. These rebels attacked the Manchu and Chinese magistrates and
destroyed their land cultivation offices. The Manchu authorities labeled these rebellious
herdsmen Meng-fei, or Mongolian bandits, placing the blame for the disorder entirely on
the Mongols. The Manchu government officials attempted to completely exterminate
these rebel herdsmen without anticipating the political effects that such a massacre would
have. In spite of these brutal tactics, the Mongolian bandits continued to exist during the
period when the government was recruiting Chinese cultivators. ^
With the signing of the Sino-Russian Beijing Treaty of 1860, Russian en
croachment into Mongolia became more active than ever before. The new situation in
Ulaanbaatar and the expansion of Russian influence forced the Manchu court to increase
the power of the amban (envoy) stationed in Ulaanbaatar. This new situation precipitated
a schism between the Mongolian authorities and the Manchu amban. At the same time,
illegal collaboration between Chinese merchants and covetous Manchu and Chinese offi
cials in all parts of Mongolia became more commonplace. The Chinese merchants were,
however, no match for the well-organized Russian economic intrusion. Because the
Sunid Right Banner was located between Ulaanbaatar and Kalgan, it suffered economi
cally more than did the other banners in its league. The Meiji Restoration which led to
the formation of modem Japan and eventually Japan’s special concern for Manchuria and
Mongolia, and its expansion on the Asian continent also led to new intrusions into Mon
golia. Most of these events took place during the lifetime of Prince Namjilwangchug, the
father of Demchugdongrob.

' It is difficult to determine the total loss of Mongol lives during Senggerinchin’s campaigns, but
judging from existing evidenee, the number of soldiers conscripted from the Shilingol League was
not as great as those taken from the Jerim, Juu Uda, and Josotu Leagues. Nevertheless, the horses
supplied by Shilingol exceeded the total from the other leagues of Inner Mongolia. This, of course,
greatly influenced the economy and the livelihood of the Shilingol people.
^ Such activities did not occur in the Shilingol League because there were no Chinese agricultural
settlers there. Even so, these events distressed the people of this pastoral region.
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Demchugdongrob never talked about his father with his friends and followers,
and the officials of Sunid also rarely spoke of their deceased lord. Only anecdotal infor
mation about Prince Namjilwangchug is available. I once heard the following from
Prince Sungjingwangchug (1885-1946), the last head of the Shilingol League.
Namjilwangchug, the prince said, originally was a vigorous, serious, and rea
sonable person. While still quite young, he became well-known and revered for his many
abilities. He was appointed deputy head of the Shilingol League and was subsequently
promoted to be its head. Because of his enthusiasm and his concern for political matters,
he enjoyed greater prestige than other league heads.’ In the court of Empress Dowager
Cixi (d. 1908), Prince Namjilwangchug was well received and eventually promoted to
the rank of qinwang (first-ranking prince). During the celebration of the sixtieth birthday
of the empress in 1894, Prince Namjilwangchug, along with a few other Mongol princes,
was honored with an assignment to participate in the main ceremony.
During the following year, 1895, Namjilwangchug suddenly and unaccountably
petitioned for release from his position as league head. His resignation provided an
opening for Yangsang, the Prince of Abaga, to be promoted from deputy head to head of
the league. As a result, the relationship between the Abaga and Sunid households became
even more intimate. After his resignation, Namjilwangchug became extremely pessimis
tic. In his later years he read many Chinese novels, including Sanguozhi yanyi (The Ro
mance of the Three Kingdoms), Shuihu zhuan (All Men Are Brothers or Water Margin
Chronicle), and others that had been translated into Mongolian and Manchu. This reading
increased his suspicion of the cunning and treacherous nature of human beings. Because
he himself had experienced many ruthless power struggles, he feared betrayal or assassi
nation and refused all requests for personal visits. Documents from the outside had to be
shown to him from the other side of a glass window, because he feared that the paper
might be poisoned. The unhealthy feelings aroused by these symptoms of what may have
been paranoia and general depression might have contributed to his untimely death.
However, Namjilwangchug’s fear of being betrayed might also be attributed to
the events of his day, for example the long conflict between the Empress Dowager and
the Guangxu Emperor, the Japanese victory over China in 1894-5, the failure of the Hun
dred Days Reformation Movement in May-September 1898, and the imprisonment of the
Guangxu Emperor by the Empress Dowager Cixi. These developments, along with the
xenophobic bent of the Empress Dowager’s court and its effects in the Hohhot area,
troubled the Mongol prince. Suspicions of the foreign missionaries in the Turned Banner
(southwest of Hohhot) and the neighboring Dorben Keuked Banner of the Ulanchab
League also caused Namjilwangchug great anxiety. The Catholic missionaries failed to
convert the local Mongols, but gathered many vagrant Chinese rice Christians and led
them to settle in the heartland of western Inner Mongolia. These activities threatened
Buddhism and traditional Mongolian values and hence irritated Prince Namjilwangchug.
In 1900, in the wake of the Boxer Incident, the allied forces of Japan and the Western
powers occupied Beijing, and both the empress dowager and the emperor fled to Xi’an.

’ Most of the league heads and deputy heads were usually drawn from the prestigious princely
families of the UJumuchin Right Banner. Abaga and Sunid often joined to balance off the superior
political position of Ujumuchin, but the ten banners of Shilingol continued to maintain their inter
nal harmony.
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Under these conditions, maintaining stability and order in his own banner were pressing
concerns for Namjilwangchug/
Namjilwangchug was interested in Chinese legends and in supernatural matters
in general, especially the theory offengshui, or Chinese geomancy. Before his retirement,
he expended a great deal of the wealth and manpower of his banner to establish a geomantically correct location and orientation for a new princely palace as symbol of his
personal prestige and as the power center of his banner. As a result, he exhausted the
wealth of his banner and his people. However, in the early 1930s this palace did serve as
a symbolic Inner Mongolian power center during the struggle for autonomy and inde
pendence.

* After the Boxer catastrophe, the Manchu court was compelled to pay indemnities to the Western

ers. A neighboring banner, the Dorben Keuked, was forced to pay indemnities for its attacks on
missionaries who occupied a large tract of good grazing land. Ihtjasag prince of the place, to
gether with some officials, resigned from their offices.

II
DEMCHUGDONGROB’S EARLY YEARS

1902-1919
His Birth
The sixty-four years of the life of Prince Demchugdongrob saw the devastation
of two world wars. Invasion of Asia by imperialists was gradually checked by the rise of
nationalism. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 restored Asian selfconfidence. But this victory also created strife within. The founding of the Republic of
China in 1912, which ended monarchical rule, and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917
marked the beginning of a new era. The Mongols, roused by these great changes, strug
gled to establish their own national identity. By the conclusion of World War 11, half of
the Mongol people had achieved their independence, at least nominally, but the other half
faced harsh and rigorous trials.
Prince Demchugdongrob, bom to a highly prestigious Chinggisid family, for a
time assumed the position of national leader, but died in the custody of the Chinese
Communists. His heroic but tragic life was entwined with the fate of his fellow country
men, especially those Inner Mongols who struggled for the existence of their nation.
Although his full name was Demchugdongrob, most Mongol people called him
De noyan or De wangye, a polite form of address for an honorable person. In Mongolian
tradition, it was not polite to speak the full name of an elder or a person of honorable
position. It was courteous to take the first syllable of his name and join it with his title.
Therefore, De noyan means De the noble and De wangye means Prince De.
According to the traditional Mongolian lunar calendar, Demchugdongrob was
bom on the day, month, and year of the tiger. This corresponds to either the twelfth or
seventeenth day of Febmary of the year 1902 in the Western solar calendar. According to
Chinese astrology, the date of Demchugdongrob’s birth was an outstandingly auspicious
one portending an excellent fate. He was bom in the morning, though no one, not even
his own mother, was able to give the exact hour of his birth. If his birth had been earlier
than five o’clock, it would have been during the hour of the tiger; had it been later, it
would have been during the hour of the rabbit. Either way the omen would have been a
good one. In Mongolian tradition, to avoid a curse, one should not divulge the time, day,
month, and year of a birth. Consequently, Demchugdongrob’s birthday was never offi
cially celebrated.
The year 1902 was the second year after the return of the Empress Dowager
Cixi and the Guangxu Emperor from their refuge in Xi’an to Beijing. The Manchu court
remained embroiled with the consequences of the Boxer Rebellion. To meet indemnity
requirements, the court encouraged all Mongolian banners to offer “good-will remunera
tion” in the form of silver presented to the court. Though this moderate requisition
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was not forced, it proved a burden for the Mongol common people. By no means did all
Mongols support the Boxer rebels. Some banners, such as the Alashan, the Dalad of the
Yekejuu League, and the Dorben Keuked of the Ulanchab League, lent their support to
the Boxers, opposed the foreign countries, and became hostile to foreign missionaries.
But Gungsangnorbu, the jasag prince of the Kharachin Right Banner and the pioneer of
Inner Mongolian modernization, adopted a policy of “protection for the land and tran
quility for the people” and forbade the Boxers from entering his territory. After the dis
turbances were over, those who had supported the Boxers were punished, but those who
opposed the Boxers were not rewarded. Under foreign pressure, the court further de
manded that those banners which had persecuted missionaries compensate them with
land and silver. These events, coupled with developments in the neighboring Dorben
Keuked Banner, worried the Sunid officials.
As for the general state of Inner Mongolia at this time, the traditional feudalistic
institutions had begun to crumble, and resistance from the common people increased. In
1901, Sewangnorbusangbuu, the jasag prince of the Khorchin Right Center Banner (also
known as the Tushiyetu Banner) of the Jerim League, whose ancestors had a close rela
tionship with the Manchu imperial household, was killed by the people of his own banner
because of the endless levies he imposed to satisfy his luxurious and extravagant life
style. Three years later, in 1904, Lenjalnortsan, the jasag prince of the Aukhan Banner of
the Juu Uda League, was stabbed to death by his own attendants during a stay in Beijing
for an imperial audience. He was killed because of his maltreatment of his own people.
These examples indicate that the people no longer tolerated tyrannical behavior; they
risked their lives in open rebellion.
This gave the Russians a chance to become further involved in eastern Inner
Mongolian affairs. When the Russians occupied Manchuria after the defeat of the Box
ers, Udai, the jasag of Khorchin Right Center Banner of the Jerim League, initiated con
tact with them and borrowed money from them. The Manchu authorities were able to
remove Udai from his post, but they were still obliged to recognize the debt he had in
curred. They ordered the banner to pay it; this of course increased the burden placed on
the common people.
In 1902, the year Demchugdongrob was bom, the great Trans-Siberian Railroad
was completed. The next year, the Jointly operated Sino-Russian Chinese Eastern Rail
road was opened. The completion of this railroad linking the Trans-Siberian Railroad in
the north and Dairen and Port Arthur (present-day Dalian and Lushun) in the south,
through Hailar and Mukden (present-day Shenyang), immediately brought eastern Inner
Mongolia under Russian influence. The Udai Incident was just a part of a larger picture.
The expansion of Russian power in East Asia worried a new Asian power: Ja
pan. In 1894-5, Japan had obtained several privileges in Manchuria as a result of its vic
tory in the first Sino-Japanese war. These were, however, soon taken from the Japanese
emperor and transferred to the Russian tsar through the combined interference of Russia,
Germany, and France. This eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and Ja
pan’s subsequent infiltration into eastern Inner Mongolia.
Russian involvement in eastern Inner Mongolia was not welcomed by the Mon
gol leadership. Some of the more conservative Mongol leaders opposed any changes;
others realized that there was no way to prevent the decline of the old ways. A change
was needed. Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin chose to follow the pattern of the Japa
nese Meiji Restoration. By the time of Demchugdongrob’s birth in 1902, Gungsangnorbu
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already enjoyed high prestige among the Mongol noble class and at the court in Beijing
and had begun a modest program of modernization in his own banner. This meant that
the Japanese obtained a foothold in Kharachin, the homeland of Prince Gung. Udai, on
the other hand, wanted the Mongols to cooperate with the Russians.
During the Russian expansion into eastern Inner Mongolia, the old land route
from Verkhneudinsk (present-day Ulan-Ude) to Beijing through Kiakhta, Ulaanbaatar,
and Kalgan continued to be the main connection between China and Russia, regardless of
the degree of completion of the railroads. With the increasing tension between the two
countries, the political and military significance of this land route markedly increased.
The Sunid Right Banner was located close by. Today, the railroad from Ulaanbaatar to
Jining mostly follows the old land route, and the old residential area of the prince of
Sunid has become a station along the rail route.
During these confrontations between China and Russia, the rulers of the Sunid
Banner assumed a very conservative posture. Even so, they could not resist the new for
eign pressure coming from Japan. This pressure, however, not only failed to lead the
Sunid group to modernization but it made them more inclined to remain conservative.
This traditionally obstinate disposition of the Sunids played a large role in influencing the
attitudes of Prince Demchugdongrob.

His Youth
When Prince Namjilwangchug died, his only son, Demchugdongrob, was not
yet born; and thus for a brief time, there was nobody to succeed the old prince. This
greatly worried the Sunid people. In accordance with tradition, the senior tusalagchi taiji
(assistant noble), Pandei, managed the jasag's responsibilities. Of course, if a son were
bom that child would become the undisputed successor. However, if the expected baby
were a girl, a successor would have had to be found among the male blood relatives of
the deceased prince and be subject to approval by the Manchu court. But a son was bom,
and the problem of succession was resolved. Because they were so nearly delirious with
Joy, the relatives, banner officials, and even the infant’s mother, as mentioned before,
neglected to record the hour of the infant’s birth.. Tusalagchi Pandei, the acting Jasag,
reported the happy news to the head of the Shilingol League, Prince Yangsang, and
through him petitioned the Lifanyuan (the Ministry of Dependencies; something akin to a
Colonial Office) for imperial recognition of Prince De.
The procedures for establishing the succession were drawn out and were not
completed for six years until 1908, when the Manchus conferred the traditional rank and
title of jasag toroyin junwang of the Sunid Right Banner upon Demchugdongrob when
he was seven nasun, or, as Westerners measure age, six years old. The delay in complet
ing the imperial recognition procedures was caused by coiruption among Beijing offi
cials; without bribes, they would indefinitely prolong these procedures.
During these six years, many important changes took place in Mongolia, China,
and Asia in general. All these changes greatly influenced the future fate of the Mongols.
Gungsangnorbu, the Prince of Kharachin, returned from a visit to Japan and established a
modem boys’ school, a girls’ school, and a military school. He also sent several young
men and women to Japan for study. This was the beginning of Inner Mongolia’s mod
ernization. While it increased the people’s knowledge of and demand for democracy, this
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modernization program also offended the conservative feudalistic mentalities of most
Mongols; from the beginning, many powerful conservative groups opposed it. Never
theless, Gungsangnorbu’s modernization plans reflected contemporary world trends and
reinforced the idea of modernization that had already gained a foothold in Mongolian
life.
Events in western Inner Mongolia also greatly affected the herding people.
During her escape from Beijing to Xi’an, the Empress Dowager Cixi met Yigu, a young
Manchu bannerman, and from him learned about the plans for Chinese migration to, and
cultivation of, Mongol land. After returning to her court in Beijing, she appointed Yigu
as Deputy Minister of Military Affairs and sent him to Suiyuan-cheng (present-day
Hohhot) to take over the grazing fields of the Yekejuu, Ulanchab, and Chahar banners
for cultivation by Chinese settlers. Shortly thereafter, Yigu was appointed Station Gen
eral of Suiyuan. Besides managing cultivation affairs, Yigu also handled the adminis
tration and military affairs of the region. With the full support of the court, Yigu forced
the Mongol banners to accept his plans voluntarily. Those Mongol officials who refused
to cooperate or who hindered Chinese cultivation were uniformly and unreasonably pun
ished. Prince Arbinbayar, the head of the Yekejuu League, was dismissed from his office
by the court in Beijing because of his opposition to Chinese cultivation.
Yigu’s interference in Mongolian affairs was unprecedented in Mongolian his
tory. His vicious policies threatening Mongol interests became the model for the later
Chinese warlords of the Republican period, such as Feng Yuxiang and Fu Zuoyi in the
West and Zou Zuohua and Tang Yulin in the East, and the present government. Yigu’s
oppressive policies eventually evoked stem resistance from the Mongol herdsmen. In
1908, the year Demchugdongrob was officially installed as the next ruling prince of
Sunid, Yigu executed Dampil taiji and six other leaders of the opposition group. This set
off a form of popular rebellion known as a duguilang (a general term for spontaneous
popular rebellion). Fearing that the situation in Mongolia would deteriorate further, the
Manchu Court discharged Yigu from all his official positions. But the damage that he had
done to Mongolia’s economy and politics was never undone. The destruction of the eco
nomic base of the Chahar Right Flank banners was especially severe.
With the support of corrupt Manchu and Chinese officials, the power and influ
ence of the Chinese merchants in Outer Mongolia also greatly expanded. Almost all the
people in Outer Mongolia had become deeply indebted to usurious Chinese moneylend
ers. The power of the Mongolian office of the amban at Ulaanbaatar diminished daily
and eventually became a mere honorific post. The Manchu amban, on the other hand,
became the real dominating force in Outer Mongolia. This precipitated a power struggle
between the Khalkha Mongol nobles and religious leaders on one side and the Manchu
amban on the other. The Manchu conflict with the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu, the
Living Buddha of Ulaanbaatar, was the most conspicuous of these confrontations. These
power struggles led to the fermentation of anti-Manchu, pro-Russian sentiment among
the Khalkha ruling group.'
' Mongolia and Tibet shared a common religious bond. The Dalai Lama of Tibet was the spiritual
leader of both Mongolia and Tibet. At the turn of the twentieth century, the British actively sought
to establish a buffer zone in Tibet between Russia and India in order to protect the British occupa
tion of India. This strategy was, however, opposed by the God-king of Tibet, the Thirteenth Dalai
Lama, and so a confrontation ensued. In 1905, a British military expedition led by Colonel Francis
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The Mongols’ anxiety and the wavering attitude of some Mongol leaders had
already attracted the attention of the Manchu court. In order to appease the Mongols, in
the late spring of 1906, the Court dispatched Shanqi (also known as Prince Su) to the
Mongolian frontier. This measure led to fear and suspicion among many banners. Prince
Shanqi visited the Josotu, Jerim, and Juu Uda Leagues and some banners of the eastern
Shilingol League, pointedly bypassing the Sunid Banner. His travels and observations
were aimed at developing a new policy toward this section of Mongolia. His recommen
dations were, however, shelved and ignored by the court.
During these six years 1902-1908, the pivotal events were the return to Beijing
of the Empress Dowager Cixi and the puppet Guangxu Emperor from their exile, and the
pressure from foreign countries for the nominal reinstatement of the deposed emperor.
Another important development was the Manchu court’s decision to adopt some mod
ernization measures and discard its backward and conservative orientation. These
changes, however, were too little too late; by this time, the agitation for a democratic
revolution led by Sun Yat-sen had already gained significant popular support in the
south. In 1905, Sun established the Tongmenghui—a revolutionary, anti-Manchu, antimonarchical organization. In 1908, the year of Demchugdongrob’s succession to his fa
ther’s position, the Empress Dowager Cixi and the Emperor Guangxu both passed away
within days of each other. The death of the empress dowager proved a turning point in
Chinese history. Because the deceased emperor had no heir, the court designated the twoyear-old son (three years old as the Chinese calculate age) of the late emperor’s younger
brother. Prince Zaifeng, as emperor. This was Emperor Puyi, the last emperor of China.
These momentous changes signaled the downfall of the dynasty.
As mentioned, the conflicts between Russia and Japan culminated in the RussoJapanese War of 1904-5. As a result of Russia’s defeat and the subsequent Portsmouth
Treaty of 1905, all privileges the Russians had obtained from the Manchus, including
control over the southern half of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, were ceded to Japan. As a
result, Japan’s influence suddenly expanded into southern Manchuria and eastern Inner
Mongolia. (During the Russo-Japanese war. Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin sup
ported Japan.) After the Portsmouth Treaty, Russia and Japan made a secret treaty in
1907. They agreed to draw a line at longitude 116 degrees 27 minutes dividing Inner
Mongolia into two spheres of influence, the eastern half being under Japanese and the
western half under Russian influence. Sunid and several other banners of the western half
of the Shilingol League were thus subjected to Russian influence. Of course this treaty

Younghusband entered Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, and the Dalai Lama fled north through the
grasslands of Kokonor to Ulaanbaatar. Fearing that the Dalai Lama’s stay in Ulaanbaatar might
cause a political crisis, the Manchu Court suggested that he go to Udai Mountain, the Buddhist
holy site in Shanxi Province. In 1908, the court invited him to Beijing to visit the Empress Dowa
ger Cixi and the Guangxu Emperor. The relationship between the Tibetan leader and the Manchu
Court soon turned sour, however, and after the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet, the Manchu court
stripped him of all his honorary titles. This arrogant measure caused the Dalai Lama to flee to India
for refuge at Darjeeling under British protection, and also led the Mongolian leader in Ulaanbaatar
to regard the Beijing court as an enemy to the Buddhist religion. This religious animosity was a
factor in the declaration of Mongolian independence from Manchu domination in 1911. Although
the Sunid banner was not directly involved, it inevitably felt the repercussions from these events.
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was concluded without the knowledge of the Mongols.
These events did not bode well for the future of Mongolia and were especially
ominous for the land south of the Gobi. Even Demchugdongrob, with his auspicious
“four-tiger” birth, would face a difficult future.

His Succession and Contemporary Events
According to Manchu regulations and Mongol tradition, the successor to a he
reditary jasag prince could not take control of banner affairs until he reached his major
ity, eighteen nasun (seventeen years in western terms). Before the heir reached his ma
jority, the senior of the two tusalagchis was to be custodian of the tamaga, the official
seal of the banner, and was to rule on behalf of the successor. Pandei, the senior tusalagchi, continued to rule over the banner until 1919, when Prince Demchugdongrob reached
eighteen nasun and became qualified to assume the duties and powers of the Jasag. Dur
ing the eleven years (1908-1919) between his designation as Jasag and his ascension as a
ruling prince, many important events occurred in Mongolia and also in Europe. Of these
events, the declaration of Mongolian independence in Ulaanbaatar was the most influen
tial for the Mongols and their future.^
The event that helped the independence movement gain momentum was the socalled new policy of Sanduo, the Manchu amban at Ulaanbaatar. Sanduo attempted to
carry out some reforms in order to transfer into his own hands the political power still
wielded by the Mongols. At about this same time, the Chinese revolution against Manchu
rule had already broken out in the provinces south of the Yangzi River.
In the winter of 1911, the Mongol leaders in Ulaanbaatar, with the support of
Tsarist Russia, installed the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu as the Bogda (saint) Khan of
Mongolia and declared Mongolia’s independence from Manchu-dominated China. The
Ulaanbaatar authorities then issued, in the name of the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu, a circular
to all Inner Mongolian nobles, officials, and commoners, inviting them to join in the
struggle for independence, the common Mongol goal. This historic event shook the entire
territory of Inner Mongolia, especially the Hulun-buir, Shilingol, and Ulanchab Leagues,
which shared borders with Outer Mongolia. The leaders of Hulunbuir immediately re
sponded to this call and wholeheartedly joined Ulaanbaatar. The nobles and leaders of
Ulanchab were comparatively pro-Ulaanbaatar, but under pressure from Beijing, they
chose to adopt a more prudent policy; they expressed sympathy with Ulaanbaatar but did
not publicly declare their own independence. Only Yangsang, the head of the Shilingol
League, opposed the independence movement. In response to this opposition, the Outer
Mongolian authorities dispatched some troops to Yangsang’s residence in the Abaga Left
Banner, took him into custody, and imprisoned him in Ulaanbaatar. Because of this inci
dent, Sodnamrabdan, prince of the Ujumuchin Right Banner and deputy-head of the
league, began acting on behalf of the league head and adopted a wait-and-see policy.
At the beginning of the Chinese Revolution, the main slogan was quchu dalu

^ Other notable events were the destabilization of Inner Mongolia, the downfall of the Manchus’

Qing Dynasty and the founding of the Republic of China, the outbreak of World War 1, the col
lapse of the Russian tsarist government, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, the founding of
the Soviet Union, the Japanese-American Siberian expedition, and the Pan-Mongolian movement.
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huifu Zhonghua, or “expel the Tartar barbarians and restore China.” Dalu is a pejorative
term for the Manchus as well as all northern non-Chinese peoples, including the Mon
gols. The Mongols, for their part, reviled the Chinese as Khara Kitad, which translates
literally as “black Chinese” but is more properly rendered as “the heretical, wild Chi
nese.” Many Mongols were deeply suspicious of the new Chinese revolution, perhaps
because the Chinese word for revolution, geming, was improperly transliterated into
Mongolian as gaming, which carried connotations of unrestrained revolt against tradition.
As a result, most Mongols took a very dim view of the Chinese revolution and were very
anxious when they learned that it had succeeded.
In January of 1912, the Republic of China was officially established in Nanjing.
In February, the Manchu court agreed to abdicate and remove the child Emperor Puyi
from his throne. At a conference held in the presence of the Empress Dowager Longyu,
only a few attendants opposed the decision to abdicate. Among the Manchu nobles who
opposed abdication were Shanqi, the Prince Su who had inspected eastern Inner Mongo
lia in 1906; and among the Mongolian nobles were Nayantu, the Prince of Khalkha, and
Gungsangnorbu, the Prince of Kharachin. The great majority agreed to peaceful abdica
tion. Later, Shanqi fled to Dairen (Dalian), sought support from Japan, and organized the
Zongshe dang, a loyalist party seeking restoration of the Manchu monarchy.
Gungsangnorbu (Prince Gung) returned to Kharachin and called a conference of
princes and delegates from the banners of Josotu and Juu Uda and a part of the Jerim
League for discussion at Ulankhada (present-day Chifeng) about the future of Mongolia.
At this conference. Prince Gung advocated seeking help from Japan in gaining the inde
pendence of Inner Mongolia. At the same time, he also sent his personal representative,
Lubsangchoijur (my father), to Ulaanbaatar to establish connections with the new regime
there. However, nothing came of Prince Gung’s plan, because Japan had reached an
agreement with the newly established Beijing government under Yuan Shikai. Since the
Japanese had obtained what they desired from the new Chinese government, they sus
pended their involvement with Prince Gung. To win back Prince Gung’s allegiance.
Yuan Shikai appointed him as the head of the main office in charge of Mongolian and
Tibetan affairs. By a combination of intimidation and enticements Prince Gung was
eventually persuaded to lean toward Beijing.
Confronting the seeming fait accompli of Outer Mongolian independence and
worried over the dissension in Inner Mongolia, Yuan Shikai’s government promulgated
the Menggu daiyu tiaoli, or Regulations for the Treatment of Mongolia. These regula
tions were as follows:
All of the Mongolian territory should be treated not as a subordinate area but as a region
equal to any other within China. The central government should not use the terms “subor
dinate” or “colony” in the office administering Mongolian affairs. The original ruling
power of the Mongolian princes and nobles is to be preserved intact. The succession of he
reditary titles and ranks in both Inner and Outer Mongolia is to be allowed to continue as
before, and the prerogatives that persons holding such titles enjoy in their banners are to
remain unchanged. The hereditary emoluments and salaries of the Mongolian princes and
nobles shall be issued in full amount. The original titles of the Mongol khutugius and la
mas shall be preserved without change.

This proclamation had no effect on the Outer Mongolian independence move-
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ment. It only protected the old feudalistic institutions of Inner Mongolia and eased the
anxieties of Inner Mongolian conservatives. In order to gain the support of more Mongol
leaders, Yuan Shikai ignored the fact that he was president of a newly founded demo
cratic republic and conferred many feudalistic titles and ranks on both nobles and com
mon people. The young Demchugdongrob was promoted to the position of Khoshoi
Dugureng Chin Wang. This promotion was, of course, a cause for great celebration in the
conservative Sunid Right Banner.
In 1913, the Ulaanbaatar government dispatched Shirun
(general) and
Namsarai bagatur (hero) to command an army and take over Doloonnor, the religious
center located between the eastern Shilingol and Chahar leagues. The purpose of this
military action was to intimidate the Inner Mongolian leagues and banners into joining
the newly established independent regime. Before this could be accomplished, however,
the Outer Mongolian force was obliged to withdraw because of heavy pressure from
Chinese troops. Immediately after the Outer Mongolian troops withdrew, the Chinese
occupied Doloonnor and killed the famous lama Kanjurwa Khutugtu, who was sympa
thetic to the goal of unifying the two Mongolias. This brutal murder created a great dis
turbance among the Inner Mongols.
Another important event during this year was the establishment of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing. When Prince Gungsangnorbu arrived in Beijing, Yuan
Shikai appointed him as general-director of the Meng-Zang shiwu ju (the Bureau of
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs), a bureau that soon had its name changed to the Meng-Zang
yuan, or the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry. In his new position. Prince Gung urged the
Mongolian parliamentarians to pass a resolution establishing an educational center for
Mongolian and Tibetan youth. The purpose of this center was to accelerate the moderni
zation of Mongolia and Tibet. Although this center did not influence the Tibetans to any
significant degree, it greatly influenced the politics of Mongolia. Prince Gung assigned
several students, whom he had earlier sent to Japan, to work as teachers in this academy.
These young intellectuals promoted the democratic ideas they had brought back from
Japan, and the academy gradually became the headquarters for Mongolian moderniza
tion, reform, and revolution.
After Outer Mongolia’s declaration of independence, relations between Ulaan
baatar and Beijing became very tense. In the winter of 1912, the Russo-Mongolian
Agreement was signed in Ulaanbaatar. With this agreement, the Russians obtained all the
economic privileges they desired, but still did not officially recognize Mongolian inde
pendence. After lengthy negotiations, a Sino-Russian treaty, obliging Chinese recogni
tion of all the Russian privileges enumerated in the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, was
signed in Beijing. In exchange for this agreement, the Tsarist government agreed to hold
Sino-Russo-Mongolian talks for the resolution of the Mongolian independence issue. In
accordance with this agreement, tripartite talks were held at Kiakhta from September
1914 to June 1915. Under pressure from both the Russians and the Chinese, the Mongols
reluctantly agreed to seek autonomy instead of independence. The First World War broke
out only two months after the talks had convened, and the Russians soon became preoc
cupied with defending themselves against the Germans. Thus, the balance of power be
gan to favor the Chinese side.
As a result of the Sino-Russo-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement, the Chinese
tuhu shi (protector) arrived at Ulaanbaatar in the winter of 1915. In order to demonstrate
Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia, the Beijing government conferred the title His Holi-
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ness Khutugtu Khan upon the Living Buddha of Ulaanbaatar, the head of the Ulaanbaatar
regime. Following this political trick, trade between Ulaanbaatar and Beijing via Kalgan
immediately increased. All commercial traffic moved through the vicinity of the princely
residence of the Sunid Right Banner; and in Pangjiang, about fifty kilometers southeast
of the residence of the Sunid prince, a coorporation was established to link Ulaanbaatar
with Kalgan and Beijing. The Kalgan-Ulaanbaatar Automobile Company, a privately
owned and managed firm, was soon organized; it succeeded in shortening the length of
the journey from Kalgan to Ulaanbaatar to only five days. Pangjiang was usually the sec
ond stop for an overnight stay, and Ere’en (Eriyen) the third. All these new developments
frustrated the conservative Sunids. It was as if they had been inadvertently drawn into a
political whirlpool.
Also during this period, Yuan Shikai, the first president of the Republic of
China, was plotting to occupy the imperial throne of China, Nayantu, the Prince of
Khalkha, was the leader of the Mongol nobles who resided in Beijing and supported
Yuan’s plot. This situation posed a dilemma for the princes and leaders of the Shilingol
League, and they could not decide what their next move would be. Immediately follow
ing Yuan’s ascent to the throne, the war for restoration of the republic broke out. Yuan
soon died under the intense pressure of this war, and Li Yuanhong, the vice-president,
became the next president of the Republic of China. Although these turbulent events had
no direct impact on the Sunid banner, they did diminish Sunid leaders confidence in the
stability of the Beijing regime.
Because of the cultural differences between Mongols and Chinese, and the
Manchu policy of ethnic segregation, the ordinary people of Shilingol tended to ignore
the political upheavals among the Chinese. But their attention was definitely captured
when the Manchu throne was temporarily restored in Beijing. In the summer of 1917,
General Chang Xun, a conservative Chinese leader, supported Puyi’s efforts to reoccupy
the throne abdicated by the Manchus in 1912. Although this political comedy lasted
scarcely two weeks, it attracted the attention of many Mongol leaders. In Beijing, all the
Mongolian nobles except for the enlightened Prince Gungsangnorbu openly expressed
their support of this restoration. Because of their traditional and conservative attitudes,
the Shilingol leaders also supported the Manchus.^
’ Toward the end of the Manchus’ dynasty, many anti-Chinese uprisings were instigated by
“Mongolian bandits.” The best organized of these groups was led by Togtakhu Taiji of the Gorlos
Banner in the Jerim League in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. His group attacked many areas
dominated by Chinese cultivators under the Jurisdiction of the three Manchurian provinces of
Mukden, Kirin, and Heilongjiang. Later, when Mongolian independence was declared, he and his
follower’s went to Ulaanbaatar and enthusiastically joined the newly organized Mongolian forces.
After the Manchu emperor abdicated his throne, many conservatives in eastern Inner
Mongolia became dissatisfied with the new Republic of China. Under Japanese protection, some
conservative Mongolian leaders even established contact with Shanqi (the Manchu Prince Su) and
his Qing loyalist party (the Zongshe dang) at Dairen, Among these leaders, the “Mongolian bandit”
Babujab was the most widely known. His military activities had three objectives; (1) attacks on the
areas dominated by Chinese cultivators in Mongolian territory in order to win the lower class
herdsmen over to his side, (2) restoration of the Manchu throne in order to win over the conserva
tive Mongolian upper class, and (3) cooperation with the Japanese military in order to sUengthen
his own armed forces. His military activities covered most areas of eastern Inner Mongolia and its
bordering districts. After he was killed in 1916 by a stray bullet during a major offensive against
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In the winter of that same year (1917), the Bolshevik revolution overthrew the
Russian Tsarist regime. The rise of the Bolsheviks alarmed the Ulaanbaatar government
and caused it to shift from its previous pro-Russian to a rather pro-Chinese foreign pol
icy. However, the effects of the Bolshevik revolution on Iimer Mongolia were still slight.
Nor did the defeat of Germany, Austria, and Italy and the end of the First World War
much attract the attention of the Inner Mongols. Not even Japan’s “Twenty-one De
mands” on China, which were to have great impact on southeastern Inner Mongolia,
caused the Inner Mongols any great concern, except for some intellectuals and progres
sive leaders. In fact, there were even some people who thought that the Japanese oppres
sion of China might provide a good chance to expel the Chinese settlers from Inner
Mongolia or at least halt further immigration by them. By this time, Demchugdongrob
was already sixteen years old. Even though he was not yet officially involved in politics,
he could neither avoid nor ignore the influence of these events.

Linxi, a strategically located Chinese city in the Juu Uda League, his followers disbanded. During
the Babujab incident, Ujumuchin and other banners in the eastern Shilingol League area were all in
turmoil, although the western part of the League was not affected.
In the next year, 1917, another independence movement occurred in the Ukerchinkhonichin area (later known as Minggan banner) of Chahar. This movement was led by one Mugdenbu, a young intellectual. This radical group initially struggled against the local conservative
Mongol leaders, then against the Chinese authorities, and was later attacked by Chinese forces
from Kalgan. Thoroughly defeated, Mugdenbu fled to the Sunid for refuge. Chinese pressure on
the banner led to his extradition to Kalgan, where he was executed. Although this was an isolated
incident, it had considerable impact on the banners in the Chakhar and Shilingol areas. Because
this incident symbolized the wide gap between the young radicals and the old conservatives, it
influenced the thoughts and actions of later generations.

Ill
DEMCHUGDONGROB’S EARLY CAREER

1919-1928
The Ruling Prince of His Own Banner
After the old Prince Namjilwangchug died, there was not an actual ruling prince
of the Sunid Right Banner for almost seventeen years. Therefore, Demchugdongrob’s
assumption of power as jasag was a momentous and happy occasion for the whole ban
ner. It also relieved, at least ostensibly, his “ official” mother (the Turned khatun, the first
wife of his father) and the elderly officials of the banner of their heavy responsibilities.'
During 1919, Prince De’s first year in charge of the banner administration, a
group of Buriyad Mongolian intellectuals initiated the Pan-Mongolian movement, and in
late February convened a meeting of delegates from Buriyad and Inner Mongolia at Dauria, in Siberia. They decided to organize a government for all Mongolia and sent repre
sentatives to the Paris Peace Conference to strive for international recognition of Mon
golia’s independence. Because it had already established its own government. Outer
Mongolia rejected the invitation, but some Inner Mongols, especially the leaders of the
Hulunbuir area in the far north of Inner Mongolia, were willing to Join, and the NaijiToyin Khutugtu of Hohhot Turned (Inner Mongolia) was recognized as their leader.
Though this movement failed to achieve its goal of recognition at the Paris con
ference, it influenced all of Mongolia. Even though the activities of Japanese militarists
and the White Russian leader, Semenov, overshadowed this movement, it still helped to
rouse a common Mongolian desire for unity and independence. Although Demchugdongrob was not involved in these matters, he was inevitably influenced by them. This
movement was to inspire him in the future to work for the unification of all Mongolia.
On May 4 of the same year, a patriotic student demonstration broke out in Bei
jing because of the Chinese government’s failures at the Paris Peace Conference to ward
off the Japanese takeover of Germany’s colonial possessions in China and the Western
Pacific. The focus of this demonstration soon shifted from foreign policy concerns to a
more general demand for democracy, modernization, and the breaking down of tradition.
Though this important event in modem Chinese history did not directly or immediately

' Because Sangrubnorbu was an elderly relative of Demchugdongrob, his influence over the boy
was considerable. He earnestly guided his young master to assume the burden of becoming an
outstanding figure among the princes of the Shilinghol League. At this time, the Turned khatun
still wielded a great deal of influence over the young prince; all important decisions had to be made
by her. Later on. Prince De, a man who always remembered his old friends and followers, pro
moted Jungnai, son of Pandei, to Pandei’s position. However, Jungnai was inefficient and unable
to achieve what his prince had hoped of him.
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affect the Inner Mongolian banners, it did influence the minds and conduct of the Mon
gol students in Beijing, especially those of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy. These
young Mongol intellectuals also started demanding democracy and participated in antifeudalistic activities. These activities not only deepened the division between the old
and the young Mongols, but also increased the antagonism between conservatives and
liberals. All these factors greatly affected Demchugdongrob, who had the inherited re
sponsibility to maintain the feudalistic institutions.
Outer Mongolia, which by this time had already achieved a degree of independ
ence or autonomy, gradually lost confidence in itself as a viable nation-state. This loss
was due to the changing international situation, the conflict between the powerful Mon
gol ecclesiastical and lay leaders, and pressure from Beijing. All these factors led to an
Outer Mongolian plan to give up its autonomy within China and restore the old prerevo
lutionary institutions. The government in Beijing, under the direction of northern Chinese
warlord Duan Qirui, regarded resolution of the Mongolia problem as a matter of first
priority. Duan wanted a solution to this problem in order to reduce opposition to his
military buildup (financed by Japanese loans) and to turn the focus of public opinion
away from his political problems. Duan designated himself the superintendent of frontier
management, and appointed his right-hand man, Xu Shuzheng, as Minister of Northwest
Frontier Management. He also appointed Xu as commander-in-chief of the Northwest
Border Defense Army to lead Chinese troops northward and force the Outer Mongols to
relinquish their autonomy. Xu’s high-handed military policy did temporarily achieve its
goal, but it eventually caused the Outer Mongols to carry out their second independence
movement.
Negotiations for “Abolition of Autonomy” in Outer Mongolia led to long dis
cussions between Ulaanbaatar and Beijing. In order to present the demands of the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu to the Chinese government, the Jalkhanza Khutugtu was sent to
Beijing as a special envoy.^ Among his entourage were two pro-Mongol Swedish mer
chants, Olson and Larson, who were working for Shenchang yanghang, an American
company in Ulaanbaatar and Kalgan. They were brought along in order to attempt to
persuade the Americans to intervene and assist the Mongols in maintaining autonomy.
This attempt to involve the Americans was unsuccessful.^

2 The Jakhnatzun Khutugtu was the most important religious leader of the two western
leagues of Outer Mongolia under the Jebtsundamba. The Dilowa Khutugtu, who died in
the United States some twenty years ago, was a high ranking “living Buddha” under
Jalkhanza. It was reported that this Diluwa Khutugtu also was among the entourage of
Jalkhanza during his visit to Beijing. About a decade later, the Diluwa Khutugtu fled to
Inner Mongolia with about a hundred families of his disciples and settled within the ter
ritory of Prince De’s banner. From then on, this high lama of Khalkha became one of the
prince’s main advisors.
’ During these negotiations, the Outer Mongols had to travel through Sunid, which obliged them to
visit the prince of the banner. Larson was quite well known by his Chinese title, Lan xiansheng, or
Mr. Lan. Through Larson’s efforts, many Outer Mongolian leaders, including the Jebtsundamba

Khutugtu, became acquainted with Westerners, As a token of their esteem, the Ulaanbaatar gov
ernment conferred upon him the title of gung, or duke, and he became known to many contempo
rary westerners as Duke Larson. After the socialist revolution in Outer Mongolia, Larson settled
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Under great pressure from General Xu Shuzheng, Ulaanbaatar’s autonomy
eventually ended. On November 22, 1919, the Beijing government stated, in the name of
President Xu Shichang, that in accord with the “petition” of the Outer Mongolian gov
erning body, the ruling princes, and the lamas, “the abolition of autonomy has been al
lowed.” This collapse of Outer Mongolia greatly affected all the leagues and banners in
Inner Mongolia. The Sunid Banner was especially shocked and disturbed because of its
location on the main road between Ulaanbaatar and Kalgan.
On January 1, 1920, the special envoy of the Beijing government, Xu Shuzheng,
carried out a grand ceremony at Outer Mongolia’s main temple, Gandan Keid, and con
ferred” upon the lama the revived title of Jebtsundamba Khutugtu. Xu used this occasion
to emphasize China’s sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and thereby insult this Mongol
religious-political leader. His arrogance greatly provoked Mongols and led to the second
independence movement. The lay and lama leaders, including the Jebtsundamba Khu
tugtu himself, advocated sending delegations to both Baron Roman von Ungern Stern
berg of the defeated White Russians and to Lenin. The envoys who visited Lenin suppos
edly included Sukhbaatar and Choibalsan, who later became the founders of the Mongol
ian People’s Revolutionary Party. In addition, a delegation was sent to Harbin to negoti
ate, unsuccessfully as it turned out, with the Japanese for loans to buy arms.
Meanwhile, in North China, a confrontation was breaking out between the war
lords of the Anhui faction, headed by Duan Qirui and Xu Shuzheng, and the warlords of
the Zhili faction, under the leadership of Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. Xu Shuzheng left Mon
golia and returned to Beijing in order to consolidate the power of the Anhui faction.
However, the Anhui group was defeated after a short war. The victorious Zhili group
announced the abolition of the office of Superintendent of Frontier Management and the
Northwest Border Defense Army.
Ever since Chinese armies returned to Ulaanbaatar, endless struggles had oc
curred between Chinese soldiers and the Mongols. These grew worse over the years, and
by 1921 had reached a climax. In February of 1921, the remnants of the White Russian
army were invited by the Ulaanbaatar leaders to attack the Chinese encampments. The
Mongols in the city cooperated with the Russians and helped drive the Chinese out. The
Chinese officers and civilian officials fled northward to Kiakhta and abandoned their
troops in the Gobi. These Chinese troops all perished either at the hands of the herdsmen
or from the severely cold weather. In March, the Outer Mongols declared their independ
ence, and the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu once again ascended to the throne as Bogda Khan.
Also in March, a small Mongol force was sent to Chahar. These events greatly affected
the Shilingol League banners, especially the Sunid Banner of Prince Demchugdongrob.
Meanwhile, Sukhbaatar, Choibalsan, and their group had already come under the influ
ence of the Communist Third International and were beginning to organize the Mongol
ian People’s Revolutionary Party and the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army to
struggle for dominance in Mongolia.

down in Aduuchin (later the Shangdu Banner) of Chahar until the Japanese invasion. He could
speak Mongolian fluently and was a good friend of Prince Demchugdongrob. Larson later became
a liaison between the prince and many Westerners.
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In April, the Ulaanbaatar regime sent a delegation to Beijing to engage in nego
tiations for a cease-fire and also autonomy. The northern Chinese warlords, however,
held a conference among themselves in Tianjin and decided to demand that the Beijing
government appoint the Fengtian (present-day Liaoning) warlord Zhang Zuolin as Mengjiang jinglueshi, or Minister of Management in Mongol Territory, to try to solve the
Mongolian problem through military means. This appointment was never made because
of financial difficulties and the fact that Zhang’s ambitions were directed more toward
North China than Mongolia.
Following the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, there occurred a political
division among the employees of the Russian consulate and the common Russians in
Ulaanbaatar. Pro-Communist factions revealed their opinions openly and created a sharp
confrontation between themselves and the non-Communists. After the troops of the
“ Mad Baron” von Sternberg entered Ulaanbaatar, the anti-Communist group carried out
an indiscriminate massacre of the Reds. This created a pretext for the Soviet Red Army
and the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army to march toward Ulaanbaatar, which
they captured in July. In order to appease the Mongolian people, the victorious Commun
ist forces supported the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu Khan as the nominal figurehead chief of
state and established the Aradun jasag, or the People’s Government. From then on until
recent years Outer Mongolia remained under Communist rule.
Soon after its takeover of Outer Mongolia, the Mongolian People’s Revolution
ary Party implemented a series of drastic social revolutions. All feudalistic ruling princes
and nobles, high lamas, and so-called counterrevolutionaries were denounced and se
verely persecuted. These unprecedented political moves were somewhat attractive to the
new intellectuals of Inner Mongolia, but aroused great fear among the conservatives
south of the Gobi. Of course these events did not escape the attention of Demchugdongrob, who had already been ruling for two years.
In 1923, a civil war broke out between Wu Peifu, the head of the Zhili faction of
warlords, and Zhang Zuolin, the leader of the Fengtian warlords. Wu put pressure on the
Beijing government to strip Zhang of his title as minister for management of Mongolian
territory. During this war, the banners of the Josotu and the Juu-uda leagues of southeast
ern Inner Mongolia suffered badly.
Together with the defeat and withdrawal of the forces of the Fengtian faction,
the three special regions of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan, established on Inner Mongolian
soil, all fell under the power of the Zhili warlords. The Beijing government appointed
General Wang Huaiqing of the Zhili clique as Xunyue shi, or governor-superintendent, of
these three regions. It was at this time that the Chinese government combined all Chinese-style local administrative institutions south of the Gobi into one unified body and
placed them under the control of a single Chinese warlord. Though this arrangement had
no immediate effect on Inner Mongolian politics, it was to become a great obstacle to
autonomy in later years. Whenever Inner Mongols initiated some political or economic
proposals, these three special regions (later provinces) always Joined together in opposi
tion and forced the Chinese government to turn down the Mongol proposals.
Also during this year (1923), the Soviet Union and the Beijing government held
a series of talks on the Outer Mongolia problem. Of course these talks pleased most of
the political leaders and intellectuals of Inner Mongolia. In this same year, Suklibaatar,
founder of the Mongolian Socialist regime, died; and in Beijing, General Cao Kun was
elected as president of the Republic of China thanks to a bribe.
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The year 1924 was a very important year in the history of modem Mongolia.
The Bogda Khan, the “God King” of Outer Mongolia, the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu, died in May. In June, the ruling Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party pro
claimed the official title of the nation as Bugude Nairamdakhu Monggol Arad Ulus, “ The
Mongolian People’s Republic,” and changed the name of the capital city that had hith
erto been called Urga to Ulaanbaatar, “ Red Hero.”
In Tibet, the long-standing confrontation of the two top religious leaders, the
Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Lama, ended in an open division and the
flight of the Panchen Lama and his group from Tibet. This incident greatly astonished the
devoutly Buddhist Mongols and had an enormous but subtle impact on the stability of
Inner Mongolian political and economic life.
Shortly thereafter, the Second Zhili-Fengtian War broke out in northern China.
Feng Yuxiang, a powerful leader of the Zhili clique, suddenly launched a mutiny. This
unexpected conspiracy caused the downfall of Wu Peifu and his entire Zhili faction. Feng
invited Duan Qirui, head of the Anhui clique, and Zhang Zuolin, head of the Fengtian
clique, to Beijing to solve the remaining problems. In the winter of 1924, Feng ignored
the agreement the republic had made with the Manchu Imperial Household at the time of
the 1912 abdication and drove the last emperor from his palace in Beijing. This perfidi
ous act created uneasiness among the Mongolian feudal leaders, including young Prince
Demchugdongrob."
In addition, Duan Qirui was installed as the provisional head of the government.
In order to reach a settlement, Duan suggested inviting all leading national figures to
Beijing for a “Rehabilitation Conference”to reunify China. Duan also sent an invitation
to Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang, who at that time had his own independent
government in Guangzhou. Sun’s political priorities were the implementation of his San
min zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People), the completion of the national revolution,
and engaging in cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists to liber
ate China from the yoke of imperialism and feudalism. Sun accepted Duan’s invitation
and left for Beijing via Japan in spite of a serious illness. His proposed solution for the
nation’s problems involved convening a “National Conference” which would include
laborers, peasants, and intellectuals; this would have had a far broader participation than
the Rehabilitation Conference Duan had initiated. Sun’s arrival in Beijing brought tre
mendous excitement to liberals and intellectuals, including some young Mongols.
Earlier, in 1912, when Sun Yat-sen first came to Beijing, the only Mongolian
leaders who had contact with him and his group were probably Gungsangnorbu, Prince
of Kharachin, and Yao Shan, a parliamentarian from the Keshigten Banner of the Juuuda League. Although these two joined Sun’s Kuomintang, they could not maintain con
tact with him because he was always in southern China engaging in revolutionary strug
gles against the government in Beijing. Later, during the civil war, the Mongolian par
liamentarians Uribatu, Chidaltu, Bai Rui, and Altanwachir (also known by his Chinese
name, Jin Yongchang) proceeded to Guangzhou to join Sun’s camp. They were from
Prince Gung’s Kharachin Right Banner. Altanwachir had been one of the students sent
by Gungsangnorbu to Japan. Sun’s doctrine, already too radical for most conservative
Mongols, became even more so after the founding of a socialistic regime in Outer Mon^ Arthur Waldron, From fVar to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925 (New York;
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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golia and Sun’s announcement that the Kuomintang would have Communists within its
ranks/

Deputy Head of the Shilingol League
The year 1924 was quite important for Demchugdongrob’s future career. It was
the first year he became involved with Mongolian politics outside his own banner. Prince
Yangsang, who had been head of the Shilingol League since 1895, decided to retire from
this honorary position. Nevertheless, the old prince was not willing to follow the regular
procedure of stepping down and having the deputy-head, Sodnamrabdan (Prince of Ujumuchin), promoted to league head. Instead, he transferred his position to the young and
capable jasag of the Sunid, Demchugdongrob. Of course this move was made in consid
eration of the traditional political entanglements and intrigues of the three powerful ban
ners of Abaga, Ujumuchin, and Sunid. Prince Yangsang did not wish to have the Ujumuchin prince lead the ten banners of the Shilingol League but instead wanted to do for
Demchugdongrob (hereafter called “ Prince De”) what Prince De’s father had previously
done for Yangsang by stepping down from the position of league head and passing it on
to Yangsang.
Promotion of the deputy head to the post of league head was the customary pro
cedure, but there was no definite restriction against another capable and prestigious noble
being appointed as league head instead. However, the Abaga-Sunid alliance against
Ujumuchin had to depend on the final decision of the Beijing government, which in turn
usually based its decisions on the recommendation of the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry.
Although by 1924 the power of this ministry had been undermined by the warlords,
Prince Gungsangnorbu still possessed the power to settle leadership problems among the
Mongolian leagues and banners. Unfortunately, neither the leading officials of the Sunid
Right Banner nor Buyandalai, Prince De’s trusted relative, had any way to reach Gung
sangnorbu to negotiate such a secret political arrangement. So as not to lose this opportu
nity to increase their political power, the Sunid officials sent Sangrubnorbu (the old Jagirugchi and the maternal uncle of Prince De) to Beijing to lobby for a favorable decision.
Sangrubnorbu was acquainted with my father, Lobsangchoijur, an acting resi
dent and trusted confidant of Prince Gung, who had many friends in the Shilingol
League. My father was an especially good friend of Sodnamrabdan, the Prince of Uju
muchin Banner. For this reason, Sangrubnorbu tried hard to persuade my father to influ
ence Ujumuchin to make some concessions. As a present from Sunid Banner, Sangrub
norbu brought a famous horse and eight thousand silver dollars to my father, who ac’ Ever since the May Fourth movement of 1919, a great deal of ideological change had been occur
ring among the students of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing. A few of them had even
Joined Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang. The most active of these liberal intellectuals was Serengdongrob, much better known by his Chinese name, Bai Yunti. Bai was a young man from the Kharachin Central Banner. After joining the party, he often traveled between Beijing and Canton, acting
as a liaison officer for the party. The arrival of Sun Yat-sen in Beijing gave him greater hopes for
advancing his career. Bai won the support of Sun and also of Feng Yuxiang, who was then already
openly collaborating with the Soviet Union. Soon thereafter, Bai began establishing a politically
liberal party called the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary party.
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cepted the horse but rejected the money. At the same time, an Ujumuchin envoy also
arrived in Beijing to lobby the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry to follow the normal proce
dure and recommend their prince as future head of the Shilingol League. In consideration
of these circumstances, my father related to me later that he had admonished Sangrubnorbu as follows:
Prince Sodnamrabdan is an elder and has held the position of deputy head of the league for
years. If your prince Jumps past Prince So and becomes the head, there will be great dis
harmony between Sunid and Ujumuchin, and that would be a loss to the Shilingol League.
Moreover, your prince is younger; he can certainly become the head in the future. Why
should you be so concerned to hurry along like this? If you agree, I will do my best to in
fluence the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry to recommend your prince as the candidate for
deputy head, and I will petition the president for his appointment.

Because of this persuasive argument, an agreement was eventually reached be
tween the Sunid and Ujumuchin banners. Prince So was nominated as league head and
Prince De as deputy. This compromise not only eased tension between Ujumuchin and
Sunid but also increased the harmony between the two princes. Afterward, Prince De
always addressed Prince So as bagshi or “teacher,” because of his seniority. As it turned
out, Prince So, who had no political ambitions, always deferred to Prince De’s Judgment.
This made it easier for the latter to achieve great success. Another result was that because
of my father’s honorable behavior, Prince De had confidence in me and often said to me,
“ Your father is an upright, honest person who cannot be bribed. He is a person able to
resist the temptation of money. You ought to take your father as your model.” This
shows the standards Prince De used in measuring his followers.
During this period, Prince De frequently traveled from his own banner to
Hohhot, Kalgan, and Beijing. His official mother, the Turned khatun, also occasionally
accompanied him to provide personal guidance. In Beijing, they usually stayed at the
famous Lamaist temple Songzhu-si, which a Manchu emperor had built for the Janggiya
Khutugtu. I remember the young Mongolian prince as quite smart in appearance. He was
slim, had large eyes, and a high, small nose. There was an aura of nobility about him. But
because he held to conservative Manchu-Mongol tradition by wearing a queue, he was
excluded from many social activities in Beijing and other Chinese cities for participants
in which the queue was a symbol of obstinacy and backwardness. He was also constantly
criticized by liberal Mongolian intellectuals. He finally cut the queue off, but not until
1945, when Outer Mongolia’s independence was at last formally recognized by the gov
ernment of the Republic of China.
Prince De has been criticized for going to see Puyi in Beijing even after the
young ex-emperor had been expelled from his palace by Feng Yuxiang, and for giving
Puyi money after the young man moved to Tianjin and for continuing to be submissive to
him in a manner befitting a vassal of the Manchu court. But if one considers the educa
tion that Prince De received during his younger days and the environment in which he
was raised, it is obvious that he considered loyalty to his lord an extremely important
virtue. In light of this, his actions are understandable. Nevertheless, Prince De’s attitude
of subordination toward his former Manchu overlord brought him caustic criticism and
ridicule from most of the nationalistic Mongol intellectuals. Under such pressure, by the
end of the 1930s he finally gave up this “foolish obedience and loyalty.”
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After Prince De was nominated as deputy head of the Shilingol League, the old
Jagirugchi of the Sunid Banner, Sangrubnorbu, retired, having fulfilled his obligation to
the princely family. When Sangrubnorbu retired. Prince De was released from the “guid
ance” of his old advisors, gained a free hand in managing banner affairs and thereafter
could determine his own destiny. Nevertheless, the formal appointment of Prince De was
delayed for two years because of the absence of the Chinese president.

His First Political Experience in Beijing
In 1925, political events in Beijing and elsewhere had major repercussions in
Inner Mongolia. Among these events, the formation of the Inner Mongolian People’s
Revolutionary Party was especially significant. As mentioned earlier, the establishment
of the Mongolian People’s Republic and the ideology of Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang both attracted many young Mongolian intellectuals. The arrival of Sun Yat-sen in
Beijing provided a good chance for these Mongol liberals to form a political party of
their own. The leaders of this movement were Serendongrob (Bai Yunti), Altanwachir,
Engkeburin, Dechin (also known as Yi Dechin), Prince Gungsangnorbu’s students who
had studied in Japan); Mandaltu (Li Danshan), the former clerk of the Harbin Mongolian
language newspaper; and Merse (Guo Daofu) and Fumingtai—both Dahur Mongol in
tellectuals.
Earlier, through the intervention of the Communist Third International (Comin
tern), a special Outer Mongolian delegate had been sent to Canton to meet with Sun Yatsen to negotiate possible cooperation between the two regimes. Sun and his party recog
nized the Mongolian revolution and the principle of self-determination. Consequently,
the formation of an Inner Mongolian party gained support from both the Comintern and
the Outer Mongolian MPRP. Because of the influence of the Comintern, the pro-Soviet
Chinese warlord Feng Yuxiang and the Chinese Communist Party also supported the
formation of this Inner Mongolian party.
In the spring of 1925, the founding congress of this party was held in Kalgan.
The Chinese name which members adopted for their party was Nei Menggu Guomindang, or Inner Mongolian Kuomintang. The party’s Mongolian name, however, was Totugadu\Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un khubisgaltu nam, meaning “the Inner Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary party.” The difference between the Mongolian and Chinese titles
clearly suggests the party’s complicated political background. It was designed to appeal
to both Mongols and Chinese and implies that this new party was an extension of neigh
boring fraternal parties.®
The party wanted to eradicate all Mongolian feudalistic institutions; to over
throw the ruling Mongol princes, feudal lords, and Chinese warlords; to struggle against
foreign imperialists; and to implement social reform. It published pamphlets to propa‘‘ The congress elected Serengdongrob (Bai Yunti), Merse, Bayantai, Yi Dcchin, Sainbayar, Murungga (YaoAfue Jingtao), Fumingtai, Mandaltu, Altanwachir, and others as members of the cen
tral committee, with Serengdongrub as chairman, Merse as secretary general, and Altanwachir as
director of the organizational department. Later, however, Bayantai, Yi Dechin, Sainbayar, and
Mandaltu all joined the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement under the leadership of Prince
De.
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gandize its doctrines. Because of the region’s longstanding conservative traditions, the
great majority of Inner Mongolian people did not look favorably on the party’s doctrines.
The noble class, the high lamas, and elderly conservatives in general regarded party
members as enemies and even as evil beings. Although the conservative Mongolian ele
ments in Beijing were greatly disturbed. Prince Gungsangnorbu did not openly interfere
with the activities of party members. This encouraged these liberals to go ahead with
their plans.
They had no single party line for the national survival of Inner Mongolia. Bai
(Serengdongrob) told me much later during a conversation in Taiwan that while he was
visiting with Prince Gung and seeking support for his party, the prince warned him that if
the Mongols fought among themselves, they would be weakened and handicapped in
their struggle against their external enemies. Likewise, when Dambadorji, the nationalist
leader of Outer Mongolia, was in Kalgan to celebrate the founding of the Inner Mongol
ian party, he also advised Bai that the Mongols’ first priority should be to maintain inter
nal unity and to defend themselves against external enemies. Internal struggle among the
Mongols would pose a dangerous threat to Mongol interests. As it turned out, however,
the advice from these two outstanding statesmen was not sufficient to help the party de
cide on its basic line.
Through the Comintern’s involvement in the activities of the Inner Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary party, a famous Mongolian writer named Buyannemeku was sent
to Beijing to try to win over the intellectuals, especially the students of the MongolianTibetan Academy. Several student groups were also sent to Ulaanbaatar and Moscow for
further political training. Yun Ze (later known as Ulanfu), Yun Run (Ulanfu’s older bro
ther), Dugurengsang (also known as Bai Haifeng), Oljeiochir, and Rong Zhao were
among them.
Sunid was not a target of this movement, but because of its geographical loca
tion, many of the people associated with it traveled through its territory. The Sunid lead
ers had no choice but to be alert to these new occurrences that they could not help but
view with a conservative eye.
While the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang carried on its activities, Duan Qirui was
conducting the Rehabilitation Conference in Beijing. This was the first time Prince De
had attended a national political gathering of the Republic of China. Prince De repre
sented the Shilingol League. The opening session convened on February 1, 1925. Formal
discussions began on February 13, and the conference ended on April 21. Because the
parliament had been dissolved, Duan announced the establishment of a Preliminary
Committee for Political Consultation to act in its stead. Because Prince De’s attitude dif
fered from that of the elder Mongol princes, he was named a member of that committee.
During this period, Prince De became aware of the activities of Bai Yunti and
his leftist revolutionary group, and soon understood the goals of this new party in the
changing political climate. Since he was a feudal prince and a target for overthrow, the
impact of these events was very strong; he became more conservative in his thought and
retained this conservatism in his later political life.
Another important event that greatly shaped Prince De’s future activity also
occurred in 1925. This event was the arrival of the Ninth Panchen Erdeni Lama in Bei
jing. I was then only ten years old. Because I accompanied my father to the magnificent
welcome ceremony at the west station of Beijing, I still clearly recall that event. The
Mongols and those Tibetans who had no close connections with the Dalai Lama’s rival
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regime in Lhasa all gathered at the station. Prince Gungsangnorbu, General-Director of
the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry, was the head of this group and one of the main dele
gates of the Beijing government.
After his arrival, the Panchen Lama was accommodated at Yingtai, a small is
land where the Empress Dowager Cixi had imprisoned the Guangxu Emperor at the end
of the Qing Dynasty. During the early republican period, this place became a part of the
garden at the presidential residence and this stage for historical tragedy, immediately
became a Mongolian center for worship. Countless Mongol pilgrims, both nobles and
commoners, laymen and lamas, poured into Beijing from all the leagues and banners.
They offered money, gold, silver. Jewels, and ornaments—whatever they had—to this
Tibetan spiritual leader. Poor commoners donated more generously than did the powerful
and rich. The Panchen Lama, because of his religious zeal and political interests, was
friendly toward these Mongol pilgrims. His disciples, however, especially the khambus
(high-ranking lama officials), who had whipped up the conflict with the Dalai Lama’s
regime, paid attention only to the nobles and neglected the commoners.
After the arrival of the Panchen Lama, Beijing became a prime gathering spot
for Inner Mongolian princes, nobles, and dignitaries. Their first priority was, of course, to
seek religious blessings for this life and the next. Nevertheless, in the course of making
these contacts, the subject of politics was unavoidable. These social contacts greatly
aroused Prince De’s interest and provided him his first experience in the art of making
political contacts. He was quite attracted to both the Panchen Lama and his khambus and
the friendship he established with them continued to develop and greatly influenced
Mongolian politics in the future.
This religious and political environment made it possible for Prince De to get
reacquainted with his old friends and to meet more Mongolian dignitaries.’ It seems,
however, that Prince Gungsangnorbu, the leader of Mongolian officialdom in Beijing,
and Ayulugei, chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry,
did not pay much attention to this young, ambitious but inexperienced prince. Prince De
was able to establish personal contacts with some conservative Mongol leaders, but he
was unable to become acquainted with the more enlightened, moderate, and experienced
leaders of that time. Naturally this had an impact on his later political activities. In addi
tion, because of the conflict between the old conservatives who befriended him and the
new leftist liberals. Prince De remained unsympathetic to the latter’s proposals.
After the Rehabilitation Conference was over, Duan Qirui organized the Pre
liminary Committee for Political Consultation, and on July 29, 1925, he appointed four
more Mongols (Amurchinggeltu, Prince De, Rinchinwangjil, and Lingsheng), three Ti
betans, two Manchus, three Chinese, and two Chinese Moslems as committee members.
Prince De learned much from his resulting experience in Chinese politics.
On July 30, 1925, two days after Prince De’s appointment as a member, the
Preliminary Committee for Political Consultation had its first meeting. In reality, this
committee was nothing more than a political tool for Duan and had no real power. The
’ Two such dignitaries were Lingsheng, a Duke of the Hulunbuir League in the north of Inner
Mongolia and son of Guifu, the most influential leader of that area, and Amurchinggeltu, a parlia
mentarian from Jerim League, southeast of the Hulunbuir League, and the lama uncle of Chimedsampil, head of that league.
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political situation in Beijing was also uncertain, and many of the old Mongol politicians
assumed a wait and see attitude, unwilling to become involved. Nevertheless, Beijing still
needed to resolve certain legislative matters and therefore needed Mongolian delegates to
attend Preliminary Committee sessions. Without these delegates, there would have been
no one to speak on behalf of the Mongol people. For this purpose. Prince Gungsangnorbu
and his advisor, Ayulugei, recommended that Wu Heling* of their own Kharachin Right
Banner attend the Rehabilitation Conference. They later helped him to be elected a mem
ber of the Preliminary Committee for Political Consultation.
After his betrayal of the Zhili faction, Feng Yuxiang had titled himself Superin
tendent of the Northwest Border Defense, and had placed the three special regions of
Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan (Hohhot) under his own control. This placed most of the In
ner Mongolian leagues and banners under his sway. To settle his surplus soldiers and to
secure a steady source of military supplies, food, and provisions, he advocated cultiva
tion of Mongol grazing fields. This affected those areas near the centers of Chinese set
tlement, such as the Chahar, Turned, Yekejuu, Alashan, and southern Ulanchab Banners.
In the meantime, decline in the condition of herders in eastern Inner Mongolia
was approaching the low level of the west. Collaborating with shrewd merchants to steal
Mongol land was an artful device used by Chinese warlords, officials, and their followers
for getting rich. Such maneuvers had already begun by the end of the Qing Dynasty but
worsened during the early Republican years. Zhang Zuolin often sent in his army to pres
sure Mongol herders into abandoning their grazing fields. By this time, both Zhang and
Feng supported Duan Qirui in his position of supreme leader. To reward Zhang for his
support, Duan agreed to accept Zhang’s request and in January of 1925 formally ap
pointed him as Superintendent-Commander of Northeastern Border Cultivation and De
fense. Zhang promulgated official procedures for legalizing earlier illegal seizures of
Mongol land. Zhang subsequently appointed Zou Zuohua as commander of military cul
tivation, and Zou used his artillery to force the Mongols from their good pastures.
Because of their dependence on Feng Yuxiang, Bai Yunti and his liberal group
could not protest this seizure of Mongolian land. This failure diminished the reputation of
Bai’s group and exposed it for what it was: a weak organization that adopted tough atti
tudes toward internal rivals, but dared not utter even one word in opposition to external
oppression.
According to Wu Heling, Prince De protested this Chinese takeover and culti
vation of Mongolian pasture land. This was his first political move connected with the
“ Unenbayan, better known by his Chinese name Wu Heling, was the eldest son of Lamajab, the
organizer of the Mongolian volunteers who fought the fanatically superstitious Chinese Jin dan
dao (Red Caps) rebels and protected the western half of the Kharachin territory. Wu Heling studied
at the Beijing College of Law and Politics and later graduated from the Department of Chinese
Literature of Beijing University. He served in both the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry and the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy. In emulation of his father’s career, he displayed very strong nationalistic
aspirations. Politically, he was rather moderate and practical. He was only five or six years older
than Prince Dc, and so it was natural that these two young Mongol members should meet. Both
were conservatives allied against the leftist movement led by the Inner Mongolian People’s Revo
lutionary Party, but because both were strong-willed, they were from the first unable to cooperate
with each other. The nature of their relationship changed over time, and both of them remained
engaged in the political struggles of Inner Mongolia.
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future of Mongolia. During this period, no Mongolian political initiative in Beijing could
have been smoothly carried out without the support of Prince Gungsangnorbu and the
other elder leaders, but also of such younger men as Wu Heling. Because the goal of this
initiative was to secure national survival and economic protection, the Mongols in Bei
jing and the entire student body of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy responded positively
to it. On April 27, 1925, they gathered at the academy, marched to the personal residence
of Duan Qirui, and submitted a petition clearly stating that all Mongols opposed Chinese
immigration onto and cultivation of Mongol lands and demanding that Chinese takeovers
stop immediately. Because this was the first Mongolian demonstration in the capital since
the establishment of the republic, the Beijing government was caught off guard and ac
cepted the demand in the petition. The newspapers published both the Mongols’ petition
and Duan’s order that Chinese cultivation in Mongolian territory be stopped.
The government’s decision had no effect on the powerful warlords, however,
and there was no response from either Feng Yuxiang or Zhang Zuolin. Consequently, the
order to protect Mongol land remained a dead letter. As this failure became apparent.
Prince De came to more fully realize the incompetence of the central government and the
arrogance of the local warlords. He realized that in the future, he could not rely on mere
bureaucratic orders to solve Mongolia’s problems. Later, in 1933, when Prince De initi
ated the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement, the declaration of this movement stated,
“At first there were migration and cultivation. Then came the establishment of [Chinese]
provinces and xian [counties or districts]. The so-called policy for developing [Chinese]
national wealth and strength is nothing but a mortal wound for Mongolia.” Perhaps these
thoughts had already entered his mind by 1925.
In the fall of 1925, Prince De resigned from his post as a member of the Pre
liminary Committee for Political Consultation; this resignation was later accepted by
Duan Qirui. The reason for his resignation was not made clear.

The Eve of the Kuomintang’s Northern Campaign
In late September of 1925, the Mongolian People’s Republic government tele
graphed the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry in Beijing to seek recognition of its selfdetermination. The telegram expressed willingness to send a delegation to Beijing to ne
gotiate a lasting peace between Outer Mongolia and China. This peace offer evoked no
response from Beijing. It did, however, attract the attention of some Mongols in Beijing,
being especially noticed among the young intellectuals.
Soon after, war broke out among the North Chinese warlords, and Zhang Zuolin
emerged the victor. By the end of March 1926, the defeated Feng Yuxiang went to Rus
sia via Sunid and Ulaanbaatar to seek help. During this war, the Inner Mongolian Peo
ple’s Revolutionary/Kuomintang and its troops sided with Feng. Following Feng’s de
feat, they were forced to retreat south to the Yekejuu League in southwestern Inner Mon
golia.
In early April of 1926, the troops of Tang Yulin, under the command of Zhang
Zuolin, occupied Chengde, the capital of the Rehe Special Region. Soon afterward, Tang
Yulin was appointed governor-general. From that time until the Japanese occupation in
1933, all the Chinese xiam and the Mongolian banners of both the Juu-uda and Josotu
Leagues, west of the lower Liao River, came under Tang’s despotic rule.
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Tang Yulin was Zhang Zuolin’s old friend. In their youth they belonged to the
same bandit gang. Tang was able, therefore, to perpetrate many evil deeds at will. But
because he was restricted by law, Tang was unable to interfere in the administration of
the Mongol leagues and banners. He did have enough military power to pressure some
weak and cowardly Mongol ruling princes and officials to assent to Chinese cultivation
of their territories’ pastoral land. His high-handed measures in the Mongolian banners
were similar to those of Yigu in the Suiyuan (Hohhot) area at the end of the Qing Dyn
asty. However, Tang’s greediness and corruption far exceeded those of his predecessors.
Under Tang’s rule, the territory of Rehe virtually became an opium factory from which
he smuggled opium to Beijing and Tianjin. He also pillaged the Khitan Liao tombs at
War-mangkha in Baarin Banner, just east of Shilingol, appropriating their treasures as
his personal possessions.
Tang Yulin’s illegal activities greatly damaged Prince Gungsangnorbu’s pres
tige, even within his own power base, the Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues. Tang’s tyrannical
rule increased the antagonism of the young intellectuals toward China and worsened
Mongol-Chinese relations in general. Actually, Tang Yulin was not liked by the Chinese
either, though all his collaborators were Chinese. In 1933, when the Inner Mongolian
Autonomy Movement began, more young people from this area than from most other
areas flocked to join the movement. Tang Yulin’s tyranny was probably the main reason.
Someone later asked Prince De, “ Antagonistic feelings against warlordism were
universal in those days; why did you Mongols turn these feelings into a nationalistic
movement?” Prince De’s answer was; “Tang Yulin’s oppression of the Chinese people
imbued them with a deep hatred only against the tyrannical warlords. This bitterness was
similar to that felt by the Mongol people against the bad Mongolian ruling princes. Nei
ther could create any nationalistic problem. Tang Yulin is, however, a Chinese, and his
transgressions against the Mongols could not help but creat a Mongol national antago
nism against alien rule.”
On April 20, under pressure from both Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu, Duan Qirui
stepped down as head of state. From this time until the Kuomintang occupation in the
summer of 1928, Beijing came under the control of Zhang Zuolin. Zhang gave one of his
daughters in marriage to the eldest son of Namjilsereng, prince of the Darkhan Banner of
the Jerim League, and through this relationship Zhang was able to persuade the prince to
agree to still more Chinese cultivation of Mongol lands. Later, the fury of the Mongols
caused the herdsmen to gather under the leadership of Gada Meiren, the head of the ban
ner’s military forces, and begin violent resistance against cultivation. However, this
group of “ Mongol bandits” was completely exterminated in the valley of the Laukha
River. Zhang Zuolin’s policy was to create divisions among the Mongols, draw the
friendly nobles to his side, and then eliminate his remaining opponents one by one. In
order to damage the personal prestige of Prince Gungsangnorbu, Zhang deliberately
downplayed the importance of the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry through malign neglect.
His aim was to eliminate the leadership of the Mongols by dissolving their unity.
By late summer of 1925, Zhang Zuolin occupied Doloonnor, an important city
in the center of Inner Mongolia; and he put the eastern half of Chahar and Shilingol
Leagues under his influence. In early September, Zhang Zuolin sent his son Zhang
Xueliang to Taiyuan to negotiate conditions for collaboration with the Shanxi warlord
Yan Xishan. As a result of these talks, the Fengtian clique agreed to let the Shanxi clique
occupy the territory of Suiyuan (Hohhot) as its exclusive domain.
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According to Manchu custom, the ordinary administration of the Yekejuu
League and the Turned Banner was handled by the Li-fan Yuan (Ministry of Dependen
cies) of the central government. Only the military supervision was the responsibility of
the Suiyuan-cheng Jiangjun, the general of Suiyuan (Hohhot) city. Later, because of the
increase in Chinese immigration, the Manchu government gradually established ting,
zhou, and xian administrative geographic units for these settlements to handle Chinese
affairs. These Chinese-style administrative units were placed under the jurisdiction of the
governor {xunfii) of Shanxi Province.® Following the aforementioned agreement between
the Fengtian and Shanxi factions, the latter took possession of the Suiyuan area and
firmly controlled it until 1949. All these events were inseparably connected with Mon
golian politics and the future life of Prince De.
Van Xishan, the Shanxi head, was a man with many new ideas. He was edu
cated at the Japanese Military Academy, and since the founding of the republic in 1912
had been head of both civilian and military affairs of Shanxi Province. Because of his
shrewdness, he was the most resilient of all the North Chinese warlords and the most
qualified to sustain his rule over Shanxi, which he did until the Communist takeover in
1949. Though, modeling himself on Mussolini, he brought some modernization, new
construction, and enterprises to his native province. His ambition, however, was directed
solely at making Shanxi Province an independent kingdom under his personal leadership.
Even the railroad he built from Kalgan, on the Shanxi border, to Taiyuan, the provincial
capital, was of a narrower gauge than all the other trunk line railroads in China.
Van’s own home was Hebian Village of Wutai xian, in the vicinity of the fa
mous Buddhist Wutai Mountain. Because of a common belief among the Mongols that
this mountain is the shrine of the Bodhisattva Manjushiri, multitudes of pilgrims, laymen,
and lamas poured into this area every year, particularly from Mongolia. This holy site, as
a result, turned into a haven for commercial activities. The money the Mongols brought
to donate to Buddhist temples and lamas usually wound up in the hands of Shanxi mer
chants. Hebian Village, located on the road to the holy mountain, gave Van Xishan the
chance to get acquainted with the character of the Mongols, especially their shortcom
ings. Van’s policy toward the Mongols took advantage of their ignorance and disunity,
encroaching upon their land and undermining the integrity of Mongolian administration,
increasing the volume of Chinese immigration, and changing Mongolian pastoral fields
into Chinese farmlands. He cleverly used threats and bribes to make the Mongol nobles
accept his demands. All this made confrontation between Van and the nationalistic lead
ers of Inner Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement of 1933 seem in
evitable.
Because the Chinese settlers were all from Shanxi, the settlements in Ulanchab, Yekejuu, and
Turned in effect became Shanxi colonies, and the economies of these areas were monopolized by
Shanxi Chinese. After the republic was founded in 1912, involvement with the Outer Mongolia
problem and the difficulty inherent in immediately establishing provinces in Inner Mongolia, led
the Beijing government to establish three tebie qu (special regions), Suiyuan, Rehe and Chahar,
and to place these areas under the jurisdiction of jiangjuns (generals) or dutongs (govemorsgeneral). Nevertheless, according to law, the administration of the Mongolian leagues and banners
remained independent of the jurisdiction of the tebie qu, and the function of the govemors-general
was limited to supervision, not domination of the leagues and banners.

32

The Last Mongol Prince

While the Northern Chinese warlords were occupied with the confrontation
among themselves, Chiang Kai-shek, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang party
army, announced in Guangzhou on July 1, 1926 the beginning of the Northern Expedi
tion. This historically important event did not draw the attention of ordinary Mongols,
but the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party did take careful note of it.
In the winter of the same year, Feng Yuxiang returned from Russia through
Outer Mongolia and reinforced his troops in Wuyuan and Baotou. The headquarters of
the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party were also located there. Members of
this party resolutely carried out their social revolution in some banners of the Yekejuu
League, and this occasioned a counterattack from several quarters.
The Northern Expedition of 1926-27 was a success: the Yangzi River valley
quickly fell under the control of the Kuomintang. An anti-Communist movement had
meanwhile emerged inside the party, and a split between its right and left wings became
inevitable. The right wing, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing, expelled
the Communists and the Soviet advisors from the party and began an open struggle
against the KMT’s own left wing, which was under the leadership of Wang Jingwei (also
known as Wang Zhaoming) in Wuhan. This struggle ended with the victory of the right
wing and led to a “ party purge.” The Communists, who had been purged somewhat be
fore this, hid underground or escaped to the countryside, where they later joined other
Communists engaged in guerrilla warfare.
Meanwhile, Zhang Zuolin had sent armed men and police to seize the Soviet
embassy in Beijing. His men found many secret documents and arrested the well-known
Chinese Communist leader Li Dazhao, then the main liaison officer between his party
and the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party.
Impressed with the Kuomintang victories, the North Chinese warlords Feng
Yuxiang and Yan Xishan joined the party and turned against Zhang Zuolin. In Ulaanbaatar, at the instigation of the Comintern delegate, the leftists criticized Bai Yunti
(Serengdongrob) and his right-wing associates. Bai’s group was protected and spirited
out of Outer Mongolia by Dambadorji, who was able to return them to their old head
quarters in Ningxia. Supported by his old comrades, Bai issued an anti-Soviet, antiCommunist declaration. In November of that year he went to Nanjing as a representative
of his party with instructions to petition for unification with the Chinese Kuomintang.
Bai’s request was accepted by both the Kuomintang party officials and the government,
and he became a Mongolian dignitary in the new KMT regime. This new political align
ment became the root of endless problems among the Mongols after the Northern Expe
dition.
While Chiang Kai-shek’s army was achieving military victories in the south,
Japan dispatched an army division to Shantong to impede his further progress to the
north. This Japanese interference did not, however, stop the Northern Expedition. Per
ceiving the changes in the Chinese military situation, Zhang Zuolin established a military
government in Beijing and made himself generalissimo. This move made apparent to all
the political bankruptcy of the Beijing regime. The local warlords continued to encroach
into lands of the leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia, and Gungsangnorbu’s Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry could not find a satisfactory solution to this state of affairs. Prince
Gung submitted his resignation, but the Beijing government did not accept it. In order to
release himself from such a difficult situation. Prince Gong claimed illness and remained
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at home for some time. This political setback temporarily deprived the Mongols of their
leader, but it served to encourage ambitious and idealistic Mongolian youth to strive for
the leadership of Inner Mongolia,
During these years, Prince De traveled continually between Beijing and Inner
Mongolia and increased his experience in, and understanding of, Chinese politics. He
realized that without military force there could be no resolution of any of the problems
faced by the Mongols, and that he could not achieve his objectives through his personal
capability and prestige alone. He saw that the Mongols must ultimately depend on their
own collective strength for protection. This realization led him to begin consolidating the
military forces of his own banner.'®
Prince De’s first step was to reorganize the forces of his banner and appoint a
mergen janggi (tertiary banner official) as the head of the troops according to the old
system. Prince De did his best to provide these forces with modem arms and made a val
iant but fruitless attempt to train them in modem military tactics.
As part of his military reorganization. Prince De built a camp about two kilo
meters west of his residence to accommodate his troops and their arms. He soon found
someone able to introduce comparatively modern forms of training and techniques to the
troops. He also established a weapons-repairing facility and an automotive repair shop.
Later, the Panchen Lama came and stayed at Sunid. Because the Lama’s bodyguards
were stationed at this camp. Prince De’s people obtained many new ideas from them, and
this made it possible for them to improve their factories and training. Although Prince De
laid these foundations during the early stage of his political life, they did not bring great
success. All his later achievements were the results of contributions from other sources.

The feudalistic Manchu system in Inner Mongolia organized every one hundred fifty families
into one sumu. Except for lamas, all males ages eighteen to sixty (by Mongolian ealeulation) were
enlisted in the military. Of every three men, one would be a khuyagh, or soldier, and the other two
were ere, or probationary soldiers. The rulingyasag/i was the commander. By the end of the Qing,
however, this system was functional in name only. For self-defense, the banners usually organized
military units according to this system and mobilized small military forces to deal with emergen
cies. After the establishment of the Republic, these forces were called “ peace preservation corps.”
Most of the weapons these forces possessed were old and inefficient; had they had ma
chine guns, the banners could have stopped the invasions of local bandits and defeated the minor
warlord troops. Some weapons were donated by the government or the powerful warlords, and
some were given by the warlords in exchange for horses; most were bought illegally at exorbitant
prices.

IV
THE KUOMINTANG’S SECOND
NORTHERN CAMPAIGN AND AFTER
1928-1931
The Northern Campaign and the Mongol Response
In early June 1928, the defeated Fengtian forces began to retreat to Manchuria
through Shanhaiguan. On June 3, Zhang Zuolin left Beijing by train. The next day he was
assassinated by Japanese agents at Huanggutun, a small station at the crossroads of the
Beijing-Fengtian Railroad and the South Manchuria Railroad under Japanese manage
ment. Beijing then came under the control of Yan Xishan.
The completion of the Kuomintang’s Northern Campaign greatly concerned the
North Chinese, espeeially the people of Beijing, the stronghold of “counterrevolution.” In
addition to the excitement evoked by the military and political events, the national flag
was changed. The Kuomintang victors changed the “Flag of Five Colors” (which equally
represented the Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans), used for sev
enteen years, to the new flag of “Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red Earth,” adopted in 1924
by Sun Yatsen, and which implied a more unitary state.' The slogans the Kuomintang
agitators recited and pasted on the walls produced a strange new feeling. The name of
Beijing, “The Northern Capital,” was changed to Beiping, “The Pacified Northern
[Area].” Except for the intelligentsia, most people had no knowledge of the Kuomintang,
its doctrines, or its differences with the Communists. They believed that the Communists
were frightful but really did not know why.
The Mongols in Beiping also lost their sense of direction for a while. At first the con
servatives feared that this revolution might enable Feng Yuxiang to further help the Inner
Mongolian Kuomintang (as the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was called
in Chinese) accelerate the social revolution. The conservatives also feared that the revo
lution would damage faith in Buddhism, as had already happened in Outer Mongolia.
Moreover, because of their fear of anything political that was “red,” they misunderstood
the meaning of the new flag, interpreting its “Red Earth” as signifying “communism all
over the earth,” This only served to increase their misgivings about the Chinese govern
ment. (Before the KMT’s break with the Communists in 1927, many Western diplomats
shared this fear that the KMT’s victory would mask a Communist takeover.)
The leaders also gradually realized that the words concerning Mongolia’s future,
written by Sun Yat-sen in his works and declarations, were ambiguous or even self
contradictory. In his Outline of Nation Building he said, “Regarding the weak and minor
ity peoples inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible
for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” Nevertheless, in his Three Princi-

' John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 180.
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pies of the People, Sun said that in reality, China had only one single Zhonghua (Chi

nese) nationality, and that within it were several subnationalities. Sun argued that peoples
living within China’s borders other than the Han Chinese were minorities who could be
assimilated easily.
The Mongols were, of course, unhappy about being classified as a “weak and
minority people” when they previously had been designated as one of the “five peoples of
the commonwealth.” They especially detested the word “assimilation” and worried about
being ethnically subsumed by the Chinese, but they took comfort from Sun’s seeming
offer of self-determination and self-rule. They were, however, still worried that no Mon
gol outside the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang had established contact with the Kuomintang and its new government in Nanjing. They feared that the social revolution advocated
by this group might become the guiding principle for the new government’s policy to
ward Mongolia.
On June 8, 1928, the National Government in Nanjing promulgated the new
Organizational Law for the reconstituted Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission {MengZang Wei-yuanhui). This new government continued to recognize a separate administra
tive framework for Mongolia and Tibet within the orbit of the central administration and
acknowledged the special political significance of these two regions. The only changes
were the alteration of the name of the office from yuan (ministry) to weiyuan-hui (com
mission) and its head’s title from zongcai (general director) to weiyuan (commissioner).
This announcement somewhat appeased the Mongols in Beiping. On the fifteenth day of
the same month, the government appointed the eight members of this commission, in
cluding Zhang Ji (a senior member of the party), Bai Yunti (Serengdongrob), Li Fenggang (Mandaltu, also known as Li Danshan), Lubsangnanja (a khambu of the Panchen
Lama), and Liu Puchen (former parliamentarian from Shanxi). This signaled that the
ministerial level Mongolian-Tibetan administrative formerly led by an high-ranking
Mongolian prince was now transformed into an office ruled in actuality by the Chinese
and only ostensibly by Mongols and Tibetans. On the eighteenth, the government ap
pointed Zhang Ji, Bai Yunti, and Liu Puchen as standing commissioners of this commis
sion.^
At Bai Yunti’s recommendation, Li Danshan (Mandaltu) and Yu Lanzhai (Bayantai) were sent to Beiping as representatives to accelerate the party’s work and to take
over the facilities and properties of the former Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry. In order to
forestall a hostile confrontation, the Mongolian leaders prepared a formal reception to
welcome them. In order to express their “revolutionary character,” however, the two
“dignitaries” from Nanjing did not show up for the reception. Although I was only thir
teen years old at this time, I still recollect my impressions of this embarrassing moment.
In the face of so unfriendly an attitude, to avoid further unpleasant encounters. Prince
Gungsangnorbu quietly left Beiping and moved into the Japanese Concession in Tianjin
with his family.

^ The appointment of Bai Yunti as one of the leading figures in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission was the natural result of his early contact with the KMT. His appointment, however,
was cause for great worry among many Mongolian conservatives, who were very skeptical of his
activities during the era of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party.
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The Rise of Wu Heling and the Mongol Delegation
The Mongolian community in Beiping deeply resented the unfriendly and arro
gant attitude of the two delegates from Nanjing. In addition, there was a report that the
new government still had no set policy toward Mongolia, and that the Mongol party
members wielded no significant influence within the KMT. The Mongolian community
resolved to establish direct contacts with the new government and concentrate on unify
ing the Mongols in order to deal with the new situation.
Experienced elders such as Ayulugei and Lobsangchoijur (my father) agreed to
assign the trustworthy youngster Wu Heling (the husband of my father’s niece) to lead
the way in achieving this goal of unity. Prince Gungsangnorbu agreed to this plan. Then,
in the name of the Beiping Office of the Two Leagues of Josotu and Juu-uda, the elders
gathered the city’s Mongolian leaders and proposed organizing a Mongol Delegation to
discuss the future of Mongolia with the new government. After receiving positive re
sponses, the Beiping Office of the Two Leagues of Josotu and Juu-uda sent out a general
notice to all Inner Mongolian leagues, inviting them to send delegates to Beiping for dis
cussions on how to ensure Mongolian rights and privileges under the new government.
By the end of the summer, most of the delegates had arrived in Beiping. They
usually held their official meetings in a big hall on Ma shi Dajieh (Horse Bazaar Street).
Many informal discussions were, however, held in the homes of the two elders, and I thus
became acquainted with Mongolian politics while 1 was still a junior high school student.
In the late fall they finally agreed to establish a Mongol Delegation and designated Wu
Heling, the delegate of the Josotu League, as the delegation’s spokesman.
During this period. Prince De did not visit Beiping as he usually did; the news
he received by way of Kalgan was mostly indirect and uncertain. His worries about the
new situation therefore multiplied. In order to strengthen the Mongol Delegation, my
father persuaded Prince Sodnamrabdan, the head of the Shilingol League, to support Wu
Heling. Prince So, agreeing to this request, sent Bagaturchilagu to join the delegation as
his personal representative. He also suggested that the deputy head of the league send a
personal delegate as well. The latter agreed and sent his most trusted associate, Jungnai
tusalagchi. Prince So was faithful to his word: having given his promise, he supported
Wu Heling without hesitation. This greatly influenced the career of Wu and the later po
litical development of Inner Mongolia.
By this time, the Chinese Government had already established the Beiping Pre
liminary Branch Political Commission to handle the political affairs of northern China.
Two senior comrades, Zhang Ji and Li Shizeng, and two North Chinese warlords, Yan
Xishan and Feng Yuxiang among others, were appointed as commissioners. According to
Wu Heling, the Mongolian delegates visited with Zhang Ji and Li Shizeng to ask him to
consider the possibility of fulfilling Sun Yat-sen’s promise of self-determination and selfrule for the minority peoples. They also attempted to inquire into the Mongolian policy of
the new government. They soon discovered that although their counterparts were quite
sympathetic and hoped to reach a reasonable solution for Mongolia’s problems, the cen
tral government still had no definite policy toward the Mongols. This superficial sympa
thy and the lack of a concrete policy toward Mongolia led the delegation to believe that it
had to come up with its own solutions for Mongolia’s problems.
I still remember a very hot afternoon when the Mongols in Beiping gathered to
welcome party, political, and military leaders in the beautiful garden of the Association
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of Students Educated in Europe and America. At first, many of them agreed to come, but
at the appointed hour, only a few appeared. The most notable of these was General Bai
Chongxi, the commander-in-chief of the Right Flank Army, one of the leading figures of
the Guangxi clique and the Fourth Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army. A
Chinese Moslem, he was said to think of himself as a member of a minority people. Ac
cordingly, the Mongols had high hopes for him as an ally, but he quite unexpectedly be
haved as an arrogant conqueror looking down on his conquered prisoners. When he saw
the slogans of “the fulfillment of the teachings of Sun Yat-sen” and “the realization of
self-determination and self-rule,” he was greatly angered and said, “The government will
never accept such demands for separation! Even though 1 myself am a Moslem, I am no
different than a Han Chinese. There is no nationality other than the Zhonghua mimu
[Chinese nationality]. Why should you demand self-determination and self-rule?”
After hearing this “sincere advice,” all the Mongols in attendance were greatly
disappointed. They began asking themselves, “What do the teachings of self-determin
ation and self-rule for the weak minority peoples really mean to the KMT? Is the party
sincere in wishing to fulfill this promise?” This was the first great disappointment the
Mongols suffered at the hands of the ruling party and its new government. News of this
unhappy event soon reached the ears of the leaders of the leagues and banners.^
The two men from Bai Yunti’s group did not attend that gathering. They isolated
themselves from most of the Mongols in Beiping. They supposedly sold the real estate of
the old Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry at a very low price to the Sino-French University,
under the management of Li Shizeng, for the purpose of drawing this influential senior
party leader to their own side. This also increased the disappointment of the Beiping
Mongol leaders with the so-called liberal group.
All of these factors made the Mongol Delegation more determined to explicitly
represent the demands of the leagues and banners in negotiating with the new regime.
Through my father’s contact with his intimate friend Lingsheng, the latter sent his
brother-in-law, Chunde, to be the delegate of the Hulunbuir League to join the delegation.
Lingsheng, also a trustworthy person, gave Wu Heling full support until the Japanese
took over Hulunbuir. Amurchinggeltu contacted his nephew Chimedsampil, the head of
the Jerim League, and won his agreement. Soon after. Prince Shirabdorji, the head of the
Yekejuu League, sent Rinchinragba to be the delegate of his league to the commission.
This man bore deep personal hatred toward the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary
Party because of the violence that its members had committed in his homeland, and he
wanted revenge. This enmity eventually created a great conflict between the Wu Heling
and Bai Yunti factions.
After receiving support from all the leaders of all the leagues and banners, the
delegation began to discuss and draft its formal requests to be submitted to the National
Government and the KMT. While the Mongols were anxiously awaiting an answer, the
Kuomintang Central Political Committee passed a resolution on August 29, 1928, to ele
vate the status of the six Chinese-dominated special districts of Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan,
Ningxia, Qinghai (Kokonor), and Xikang to provinces. This news greatly disappointed
the delegation and the Mongols. This resolution not only impeded their chances for selfdetermination and self-rule but also violated the Mongols’ traditional form of local
autonomy under the old feudal arrangements. Many Mongols became more critical of Bai
^ General Bai proved to be a man of his word. After he expressed his opposition to Mongolia’s selfdetermination and self-rule, he persisted in his opinion until his last day. During every discussion of
Mongolian problems, he always took the opposing point of view.
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Yunti, who was then a member of the Kuomintang Central Political Committee that made
this resolution. It seemed that Bai and his group were eager only to accelerate the internal
struggle among the Mongols; they could not stand up under external pressure.'*
On September 12, the Mongol Delegation presented a petition in the name of all
the people of Inner Mongolia. In this petition two points were stressed: (1) “The Mongol
people wholeheartedly support the doctrine of The Three Principles of the People and the
early realization of peaceful unification, and they sustain the liberty and independence [of
the nation],” and (2) “the Mongol people in this new China should protect their own secu
rity and assure their own development to make it possible for them to survive and flour
ish along with other nationalities in the country. We demand the dismantling of the
provinces in the three special regions of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan . . . and propose the
establishment of a Mongolian Regional Political Committee instead.”
This petition received no positive response, and on September 17, according to
the resolution of the Kuomintang’s Central Political Committee, the National Govern
ment ordered the establishment of the provinces of Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Qinghai.
One month later, the KMT Central Political Committee passed yet another resolution to
establish a new Ningxia Province that would include the territories of the two Mongol
banners of Alashan and Ejine to the west of the great loop of the Yellow River as well as
the region of Ningxia dao (route, circuit) to the east of the Alashan Mountains (ch. Helan-shan) of Gansu Province. At the request of the Mongols, the KMT made no alteration
in the existing institutions of the leagues and banners.
After lengthy negotiations, the Mongol delegation, with Wu Heling as its
spokesman, proceeded to Nanjing during mid-October. The appearance of the Mongol
Delegation in the new capital was a serious challenge to Bai Yunti and his associates,
because they were no longer the only body representing Mongols to the government. In
order to defend their position of supremacy, Bai and his group retaliated by maligning
Wu Heling and the Delegation as feudalistic remnants, running dogs of the feudal
princes, reactionaries against The Three Principles of the People, and persons unqualified
to represent the Mongols. An open clash between the two factions ensued.
Meanwhile, Rinchinragba, the delegate from the Yekejuu League, accused Bai
and his men of involvement in certain murder cases in the Yekejuu League and peti
tioned the government to put them on trial. This confrontation resulted in a defeat for
both sides and was indeed a serious political loss for all of Inner Mongolia. This situation
was shrewdly exploited by Yan Xishan and those who opposed Mongolian autonomy.
The unity of the Mongols was largely destroyed, and the Mongol Delegation became
deeply bogged down in a predicament. Since the Delegation was unable to achieve its
goal of self-rule, it had no alternative but to struggle to maintain the existence of the
leagues and banners and a fair division of power between the Mongolian leagues and
banners and the new Chinese provinces and xians (districts or counties).
On the other hand, because of the impact of the idea of democracy, the Delega
tion also advocated some reform of their old league-banner system. Besides the heredi'' In the 1960s, I discussed this event with Bai Yunti in Taiwan. According to his explanation, on
the day of the meeting he was sick and telephoned Feng Yuxiang, who was to chair the meeting,
and asked whether he should attend. Feng replied, “There will be no important matters taken up.
Better stay at home and rest.” Feng himself, however, made the motion and got it passed. Never
theless, the minutes of this meeting need to be checked to find out what the actual record reveals. In
any event, Bai was criticized in this matter because of his negligence in meeting his obligations as a
Mongol member of so important a committee.
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tary institution of the ruling jasag, the delegation planned to establish both league and
banner councils to nominate officials for appointment by the central government.
Although this compromise proposal was aimed at guiding the league-banner
system away from feudalism and toward democracy, it was far short of the original goal
of urging the government to grant self-rule to Mongolia. Moreover, its inclination toward
democratic reform at the expense of feudal prerogatives contradicted the demands of the
conservatives. This contradiction produced a split inside the Mongol Delegation. The first
person to break away from the delegation was Jungnai, the delegate sent by Prince De,
and this was the beginning of the confrontation between Prince De and Wu Heling. Soon
Amurchinggeltu urged his nephew (Chimedsampil, head of the Jerim League) to with
draw his support and openly characterized Wu Heling as a rebel against Mongolian tradi
tion. This situation gradually led the conservative hardliners, under the leadership of
Prince De, to struggle against Wu Heling until the time of the autonomy movement dur
ing the fall of 1933. During this internal struggle, both Prince Sodnamrabdan and Lingsheng kept their words and faithfully remained neutral. Their neutrality helped Wu
Heling resist the strong attacks from the conservative hardliners.
Although its unity was damaged, the Mongol Delegation remained in Nanjing
and continued its appeals for a solution to Mongoliais problems. Finally, in June of 1929,
the Second Central Committee Meeting of the Kuomintang’s Third Congress accepted
the petition of the Mongol Delegation and passed a resolution to convene a Mongolian
Convention in March of 1930 to solve Mongolia’s problems. Thus, the Mongol Delega
tion was able to achieve some results through its petitions.

External Pressure and Internal Factions
In mid-October 1928, the National Government appointed Zhao Daiwen as gov
ernor of Chahar Province and Xu Yungchang as governor of Suiyuan Province. In Janu
ary of 1929, Yan Xishan was appointed minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission. The Beiping Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was
also established at this time and Wang Ping was appointed its head. All these people were
from Shanxi Province. In other words, the Mongolian administration in the government
and most of the areas connected with Inner Mongolia all fell under the control of the
Shanxi clique, headed by Yan Xishan. The aim of Yan’s Mongolian policy was to gradu
ally eliminate the Mongolian league-banner system.^
Though the Kuomintang Central Committee Meeting had passed a resolution to
convene a special convention to settle the Mongolian problem, Yan Xishan, the minister
* During this same time the national government appointed Prince Sodnamrabdan, head of the
Shilingol League, and Samdanlhungrob, an outstanding Chahar leader, as commissioners of the
Chahar provincial government; and Prince Yondonwangchug, head of the Ulanchab League, and
Prince Shagdurjab, head of the Yekejuu League, as commissioners in the Suiyuan provincial gov
ernment. Through this arrangement, the government tried to put Inner Mongolian regions under the
jurisdiction of the newly established provinces. As for Rehe Province, the national government
recognized the status quo and appointed Tang Yuling, the notorious Fengtian warlord who had
occupied Rehe from the time of Zhang Zuolin’s victory, as governor. The Mongols of the Josotu
and Juu-uda Leages thus came to see no difference between the new revolutionary government s
Mongolian policy and that of the old Fengtian warlord regime. If there was a significant difference,
why would a man like Tang Yuling, who had practiced extortion of the people to so great an extent,
be reappointed as the governor of a province?
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in charge of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, advised Wu Heling and his
group to be practical, to stop calling in vain for self-rule, to be realistic and move forward
step by step.
He also offered Wu Heling the post of commission counselor to join in the task
of planning laws and regulations concerning the administration of Mongolia. Wu Heling
was a realistic man; his personal philosophy was “anything which you manage to keep in
your basket is yours.” Accordingly, he accepted Van’s advice and offer. Those who had
the same views as Wu also accepted Van’s offers and were appointed as section heads or
to other similar positions. They compromised with Van by dissolving the Mongol Dele
gation and reorganizing it into the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner
Delegates. This office served as the liaison between the central government and the local
Mongolian leagues and banners. Because of this new development, Wu Heling’s follow
ers supported his becoming head of this office.
Van Xishan’s management of Mongolian affairs was deemed a great success.
On the one hand, he was able to appease Wu Heling and his politically active Mongolian
group. On the other hand, he was able to use Wu’s group to check the power of Bai Vunti
and his group. In doing so, he rendered both groups unable to accomplish anything for
the Mongol people. This was also a personal success for Wu Heling. The party’s resolu
tion saved his Mongol Delegation from complete defeat, and all delegates who supported
him were rewarded with governmental positions. Their continuing support assured solid
recognition for his leadership. He became a powerful representative of Mongol interests
in Nanjing and created the foundation for his later political career.
Nevertheless, judging from the original goal of the Mongol Delegation, Wu
Heling’s accomplishment was nothing but a weak compromise. The general criticism
could be framed in the following tenns: “Because it was impossible to get a concrete an
swer from the government, the entire delegation should have withdrawn from Nanjing.
The delegation members should not have accepted any official position from the govern
ment.” Prince De was the one who criticized the most, and this criticism brought him into
open conflict with Wu. Their personal relations deteriorated, and both strove to gain the
initiative and win more people to their own side. Because of his personal character,
Prince De was able to draw the more independently willed people to his side.*
Van Xishan soon left Nanjing and returned to his home base in Shanxi; Ma
Fuxiang, a northwest Moslem military leader, was appointed Minister of the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission. Ma, admiring Wu Heling’s capability, appointed him Head
of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Commission. This move elevated Wu’s position
in Mongolian political society but also earned him more enemies, among whom was
Sangjaijab, the Seventh Janggiya KhutugtuJ
* At first, those who disagreed with Wu Heling or had been repelled and squeezed out by him
gradually gathered to Prince De’s camp. Their original purpose was to use the prince in their strug
gle against Wu Heling, but later, most of them were moved by Prince De’s generosity, tolerance,
and especially his strong nationalistic spirit, and they became his faithful assistants and supporters.
Sainbayar, a founder of the radical Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, was among
these supporters.
’’ Early in the Manchu period, the seventh reincarnation of the khutugtus of this line was co-opted
so as provide a political tool for the court to use in dealing with Mongolian matters. At the begin
ning of the republic, this seventh reincarnation was quite young. His disciples assumed his name
and engaged in much political trickery. Because most of them had an aversion to Prince Gungsangnorbu and his inclination toward moderate reform and modernization, they were heavily involved
in almost every activity directed against Prince Gung. When Wu Heling became the head of the
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Meanwhile, many were advocating the appointment of Prince De as commis
sioner of the Chahar provincial government. Prince Sodnamrabdan, head of the Shilingol
League, was an influential person but had no interest in politics. Although he was ap
pointed commissioner of the Chahar provincial government, he had never been to Kalgan, the capital of the province, and soon after his appointment, he resigned from this
nominal post. In order to maintain its contacts with the Shilingol League, the Chahar pro
vincial government petitioned the central government to appoint Prince De as commis
sioner instead of Prince So. As a consequence. Prince De had to increase his contacts
with the officials of the Chahar provincial government and thereby gained more know
ledge of the policy of the Chinese border provincial govenunents toward the Mongols.
The increased intercourse between Prince De and the Chahar provincial government en
hanced the importance of Buyandalai, head of the Kalgan office of the Shilingol League.
Despite this appointment. Prince De did not participate in the provincial admin
istration. It was the policy of the provincial governments to treat all commissioners, espe
cially Mongolian commissioners, as persons holding only nominal “honorary posts” who
did not participate in actual administration. Prince De himself had no real interest in these
matters. During this period, he usually traveled between Kalgan and Beiping in order to
have regular audiences with the Panchen Lama and establish friendly relations with the
Mongol nobles who came to this city for the same purpose.
In addition to the old confrontation between the liberals and conservatives in
Beiping Mongolian circles, a new challenge had occurred by this time that was influ
enced by the conflict between the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner
Delegates under Wu Heling’s leadership, and the old followers of Bai Yunti working in
the central headquarters of the KMT (who became cadres of the Frontier Party Affairs
Bureau). Because of their cornmon interests in opposing Wu Heling, the latter group
gradually drew close to Prince De. Through this unexpected cooperation, the liberal
thought of Bai Yunti’s group also influenced the conservative Prince De.
Both liberal factions were mainly led by Kharachin Mongols of eastern Inner
Mongolia, and this situation caused the new intellectuals from the Turned and Chahar
areas to feel pushed aside. So in order to struggle against the eastern Inner Mongolian
clique, these western Mongols also formed a political group. To exert pressure on their
opponents, they joined Prince De’s camp. This connection gave Prince De more opportu
nity to contact the new intellectuals.

Mongolian Affairs Bureau, he advocated the separation of religion and politics and the exclusion of
lamas from politics. He resented the Janggiya Khuiugiu and his followers because the Khutugtu
usually resided at Wutai Mountain near Hebian Village, the home of Yan Xishan, and was ac
quainted with Yan. It seemed that after he left the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Yan felt
that the Nanking government was too tolerant of the Mongols and hindered the takeover of Mon
golian administration by the provinces and xian%. Yan felt that this situation might have been partly
the work of Wu Heling. In order to interfere indirectly with Mongolian politics, he used the Jang
giya Khutugtu to block Wu’s activities. He also urged the ruling party to continue the Manchu re
ligious policy of discouraging Mongolian movements for progressive reform. The Janggiya Khu
tugtu depended on Van’s help to establish himself as the foremost political and religious leader of
Inner Mongolia. These situations also contributed to the open confrontation between Wu Heling
and the Janggiya Lama. On the other hand, because of their shared religious faith, the Janggiya
Khutugtu and Prince De were engaged in a traditional master-disciple relationship, and a disciple
was bound by a religious oath to unconditionally obey the master. Consequently, a Janggiya-Prince
De alliance was formed.
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The Panchen Lama’s First Visit to Inner Mongolia
Accepting an invitation from Zhang Xueliang, the Panchen Lama proceeded to
Shenyang (Mukden) together with his faithful devotee, Prince De. Through the recom
mendation of the lama, Prince De met Zhang Xueliang, the “Young Marshal.” In addition
to his special intimacy with the lama. Prince De also was acquainted with the northeast
ern Mongol leaders who came to pay their respects to their spiritual leader. Among them
Merse (also known by his Chinese name, Guo Taofu) was the most notable one. He was a
very influential intellectual leader of the Dahur Mongols. Merse had studied in the Bei
jing College of Law and Politics. Radical and nationalistic, he allied himself with a group
of eastern Inner Mongolian youth and founded the Mongolian Youth Party. Soon after, he
joined the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party under Bai Yunti’s leadership.
After Bai was pushed out by his leftist opponents and departed from Ulaanbaatar, Merse
was sent back to Hulunbuir League. After these political setbacks, Merse revised his
leftist stance and developed a good personal relationship with Lingsheng, the powerful
conservative leader of the Hulunbuir area.
To appease the radical groups, Lingsheng expressed sympathy toward them and
initially recognized Merse as his own advisor. Later, Lingsheng even sent Merse to Nan
jing as his personal representative to welcome the Panchen Erdeni to Hailar. Both Prince
De and Merse had the zeal and determination to struggle for Mongolian survival. They
both seem to have had the same idea of meeting with the Mongolian nobles and leaders
who gathered at the Panchen Lama’s residence and securing their cooperation in the
struggle for Mongolian national survival.
Later, in the winter of 1929, Merse and his former comrade, Fumingtai, took
advantage of the Soviet invasion of northern Manchuria and initiated a Hulunbuir inde
pendence movement in Hailar. The next spring, as the Soviet troops withdrew, Fumingtai
went to the Mongolian People’s Republic, and Merse accepted Zhang Xueliang’s offer to
proceed to Mukden to found the Normal Academy of the Northeastern Mongol Banners.
At this school, Merse educated many outstanding young Mongol intellectuals and also
sowed the seeds of nationalism and socialism in their youthful minds. Later the students
of this school made important contributions to Inner Mongolia’s economy, politics, and
education.
After Prince De returned to the Shilingol League from Mukden via Beiping and
Kalgan, the Panchen Lama also accepted the invitation of Prince Sodnamrabdan, the head
of the Shilingol League and the richest person in all of Inner Mongolia, to go to the Ujumuchin Right Banner from Hulunbuir by the way of the steppe lands. In Ujumuchin the
lama was welcomed with lavish hospitality. Both nobles and commoners able to travel
there gathered to join the “Kalachakra Initiation,” the greatest religious ceremony of Ti
betan Tantric Buddhism, as presided over by the Panchen Lama. In those days there were
no microphones, and only the religious and lay dignitaries seated in front of the Lama on
a platform were able to hear the voices of the Lama and his attendant monks in the cere
mony. The pilgrims who had gathered in the open air further back could not hear the re
cital of holy scriptures. Even the sound of the “Bell of the Law” did not reach their ears.
They could hear only the drums, conch shells, brass trumpets, and cymbals of the relig
ious music band. Even so, they were all satisfied. They firmly believed that the Buddha
would bless their souls and future lives simply because they had been present at the
ceremony.
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In such a devoutly religious atmosphere. Prince De urged Sodnamrabdan to
build a temple for the Panchen Lama; this would provide him with a permanent residence
in Mongolia. Although Prince So immediately agreed, the location was a problem. Ujumuchin possessed excellent grazing fields and produced many animal husbandry pro
ducts, but it had already established a monastic treasury, the Nunai-shang, to manage the
property and wealth of the Dalai Lama. Moreover, the princely family of Ujumuchin had
always been the main contributer to the Dalai Lama. It would not have been proper to
build a temple for the Panchen Lama in Ujumuchin and thereby harm UJumuchin’s rela
tionship with His Holiness in Lhasa. Prince So also objected to building so important a
religious center outside his own Shilingol League. At Prince De’s invitation, Prince So
decided that the temple would be built in the Sunid Right Banner. As earlier. Prince So,
as the elder and the head of the Shilingol League, appointed Prince De to direct planning
and fundraising efforts for the center. Although this was not an easy task, it gave this
young and ambitious prince an opportunity to show he could succeed succeed. Through
this project, an intimate relationship with the Panchen Lama would naturally develop.
Perhaps in time of need, this influential religious leader might provide him some kind of
assistance. The construction of so big a temple in his own banner would also certainly
increase his personal prestige. Moreover, in a religious sense, it would be a great accom
plishment.
In the spring of 1930, Gungsangnorbu, the prince of Kharachin, passed away in
Beiping. After his death, the only Mongol prince and noble in this old capital city who
still had some influence was Nayantu, and he was on Wu Heling’s side. But because of
his age and poor health, his interest in politics waned. During this period. Prince De con
stantly traveled to Beiping to meet with those Mongol princes, nobles, and dignitaries
who came fi'om the leagues and banners to discuss constructing a temple for the Panchen
Lama. Such activities gave him an activist image in the eyes of many conservative Mon
golian nobles. He was, of course, highly valued and trusted by the great Tibetan lama.
Nevertheless, these activities were not welcomed by the Mongol intellectuals.

The Mongolian Convention and the Law Concerning Mongolia
The KMT’s unification of China in 1928 did not last long. Because of personal
conflicts among them, local military leaders Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren
soon left Nanjing and returned to their own power bases. After Yan Xishan resigned from
his post as minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, the National Gov
ernment appointed Ma Fuxiang, one of the leading Moslem warlords in the Northwest, to
take his place. Ma appointed Wu Heling as head of the commission’s Bureau of Mongol
ian Affairs and gave him his full support and confidence. Consequently, Wu’s Nanjing
Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates became the only organization
representing all of Mongolia to the central government. These political outcomes not only
worried Prince De but also the Janggiya Khutugtu. Of course, Yan Xishan exercised full
control of the lama behind the scenes. Ma supported Wu out of concern for his own
Moslem people. Ma’s strategy was to observe Mongolian efforts and then imitate them if
they proved successful. But regardless of Ma’s purpose, the cooperation of Ma and Wu
continued until the end of 1931, when Ma left the commission because of the reshuffling
of the National Government.
In March 1930, the anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign of Yan Xishan and Feng
Yuxiang became fully public, supported not only by Li Zongren and his Guangxi clique-
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but also by Wang Jingwei, the disillusioned leading figure of the KMT left. In July,
Wang, Yan, and Feng convened an “Enlarged Conference” in Beiping to establish an
other national government to resist Chiang Kai-shek. Bai Yunti came to this meeting as
an associate of Wang Jingwei and was appointed minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Af
fairs Commission of this government. During this political crisis, most of the students of
the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy were on Bai Yunti’s side, in keeping with their resent
ment of Wu Heling’s conservatism. Prince De was the leading figure of the anti-Wu
group. Nevertheless, because of his criticism of Bai’s radical behavior in the past, he did
not join with the radicals either. Due to the instability of the “Enlarged Conference,” Bai
Yunti could not accomplish anything concerning Mongolian matters. Soon the “Enlarged
Conference” group collapsed because of military oppression from the Chiang Kai-shek
group to the south and the movement of Zhang Xueliang’s pro-Chiang forces from Man
churia to Beiping.
During this period of great political and military confusion, the Mongolian Con
vention convened in Nanjing from May 21 to June 12, 1930. As mentioned earlier, the
convention was scheduled to be held in March of 1930; but because of the confused
situation, it was delayed for two months. This was a pivotal event in the history of the
Republic of China. The ostensible goal of the convention was to arrive at a practical so
lution for Mongolian problems in accordance with both the desires of the Mongols and
the exigencies of the nation as a whole. The attendees were delegates from the Mongol
leagues and the representatives of the provinces nominally in control of the leagues. In
order to arbitrate the differences between the leagues and provinces and to reach a com
promise between the two competing hierarchies, the heads or deputies of the concerned
ministries were also ordered to attend the meeting.
However, the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningxia, under the control of
Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, did not send representatives. In addition, the delegates of
western Inner Mongolia could not get to Nanjing because the important railroad stations
at Guisui and Kalgan were under the control of Yan’s and Feng’s forces. As a result of
this civil strife, only the delegates of the Jerim, Hulunbuir, Juu-uda, and Josotu Leagues
of eastern Inner Mongolia and the representatives of the four provinces of Liaoning, Jilin,
Heilongjiang, and Rehe (under the control of Zhang Xueliang) could attend the confer
ence.
The conference issued a draft Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues,
Tribes, and Banners, a draft later formally promulgated by the National Government. It
also became the law of the Mongolian local governments. Even until his late years, Wu
Heling recognized it as the greatest accomplishment of his entire life. There were five
main points of the draft: (1) the existence and institutions of Mongol leagues and banners
would be protected by the National Government; (2) the leagues and banners could pre
serve their original rights of local self-rule; (3) the banners would be under the Jurisdic
tion of the leagues, with the leagues placed under the direct authority of the central gov
ernment; their administration would be separate from that of the provinces and xians, and
was not to be encroached upon; (4) the jasag system would be retained, but not in the old
hereditary tradition; (5) the rights and obligations of the people in all leagues, tribes, and
banners which made them all equal were to be recognized. This law promised to moder
ate the conflict between the old conservatives and the new liberals and gradually abolish
the hereditary rights of the feudalistic ruling class.
However, the border provinces ignored the law, and conflicts and entanglements
between the Mongolian leagues and banners and the Chinese provinces and xians still
went unresolved. The response from Mongolian society was also quite varied. Both Cha-
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har and Hulunbuir (especially the Dahur group to the east of the latter) were satisfied
because their aimags (tribes) were recognized by law as collectively constituting a
league. To the south, in the banners of the Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues, the great majority
welcomed this law because of these banners’ long contact with the world outside Mon
golia., Moreover, their delegates were the original proponents of the draft of this law.
Nevertheless, Prince De and the great majority of the conservative nobles recognized the
law as destructive of feudalistic traditions and expressed their objections. The strongly
conservative Prince Chimedsampil, head of the Jerim League, was another main figure on
the opposition side. In other words, this law served to increase the tension between Prince
De and Wu Heling. Regardless of the support given or objections raised among all the
areas of Inner Mongolia, only the Kharachin Right Banner and the Khorchin Left Front
Banner reorganized themselves according to the regulations of this law.
As a result of the Mongolian Convention’s resolution on education, more Mon
golian youth could study at universities and colleges in Beiping, Nanjing, and other large
cities of China. Later, many of these students fought in the Mongolian Autonomy Move
ment initiated by Prince De in 1933.
Zhang Xueliang’s occupation of Beiping, the collapse of the “Enlarged Confer
ence,” and the power change in northern China all had some impact on Inner Mongolia.
Zhang appointed Liu Yifei as governor of Chahar province, and Liu established a good
personal friendship with Prince De. Zhang Xueliang’s attitude toward Mongolia was
comparatively moderate and compromising, quite different from that of Feng Yuxiang
and his policy of cultivating the military, or Yan Xishan’s policy of nibbling away at
Mongolian territory. From the viewpoint of most Mongols, the downfall of Feng Yuxiang
was a favorable development.
From May 5, to May 17, of 1931, the National Government convened a national
convention in Nanjing, and each of the Inner Mongolian leagues sent three delegates.
From the Shilingol League, Prince So sent his friend Lubsangchoijur, my father, and his
jakirugchi, Khuturi, as delegates of the league. Prince De sent Buyandalai, the head of the
Kalgan office of the Shilingol League, with them. After their arrival, however, Wu
Heling told them that only one of them could vote as a delegate, and he had already rec
ommended to the government that Khuturi be the one with voting power because he was
the only one who was bom in Shilingol and who was currently serving in the office of the
league head. Buyandalai greatly resented Wu’s decision, and this unhappy event created
many problems in the relationship between Prince De and Wu Heling in their later con
tacts.

V
THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE JAPANESE INVASION
193M933
The Manchurian Incident and the Mongolian Response
During the summer of 1931, a series of conflicts occurred between the Chinese
and the Japanese military adventurers along the Korean border. Among these conflicts,
the Wanbaoshan Incident was the most sinister; because of this incident, tension between
the two countries greatly increased. These incidents were planned and instigated by the
Japanese militarists to create a pretext for invasion.
In the early morning of September 18, 1931, the Japanese army stationed at the
Japanese Concession in the Shenyang (Mukden) area shelled the military base of Zhang
Xueliang’s forces located at the Northern Camp and started the Manchurian Incident. At
that very moment, Zhang, who was in Beiping, asked for instructions from Nanjing. The
watchword of the KMT was “ nonresistance,” a policy that, it was thought, would earn
China the support of world opinion and force the Japanese to back down through peace
ful measures. Although the League of Nations in Geneva was sympathetic to China, such
moral support could neither help the antiaggressive advocacy of certain Japanese politi
cians nor halt the militarists’ adventures. The Japanese Guandong Army in Dalian and
LUshun took advantage of the Chinese policy of nonresistance to swiftly occupy all of
Manchuria, including the Jerim League, the Hulunbuir area, and the Yeke-Minggan Ban
ner of eastern Inner Mongolia. During this time, the Soviet Union’s military was suffer
ing from Stalin’s purges, and so could mobilize no real strength to halt Japanese expan
sion.
This incident had a great impact in Mongolia, China, and northeast Asia. It also
changed Prince De’s fate and made him a notable figure in the history of twentiethcentury Mongolia. Further, it marked the beginning of open Japanese intervention in
Mongolian affairs. As for Prince De himself, this incident was a major turning point. It
not only changed his philosophy of life, but also gradually led him away from an extreme
conservative position toward all kinds of progressive liberal ideologies, and from a nar
row-minded desire for rehabilitation of Mongolian feudalistic institutions to the goals of
Mongolian national survival and independence.
The Japanese occupation of Mukden unexpectedly deprived many Mongols of
their political bases. Merse’s Normal Academy of the Northeast Mongolian Banners was
affected first, and it disintegrated. As for Merse himself, because of his earlier involve
ment with the Comintern and the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, he felt
deep antagonism toward Japan. Moreover, because of his socialistic inclinations, he left
Mukden immediately after the fall of the city and returned to his homeland, Hulunbuir.
Later, when Japanese forces invaded that area, he proceeded to Ulaanbaatar and disap
peared. Some reports said that he was killed by Su Bingwen, a commander of the Chi-
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nese remnant forces, but there is no evidence to support this.
Although the Normal Academy of the Northeast Mongolian Banners existed for
only two years, many students were influenced by Merse’s zeal for Mongolian recon
struction and survival. Among them, a group of radicals deeply influenced by his leftist
inclinations later joined the Communist International upon the recommendation of one
Altanbagana, a Kharachin Mongol who was trained in Ulaanbaatar during the active pe
riod of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. These young radicals joined
the Communist Party not necessarily because of their devotion to the philosophy of Marx
and Lenin, but rather to fulfill their own strong nationalistic aspirations. Their goal was
to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia and to establish an independent country for all Mon
gols. During the Japanese occupation, most of the students of this academy left Mukden,
returned to their homes, and waited for their chance to struggle for the survival of their
own people.
The Mongol princes and nobles were, of course, also disturbed. Among them.
Prince Namjilsereng of the Darkhan Banner (formally known as the Khorchin Left Cen
tral Banner), then the deputy head of the Jerim League, fled to Beiping, along with his
family. Wubao, the newly appointed jasag of Bingtu Banner (formally known as the
Khorchin Left Front Banner), also soon fled to Beiping. The goal of this man, an oppor
tunist, was perhaps to show his loyalty to the Chinese government merely to assure his
own personal political advantage in the future. The great majority of the ruling nobles
simply waited anxiously for the dust to settle.
By this time, the Japanese militarists had already brought the former Manchu
emperor, Puyi, from Tianjin to Dalian and prepared to use him as a political puppet to
appease the people of the Japanese-occupied regions. Some Mongol nobles who had re
ceived their ranks and titles from the former dynasty began to relax and look forward to
an imperial restoration and the renewal of all their feudalistic privileges. Some even
hoped a second Qing Dynasty would be established. The leaders of this group were
Chimedsampil, the head of the Jerim League; Yeshikhaishun, the Tushiyetu prince of the
Khorchin Right Central Banner; and Guifii and his son, Lingsheng, of the Hulunbuir
area. The liaison officer between the Japanese Guandong Army and the Mongols was
Jitsuzo Kikutake, a special agent of the Southern Manchurian Railway Company.
The Japanese occupation of Manchuria spawned two political rumors: one
raised hopes for the restoration of the Manchu’s Qing Dynasty; the other looked forward
to establishment of a Manchu-Mongol country. The Mongols responded differently to
these two rumors. The former won the support of the nobles; the latter particularly ap
pealed to the intellectuals and commoners. It soon became apparent, however, that these
rumors were in fact groundless. First, it would have been extremely difficult to effect a
complete restoration of the Qing Dynasty because too many things had changed since the
abdication of the last Manchu emperor twenty years earlier. Second, after the death of
Prince Gungsangnorbu in the spring of 1930, Inner Mongolia lost its common leader, a
man who had high prestige and enjoyed personal contacts with many Japanese leaders.
Many Mongols who were antagonistic toward Chinese cultivation of herding
lands would have been glad to see the Japanese push the Chinese settlers out from their
former grazing fields. That was the attitude of many Mongols in the realms under Japan
ese occupation. But the response from the western limer Mongolian leaders was different
from that in the east. They maintained a wait-and-see attitude and had no desire for the
Japanese to intervene further in their own areas. Most of the conservative ruling nobles
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were more pro-Chinese than pro-Manchu, and feared Japanese aggression. The intellec
tuals, liberal or radical, were mostly influenced by their Chinese educations and were
basically anti-Japanese. As for the two leagues of Josotu and Juu Uda, although the Japa
nese had not yet invaded their territory, it was clear that their central locations made in
vasion inevitable, and their leaders could do nothing but wait and prepare for the change
to come. Moreover, because of their close relationship with the Nanjing government,
they were more disillusioned than most.
A group of eastern Mongolian intellectuals tried to use the Manchurian Incident
to create a movement to establish an independent Mongolian state. They organized their
own military forces and attacked and occupied such cities in Mongolian territory as
Taonan and Bayantala (Tongliao), that were still occupied by remnant Chinese forces. At
first, the Japanese tolerated their activities; but as this manifestation of Mongolian na
tionalism peaked, Japan decided to establish its puppet state, Manchukuo (“The Manchu
Country”), and brought the movement to a halt by threatening to kill its leaders. Under
such circumstances, the nationalists disbanded their forces “ of their own accord.” The
most influential initiators of this movement were Jirgalang, a Dahur Mongol intellectual
educated in Japan; Khafungga, an intellectual from the Bingtu Banner and a former stu
dent of Merse at the Normal Academy of the Northeast Mongolian Banners and Ashkan,
an intellectual from the Darkhan Banner, educated in the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in
Beiping. In order to pacify these intellectuals, the Japanese offered them official posts in
the Manchukuo government. But their desire for Mongolian self-determination did not
waver. Afterward, when Prince De initiated the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement,
many young men came to join him from areas of Japanese occupation. Their dissatisfac
tion with Japanese policy toward the Mongols in Manchukuo was one of the main rea
sons for their defections. Jirgalang was one of these young men.

The Changing Situation in Nanjing and Manchuria
Japan’s invasion had tremendous political impact on the Chinese government.
China’s policy of nonresistance was seriously criticized by the great majority of the Chi
nese people and created many political problems. In the spring of 1932, after a long per
iod of consultation between different groups in the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek decided to
step down from his administrative position and assume the position of chairman of the
military committee in order to manage the national defense against Japan and the pacifi
cation of the Chinese Communists. Chiang had his long-time political opponent Wang
Jingwei take over the Executive Yuan, the central organ of national administration. The
KMT soon reshuffled the government to encourage unity among national minorities and
convened the Conference on National Calamities at Luoyang in April 1932. Prince De,
Wu Heling, and a dozen of the Mongol leaders were invited to attend the conference.
Some Tibetans were also invited, among whom were two leading figures with intimate
connections with Mongolia: the Panchen Lama and the Janggiya Khutugtu. It was appar
ent that the renewed attention the National Government was paying to Inner Mongolia
was caused by the rumor that the Japanese were plotting to establish a ManchuMongolian country.
This conference did not produce any concrete results. Except among the rebel
lious Communist Party members, who were already calling for a united front against Ja-
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pan, it did bring about a sense of unity in public opinion against Japan and a temporary
settlement of the long-confused political situation. For the Mongol members, there was
no new achievement. Although it brought Prince De and Wu Heling together again, they
reached no compromise or understanding with the Chinese authorities.
In the meantime, because of the new cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and
Wang Jingwei, Bai Yunti, as a follower of Wang, also returned to Nanjing. Although the
situation seemed favorable for Bai to obtain the post of minister in charge of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, this was blocked by strong opposition from the Nan
jing Joint Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates under Wu Heling. Nev
ertheless, its hand forced by the new situation, the National Government had to reshuffle
its cabinet, and Ma Fuxiang was removed from his post as minister of the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission. The new appointee, Shi Qingyang, was associated with the
Guangdong clique and Sichuan warlords. He had no previous links with Wu Heling, but
because of his personal relations with the Guangdong clique and with Wang, he had to
make some concessions to Bai Yunti in order to rebalance the power struggle among
Mongolian politicians, and so he removed Wu from his post as head of the Mongolian
Affairs Bureau. This new situation provided a good chance for Prince De and other antiWu elements to attempt to land a final blow on Wu.
Before the Conference on National Calamities, the Japanese Guandong Army
had installed Puyi as the head of state in Changchun in order to enhance the legitimacy of
their puppet state, Manchukuo. Japanese propaganda aimed at the Mongols no longer
centered on the independence issue but on the need for harmony among Japanese, Manchus, Mongols, Chinese, and Moslems. The Japanese now emphasized unity, not separa
tion. Unable, however, to completely ignore the Mongolian demand for independence or
at least self-rule, they established the Kinggan (Xing’an) General Bureau as a special
office for Mongolian affairs in the central administration of Manchukuo and appointed
Chimedsampil, the extremely conservative head of the Jerim League, as its head. They
established the Kinggan South Province in the area of the Jerim League, the Kinggan
East Province in the land of the Dahur Mongols along the Non River Valley, and the
Kinggan North Province in Hulunbuir district, abolishing the leagues and putting the
banners under the jurisdiction of the newly established Kinggan provinces.
To show the Japanese belief that Mongolia should be ruled by the Mongols,
Yeshikhaishun, Elechun, and Lingsheng were each appointed as provincial governors. In
reality, Lingsheng resisted Japanese interference as governor of Kinggan North Province.
The other two provinces and the Kinggan General Bureau, however, were entirely con
trolled by the Japanese. Chimedsampil, well known as an unyielding, stem conservative,
now became a puppet displaying unquestioned obedience. This was the way the Japanese
“satisfied” the Mongolian desire for self-rule and separation from Chinese domination.'

‘ During this period, Morishima, a Japanese spy, appeared in Kalgan. He had a Chinese wife and
was known among the Japanese as Moko-ronin, or the “adventurer of Mongolia.” He was assigned
to establish contact with the Mongol leaders, especially Prince De; his mission, however, was un
successful because he failed to change the mind of his chief Mongol counterpart. To the very end
of World War II in 1945, Morishima still had not established a friendly relationship with Prince De
and was despised by most of the Mongol leaders. During that time. Prince De was still concentrat
ing his attention on the Chinese government and was attempting to solve Mongolian problems
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In the meantime, the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations, headed
by Lord Lytton, arrived in Beiping, and the Beiping Association of Fellow Mongols pre
sented the commission with a memorandum. First, the Mongols denounced Japanese
aggression, and second, they expressed their opposition to any form of illegal organiza
tion created by the Japanese. Later, when the commission arrived in Manchukuo, it re
ceived another memorandum from the representative of the “Manchukuo” Mongols.
This memorandum expressed support for Manchukuo and an appreciation of Japanese
activity; and it denounced the treacherous deeds the Chinese government had perpetrated
against the Mongols. The spokesman of this group was Namkhaijab, an intellectual of the
Darkhan Banner who was educated at Beiping Normal University.

Prince De’s First Visit with Chiang Kai-shek
and His Conflict with Wu Heling
During the summer of 1932, Prince Sodnamrabdan, head of the Shilingol
League, fell ill, and doctors advised him to rest. He asked his deputy head. Prince De, to
manage the affairs of the league for a few months. Taking advantage of this opportunity.
Prince De sent out a telegram to the National Government in the name of all the jasag
princes of the league expressing their opposition to The Organizational Law of Mongol
ian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners and to repeat their demand to reshuffle the Nanjing
Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates out from under Wu Heling’s
control and to dismiss Ayulugei from his position as the deputy head of the Josotu
League. The reasoning behind the last demand went as follows; “Only nobles are quali
fied to be head or deputy head of a league, and Ayulugei is not a noble by birth.”
Earlier, in 1931, when Prince Gungsangnorbu died, the deputy head of the
Josotu League, Dagdanwangshug, was promoted to the position of league head. Although
he was the jasag of the Tanggud Khalkha, the smallest banner of the Josotu League, he
had no experience in political matters. In order to continue the leadership and prestige of
the league that were established during the time of Gungsangnorbu, Wu Heling and oth
ers supported Ayulugei, an elder of Kharachin, to take up the new office of deputy head
to manage league affairs. This support was also for the purpose of fulfilling the promise
contained in the Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners that the
rights of all Mongols were equal without regard to status as commoner or noble.
Prince De’s demand played into Wu Heling’s hands. Wu immediately re
sponded that democracy had to be carried out in Mongolia and asked why the feudal no
bles should demand monopoly ruling power forever. Although Wu’s counterattack dis
appointed the Mongol conservatives, the government had to support Wu’s idea because
of its own publicized doctrine. The delegates of the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian
League and Banner Delegates also supported Wu and rejected all interference from out
side. In addition, in past years Wu Heling had done many things for the leagues and ban
ners; so, when faced with such a crisis, most of the leaders kept their mouths shut. As
mentioned. Prince Sodnamrabdan was a man of honor. Because of his personal friend
ship with my father, the uncle of Wu’s wife, he also refused to Join the anti-Wu struggle.
through it. His main goal was to defeat Wu Heling and reshuffle the Nanjing Office of Mongolian
League and Banner Delegates.
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This refusal provided Wu Heling with powerful support.
Nevertheless, Prince De was put in the limelight, and all of Wu’s opponents
gathered under his shadow. They esteemed Prince De as their leader and formed a pow
erful new group. This attracted the attention of the National Government, especially
Chiang Kai-shek and his staff. Soon Gui Yongqing came to Sunid to visit with Prince De
as a representative of Chiang. Their talks were harmonious and friendly. Soon after Gui’s
return, Prince De got a telegram from Chiang inviting him to Hankou for a visit. From
then on. Prince De and Gui Yongqing had a solidly established friendship.
In the meantime, the Mongolian community in Beiping had divided into two
factions, and two “ Beiping Associations of Fellow Mongols” appeared at the same time.
Nevertheless, most of the Beiping Mongols sided with Wu Heling. Students of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy also split into two factions.^
At this time, the Panchen Lama arrived in Beiping, and many Mongols gathered
in the old capital. Among them were the elderly leader of Chahar, Jodbajab ambarv, the
influential tusalagchi of the Dorben Keuked Banner of the Ulanchab League, Dewagenden; and the delegate of the head of the Yekejuu League, Rashisereng, and others. In the
meantime, Wu Heling also arrived from Nanjing. Mongol leaders realized that an all-out
struggle between Prince De and Wu Heling would be a great loss for all Mongols. After
consultation with Wu Heling, they decided in the name of Dewagenden and Rashisereng
to invite all influential Mongol leaders in Beiping to a luncheon party at the well-known
Jieying Restaurant in order to discuss ways to avoid conflict. As a result of this gathering,
the attendants asked Jodbajab, Dewagenden, and my father, who had good personal rela
tionships with persons on both sides, to represent them, visit Prince De, and work toward
a breakthrough. I accompanied my father on this trip.
The next morning, the three Mongol elders went to the Song-zhu-si Temple,
where they were welcomed by Buyandalai and Bai Fashan, the demchi lama of the tem
ple. Then they went into the temple and met with Prince De. About noon they came out
smiling. They had resolved that Prince De would not reshuffle the Nanjing Office of the
Mongolian League and Banner Delegates and that Wu Heling would remain as head but
would honor the prince’s proposals and cooperate wholeheartedly. The prince accepted
this, and both parties decided to talk again the next day. At the first negotiation, Buyan
dalai sat by and did not utter a single word.
The next day, the same group again went to see Prince De. The results, how^ Among the Beiping Mongols, Ao Yunzhang was a man quite learned in Chinese literature. Origi
nally, his family was from the Aukhan Banner of the Juu Uda league, but he himself was thor
oughly Sinicized and could not speak Mongolian. When Wu Peifu was in power, Ao was made
head of the Aviation Bureau. Because his personal relationship with Wu Heling was less than ami
cable and also because he was friendly with Bai Yunti, he decided to join Prince De’s group. From
then on, he drafted most of the prince’s important statements. He led the anti-Wu Beiping Asso
ciation of Fellow Mongols. Among the Mongol nobles in Beiping who joined this group were
Chimbudorji and Kichiyeltumergen. Chinbudorji’s purpose was to exploit Prince De s prestige and
take over the post of deputy head of the Josotu League. Kichiyeltumergen’s ancestors were merito
rious supporters of the Manchus even before their occupation of Beijing. In order to reward them
for their merit, the Manchu emperor conferred upon these ancestors the rank of first ranking prince
(the Jorigtu ginwang) with high emoluments but no banner to rule. This Kichiyeltumergen was a
Sinicized playboy without any Mongol-ness about him at all. Because of these complications, the
anti-Wu Mongolian Association in Beiping did not last long.
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ever, were entirely different from the first ones. Buyandalai sabotaged the agreement
because he strongly insisted on taking over Wu Heling’s position as head of the Nanjing
Office. Nevertheless, my father intervened by bringing Wu Heling with him to see Prince
De so the two could talk frankly face to face. During this meeting, each recognized the
other as a fighter for Mongolian survival, but they still could not agree on method and
strategy. The prince insisted that Wu’s great achievement, the Organizatiohal Law of
Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners, was a complete failure and pointed out that it
was even worse than the old Regulations for the Treatment of Mongolia, as issued by the
Beijing government. He demanded that the original ruling power of the Mongolian
princes and nobles remain unaltered. Wu, however, regarding the regulations as a dead
historical document, insisted that the prerogatives of the Mongol nobles could not con
tinue forever. Thus they were unable to reach an agreement.
Finally, my father, as an elder and a peacemaker, exhorted them and said,
“Neither of you should oppose the other anymore. I earnestly hope that your friendship
will be restored.” Then he pointed at his niece’s husband, Wu Heling, and said to the
prince, “I sincerely hope that one day he will be your associate.” They thereupon
stopped arguing and diplomatically expressed their hopes for cooperation in the future.
Although this promise was only a formality of that moment, it materialized in the Inner
Mongolian Autonomy Movement in the fall of 1933. The khambus of the Panchen Lama
also tried to bring the two sides together, but their efforts also ended in vain.
Prince De’s first visit with Chiang Kai-shek was harmonious and established a
good mutual understanding, but no concrete result was reached. Following the visit.
Prince De met with several of Chiang’s assistants, such as Yang Yongtai, Gui Yongqing,
Cao Haosen, and others. Prince De’s hopes were to change government policy toward
Mongolia, establish a Mongolian military, and acquire real power; he had no interest in
the Nanjing government’s offer of a high honorary position. He explained to Chiang’s
assistants that his purpose in visiting the generalissimo was to reach a solution for the
Mongolian problem, not to secure for himself an appointment to a high official position.
In short, after this visit. Prince De saw Chiang as the real leader of China and as a states
man of good faith; and Chiang also recognized Prince De as a leader of the Mongolian
national movement, and not as an opportunist seeking personal gain. Although this visit
did not produce any constructive specific result, the mutual understanding influenced
Mongolian politics in later days.
Only the following could be considered a result of this visit. Chiang promised to
establish one Mongolian cavalry division and a branch of the Central Military Academy
in Sunid for training cavalry officers. It seems that Gui Yongqing made these sugges
tions. Later, Nanjing, realizing that Sunid was too far away, changed the site of the
branch school to Miaotan, just north of Zhangbei xian. The Japanese invasion of Rehe
and the subsequent threat to Shilingol and Chahar prevented these projects from ever
being carried out.
Before his departure to Hankou, Prince De had already arranged for Khorjurjab,
a “prince in leisure” of the Sunid Left Banner, to lead a group of Mongolian “delegates”
to go to Nanjing and express their good will to the government. This group received a
warm welcome in Nanjing; the newspapers hailed their visit as the first appearance of
Mongolian princes in the new capital. In order to exploit this good press and apply pres-
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sure on their mortal enemy, Wu Heling, Bai Yunti and his group showed great concern
for the delegation and willingness to cooperate with it.^
Prince De arrived while Khorjurjab’s group was in Nanjing,. He visited with
Wang Jingwei, head of the Executive Yuan; Dai Chuanxian, the head of the Examination
Yuan, who was known as a famous Buddhologist and an expert in frontier affairs; and
other dignitaries of the party and government. Before Prince De’s departure, Chiang Kaishek returned to Nanjing and had a second courtesy meeting with Prince De.
In short. Prince De’s visit to Nanjing was not successful; it failed to remove Wu
Heling from his post. Nevertheless, the National Government, trying not to disappoint the
prince, offered him an appointment as minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Com
mission. News of this offer greatly worried Shi Qingyang (who was the incumbent min
ister of this commission) and disappointed Bai Yunti (who had been competing for this
post). Prince De, however, rejected this offer, emphasizing that his visit to the capital was
not to seek any official position but to achieve a breakthrough leading to improvment in
the present Mongolian situation. In so doing, he relieved both Shi and Bai of their wor
ries. In order not to become involved in personal politics in the capital, he did not recom
mend that Bai take over Shi’s position. Consequently, Bai’s “assistance” to the prince
also gradually decreased. Nevertheless, most Mongol intellectuals in Nanjing and Beiping applauded his rejection of a high official position.
Just before Prince De’s departure, both the Panchen Lama and the Janggiya
Khutugtu arrived in Nanjing. By the end of December, the National Government ap
pointed the Panchen Lama as the Pacification Envoy for the Western Frontier Region and
the khutugtu as the Pacification Envoy for Mongolian Banners. This measure satisfied
Janggiya, who had long expected a position of political leadership. It was unprecedented
for a lama to be openly appointed as a governmental official with a legal status that could
let him interfere in Mongolian politics. The Manchu rulers were the initiators of a policy
for using religion to control the Mongols, although they still honored—at least ostensi
bly—the separation of religion and politics. It was evident that Yan Xishan and Dai
Chuanxian were the behind-the-scenes directors and managers of this political perfonnance. They thought that if a “Living Buddha” {Khutugtu) appeared, the Mongolian
problem could easily be solved. They did not realize that times had changed, and that this
kind of trick would no longer work. The growing influence of the intelligentsia in Mon
golian society was significant, and this kind of backward policy undoubtedly reduced

’ Although the opposition he faced was heavy, it did not affect Wu and his Nanjing Office of the
Mongolian League and Banner Delegates because all the delegates were dispatched to the capital
by their own league heads, and the head of the office was elected by the delegates themselves.
Prince De was only a deputy head of a league. He might dispatch a delegate from his own league,
but he was unable to transfer delegates of other leagues. Moreover, the head of the office was not
appointed by the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; and by law, the government was also
unable to remove him. Although the league heads did not oppose Prince De, they did not want to
offend Wu either. Chimedsampil, head of the Jerim League, was Wu’s leading opponent, but his
league was occupied by the Japanese. Chimedsampil himself had been appointed by Puyi as head
of the Mongolian administration in Manchukuo, and so was unable to join the campaign. The head
of the Shilingol League, Prince Sodnamrabdan, deeply disliked Buyandalai and did not endorse
him as head of the Nanjng Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates.
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their confidence in the Chinese government.''
During this time, two active and adventurous youths named Yu Fugeng (from
the Kharachin Left Banner and educated in the Beiping Mongolian-Tibetan Academy)
and Yun Jixian (from Hohhot Turned and educated in the Central Military Academy in
Nanjing) joined Prince De’s camp and helped him organize the Student Brigade in order
to give military training to the young students gathered in Sunid and create cadres for the
future Mongolian forces. The founding of this brigade attracted more adventurous per
sons to Prince De’s camp.
During this time, Fu Zuoyi, the governor of Suiyuan Province, was pushing hard
with his policy to extend the power of the province and xians in order to disintegrate the
leagues and banners. The Turned Banner was the first target for his encroachment. The
amban of Turned, Rong Xiang, was a graduate of the University of Law and Politics in
Beijing (later to become the College of Law of Beiping University). Rong Xiang wanted
to resist Fu Zuoyi but was powerless to do so. Nevertheless, two Beijing University stu
dents named Ren Bingjun and Mergenbagatur (Kang Ren) were daring enough to speak
out in opposition. Because of their outspoken opposition and association with Prince De,
Fu had them arrested and put into prison. After they were released, they went to Beiping
to continue their studies and there cast their lot with the camp of Prince De. They also
persuaded many more students to join Prince De’s camp. Mergenbator introduced his
schoolmate’s father, Wang Shiqing, an expert in ancient Chinese literature, to Prince De,
Later, this man became one of Prince De’s secretaries, and he either drafted or polished
many important statements. He was a faithful and prudent person, but his advice was
limited to questions of phrasing and wording in documents.

The Japanese Occupation of Rehe
and the Emergence of Li Shouxin
In the history of Inner Mongolia, 1933 was a year of special significance. The
Inner Mongolian Autonomy movement began during this year, and Japanese aggression
toward the western half of Inner Mongolia also flared up. During the spring of 1933, the
Japanese Guandong Army defeated Tang Yuling’s forces, occupied the whole area of
Rehe, including the two Mongolian leagues of Josotu and Juu Uda, and put them under
the control of Manchukuo. During this war, Cui Xingwu, commander of one of Tang’s
brigades, surrendered. Colonel Matsumuro Takayoshi, head of the Japanese Special
Service (intelligence) Office in Chengde and a well-known militaiy Mongolian specialist,
seized this opportunity and bribed Cui with a high-paying civilian post, thereby per
suading him to retire, then promoted Li Shouxin to be the commander of Cui’s former
brigade. Matsumoro then had the Manchukuo Army offer Li the rank of lieutenant gen
eral and reorganized his troops into the Kinggan Guerilla Division as a special strategic
component of the Japanese intrusion into western Inner Mongolia.*
* It should be mentioned here that the Janggiya Khutugtu and Wu Heling, who had originally been

at odds over Mongolian policy, were reconciled with each other through the mediation of the
Khutugtu's teacher,

’ Li Shouxin was bom in the Turned Right Banner of the Josotu League. In his youthful days his
parents sent him to a monastery of the Tugon Gegeen’s monastic system to become a lama. One
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During Japan’s invasion of the Rehe region, a Kharachin Right Banner Mongol
named Wu Guting, then an assistant officer in Tang Yuling’s staff, became resentful of
Japanese aggression. He recruited many militant and adventurous youth from the banners
of the Josotu and Juu Uda Leagues, and organized them into contingents of volunteers to
resist the Japanese. It was at this time, however, that Cui Xingwu surrendered and the
entire situation in Rehe changed. Because the members of Wu Guting’s group were
mostly Mongols, Japanese agents hoped to use them as pawns to manipulate Mongolian
affairs; and consequently the group became a target of these agents. Under great military
pressure and temptation, Wu Guting’s forces eventually became transformed from antiJapanese volunteers into a Japanese strategic force aiming at further encroachment on
western Inner Mongolia.
After Rehe was occupied, the Japanese began attacking the Great Wall line,
thereby threatening the stability of Beiping and Tianjin. In May, the Chinese were forced
to sign an armistice agreement at Tanggu and promised to withdraw forces from the
Great Wall. This gave the Japanese a chance to push forward the next step of their inva
sion, into North China. Meanwhile, they moved Li Shouxin’s forces westward and took
over Doloonnor, the gateway to western Inner Mongolia.®
day, a group of Chinese bandits arrived at the temple and forced him to take care of their horses.
When they withdrew, the bandit chief forced him to go with them. From then on, he was com
pletely separated from other Mongols. He could not even speak Mongolian. As time passed, the
headman died and Li was made the new bandit leader because of his courage and friendly attitude.
Under Li’s leadership, the band usually appeared in the southwestern Rehe district and was known
as “Da-xin-zi,” which means “Big Xin.” (The Chinese word xin means “faithful,” and Li’s given
name contained this word.) These bands sometimes appeared along the Mongol-Chinese border of
the Josotu and Juu Uda Leagues.
Cui Xingwu was at heart a would-be mler from horseback. After Tang Yulin’s takeover
of Rehe, he was made a brigade commander and assigned to recmit armed bandits into Tang’s
forces. He eventually persuaded Li Shouxin and his band to submit to Tang, and Tang put Li and
his men under Cui Xingwu’s commmand. By the time of the Japanese invasion, Li had already
been promoted to the rank of a regimental commanding officer within Cui’s brigade. Colonel
Matsumoro Takayoshi suddenly promoted Li Shouxin to a very important position to perform
Japanese “work” on Mongolia. All of Li’s followers, however, were Chinese; almost no Mongols
were involved. Because of his background, Li was an intensely realistic and opportunistic man
who had no national pride or sense of Mongolian identity. Later, during the Japanese occupation of
western Inner Mongolia, he was made the number-two leader of the Mongolian regime and became
a tool for the Japanese authorities to use to check Prince De. Although he was unconditionally
faithful to the Japanese, he was smooth, slick, and talented in manipulating circumstances to gain
benefits for himself
'■ In 1691, Doloonnor was the site of the Manchu Emperor Kangxi’s acceptance of the surrender of
the Khalkha leaders defeated by Galdan, the leader of the Oirad Mongols. Later, to commemorate
this historical event, the Mongol nobles built a monastery, the K.oke Sume (ch. Huizong si), on this
spot. In 1731, Emperor Yungcheng built another imperial temple, the Shira Sume (Shanyin-si), in
its vicinity and appointed the Janggiya Khutugtu as its abbot. Twelve Khutugtus were also assigned
to reside in these two monasteries. Doloonnor then became a great center of Buddhism in Inner
Mongolia. Because it was located on the road from Beijing to Ulaanbaatar (then Urga) of the
Khalkha, it also became a commercial center linking Mongols and Chinese. The Manchu court
established a preparatory magistracy {ting) there to manage Chinese affairs. At the beginning of the
republic, the preparatory magistracy was made into the Duolun xian. The Mongol shabinar (lay
disciples) of the Janggiya Khutugtu and other great lamas, however, were ruled separately by the

56

The Last Mongol Prince

Li Shouxin’s occupation of Doloonnor greatly influenced both the Chinese gov
ernment and the Mongolian banners. Feng Yuxiang, who had been expelled from politics
after the collapse of the “Enlarged Conference” in the summer of 1930, suddenly reap
peared in Kalgan. He openly urged the whole nation to take action against Japan and
titled himself commander-in-chief of the People’s Anti-Japanese Allied Forces to fight
for the protection of Chahar. The sudden rise of Feng worried the Mongol leaders of
Shilingol and Chahar, who recalled his early militarist anti-Mongol behavior and his proRussian, leftist inclinations. Besides recruiting his old followers and local Chinese forces,
Feng also reorganized the Mongolian forces under his control. He appointed Jodbajab of
Chahar as commander of the First Army and offered Prince De the post of commander of
the Second Army. Because of the geographic distance between Kalgan and Sunid, it was
possible for Prince De to decline Feng’s offer in a diplomatic manner, but the Chahar
leaders could not resist.
To eliminate the obstacles in his way, Feng arrested Nimaodzar, “the spirit of
Jodbajab,” who was popular among the Chahars and had good contacts with Nanjing.
Later, Nimaodzar was released through the efforts of Yao/Yue Jingtao (Murungga), a
founder of the early Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party who had good per
sonal relations with Feng. Nevertheless, Feng’s arrogance once again greatly offended
the Mongols, and anti-Feng sentiment among the Mongols encouraged Japanese propa
ganda against the Chinese.
The KMT government in Nanjing did not approve of Feng’s return to promi
nence, and three months later, Feng’s position collapsed without anything having been
accomplished. His collapse was not occasioned by Chiang Kai-shek alone but also by the
public consensus against him. Feng handed the provincial government of Chahar back to
Song Zheyuan, announced his resignation, and returned to his retirement at Mount Tai in
Shandong. During Feng’s occupation of Kalgan, his troops did on one occasion recover
Doloonnor from the hands of Li Shouxin. Following Feng’s collapse, however, Li’s
forces once again occupied the city.
While Feng was still in Kalgan, Prince De accompanied his mother on a pil
grimage to Wutai Mountain. At Kalgan, he visited Feng, who explained to him the rea
sons for and importance of his actions against Japan. This conversation, however, did not
change Prince De’s opposition to Feng’s activities. Following Song Zheyuan’s reap
pointment as governor and the subsequent reshuffle of the provincial government. Prince
De was again appointed as a commissioner.
During northern China’s long period of instability, Zhang Xueliang resigned
and left for Europe. The Chinese Government appointed He Yingqin, Minister of Mili
tary Administration, as Commissioner-in-Charge of the Beiping Branch of the Military
Committee and directed Huang Fu, Head Commissioner of the Executive Yuan’s Beiping
Political Adjustment Committee, to manage negotiations with Japan. Most of the Mon
gols did not really notice, but to Prince De, the changes were significant. He had to con
sider the problems that a defeat of China would present, the instability of the present cir
cumstances, and the viability of the Chinese Government’s guarantee of protection for
Inner Mongolia.
lama administration. Because of its historical background, Doloonnor gradually came to be recog
nized not only as a religious center but also as a center of Inner Mongolia’s economy, politics, and
military strategy.
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In the Tanggu Agreement, the Chinese more or less recognized the Japanese
takeover of the Rehe region; and as a consequence, the Guandong Army reorganized
several northern and western banners of the Juu Uda League into the so-called “ Mongol
ian Autonomous” Kinggan West Province. The Japanese placed the remaining banners
of the Juu Uda League and all banners of the Josotu League (except for Lama Kuriye)
under the jurisdiction of the two Chinese provinces of Jinzhou and Rehe, in both of
which there was a majority of Chinese agricultural settlers. In order to show their attentativeness to the demands of the Mongols, the Japanese also abolished all xians previ
ously established by the Chinese government in the territories of these banners. Even so,
these measures did not satisfy all Mongols in these banners. Many young and educated
Mongols who were disillusioned about life in their homeland decided to leave the Japa
nese puppet state of Manchukuo and to find a place where they could be more free and
able to do something to promote the survival of their own Mongol people. Many young
Mongol adventurers went to western Inner Mongolia and joined Prince De’s camp.

The Beginning of Japanese Encroachment
into Western Inner Mongolian Territory
After consolidating its occupation of Rehe, the Japanese Guandong Army began
its “Mongolian work.” The army dispatched Major Tanaka Hisashi and Altanwachir (Jin
Yongchang) as consultants to go to Ujumuchin and to visit with Prince Sodnamrabdan,
head of the Shilingol League. The Guandong Army also invited Prince So to visit Manchukuo’s head of state, Puyi. This Japanese mission received the cold shoulder. Prince
So, however, had little choice but to send his Jikirugch, Khuturi, to congratulate Puyi. At
this time, Tanaka asked for permission to establish a Japanese Special Service Office in
Ujumuchin, and to establish links with the other banners of Shilingol. Prince So an
swered, “ I cannot approve of establishing any such organization. You are not welcome to
stay in my banner. If you insist on establishing a Special Service Office, that will be your
affair and I will assume no responsibility for it.” The first contact between the Japanese
military and the Mongol Prince So ended in a very unfriendly atmosphere. Nevertheless,
the Guandong Army succeeded in establishing a Special Service Office in the vicinity of
the banner office at Ujumuchin to administer intelligence operations.
These problems put Prince So in a very difficult position: first, he was the most
influential prince in Shilingol and perhaps all of western Inner Mongolia; second, he was
strongly antagonistic toward Japan and its invasion of Inner Mongolia; third, his own
banner and the five eastern banners of his league had to buy agrarian products from the
territory of Japanese-ruled Manchukuo, especially from Rehe district; and fourth, he did
not want to respond coldly to Puyi, his former lord. Hence, he reluctantly accepted part
of Tanaka’s request. Although Prince So allowed the Japanese to come, he assumed a
strongly noncooperative attitude and boycotted their activities.
The first appointee to head the Japanese Special Service Office was Morishima,
who, as mentioned earlier in a footnote, had a Chinese wife and had lived in Kalgan for
years. He was honored by most Japanese spies as a senior participant in the “ Mongolian
work” who had traveled extensively in both Outer and Inner Mongolia. He could speak
some imperfect Mongolian with a strong Japanese accent. Among the Mongols he usu
ally posed as a “ friend of the Mongol people,” but most Mongols regarded him as the
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opposite. Since Morishima and his men were regarded as persona non grata, the Ujumuchin Banner provided only two yurts for them and did not give them any other sup
plies. Two men were assigned to “ serve” (i.e., watch) them, and no other people could
contact them. This shut them off from any possibility of gathering useful intelligence.
When winter came, their lack of fuel made them unable to withstand the severely cold
temperatures. Morishima had no choice but to leave. Thus the people of Ujumuchin, on
their first try, temporarily expelled the Japanese from their banner.
Although the Guandong Army’s first contact with western Inner Mongolia
ended in failure, Prince Sodnamrabdan and his officials (especially Togtokhu, the senior
tusalagchi who directed these negotiations) began to worry about the future Japanese
threat. These officials reported their concerns to the authorities of Chahar Province, the
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, and the Military Committee Beiping Branch.
But the responses of these organizations were nothing more than production of docu
ments; these organizations could not even negotiate with the Japanese, much less stop
Japanese aggression. This was why Prince So eventually lent his support to Prince De
and the Inner Mongolian Autonomy movement.
Prince So’s rejection led the Japanese to alter their methods for carrying out the
“ Mongolian work.” The Japanese gradually shifted their attention away from Prince So
and toward Prince De. Of course, the latter’s activities and articles about him in the
newspapers had already attracted the attention of the Japanese. It was probably about this
time that a Japanese by the name of Sasame Tsueno disguised himself as a lama and ap
peared in Sunid to meet with Prince De. He brought a letter from General Matsui Iwane
and General Hayashi Senjuro to the Prince and told him that Japan wanted to help the
Mongols found an independent country, and that his mission was for this purpose. He
was, of course, welcomed by Prince De, who had him stay secretly in a temple of his
banner. Earlier, before the Manchurian Incident, Sasame had already come to Beiping
and Manchuria. He brought Askhan and Kokebagatur (Han Fenglin) back to Japan and
arranged for them to study at the Shikan Gakko, a well-known Japanese military acad
emy. The young Mongol officers of the Kinggan (Xing’an) Army of Manchukuo later
came to admire Askhan. He appeared very pro-Japanese, but in reality he was a leftist.
Later, after Japan’s surrender in 1945, he became one of the initiators of the Eastern
Mongolian Autonomy Movement. He died soon after the Chinese Communist takeover
of eastern Inner Mongolia.
As mentioned, the Guandong Army invited Prince So to go to Manchukuo and
visit Puyi, but he reluctantly sent his Jakirugchi, KJiuturi, in order to maintain access to
Manchurian food supplies and also to avoid embarrassment. Other eastern banners of
Shilingol also sent delegates to celebrate Puyi’s inauguration for the same reason. Among
these delegates was one Urgungge from the Abaga Left Banner, a son-in-law of the old
Prince Yangsang. Urgungge’s assignment as a delegate, however, did not change Yangsang’s pro-Chinese attitudes. The four western Shilingol banners rejected the Guandong
Army’s invitation because these banners did not depend on a food supply from Manchu
ria and were also influenced by Prince De’s negative response. At that time, Prince De’s
attitudes toward Japan were still frigid, and he did not want to either please the Guan
dong Army or offend the Nanjing government.
Colonel Matsumoro, head of the Chengde Special Service Office, was active in
the “Mongolian work.” Under his management. Special Service Offices were established
in Ujumuchin and Doloonnor. Although the former Special Service Office collapsed, the
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latter office functioned quite well under the administration of Captain Shishiura. The
Chahar leaders, especially Jodbajab, were the main targets of these offices. Matsumoro
soon came to Doloonnor to convene a conference of Mongolian delegates. News of this
had a great impact on both Shilingol and Chahar. After cautious consultations, the ban
ners agreed that they should not offend the Japanese by bluntly rejecting their invitation.
These banners did agree, however, that they should not conclude any agreements with
the Japanese. So the delegates sent by the banners were lower-ranking officials who had
no authorizations to conclude agreements.
Meanwhile, Matsumoro’s airplane developed engine problems and landed un
expectedly in a mountainous area east of Doloonnor, where he was captured by a group
of bandits. Although released through Li Shouxin’s intervention, he was forced to cease
his military service permanently because of his negligence of the army’s moral tradition.
He did not kill himself but instead had allowed the enemy to capture him. By so doing,
he marred the pride of the glorious “ Imperial Army.” Immediately after his release, he
was promoted to the rank of major-general and ordered to retire.
Matsumoro’s stepdown also affected Sasame. A conflict soon broke out be
tween Sasame and Morishima, who was supported by Tanaka Hisashi. Sasame was re
called, and the Guandong Army forbade him to enter Mongolia ever again. After these
events, Japanese activity in western Inner Mongolia cooled off for a short period.
The fall of Rehe, the retreat of the Nanjing government forces, the political in
stability of North China, the arrogance of Fu Zuoyi and other top border officials toward
the Mongols, and Japan’s activities all caused the leaders of western Inner Mongolia to
realize that great change was inevitable. Making a breakthrough to such understanding
was, however, a difficult task for them.
As already noted, although the Soviets were opposed to Japan’s aggression, they
were preoccupied with internal problems of their own and had no strength to put pressure
on Japan. On the one hand, the Kremlin restored its diplomatic ties with China (severed
in 1929) because of the border conflict in Manchuria. But on the other hand, the Rus
sians, under Japanese pressure, sold the northern half of the Chinese Eastern Railroad to
Japan and withdrew from northern Manchuria.
After the 1928 fall of the Outer Mongolian nationalistic leader Dambadorji, no
body in Outer Mongolia took an active interest in Inner Mongolia or the movement to
unify the two Mongolias. At the same time, Choibalsan, influenced by Stalin’s elimina
tion of his opponents, carried out his own party purge. Thousands of people were brutally
liquidated, and some of the threatened leaders fled to Inner Mongolia, thus creating deep
confusion among the Inner Mongols toward Urga (Ulaanbaatar). This of course led many
independence-minded Inner Mongols to turn their attention to Japan.

VI
THE INNER MONGOLIAN
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT
JUNE 1933-MARCH 1934
Direct Causes
The period of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy movement was Prince De’s
golden age. The movement made him the world-famous leader of his people and also
symbolized the unified will of all of Inner Mongolia. This movement, in accordance with
the freely expressed will of the Mongols and not directed by any alien power, was the
most monumental event in the history of modern Mongolia but also the beginning of an
historical tragedy. If there had been no Prince De, there might not have been this type of
Mongolian nationalistic movement; if there had not been such a movement. Prince De
might not have become the leader of the Mongol struggle for self-determination and the
hero of this historical tragedy.
Here is a brief review of the historical background to the movement. After the
Anglo-French Invasion (also known as the Second Opium War, 1857-1860) and the ex
pansion of Tsarist Russia, the Manchu court began to change its policy toward Mongolia.
In order to stem the flow of Russian influence, the court ceased isolating Mongolia from
China Proper as a forbidden land and began to encourage Chinese peasants to migrate
and fill up the “borderland.” After the number of Chinese settlers reached a certain level,
the Manchu court established a Chinese style of political administration to handle Chi
nese affairs in the territories of the Mongolian leagues and banners. By the end of the
dynasty, the court had increased the power of the Manchu ambans in order to draw Mon
golia more completely into the Chinese realm. This action backfired and led to the declar
ation of Outer Mongolian independence in 1911 and its achievement during subsequent
decades. Although the policy of the Manchus toward Mongolia had failed in Outer Mon
golia, the Republic of China stubbornly continued the Manchu policy toward Inner Mon
golia, without change.
In 1928, when China was temporarily unified by the KMT, the Inner Mongols
began to oppose the establishment of Chinese-style administrative districts on their terri
tory. This opposition stemmed from the Mongols’ desire to protect their own political and
economic privileges. Although the Chinese government did not abolish the Mongolian
leagues and banners, it nevertheless neglected the desires of the Mongols and pushed
through its benighted policy of sinicization. Later, the government promulgated the Or
ganizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners to protect the traditional
Mongolian political institutions and evenly divide the power between the provinces and
xians on one hand and the leagues and banners on the other. However, the powerful fron
tier authorities ignored this law. Nor did the government fully protect the feudal privi
leges of the Mongol nobles, and most of the hard-line Mongolian conservatives, includ
ing Prince De, resented this.
Ethnic differences between the Chinese and Mongols were reflected and magni-
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Tied by the existence of two types of administrative frameworks in the same territory.
Conflict was, of course, inevitable. Moreover, because the central government usually
favored the provinces and xians, the status of the Mongolian administrations became
more inferior than ever. And because of provincial obstacles, relations between the Mon
golian leagues and banners and the central government were greatly damaged. In addi
tion, the northern warlords, acting as provincial governors, constantly disobeyed the or
ders of the central government; even if some of the central government’s decisions would
have been beneficial to the Mongols, the provincial governors usually ignored these deci
sions. Thus the situation in Inner Mongolia during the first decades of this century an
tagonized the provinces and diminished Mongol confidence in the central government.
Ever since the Manchu court began to encourage Chinese migration to and culti
vation of Mongolian territory, “Mongolian bandits” had been active in resistance. After
the Kuomintang government was established in Nanjing, the Shanxi warlords had Fu
Zuoyi (the governor of Suiyuan) and Wang Jingguo (the commander of the Shanxi forces
in the Baotou district) carry out by force the policy of military cultivation of Mongolian
territory so as to provide livelihoods for the multitude of discharged soldiers and landless,
jobless Chinese fanners. The warlords’ attitudes toward the Mongols were no different
from those of Feng Yuxiang and Zou Zuohua during the 1920s.
Strong animosity arose between the Mongol herders and the Chinese agricultural
settlers. From the Mongol point of view, the continuing increase of Chinese migration
and cultivation would eventually reduce the size of the Mongol grazing fields and hurt
the Mongols’ livelihood. These Mongol anxieties were intensified by the fact that Chi
nese cultivation of Mongolian territory usually began on prime pastures with the best
grass and water. If these lands were completely occupied by Chinese, then the Mongols
would have to retreat to inferior pasture areas. For these reasons, the Mongols regarded
the influx of Chinese agricultural settlers as a dangerous threat to the survival of their
people.
In 1930, the Mongolian Convention passed the “Resolution for Protection of the
Livelihood of the Mongol People,” which states that all Mongolian land unsuitable for
cultivation should be preserved as pasture forever, that lands suitable for agrarian use
might be put under cultivation only through the consent of the concerned banner(s), and
that a portion of this cultivated land should be preserved for the improvement of the live
lihood of the Mongols. Even though this resolution passed, the frontier provinces and
military governors ignored it, and Chinese cultivation continued as before. Under such
conditions, most Mongolian political leaders, intellectuals, and common people wanted
drastic change in order to ensure their survival as a people.
The Western imperialist invasions awoke the Chinese people and stimulated the
growth of both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism. The Outer Mongolian Independence
movement of 1911 greatly excited the Inner Mongolian ruling class and common people,
whether they supported it or not. Although the Pan-Mongolian movement advocated by
the Buriyad Mongols failed by the end of the First World War, it had considerable impact
on Mongol leaders and intellectuals. The call for national self-determination by Woodrow
Wilson’s Fourteen Points; the emergence of the republics, autonomous republics, and
minority areas in the Soviet Union; and especially the establishment of the Mongolian
People’s Republic in 1924 immensely gladdened the hearts of Mongol intellectuals.
When the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was founded, it had leftist in
clinations and propagandized for the unification of the two Mongolias.
The main contact between the Inner Mongols and the Chinese Kuomintang
started with the victorious Northern Expedition of 1927. The main KMT doctrine which
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attracted the Mongols was the fourth article of the Outline of Nation Building written by
party founder Sun Yat-sen: “Regarding the weak and minority nationalities inside the
country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out
self-determination and self-rule.” The Mongols thought optimistically that the success of
the KMT would create a new future for Mongolia and bring about self-determination and
self-rule. They waited in vain for five years for this promise to materialize. Their disap
pointment did not, however, deter them in their struggle for self-determination and selfrule; indeed, this bitter disappointment made them even more resolute in their demands.
The Chinese government could not protect the rights of the leagues and banners
and the livelihood of the herdsmen. Nor did the government abolish the old feudalistic
institutions and push through democracy as it had promised. In fact, the KMT govern
ment even continued the Manchu religious policy of using the high lamas to deceive the
people. This, not unexpectedly, created distrust and disappointment among both the con
servative ruling nobles and the liberal-minded intellectuals.
By 1933, the Japanese had already annexed the eastern half of Inner Mongolia.
Their policy toward the western half was to manipulate the old lord-vassal relationship
between Puyi and the Mongolian princes and sought alliance with these princes. It was
evident that if the Mongols were not able to unify themselves, the result would be cata
strophic. At this crucial juncture, many patriotic Mongols concerned with national sur
vival sought a solution to this crisis. Moreover, the top Chinese officials of the frontier
provinces, especially Chahar and Suiyuan, continuously pressed forward with Chinese
cultivation of Mongolian territory without regard to the Japanese expansion. The confu
sion and depression in East Asia, the aggression of Japan, difficulties in the Soviet Union,
disturbances caused by the Chinese Communists, and incompetence of the Chinese gov
ernment all inspired Prince De and his followers to take a courageous step forward and
advocate political autonomy for Inner Mongolia.

The Condition of the Leagues and Banners
The young intellectuals who had gathered under Prince De’s leadership were
waiting for an opportune moment to act and realized that this was the best time for them
to make a decisive move. Prince De had already established a high reputation for himself,
and his name often appeared in the newspapers. Although he was broadly supported by
young and zealous Mongol intellectuals, he had still not reached a position of prominence
among the traditional-minded local ruling princes. Moreover, after three centuries of
domination under the Manchu policy of fragmentation, it was very difficult for a broad
based political leader to emerge from among the Mongols themselves. Consequently, the
initiation of any new political movement had to have the support and agreement of these
prestigious princes and nobles.
Among the Jasags of the ten banners of the Shilingol League, except for Prince
De’s own Sunid Right Banner, he was only able to persuade Prince Rinchinwangdud (of
the Sunid Left Banner), Magsurjab and Khorjurjab (two “princes in leisure” of the same
banner), Shognodongrob (Prince of the Abaga Right Banner), and Sodnamnuobu (the
ruling beile of the Abkhanar Right Banner) to support him. Although young Budabala
was the Abaga Left Banner’s ruling vastjg, his father Yangsang, the aged ex-head of the
league, still wielded the real power. This old prince was at first sympathetic to Prince De
and even tried to pass his post as league head to him in order to block Prince Sodnamrabdan’s promotion to that prestigious position. Later, however. Prince Yangsang came to
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believe that Prince De was too ambitious and was always trying to initiate something
new. As a result, he turned away from Prince De.
Agdungga, the ruling beile of the Abkhanar Left Banner, always followed the
directions of Prince Yangsang because of tradition and because his banner was geo
graphically close to Abaga. Other princes, such as Sangdagdorji (of the Khauchid Right
Banner), Sungjingwangchug (of the Khauchid Left Banner), and Duke Dobdan (a
tusalagchi in charge of the jasag of the Ujumuchin Left Banner), were all faithful follow
ers of Prince Sodnamrabdan of the Ujumuchin Right Banner, then the head of Shilingol
League. Among them, Sungjingwangchug was a good personal friend of Prince So. In
other words, even in his own league, the status of Prince De was limited.
In the Ulanchab League, the Dorben Keuked (also known as Dorbod) Banner
was close to Sunid geographically, but Pandeigungchab, the prince of this banner, was
somewhat mentally unbalanced. Taking advantage of this shortcoming, Fu Zuoyi used
him as a political puppet against Mongolian interests. The real power of this banner was
in the hands of tusalagchi Dewagenden. Fortunately, this man felt goodwill toward
Prince De and tried earnestly to find a way to reconcile Wu Heling and Prince De.
The land of the West Gung Banner, located near the Great Bend of the Yellow
River, was rich and fertile. By the end of the Manchu domination, Chinese settlers had
taken over these good lands backed by the harsh oppression of Mongols by General Yigu,
and the Mongols and the Chinese immigrants were in constant conflict. By then, this land
had become a political target of Fu Zuoyi and his Suiyuan Provincial Government. These
outside influences brought about a split among the Mongols; one faction determined to
resist unconditionally, the other wanted conciliation. In general, most of the Ulanchab
leaders neither associated closely with Prince De nor had any ill feelings against him. The
situation of Yekejuu League was very difficult to predict.^
' The head of the league, Prince Yondonwangchug, was originally ihc jasag of the Khalkha Right
Banner (commonly known as Darkhan Beil). He later retired and made his nephew Gendenjab the
jasag. Another nephew, Shirabdorji, was the tusalagchi of the banner. Shirabdorji’s family was
well-known and quite prestigious in this league. Although Prince Yon was a faithful devotee of the
Law of Buddha and had no personal political ambition, he was a man of strong determination. Be
cause of his opposition to Chinese eultivation of Mongolian territory, he never compromised with
Fu Zuoyi. The well-known Beile-yin sume temple (Bailingmiao) was located at Bat-khaalag, about
forty kilometers south of his residence. Muuminggan, the neighboring banner to the southwest of
Darkhan-beile, was too small both in population and land to play a large role. The three banners of
Urad occupied half the area of the entire league. Of these banners, the Central Banner (commonly
known as the Middle Gung) was the largest. The jasag Babudorji was quite influential, and his
banner well ruled. Both the Right and Left Banners (commonly known as the West Gung and East
Gung), had however, suffered from internal power struggles and Chinese oppression for several
decades.
^ The seven Ordos banners of the Yekejuu League, located south of the Great Bend of the Yellow
River, geographically distant from Shilingol, had very little contact with the leaders of the Shilingol
League. The head of this league. Prince Shagdurjab, was originally the jasag of the Ordos Right
Front Last Banner (commonly called the Jasag Banner), but he had retired and passed the position
ofjasag to his son Ochirkhuyagtu. Prince Sha rarely traveled and had very little contact with out
side people. Nevertheless, in the 1920s, when the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
was active in the Yekejuu area, his banner was quite disturbed. He therefore had a very negative
impression of Bai Yunti and his group and supported Wu Heling and his Mongolian delegation in
their struggle against Bai Yunti and his comrades. In addition, he had no personal friendship with
Prince De. The deputy head. Prince Altanwachir (jasag of the Ordos Right Rear Banner, commonly
called the Khanggin Banner), was a mature politician who, during his visits in Beijing, became
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Hohhot, the site of the banner office of Turned, was also the location of the Suiyuan provincial government; the Chinese called it the Hohhot xian. Of course, Hohhot
became the center of conflict between the Mongol banners and the Chinese jc/ans. Since it
was also the power base of Fu Zuoyi, Fu and his followers kept close watch on this area.
In Mongolia, the Hohhot Turned area was extensively sinicized; Mongols under forty
years of age from this area rarely spoke Mongolian. Nevertheless, education was more
developed in Hohhot than elsewhere, and Mongolian nationalism there was quite strong.
Fu Zuoyi was able to put Rong Xiang, the amban of this banner, under his influence, but
he failed to enchain the nationalistic youth.
During the Manchu reign, the Chahar Tribe was organized into the Right and
Left Flanks, with each flank containing four banners. In addition to these banners there
were four pastures. There was no hereditary system for selecting banner heads, who were
known as ambans. No league was established, and both the banners and the pastures
came under the jurisdiction of the govemer-general (dutong) of Chahar.^ In the Right
Flank, Damrinsurung, the amban of the Pure Yellow Banner, was the senior. He was
quite nationalistic and had a good personal relationship with Prince De. In the Left Flank,
Samdanlhungrob, the amban of the Taipus Left Pasture, was also a good friend of Prince
De.
acquainted with Prince De. Because his banner was located in the vicinity of Baotou, he had fre
quent contact with the Shanxi Chinese authorities, such as Wang Jingguo and Fu Zuoyi. The two
southern banners of the Ordos Right Front (Uushin) and Right Ordos Central (Otog) both had been
bases of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, and so some people in these two ban
ners were influenced by the party’s doctrines. Other people, however, were offended by the party’s
campaign and became increasingly conservative. In other words, both Uushin and Otog contained
liberals and conservatives within their jurisdictions. Later, after the Chinese Communist occupation
of their neighboring northern Shanxi province, these two banners were easily turned into a Com
munist springboard for penetration into Inner Mongolia. The Ordos Left Central Banner (com
monly called the Jun Wang Banner), where the shrine of Chinggis Khan is still located, was tradi
tionally the main banner of the entire league. Its nAmgJasagh, Prince Tobshinjirgal, was an influ
ential leader of the league but had no personal contacts with Prince De. The Ordos Left Front Ban
ner (commonly known as Juungar), located in the north of the Ordos near the Yellow River, was
one of the influential centers of the league. In 1932 the dictator of this banner, the powerful
tusalagchi Nasunbayar, was assassinated by a rival. Because the nominal yosag was very young,
another tusalagchi, Qi Wenying, was placed in charge of the banner administration. Qi, thoroughly
preoccupied with the confusion within his own banner, had no interest in outside affairs. Another
section, also in the north near the Yellow River, was the Ordos Left Rear Banner (commonly
known as Dalad). Its Jasag, Khangdadorji, was a playboy who had no concern for the future of
Mongolia. Nevertheless, because of their geographic proximity to the Yellow River bend and their
fertile lands, both the Dalad and Khanggin Banners had been targeted for cultivation by the Chinese
from the end of the Manchu rule until the time of Fu Zuoyi. In short, because the entire territory of
the Yekejuu League was located south of the Great Bend of the Yellow River, it easily fell under
the shadow of Fu Zuoyi’s power.
’ Because of this, when the Chahar and Suiyuan Special Regions were transformed into provinces
in 1928, the Pure Yellow, Pure Red, Bordered Red, and Bordered Blue Banners of the Right Flank
were placed under the administration of Suiyuan; the Pure Blue, Pure White, Bordered White, and
Bordered Yellow Banners of the Left Flank, together with the pastures of Shangdu, Minggan, Tai
pus Right, and Taipus Left, remained under the administration of the Chahar provincial govern
ment. Although the Chahar Tribe was not a league, by long-standing tradition it usually joined with
the leagues. In the republican period, Chahar established the Joint Office of the Twelve Chahar
Banners and Pastures in Kalgan and recognized the seniority and leadership of the amban of the
Minggan Pasture, Jodbajab,
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By this time, Samdanlhungrub had passed away, and his successor, Serengnamjil, followed his predecessor’s footsteps. Norbujana, the amban of the Taipus Right Pas
ture, was a friend and follower of the amban of the left. The amban of the Bordered Yel
low Banner was the ambitious young Mugdenbuu. Although he was not an intimate ac
quaintance of Prince De, he supported the Autonomy movement for his own sake.
Temurbolod, the amban of the Shangdu Pasture (also known as the Aduuchin Pasture),
was quite friendly with Prince De because his banner was geographically close to Sunid.
Because the Pure White Banner was the home banner of Prince De’s mother, it continued
its friendly ties with Prince De.‘* Nevertheless, relations between Wu Heling and these
two Chahar leaders were much more intimate than were their relations with Prince De.
Jodbajab’s relations with the latter turned quite sour, especially after the failure of his
mediation between Wu and the prince.
Although the influence of the provincial government in Kalgan should not be
neglected, heightened educational standards encouraging the rise of nationalism were
sufficient to counterbalance the pressure from Kalgan. It became easier to get sympa
thetic support from the Chahar leaders—especially their intellectuals.
The two special banners of Alashan and Ejine on the west of the Great Bend of
the Yellow River were far away from the center of Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless,
Damzana (also known in Chinese transliteration as Dalizhaya), the ruling prince of
Alashan, was well acquainted with Prince De because they usually met in Beiping. Al
though they were not close friends, they somewhat understood each other. In addition,
because of the conflict between the Alashan Banner and the Ningxia Provincial Govern
ment, personal relations between Damzana and Governor Ma Hongkui (son of Ma Fuxiang, the former minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission) were very
unfriendly. Damzana supported any kind of struggle against the Chinese provinces and
xians.
Ejine, to the west of Alashan, was isolated from the outside world. Even so, it
also experienced heavy pressure from Ma Hongkui’s provincial government. Su Jianxiao
(later an active member of the Chinese Communist Party), the personal representative of
Tobshinbayar (the rulingy'asog of Ejine), was imprisoned by Ma Hongkui when he came
to the Ninghsia Provincial Government to negotiate local tax problems. Of course he lent
his full support to the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement.
The distance between Kokonor and Shilingol was great. The leaders of the
twenty-nine banners of the two leagues of the Right and Left Flanks of the Kokonor
Mongols had almost no contact with Prince De. They were thoroughly subdued under the
heavy pressure of the notorious Moslem warlords Ma Bufang, the governor of Qinghai,
and his cousin Ma Buqing. No one dared to initiate anything unless it was approved per
sonally by Ma Bufang, and so it was impossible to win open support from Kokonor. Earl
ier, however, because of Ma Fuxiang’s influence, the two Kokonor Leagues had sent four
delegates to Wu Heling’s Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Dele
gates, but two of them were Chinese from Ma Bufang sent to watch the two Mongol
delegates. Even these two Mongol delegates had nothing to do with Prince De.

'* The Pure Blue Banner during this time suffered from serious internal conflicts and had no interest
ip matters outside its own territory. The situation of the Bordered White Banner was similar to that
of the Pure Blue. By then, Nimaodzar, once the amban of the Minggan Pasture, was the outstanding
and prestigious leader among all the Chahar banners and was known as the brains of the elderly
Jodbajab.
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Preparatory Work
Of course Prince De was well aware of the difficult situations mentioned above,
but he also realized that this was the only moment during which he might be able to use
the conflict between China and Japan and the complicated world situation to make a
breakthrough for Inner Mongolia. Yet he dared not openly advocate this important move
without careful consultation with other leaders. Grasping the chance provided by the
Panchen Lama’s stay in Ujumuchin, Prince De went there to visit with Prinee Sodnamrabdan to discuss the situation.
Although the Ujumuchin Banner had expelled Morishima and his Special Serv
ice Office during the previous winter, it was forced to accept Tanaka Hisashi and his of
fice of intelligence the next spring. This led Prince So to have more worries about the
insufficient protection provided by the Chinese government and the increasing pressure
from the Guandong Army. So when Prince De visited him and suggested that it would be
better to unite all the leagues and banners into one body to deal with the Japanese, he
responded positively. Prince De argued further that unless this measure was taken, the
Mongols would collapse under Japanese pressure or political bribes. Not only did Prince
So immediately agree with Prince De’s proposal, he also gave his full support in later
struggles. Other important persons who participated in these secret talks were Togtakhu,
the senior tusalagchi of UJumuehin, and Prince Sungjingwangchug (1886-1948) of the
Khauchid Left Banner. At this time. Prince So was overweight and in poor health, and the
actual administration of his banner was handled by Togtakhu, a man of courageous spirit.
Because Prince Sung was a prudent person, he also was involved.
Another great supporter was the Panchen Lama. Prince De’s pretext for visiting
Ujumuchin was his desire to pay personal respect to his great master. The Panchen
Lama’s opinions influenced Prince So’s decision-making process. This exiled Tibetan
religious leader recognized that under such difficult conditions, the only possibility for
the Mongols to rescue themselves was to unify and carry out a joint defense of their peo
ple and territory. Yet, because of his personal position, he could not express this idea
openly.
The final act of Prince So was to write a personal letter to Prince Yondonwangchug (1870-1938), head of the Ulanchab League, and have Prince De go to Ulanchab to
discuss this problem face to face with Prince Yon. As head of the league. Prince So in
vited the jasags of the ten banners to come to his residence for discussions. The former
head of the Shilingol League, Prince Yangsang, who was still quite influential, although
he disagreed with Prince De’s proposals, remained neutral in order to blunt further Japa
nese aggression.
After receiving the confidential letter from Prince So, Prince De went to Beileyin sume, the famous temple at Bat-khaalag, under the pretext of making a pilgrimage.
From there he sent an envoy to the residence of Prince Yondonwangchug to announce his
arrival. Because this was such an important matter. Prince Yon told the messenger that he
* The temple was the official monastery of the Khalkha Right Banner (the banner of Prince Yon).
would
see the
honorable
guest at the temple
a few was
daysbeile
later.(third-ranking prince), the
Becauselike
the to
original
rank
title of Yondonwangchug’s
ancestor
monastery was called Beile-yin sume, the temple of the beile. In colloquial speech it was called the
Beilin-sum, and the Chinese called it Bailingmiao, a phonetic approximation of the Mongolian.
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Prince Yon did not immediately invite Prince De to his own residence, for two
reasons: first, he himself had never met this new and adventurous young prince from
Sunid; and second, he had to handle such important matters with great care and needed
some advice from those who knew Prince De better. At this time, the head of the Bureau
of Mongolian Affairs of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Bayankhan (also
known by his Chinese names as Ba Wenjun or Ba Weisong), came to Bat-khaalag on
some official business with the banners of the Ulanchab League. Bayankhan was a
Hohhot Turned Mongol who had studied chemistry at the University of Lyons in France
during his youth. While Prince De was visiting in Nanjing, they became acquainted. Al
though Bayankhan was a sinicized person, he was very nationalistic, and because of his
studies in France, he was deeply influenced by the Western doctrine of freedom of
thought. Limited by his own circumstances, he had no chance to push through his ideas.
When Prince De told him about the purpose of his visit, Bayankhan was moved by his
enthusiastic nationalism and volunteered to see Prince Yondonwangchug on behalf of
Prince De to explain the need for Mongolian autonomy.
Early in 1911, when Outer Mongolia declared its independence, most of the
princes and nobles of Ulanchab were sympathetic to Ulaanbaatar. At that time, Yondon
wangchug was already the deputy head of the league and was involved in that movement.
Later, circumstances made it impossible for them to join Outer Mongolia, and under the
pressure and bribes of Zhang Shaozeng, the governor-general of Suiyuan, they had to
express their support for the newly established republic. As a reward, the Beijing gov
ernment conferred promotion on most of the nobles of the league. Yondonwangchug was
promoted from the rank of beile to junwang, or second-ranking prince.
During the period of Chinese warlordism, the Ulanchab League was disturbed
by endless civil war and forceful immigration of Chinese farmers to cultivate its grazing
fields. Understandably, Prince Yon was greatly disappointed with the Suiyuan Provincial
Government. Although he was unable to take any violent measures to stop Chinese en
croachment, he never compromised with his Chinese opponents. So when Bayankhan
visited him, he asked if the Nanjing government would order Fu Zuoyi to attack the
Mongols if they demanded autonomy. Bayankhan responded that under such conditions it
would be impossible for the Chinese to intervene militarily. Getting such words from
Bayankhan, Prince Yon decided to come to Bat-khaalag to meet with Prince De. In
Prince Yon’s banner, both of his nephews—Gendenjab, the Jasag, and Shirabdorji, the
tusalagchi—agreed to this decision. Nasunochir, the jakirugchi, was comparatively proOuter Mongolia, but he still supported Inner Mongolian autonomy.
On July 25, Yondonwangchug and his two nephews arrived in Bat-khaalag and
talked with Prince De for two days. Finally, they decided that to increase the strength
Because the temple was located in Batu-khagalaga (Bat-khaalag), the Mongols commonly called it
Bat-khaalagiin sum. It was a large monastery built mainly in the Tibetan architectural style; only
some parts of the main halls were constructed in the Chinese style of temple architecture. Unfortu
nately, this temple was damaged by Fu Zuoyi’s invading troops during the winter of 1936, but it
was repaired during the Japanese occupation. In the fall of 1945, it was heavily damaged by Soviet
forces, and finally was almost destroyed by “Red Guards” during the Cultural Revolution in the
1960s under the direction of the “non-Han chauvinist” Chinese Communist Party. Along a river
east of the temple were several dozen Chinese shops, houses for merchants, and a telegraph station.
The temple was one of the main stops along the Suiyuan-Xinjiang automobile transportation route,
and also one of the stations for the opium trade between Suiyuan and the provinces of Ningxia and
Gansu.
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applied to a united defense against the pressure from the frontier provinces, to resist
Japanese encroachment, and to maintain the unique traditions of Mongolia it was neces
sary to request permission for autonomy from Nanjing and to establish a Mongolian gov
ernment for self-rule. They also agreed to convene a conference of all the jasags of the
banners and the leaders residing outside Mongolia to decide the future of their own peo
ple. During these talks. Prince Yondonwangchug was resolute. His determination greatly
moved Prince De, and a solid friendship developed between these two leaders. Years
later, when Prince De referred to the Autonomy Movement, which started in BatKhaalag, he always praised the unyielding spirit of Prince Yondonwangchug. In other
words, the movement got under way only after Prince Yon gave his consent. Because of
his prestige, no objection was raised to Yondonwangchug’s decision in the Ulanchab
League—at least not at that moment—and therefore the problem of the six banners of
that league was settled.
The situation in the Yekejuu League was different: the league had to make se
cret contacts with Prince De first and only then come into the open. Moreover, the loca
tion of this league was south of the Yellow River and the Beiping-Suiyuan Railroad. In
addition, it was cut off from the rest of Inner Mongolia by the two cities of Hohhot and
Baotou, the military bases of Fu Zuoyi. It would have been quite dangerous for Prince De
to go there personally. Just then, it was reported that the deputy head of the Yekejuu
League, Prince Altanwachir, was in Hohhot, so Prince De sent Altangerel, his meiren
janggi (third highest official of the banner), to go there and report to Altanwachir on the
talks between himself and Prince Yon. The response was positive. Altanwachir not only
showed his personal support, but also gave to Prince De the names of the Jasags of the
seven banners of the Yekejuu League and told the emissary of Prince De to put these
names on documents to be used during time of need.*
After receiving so encouraging an answer from Prince Altanwachir, Prince De
returned to Sunid and sent a messenger to report his success to Prince So. In the name of
all the league heads and jasags. Prince De issued an open telegram announcing the de
mand for a higher degree of autonomy. He also announced that a Mongolian congress of
all jasags, ambans, and other officials and leaders residing outside the banners would be
convened to discuss autonomy, and that a self-rule government would be established on
September 28, 1933 at Beile-yin sume of the Khalkha Right Banner of the Ulanchab
League.
The reasons for selecting Bat-khaalag as the location for this important confer
ence, a milestone in modem Mongolian history, were varied: (1) both Prince So and
Prince De tried to avoid arousing suspicion that this movement was being monopolized
by the leaders of the Shilingol League; (2) although Beile-yin sume was not far from the
power base of Fu Zuoyi, it was quite remote from Japanese-occupied territories and thus
might help avoid suspicion of Japanese involvement; (3) it would be easier for the ban
ners of Alashan, Ejine, and Yekejuu to be involved; and (4) Prince So was a person of no
political ambition; therefore, to help the movement along. Prince So decided to have
Prince Yon of the Ulanchab League be the leader of the movement.

* These actions of Altanwachir were emotional and were done without due consideration. Because
he did not discuss these actions with the head of the league and the leaders of the banners, they later
became loopholes that Fu Zuoyi used to prevent the leaders from joining the Bat-khaalag move
ment. They even made it impossible for Altanwachir to continue his support as he had promised.
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A book purporting to be an autobiography of Prince De,’ a distorted record
made during Prince De’s imprisonment by the Communists, conceals some facts that can
nevertheless be perceived by reading between the lines;
At that moment Sasame, the Japanese agent disguised as a lama and hiding at a temple in
my banner, told Han Fenglin [Kokebagatur], “You started the Autonomy movement too
early. The time is not yet ripe. It would be better to start the Autonomy Movement when
our Japanese military forces arrive.” This showed that the Japanese imperialists were not
pleased with our demand to the Kuomintang central government for autonomy....
1 also sent Han Fenglin to the Japanese Embassy Beiping Branch Office to visit the
military attache Shibayama and find out his attitude toward Inner Mongolian autonomy.
Han Fenglin returned and reported, “In Beiping 1 met Shibayama . . . and asked [them] to
give [their] support for the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. His response was,
‘There are too many problems between China and Japan, and conflicts occur unceasingly.
Even so, diplomatic relations are still being maintained. Inner Mongolian autonomy is an
internal problem of China, It would be inconvenient for Japan to interfere.’ His tone was
cold. It seems that [they] were not interested in Inner Mongolian autonomy.”

These words suggest that Inner Mongolian autonomy was not Japan’s goal, and that it
was not encouraged by the Japanese.

The Immediate Response
Prince De’s open telegram was aimed at the Chinese government and the KMT.
It tried to explain why the Mongols were demanding a higher degree of autonomy and
stressed the Mongol goal of self-protection. It also urged the government to honor the
will of Sun Yat-sen, which promised the right of self-determination and self-rule. This
will stated that the term “higher degree of autonomy” meant that, with the exception of
national military and diplomatic affairs, which were clearly matters to be managed by the
central government, the rest of the administration should be handled by the Mongols.
Autonomy would be a step toward cooperation among the nationalities, not a separatist
movement.
Newspapers printed sensationalistic reports about Mongol demands and created
an uproar. During this uproar, I was accepted by Beiping University as a freshman. Both I
and other Mongol students in Beiping were overwhelmed; our excitement was indescrib
able. We rushed to tell each other about this event and gathered to discuss what kind of
contribution we should make for this common purpose. All factional disagreement among
ourselves disappeared immediately, and we were united in striving for the same goal. Of
course the high emotions of the Mongol students in Nanjing were exactly the same as
those of the students in Beiping.
The response of Mongolian politicians to Prince De’s initiative was positive but
complicated. The first group to give Prince De a positive answer was Wu Heling’s Nan
jing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates. At the same time, Wu made
contact with both the government and the party and tried to find out whether they would
permit autonomy. In so doing, he was able on the one hand to act as a delegate of the
Mongolian leagues and banners and, on the other hand, to give his advice to the govem’ Tao Buxin, ed. Demuchukedonglupu zishu (Personal narrative of Demchugdongrob), Inner
Mongolian Historical Materials, No, 13 (Hohhot: Inner Mongolian Peoples' Press, 1984), p. 3.
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ment for formulating a policy response to this event. This was Wu Heling’s usual style in
Mongolian politics. Although that made it easier for him to establish himself as an im
portant mediator between the two sides, it also created some suspicions among the Mon
gols that he was an agent of the Nanjing government.
Encouraged by this movement, party officers, students, and some young Mongol
staff members in the government gave up their Jobs, salaries, and studies, left Nanjing,
and went to Beile-yin sume to Join the Autonomy Movement. These persons included
Oljeitu, Mergenbagatur, and others. From Beiping, Dugurengsang (Bai Haifeng), a
Kharachin Mongol who was a first-session graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy
and had been educated in both Ulaanbaatar and Moscow, escaped from the supervision of
General He Yingqin and fled to Bat-khaalag to Join the ranks of the Mongol activists. The
Mongols in Nanjing and Beiping who had split in 1928 were now reunified by this call
for Mongolian survival and expressed their full support of the demand for autonomy.
They were excited and at the same time anxious to see results.
After the newspapers published the Mongols’ demand for autonomy, the move
ment attracted nationwide attention as well as attention from foreign Journalists. The
government, however, did not respond immediately, nor did it reply to the open telegram.
This did not mean that officials were neglecting this very important matter, but rather that
they were preparing to solve the problem. The government hoped to act after emotions
had cooled. Also, it was greatly worried that Japan might be involved. The relevant office
of the administration was, of course, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; but it
had no plans or measures to use to respond to a demand for Mongolian autonomy.
Among the officials of the administration, Fu Zuoyi, the governor of Suiyuan,
and his boss, Yan Xishan, the head of the Shanxi clique, and their group were the most
anxious. They decided to mobilize their entire strength to crush the Mongolian autonomy
movement. Although Song Zheyuan, the governor of Chahar Province, was also unhappy
with the movement, the conflict between his provincial government and the Mongols was
not as bad as was the antagonism in Suiyuan, by comparison with which his attitude was
relatively mild. The goal of Mongolian autonomy required a clear division of power be
tween the Mongol administrations and the Chinese provinces and xians. Hence the Mon
gols viewed Fu Zuoyi and his group as their number-one enemy, not Song and his group.
Prince De and his comrades did not Just wait for the answer of the Nanjing gov
ernment; they also carried out active preliminary work. Prince De convinced Prince Yon
to have the abbot of the Beile-yin sume invite the Panchen Lama (who was then in Sunid)
to come and conduct the Kalachakra Initiation, the most important religious ceremony of
Tibetan Buddhism, at their monastery. Of course, although the high lama clearly under
stood the intention of this invitation, he accepted it with pleasure. Both Prince Yon and
Prince De knew that the presence of the Panchen Lama would attraact thousands of Mon
gols to Beile-yin sume to pay homage and attend the ceremonies, and that would increase
the momentum of the movement. Also, the officials at the meeting might not all be dedi
cated to the goal to the same degree, and they might ask for instructions from their mas
ter. Since the Panchen Lama was sympathetic to the Mongolian struggle for survival, he
would give them a positive answer. This was a top secret at that moment. The presence of
this high lama and his sympathetic attitude had great impact on the decisions of the con
servative attendees.
The first step of the counterattack by Yan Xishan, Fu Zuoyi, and their group was
to dispatch their special emissaries to the leagues and banners of Yekejuu, Ulanchab, and
Turned and convince them with threats and bribes not to become involved in this move
ment. As the result of this pressure, they were able to stop theya^ags of the Yekejuu
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League from going to Bat-khaalag. They not only forced Prince Altanochir to break his
promise but also to express openly his personal opposition to the movement. The promise
that Altanochir had made without consulting Shagdurjab now turned out to be a stum
bling block for the Yekejuu banners in joining the movement. The plot of Yan and Fu did
not, however, work out in the banners of the Ulanchab League because of the prestige of
Prince Yon. Yan Xishan even sent his trusted henchman, Shi Huayan, the superintendent
of Northwest Cultivation Affairs, as his private representative to visit Prince Yon for dis
cussion, but this attempt also ended in failure.
Influenced by Yan and Fu, Song Zheyuan also sent his top advisor, Xiao Zhengyin, to Sunid to visit with Prince De, but their talks reached no conclusion. Then Xiao
went to Abaga to persuade Prince Yangsang to oppose the movement. This aged conser
vative leader disagreed with the actions of Prince De, but because he wished to preserve
the outward unity of the Shilingol League and a tradition that frowned on open political
intervention by the ex-head of a league. Prince Yangsang refrained from expressing his
personal opinion. From Abaga, Xiao went to Ujumuchin to dissuade Prince Sodnamrabdan, the head of the Shilingol League. This effort also failed.
The ambans of the Chahar Left Flank Banners and pastures were officially un
der the administration of the Chahar provincial government. Although it was difficult for
Song Zheyuan to prohibit them from joining the conference, they had to avoid further
conflict with Kalgan. In order to protect themselves and to avoid hurting their relations
with all sides, they decided to consult with other ambans. Jodbajab and Nimaodzar also
decided to contact both the provincial government and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission; they also had Mugdenbuu (the amban of the Bordered Yellow Banner, who
had better relations with Prince De) and Khasochir (a young and adventurous official) go
to Bat-khaalag and attend the conference. As for the four banners of the Chahar Right
Flank, because of their administrative relations with the Suiyuan provincial government
and Fu Zuoyi, they were not able to join the others at Bat-khaalag.

The Preliminary Committee and the Declaration
Prince De and his assistants were mindful of these difficulties. After the middle
of September, a small minority of the Shilingol attendants gradually arrived in Beile-yin
sume.* Because the attendees were still too few in number. Prince Yon and Prince De
postponed the meeting for ten days and had the formal opening session on the ninth of
October.
The situation in the Yekejuu League was delicate. Although the league head.
* The Jasags and delegates from Shilingol were Prince De himself and his Sunid followers: his
good friend Khorjurjab, a “prince in leisure” of the Sunid Left Banner; Shonnudongrob, jasag of
the Abaga Right Banner; Prince De’s father-in-law, Gungsang, tusalagchi of the Abaga Left Ban
ner; Sodnamnorbu, jasag of the Abkhanar Right Banner; Bazargurda, tusalagchi of the Abkhanar
Left Banner; Sungjingwangchug.^osag of the Khauchid Left Banner; Tubdannima, tusalagchi of
the Ujumuchin Right Banner; Ichingga, tusalagchi of the Ujumuchin Left Banner; and a delegate
from the Khauchid Right Banner. From the Ulanchab League were Yondonwangchug himself;
Gendenjab,yajag of the Khalkha Right Darkhan Banner; Shirabdorji, tusalagchi of the same ban
ner; Dewagendon, tusalagchi of the Dorbcd Banner; Babudorji, deputy head of the league and his
son Rinchinsengge,y«sag of the Urad Central Banner; Erkedorji, tusalagchi of the Urad Front Ban
ner; Juutaibau, jakirugchi of the Urad Rear Banner; and Chimedrinchinkhorlowa, jasag of the
Muuminggan Banner.
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Prince Shagduijab, was under pressure from Fu, and was unable to express his support
openly, in his heart he had no objections. Wu Heling secretly persuaded Prince Sha to
have the two delegates of his league, Senggerinchin and Burintogtakhu (who were sta
tioned in the Nanjing office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates) leave Nan
jing and go to Bat-khaalag to attend the conference. Rong Xiang, the Turned amban, was
in a similar situation. Su Ludai, the delegate stationed in Nanjing, went directly from the
capital, and Bayar was secretly sent from Hohhot. The four banners of the Chahar Right
Flank under Fu’s strict control were unable to send delegates, but the two ambans,
Temurbolod and Mugdenbuu, sent from the Left Flank, were recognized as delegates
representing all the Chahar banners and pasmres. The representative of the Ejine Banner,
Su Baofeng, was the banner delegate stationed in the Nanjing office of the Mongolian
League and Banner Delegates, so he went to the conference from the capital. The
Alashan Banner and the two leagues of Kokonor (Qinghai) could not dispatch their repre
sentatives to join the conference because of time constraints and pressure from the Mos
lem Ma family warlords.
In addition, there were also delegates from the Japanese-controlled territories.
Engkeamur of the Josotu League and Jirgalang of the Jerim League, both of whom had
been stationed in Nanjing since 1928, also arrived from the capital. Since Wu Heling had
persuaded so many delegates from Nanjing to join the conference, relations between him
and his erstwhile political opponent. Prince De, became much more amicable. This move
also increased his personal influence among conference attendees.
Also from Nanjing came a representative of the Association of Fellow Mongols
in Nanjing, Bai Rui, a Kharachin man who had joined Sun Yat-sen’s Guangdong gov
ernment years earlier. After the Nanjing government was established, he was appointed a
member of the Control Yuan. The Mongols in Beiping sent Keshig,^ Sainbayar, Ao
Yunzhang—all faithful supporters of Prince De—and others as their representatives. By
this critical time, the intellectuals gathered at Prince De’s camp also arrived at Beile-yin
sume, and they were all ordered to serve as staff members of the conference secretariat.
Since the formal conference could not be convened on September 28, 1933,
those who had arrived met as a preliminary committee. The high emotions at this meeting
led the persons in attendance to send another telegram to the leaders of the Nanjing gov
ernment and the KMT. In reality, this telegram should be considered as the real Declara
tion of Inner Mongolian Autonomy. Its text follows:
This petition is to state that the situation on the frontier has become more serious by the
day, and that in order to satisfy the hopes of our Mongol masses, we must organize the In
ner Mongolian Autonomous Government to carry out self-rule, deliver our people from
extermination, and fortify the national defenses. Our case follows.
Our Mongolian emperor, Chinggis Khan, put both Europe and Asia under his rule,
and the whole universe was pacified. [He] brought justice and peace to China proper and
harmony to all the nationalities. [He] expanded the territory of the Middle Kingdom to a
degree unprecedented in history and gave glory to all East Asian nations. [This] was recog
nized by the whole world. Those who have succeeded [him] should faithfully maintain the
doctrine that the realm under heaven belongs to the public, that fellow countrymen should
be treated equally without discrimination, and that all lands within the four oceans are un
der one roof. We [Mongols] joined ourselves to the [Manchu] Qing and were treated with
’ Keshig was the great-grandson of Senggerinchin, the commander of the Mongolian volunteers
who fought bravely against the Anglo-French invading forces at Tanggu Port and against the Chi
nese Taiping rebels during the mid-nineteenth century.
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care and honor. When the republic was established, because of the commonwealth [advo
cacy] of the five nationalities, we sincerely lent our support and whole-heartedly looked
forward to a good government, prosperity, and blessings. Now, under the domination of the
theory of evolution and the survival of the fittest, the more civilizations develop, the more
their morals decline; the more science is successful, the more human beings will be annihi
lated by efficient weapons. If it is impossible for us to rely on ourselves, there will be no
justice that [we] can rely upon. If reform cannot be carried out, there will be no way for us
to survive. Under such circumstances, our central government should be aware of the situa
tion, provide brilliant guidance, and remedy shortcomings so as to be on an equal footing
with the powerful nations of Europe and America, thereby to enhance the prestige of China
and strive for international equality.
Nevertheless, the government has not only neglected to implement such policies, but
it even exploits [us]. At first there was migration and cultivation. Then came the establish
ment of [Chinese] provinces and xians. The so-called policy for developing [Chinese] na
tional wealth and strength is nothing but a mortal wound for Mongolia. How can we avoid
grief and distress while recalling these past pains? In the present world, everybody clearly
knows that if the rights of the people are taken away, the destitution of the livelihood of the
people and the decline of the race will be the inevitable result. Even so, the Mongols cor
dially support the nation and do not waver, but rather hope that the central government will
formulate sound plans for building a new Mongolia.
Soviet Russia has already imposed agony in Outer Mongolia for ten years, and Japan
is currently implementing its traditional aggressive “Continental Policy.” The annexation of
Manchuria and Mongolia will be the next step. It is clear that we face a crisis that will de
termine our future welfare and happiness. If we continue to be lax and waste time, then
perilous danger will immediately approach us. If Mongolia is exterminated, then the gate
ways to North China proper will all be opened [to the Japanese enemy]. The provinces
north of the Yellow River will fall as did the provinces of the northeast, and then the splen
did territory of China will come under alien tyranny. This would be a galling shame and
humiliation to the entire nation of China. In thinking of these matters, how can we refrain
from weeping? Our central government has repeatedly suffered from internal disturbance
and paid no attention to us. Perhaps we Mongols are considered irrelevant or valuelessi
More than a decade has now passed, and our government has made no efforts to re
cover Outer Mongolia. Eastern Inner Mongolia is now being swallowed up, and there is no
way to stop the enemy. These facts cannot be neglected. Under the pressure of our violent
neighbor and the neglect of our central government, the leagues, tribes, and banners of
Jerim, Juu-uda, Josotu, and Hulun-buir have all been taken over in the twinkling of an eye.
How can the leagues and banners of the western frontier, which lack basic strength, con
front the aggression of so powerful an enemy? Facing such a tense situation and the ap
proaching disaster, we, the leaders of the leagues of Mongolia, have come to realize that if
it is impossible to unite, there will be no way to protect ourselves from disaster. If we do
not rescue ourselves, we will have no future. Unity must begin with political unification
and the reform of antiquated and inappropriate administrative practices. In order to ensure
[our] survival, [we] must establish an organization for self-determination and self-rule and
increase the people’s strength.
For these purposes, the heads of the leagues and the jasags [of the banners] have de
cided unanimously to strive for the accomplishment of [our national] survival. In July of
this year, [we] the heads of the leagues, yasags, heads of banners, princes, and nobles gath
ered at Beile-yin sume of the Ulanchab League. Following [our] discussion, [we] reached
the conclusion that bringing about a high degree of autonomy [was the only way] to save
the [Mongol] people from extinction and to ensure their survival.
[We have] established the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government to assume the
overall authority of administration in Inner Mongolia in order to stop the insidious propa
ganda and invasion from the outside; to evenly develop education, economy, military,
transportation, enterprise and other works; to carry out organized and orderly politics; to

73

74

The Last Mongol Prince
solve the problems of people’s suffering and their livelihood; to correspond to the will of
the Mongol masses; to bring about the unity of soldiers and civilians; and to strengthen the
defense of the frontier zone. This will eliminate the central government’s fear of distur
bance in [the border areas] and will save the Mongols from fear of calamity.
Consider the instructions of Mr. Sun Yat-sen: “Foster the weak and small nationali
ties to make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” We honor
these instructions as a golden rule, a precious precept, and an unchangeable model [that
should be adhered to] for ten thousand generations. [The purpose of] these instructions is
clearly to protect the rights and benefits of the weak and small nationalities. Establishing
the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Government under the teachings of Mr. Sun and [the ideal
of] humanism will undoubtedly save us from disaster and extinction. This will not only
give the Mongols cause to rejoice but will also be a blessing to the entire nation.
If this cannot be achieved, the fallen [Mongol people] will never recover, and there
will be no way to save [Inner Mongolia] from the fate of Outer and Eastern Mongolia. [All
Mongolian territories] are as closely related as lips and teeth, and they are bound together
by their common Joy and sorrow. Moreover, the goal of the [KMT’s] “Period of Political
Tutelage” is [to help the people] carry out self-rule. In addition, the autonomy of Outer
Mongolia was already assented to by the National Congress [Guomin huiyi] in the twentieth
year of the republic [1931]. The Preliminary Constitution states that “the Mongolian local
institutions should be settled according to local circumstances.”
Therefore, we honestly hope Your Excellencies of the party and the nation will see
that our petition will be beneficial to the Mongols and in accordance with the teachings of
Mr. Sun Yat-sen. The reasons for the establishment of this government are to satisfy the
will of the people and save Mongolia during this [time of] crisis on the frontier. We humbly
beg for your consideration [of the material in this petition].

The Beile-yin sume Conference for Autonomy
After ten more days of waiting and preparation, the Mongolian Conference for
Autonomy finally convened at the main hall of the Yungrung-shang of the Beile-yin
sume on the ninth of October. Togtakhu, the tusalagchi of Prince So, and Duke Dobdan
of Ujumuchin arrived at the start of the conference. The morale of Prince De and his fol
lowers was greatly increased by Prince So’s open show of support. A total of sixty-eight
persons attended this conference. Prince Yondonwangchug delivered the opening ad
dress, emphasizing the necessity for autonomy and encouraging the attendants to strive
for the success of their common goals. Next, Prince De gave a report on the preliminary
work of the conference. Both Prince Yondonwangchug’s address and Prince De’s report
were accepted unanimously; Yondonwangchug, Babudorji, Prince De, Gendenjab, and
Shungnodongrob were elected members of the presidium.
Prince De and twenty-two other persons were appointed to prepare the draft of
the open telegram proclaiming Mongolian autonomy to the central government and the
nation. These persons also worked to prepare the draft of the Organizational Law of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. While these drafts were being completed, the
conference was recessed for five days. During this recess, Prince Rinchinwangdud, the
jasag of the Sunid Left Banner, arrived, along with fifty-eight other members. On Octo
ber 15, the second meeting of the conference convened, and the drafts of both the open
telegram and the organizational law were passed. The Organizational Law of the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Government contained a preface, four chapters, and thirty-six
articles. The main points of this law are extracted below:
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Preface
In response to the exigencies of the present Inner Mongolian situation and in accord
ance with the stipulations concerning self-determination and self-rule as contained in the
Chinese government’s Outline ofNation Building, the senior officials of the Inner Mongol
ian leagues and banners have convened the Plenary Conference of the Senior Officials of
the Inner Mongolian Leagues and Banners, have decided to establish an Autonomous gov
ernment under the leadership of the Chinese government, and have formulated this Organ
izational Law of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government.
Chapter I: Autonomous Government
(1) The overall authority for ruling the Inner Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes
rests with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. (2) The territory under the juris
diction of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government shall encompass all of the origi
nal domains of the Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes. (3) Except for international and
military affairs, which are the demesne of the central government, the administration of In
ner Mongolia shall be carried out in accordance with the law established by the autono
mous government. (4) The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish one
commission chairman, two vice-chairmen, and nine to fifteen commissioners. (5) The
promulgation of laws and issuance of orders must be passed by a meeting of the govern
ment and signed by the commission chairman, the two deputy-chairmen, and the head of
the concerned offices. (6) The offices of the autonomous government shall consist of the
Secretariat Bureau and the General Affairs Bureau.
Chapter II: The Department of Political Affairs
(1) The Department of Political Affairs shall be the supreme administrative organ of
the autonomous government. (2) The department shall have one head and two deputy
heads. (3) Subordinate to the department shall be the following bureaus: Internal Affairs,
Police Affairs, Financial Affairs, Education, Judicial Affairs, Construction, Industry and
Commerce, and Public Relations.
Chapter III: The Legislative Committee
The Legislative Committee shall be the supreme legislative organ of the autonomous
government. The committee shall be headed by a chairman, two deputy chairmen, and have
seventeen to twenty-nine members.
Chapter IV: The Advisory Council
The Advisory Council shall be presided over by one director, two deputy directors,
and have twenty-one to forty-one counselors.

The following is the text of the open telegram sent to the Chinese government:
In recent years, our nation has faced famines and the ravages of war. Our borders on
the frontier are being pressed and eroded, and foreign aggression becomes more serious
with each passing day. Mongolia, being geographically close to both Japan and Russia, suf
fers greatly from these calamities. The territory of Mongolia is vast and desolate, and its
weak and feeble people are unable to resist aggression and protect themselves. We are cur
rently little more than meat on the chopping block waiting to be hacked to pieces by the ag
gressors. Within the past ten years. Outer Mongolia has been stripped away by Soviet Rus
sia, and the Jerim League and Hulunbuir have been annexed by Japan. The Josotu, and Juuuda Leagues have also recently been swallowed up. Western Inner Mongolia is currently
being drawn into these calamities, and northern China is already badly shaken. Our very
existence as a people hangs by a thread, and the entire nation is burning with anxiety.
We Mongols are a weak people and have suffered for a long time now. Although the
central government is responsible for providing relief and aid, it is continually prevented
from doing so by the domestic chaos, and the general course of events seems to be getting
worse, not better. The leaders of the central government cannot even provide relief aid for
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themselves; how can the central government be expected to accept the responsibility to as
sist us? After each wartime calamity [the central government] has occasionally sent envoys
of comfort and solicitude from afar. This suggests that our relationship [with the central
government] is intimate and that we are together in our suffering. We Mongols deeply ap
preciate these expressions of sincere concern.
If we were so inclined, we could stand idly by and do nothing when the border areas
are being encroached upon. All our powerful neighbors have recently followed policies of
aggression, and time is not on our side. Our situation now is akin to that of a bird in immi
nent danger of being caught in a snare; we currently face the ominous prospect of complete
extinction as a people. The current situation will not allow us to follow the old path of tem
porary, expedient peace. We are no longer able to bear our hardships, yet we have no way
to rid ourselves of them. If we do not diligently seek to implement self-rule, everything will
be destroyed when the powerful enemy arrives. Wherever the power of the enemy extends,
the Mongolian territory will be completely gobbled up because of the weak defenses in
Mongolian territory. This will worry the central government greatly, and the frontier will be
wide open to the enemy.
Extermination of us Mongols would also be a great disaster for the rest of our nation;
if one limb is broken off, the whole body will be handicapped. The costs [of the extinction
of the Mongols as a people] would be great and the injuries very serious. It is written in the
Zuo Zhuan that “a dying deer is not able to find a shadowy place.” Dear fellow country
men, please put yourselves in our position and consider the Mongols’ situation again and
again. Is there any way for us Mongols to survive except by self-determination and selfrule?
We recall Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s herculean struggle for the founding of the nation and his
desire to strengthen the foundation of people’s self-government and to foster the weak and
minority peoples. These brilliant teachings should be remembered and adhered to for ten
thousand generations. Since the central government is occupied by urgent military affairs
and cannot possibly manage the affairs of remote areas, why should we Mongols not cou
rageously stand up and follow the teachings of Mr. Sun Yat-sen in order to carry out selfdetermination and self-rule for self-strengthening and self-defense?
We the heads of the leagues and the jasags [of the banners], with the resolution of the
national congress of the twentieth year of the republic [1931] which assented to the auton
omy of Outer Mongolia as our precedent, on the twenty-sixth day of the seventh month
[September 15, 1933] convened a conference of all senior [Mongolian] officials at Beileyin sume, Ulanchab League. All persons in attendance unanimously called for implementa
tion of a high degree of autonomy and the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autono
mous Government, prompt acceleration of unity, and supplementation of the inadequacy of
the central government. Through self-determination and self-rule we can save ourselves
and protect the land of our nation.
Since this is the common view of the [Mongol] people, we are carrying it out reso
lutely and are implementing change with great momentum in order to follow the will of the
[Mongol] people and to respond effectively to current circumstances. The implementation
of autonomy has already been reported by the league heads, they'asags of the banners, and
the nobles to the central government for consideration. In this telegram we report on the
actual operation of [Mongolian] autonomy.
We sincerely hope that Your Excellencies will realize the true purposes of our auton
omy and will understand that it was necessitated by urgent circumstances. Under extremely
desperate conditions, we have no choice but to carry out urgently and quickly our selfdetermination and self-rule in order to avoid our complete extermination. As for military
and diplomatic affairs, these are matters connected with the national institutions. Even
during ordinary times, we would need more help and support from the central government;
at this critical Juncture, we can only depend on the central government to deal with foreign
countries. We sincerely hope that Your Excellencies will be sympathetic to our helpless
ness and difficulties and will help and guide us in accordance with the principle of “every-
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thing under heaven for the common good.” We also hope that you will guide us, supple
ment us, and teach us how to overcome our insufficiencies and shortcomings, encourage
the spirit of self-determination and self-rule, accelerate [our] desire for hard work and pros
perity, bring reform of antiquated [Mongolian] tradition, and develop good order and civili
zation.
In this way, it will be possible for the Mongols to support the central government in
making the [entire] country prosperous and well governed. It will also satisfy every Mongol
heart that fervently hopes for [peace and] effective government. This will bring about the
peaceful coexistence of the five nationalities [Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems,
and Tibetans] and help them to merge with one another into one great whole, rescue the
nation from destruction, and fortify the frontier territory. This will indeed be good fortune
for the Mongols and the entire nation. [Senders’ names]

The tone and wording of this telegram were much more moderate and relaxed
than in the former one, probably because the intervening conference was successful and
because the Chinese government responded to the conference’s recommendations. The
Mongol leaders, knowing that by this time it would have been impossible to ignore the
Mongols’ demand for autonomy, felt no need or desire to use irritating words to upset the
central government. Instead, they gave a clear explanation of their motives; they ex
plained that the movement was to strengthen unity and defense, and that it was absolutely
free of foreign involvement of any kind. The Mongol leaders emphasized this lack of
foreign involvement because most Chinese newspaper editorialists had expressed some
suspicion that the movement had Japanese backing and support. Of course, Fu Zuoyi’s
propaganda made these unfounded rumors even more widespread. Huang Shaohong and
Zhao Pilian, the Chinese government’s two special envoys, were scheduled to arrive pre
cisely during this time of suspicion of foreign involvement in the movement, and this is
why Prince De and others at the conference did their best to eradicate these misconcep
tions and eliminate the obstacles they created.
Foreign journalists arrived at Beile-yin sume during this time, and news of the
Mongols’ demand for autonomy was soon broadcast to the world. The tone of Japan’s
newspaper accounts was clearly sympathetic, and this naturally contributed to suspicion
of Japanese involvement in the movement and led to even more confusion and misunder
standing. Among the foreign Journalists at Beile-yin sume was Owen Lattimore, the fa
mous Mongolist. All Lattimore’s reports were sympathetic to the Mongols, and conse
quently, a long-lasting friendship formed between him and Prince De. Another foreigner
at Beile-yin sume was the Swedish merchant Larson, who had received the rank of duke
from the Bogda Khan of Ulaanbaatar during the early days of Outer Mongolia’s inde
pendence and later settled in the Aduuchin Pasture of Chahar. Larson also expressed
goodwill and concern toward the Mongols and helped them win the sympathy of foreign
visitors.
On October 19, the third meeting was held. During this meeting it was resolved
that (1) the budget for the first year would be 320,000 Chinese yuan, to be shared by the
banners, (2) all leagues and banners would contribute one-hundred twenty yurts for the
temporary office of the autonomous government, (3) one thousand cavalry troops would
be conscripted from the leagues and banners to organize an army for the protection of the
autonomous government, and (4) no officials and staff members would receive any sal
ary, but their living expenditures would be supplied by the autonomous government.
On October 21, the fourth meeting elected Yondonwangchug as chairman of the
autonomous government, Sodnamrabdan and Altanwachir, deputy head of the Yekejuu
League, as the two deputy chairmen, and decided that the eleven commissioners of the
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government should be elected separately by the leagues and banners. Then, through
Prince Yon’s nomination, Prince De was elected as head of the Department of Political
Affairs; and Nartai (about forty kilometers north of Bat-khaalag) of the Khalkha Banner
was selected as the future capital of the autonomous government.
The fifth meeting, on October 24, discussed preparations for the reception of
Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian, the special envoys of the Chinese government, and the
matters to be discussed with them. In addition, Sainbayar, Temurbolod (the amban of the
Chahar Shangdu Pasture), Jiyatai (a Kharachin man and a confidant of Prince Yon), and
Suludai (the delegate of Hohhot Turned) were appointed to represent the conference and
go to Hohhot to welcome Huang and Zhao and present them with an introductory briefing
on the conference and the hopes of the Mongols.

The Arrival of Huang and Zhao
On October 21, the day before Huang Shaohong, Zhao Pilian, the concerned
officials of the Kuomintang Central Committee, the Interior ministry, and the general
staff left Nanjing by the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, Wu Heling and his Nanjing Office of
the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates held a press conference. In this press con
ference, Wu expressed his support for Prince De’s proposals and explained that in view
of the situation in Inner Mongolia, a united autonomous government was the only way to
assure defense and survival. He also expressed his support for the ideals of the central
government: (1) cooperation between the Mongolian local authorities and the central
government, (2) cooperation between the leagues and banners on the one hand and the
provinces and xians on the other, and (3) cooperation between nobles and commoners.
The government, Huang and Zhao, and the “stable” Mongolian leaders wel
comed these measures. Nevertheless, the Bat-khaalag group, especially the radical intel
lectuals, did not approve of them. Soon after he made this statement, Wu left Nanjing and
went to Beiping, where he gathered some Mongol leaders who agreed with his ideas. He
then went on to Bat-khaalag. Although Wu was not welcomed by Prince De and his close
followers, the contributions he made to the leagues and banners gave him a large number
of supporters, one of whom was Prince Yon. Even so, after his arrival, he was suspected
by Prince De and his group of being an agent of the government. Even worse, Chogbadarakhu and Khatanbagatur threatened him with pistols while talking with him and de
manded that he leave Bat-khaalag immediately. But none of these unfriendly actions
could affect a strong-willed person like Wu Heling.
After arriving in Beiping, Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian visited with General
He Yingqin, the Head Commissioner in charge of the Beiping Branch of the Military
Committee; Huang Fu, the Head Commissioner of the Executive Yuan’s Beiping Com
mittee of Political Adjustment; Song Zheyuan, the governor of Chahar Province; and the
Janggiya Khutugtu, Pacification Envoy for the Mongolian Banners.
After hearing the opposing opinions of this group, Huang and Zhao began to
receive the delegates of the Beiping Association of Fellow Mongols, who supported
Prince De and the autonomous movement. By then, the rift in the association had already
been mended because of the call for national autonomy. The association submitted to
Huang and Zhao the following summary of its opinions: (1) the Mongolian demand for
autonomy is a movement for both Mongolian and national salvation; (2) Prince De’s ac
tivities are based on the will of all the Mongol people; the demand for autonomy did not
originate from his personal desires and was not being utilized or manipulated by any for-
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eign power, and the central government must distinguish between the public will and
personal motives; (3) the officials of the frontier provinces had consistently humiliated
the Mongols and currently were engaged again in vicious slander of the autonomy
movement; all Mongols resent them, and the central government must ascertain the facts
and not only hear one side of the story; and 4) they resolutely opposed the Janggiya
Khutugtu 's entry into Mongolia for “pacification.” Monks should not interfere in political
affairs.
The Beiping Association of Mongolian Students also sent Ren Pingjun, Bao
Yinxi, Kokebagatur (Hu Fengshan), Wu Bailing, and me as student delegates to go to the
Grand Hotel in Beijing to visit Huang and Zhao. These two envoys of the government
were probably already aware of our demands, and they did not receive us personally but
instead had their secretaries meet with us and accept our petition for Mongolian auton
omy. This petition stressed (1) the need for Mongolian autonomy, (2) the Mongols’ de
sire that the Chinese provincial and xian governments stop interfering in Mongolian ad
ministrative affairs, and (3) opposition to the government’s continuing use of the Manchu
religious-obscurantist policy toward the Mongols. Perhaps this petition was the most
strongly worded statement the two envoys received during their stay in Beiping.
Prince Nayantu, the senior leader among the Mongolian princes and nobles in
Beiping, was a friend of Wu Heling. Although he could not return to his homeland in
Outer Mongolia, he was still quite prestigious and was the nominal head of the Beiping
Association of Fellow Mongols. He visited Huang and Zhao personally to express in a
moderate way his support for the autonomy movement. Prince Namjilsereng, who was
the ex-deputy head of the Jerim League and who fled to Beiping soon after the Japanese
occupation in 1931, also followed the common voice of the Beiping Mongols and ex
pressed his support for the movement, though not zealously. Ayulugei, the deputy head of
the Japanese-occupied Josotu League, who had been Prince De’s target during his strug
gle against Wu Heling a year earlier, also expressed his support for the Beile-yin sume
convention. He also sent his son Engkeamur, then the Josutu League representative sta
tioned in the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, to go to
Bat-khaalag and to Join the conference.
While the emissaries Huang and Zhao were still in Beiping, a schoolmate of
mine at Beijing University, Wu Bailing, and 1 were invited to talk to Professor Tao
Xisheng, a well-known specialist in Chinese social history who was intimately connected
with the ruling party. We talked for the entire night. Professor Tao was quite impressed
by our zeal and attitudes and felt that the opinions of the intellectuals should not be
overlooked. He immediately phoned He Yangling, a senior staff member of the Kuomintang’s Central Committee, and arranged a time for him and us to talk to Minister Huang.
Tao’s request was accepted, and the visit was carried out the next morning.
Huang’s purpose was not to listen but to convince us of the “error” of our ideas.
Again and again he expressed deep concern over the autonomy advocated by the Mon
gols. He explained that political self-rule would not be beneficial economically, and that
it might benefit a certain group of people but not the majority of the masses. “It would be
better to be realistic and practical than to shout hollow slogans,” he continued. Wu and I
seized this opportunity to emphasize that unless the Mongols were able to enjoy political
self-rule, they would continue to be exploited by the frontier provinces and xians. We
continued by explaining that not only would it be impossible to protect the economic
benefits, but there would also be no way to protect the national unity. We also explained
our reasons for opposing the activities of the Janggiya Khutugtu. Although Huang did not
argue with us, neither did he accept our opinions. Nevertheless, he did not oppose the
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separation of religion and politics in principle. Nevertheless this conversation made it
evident that the government emissary already had his own prejudices before the talks
with the Mongols even began. It was also clear that it would be very difficult to reach any
agreeable conclusion at the talks in Beile-yin sume.
On October 27, Huang and Zhao and their entourage left Beiping, going via
Kalgan to Hohhot. At Kalgan, both Huang and Zhao met with Song Zheyuan to find a
solution to the problems of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. They then met
with Nimaodzar and other delegates of the twelve Chahar banners. Sainbayar and other
delegates from Bat-khaalag also came to welcome Huang and Zhao. They did not, how
ever, have any time to discuss the problems of the movement. On the twenty-ninth,
Huang and Zhao and their attendants arrived at Hohhot and immediately entered into
discussions with Fu Zuoyi and his advisors.
Following this discussion, they met with the so-called “Mongolian delegates,”
who had been bribed and were under Fu Zuoyi’s complete control. Among these puppets
of Fu were Altanochir, the deputy head of the Yekejuu League, who had at first sup
ported the autonomy movement and then defected to Fu’s camp. From these people,
Huang and Zhao received the “opinions” that Fu ordered them to give. Huang and Zhao
then met with the delegates of the Education Association, the Farmers’ Association, and
other Chinese groups to hear their opinions in opposition to greater Mongolian autonomy.
These people insisted that if the government allowed the Mongols to carry out self-rule, it
should be limited to the banner level, and that any kind of self-rule above the level of the
banner should not be allowed. In other words, it was their goal to maintain the banners,
abolish the leagues, and put the supposedly autonomous banners under the all-powerful
administration of the Chinese provinces.
Later, it was heard that Huang recognized that these opinions, although quite far
from representing the opinions of the vast majority of the Mongol people, were useful to
him as establishing reference points. The Suiyuan authorities were adamant about not
yielding any tax revenues to the Mongols and insisted that in areas where xians were al
ready established, their taxation prerogatives should not be altered by Mongol demands
for self-rule. In summary, then, the Mongols demanded that the Chinese provinces and
xians not interfere with Mongolian autonomy, while both Chahar and Suiyuan provinces
insisted that even if the Mongols could establish an autonomous government, Mongolian
territory should remain under the control of the Chinese provincial governments.
Seeing very little chance for meaningful compromise, Huang Shaohong ordered
his top adviser, Li Songfeng, to accompany Altanwachir and Wu Heling to Bat-khaalag.
There they would attempt to persuade Prince De and other proponents of more Mongol
ian autonomy to compromise. Wu Heling was sent on this mission because he usually
took a stance somewhere between the positions of the Chinese central government and
the Mongol leaders. In order to accommodate Fu Zuoyi, Altanochir did his best at these
talks to prod Prince De into compromise. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful and
achieved results entirely different from those he originally intended. Prince De and his
group insisted that the Mongols wanted to establish a unified Mongolian autonomous
organization that would not be manipulated by the Chinese provinces. These talks con
tinued for almost a week, but in the end, Li Songfeng returned to Hohhot without having
achieved any concrete results.
Both Huang and Zhao had been brainwashed by Fu Zuoyi during their long stay
in Hohhot, and Huang had become adamantly opposed to any increase in Mongolian
autonomy. On the tenth of November, Huang and Zhao finally arrived in Bat-khaalag,
along with Xu Tingyao, commander of the central government’s Seventeenth Army. Xu’s
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arrival in Bat-khaalag with his heavily armed troops was ostensibly to protect the gov
ernment’s emissaries, but in reality, they were present to intimidate the unarmed Mon
gols. After their arrival. Princes Yon and De, the other attendants at the conference, and
the lamas of the Beile-yin sume temple gave a great welcome party. The next day, Huang
Shaohong, Xu Tingyao, Zhao Pilian, and their high-ranking attendants all offered incense
in the grand hall of the temple and paid a personal visit to the Panchen Lama. On this
day, they did not talk about any political matters. Nevertheless, the advisors of both sides
had already come into preliminary contact with one another.
November 12 was Sun Yat-sen’s birthday, an occasion which Prince De and his
group used as a particularly meaningful day on which to discuss the problems of Mongol
ian autonomy with Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian. In reality, Huang was the repre
sentative with the real clout. Prince De started his discussion with the fourth article of
Sun Yat-sen’s Outline of National Building, which states in part, “Regarding the weak
and minority peoples inside the country, the government should foster them and make it
possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.’’ By this time, many jour
nalists from foreign countries had arrived. These Journalists basically reported what they
heard and saw, but occasionally they circulated groundless rumors and put their own
analyses into their reports. Other than the foreign papers, only the Chinese Dagongbao
gave fair coverage of, and commentary on, the event. The rest of the newspapers were
merely propaganda sheets for Fu Zuoyi. Of course, this lack of quality newspaper cover
age can be blamed to some extent to the language barrier and the shortage of Mongol
leaders capable of dealing with the Chinese newspaper reporters.
Even under the pressure of the “public opinion” created by the newspapers and
the intimidation by the soldiers and armored vehicles, Prince De held obstinately to his
positions. He told the journalists, “1 hope that the central government’s policy toward us
Mongols will be one of persuasion not force, encouragement, not aggression.” These sin
cere words provide a good sketch of the actual situation; however, they were reported
only in the Dagongbao newspaper.
At the first session of the negotiations, Huang Shaohong remained cognizant of
the agreement he had made at Hohhot with Fu Zuoyi’s group. Huang expressed his suspi
cions of the autonomy movement and stated that the negotiations must be undertaken in
accordance with the policy for altering Mongolian political institutions established by the
central government. He stated further that it was necessary to reach a solution that would
be acceptable to the central, provincial, and xian governments, as well as to the Mongol
ian leagues and banners. He then submitted the policy for altering Mongolian political
institutions as passed by the Central Political Committee of the KMT on October 18,
1933 as the blueprint for the negotiations.
Huang’s first matter for discussion was the reshuffling of the personnel in the
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. His second item was the reforming of the Mon
golian local administrative system. The third item was the establishment of personnel
qualification standards for the Mongolian administration. In other words, Huang’s strat
egy was to turn the national problems to his own advantage. Huang attempted to pull the
rug out from under the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement by bribing prominent
Mongols with offers of official position and advancement in rank. These bribes would, he
hoped, reduce the desire of the most influential Mongols for self-determination and selfrule. Huang’s policy was no different from Yuan Shikai’s policies for dealing with the
Mongols during the first few years of the new Chinese republic.
Prince De responded immediately to Huang by saying that the first and third
points of his proposed negotiations blueprint were matters for the central government
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itself to decide and that it was not necessary to discuss them with the Mongols. Prince De
explained that these were old issues that he had previously discussed with Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek in Hankou and in Nanjing with the leaders of the government. As for
the second point, the reform of the Mongolian local administrative system, Prince De
submitted to Huang the Organizational Law of the Mongolian Autonomous Government
as passed by the conference held on October 15, and asked him to present it to the Chi
nese government for consideration.
Prince De’s counterparts in the central government had tried to give this ambi
tious young prince a high-sounding title and remarkable salary in order to win him over
to their side. Whenever Prince De received these offers, however, he always rejected
them by saying, “I came here to reach a solution for Mongolian problems and not to ob
tain an official title for myself or others.” Although Huang’s offer was directed at other
Mongol leaders in addition to Prince De, Prince De was confident that the Mongols in
attendance at this conference would not be bought off by Huang’s offers. He was, there
fore, able to decline tactfully the “good will” of this central government envoy and his
attempt at bribery. Of course, this rejection was very awkward for both Huang Shaohong
and Prince De. It is understandable that this rejection poisoned the entire atmosphere for
negotiations between the two.
Ever since the days of his youth. Prince De had been accustomed to being a
prince and having everyone go along with whatever he said. Because of this, he had not
developed the habit of saying things in an indirect way in order to please the people with
whom he was dealing. On unhappy occasions, his words were still more straightforward,
even blunt. Prince De’s direct rejection of Huang’s offer made Huang, a minister of the
interior, very angry and resentful. Therefore, when Prince De proceeded to hand him the
organizational law, Huang responded by saying that it was too far removed from the
principles laid down by the central government and refused to accept it. The negotiations
started on this negative note.
Huang soon expressed a desire to return to Hohhot, but in reality, he had no in
tention of leaving without being able to report a success to the central government, be
cause such a failure would have been a stumbling block in his political career. Prince Yon
and Prince De also did not want to see Huang and his entourage leave, so they personally
went to Huang’s quarters to soften the atmosphere and request that he remain. As a result
of these efforts, Huang agreed to stay on in Bat-khaalag, and the negotiations continued
for three more days.
Following is a synopsis of the dialogue between Prince De and Huang Shaohong
during these subsequent negotiations. This synopsis is based on Tan Tiwu (Huang’s sec
retary), Nei Meng zhi Jinxi [Inner Mongolia Past and Present]; and Huang Fensheng, Nei
Meng zizhiyundongjishi [The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement].
Prince De: The central government should allow an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Gov
ernment to be established under its direct control and permit it to implement a higher de
gree of autonomy.
Huang Shaohong: The Inner Mongolian Autonomous organization can only be allowed to
exist as a regional administrative framework under the Jurisdiction of the provincial gov
ernment.
Prince De: The government should remember Sun Yat-sen’s teachings and promises as re
corded in his Outline of National Building: “Regarding the weak and minority peoples in
side the country, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry
out self-determination and self-mle.”
Huang: The government should foster the domestic minorities and allow them to carry out
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limited self-rule, but not self-determination.
Prince De: Self-rule is the common desire of all Mongols. It is not the personal stance of a
few people. Its goals are unification and self-protection. It is not a separatist movement and
is completely free of foreign involvement. Outer Mongolia is under total Soviet domina
tion, eastern Inner Mongolia is occupied by the Japanese, and western Inner Mongolia is
teetering on the brink of collapse. Unless we can implement self-rule, there will be no way
for western Inner Mongolia to protect itself from foreign invasion and maintain its own ex
istence.
Huang: Japan’s intentions are to swallow up all of China eventually. Therefore, the entire
nation must be unified. If Inner Mongolia establishes some half-hearted autonomous gov
ernment, it will exist in name only. An autonomous government in Inner Mongolia will not
accomplish anything meaningful and will be of no help in resisting Japanese aggression.
Prince De: The region of autonomy should include all land originally under the jurisdiction
of the leagues and banners. Provinces and xians in these territories should be abolished and
replaced with leagues and banners. In the seventeenth year of the republic [1928], when the
central government began establishing provinces and xians in Inner Mongolia, the Mongols
opposed this mightily. Because the central government ignored the Mongolian opposition
[to the establishment of provinces and xians in Inner Mongolian territory], the present diffi
culties developed. It is now time [for the central government] to accept the common will of
the Mongols by abolishing the provinces and xians and permitting the establishment of an
autonomous government.
Huang: The cold, hard facts should not be ignored. In the two provinces of Chahar and
Suiyuan, the Chinese outnumber the Mongols. The power of the provinces and xians is
greater than the power of the leagues and banners. As far as national defense is concerned,
the provinces and xians are much more important [than the leagues and banners]. Your de
mands [if accepted] will split the nation. The central government will absolutely not allow
your demands to be implemented.

At this point, both Prince De and Huang realized that their negotiations had
reached a deadlock. They saw that it would be better for the consultants or advisors of
both sides to engage in exploratory or experimental talks.'”
On the night of the sixteenth, the delegates from both sides met in a yurt at the
temporary residence of Prince Yon and began their discussions. The Mongolian delegates
drew up an eleven-article outline of Mongolian autonomy and proposed that it be used as
the basis for discussion. The first article provided for the establishment of an Inner Mon
golian Autonomous Government in Inner Mongolia under the direct administration of the
central government, and the abolition of the provinces and xians that had been established
in Mongolian territory. Li Songfeng said that this article was unacceptable. The negotia
tions collapsed, and all the delegates left angrily. The following are the eleven articles as
'“Huang appointed Li Songfeng (a high-ranking official of the interior ministry), Liu Puchen (a
Shanxi man and a commissioner in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Kong Qingzong
(a counselor in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and an extreme Han chauvinist, later
appointed as a special commissioner in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and stationed
in Lhasa, whence he was expelled prior to the Chinese Communist takeover). He Yangling (a
higher member of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters), and E Qiguang (a Mongolian Eight Ban
ner man and a section head of the Beiping office of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission
and the official interpreter of Huang’s group) as his representatives. Princes Yon and De appointed
Wu Heling (actually appointed by Prince Yon), Sainbayar, Su Lutai (the Turned Banner’s delegate
in Nanjing), Kang Ren (Mergenbagatur, a Turned student at Beijing University), Chogbagatur
(Chen Shaowu, a Kharachin Left Banner man and a student at the Kuomintang’s Political Academy
in Nanjing and Prince De’s secretary), and Khasochir (a young Chahar official) as delegates from
the Mongolian side.
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drawn up by the Mongolian side.

1. In Inner Mongolia, a unified supreme autonomous organization should be estab
lished under the name of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government and should be di
rectly under the administration of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese government. This or
ganization should handle the administrative powers of the Inner Mongolian leagues, ban
ners, and tribes. Its expenditures should be supplemented by the central government.
2. The ruling and administrative powers of the Mongolian leagues, banners, and
tribes should remain unaltered.
3. From now on, there should be no further establishment of xians or preliminary xians within the territory of the Inner Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes. The xians, pre
liminary xians, and other lower-level political units [in Inner Mongolian territory] should
be abolished.
4. The Inner Mongolian territoiy currently not under cultivation should be designated
as Mongolian pastoral zones and should never be put under cultivation. Isolated pockets of
farmland in the midst of Mongolian pasture lands should be eliminated.
5. The taxes in the Mongolian pastoral zones should be assessed by the Mongolian
unified supreme autonomous organization according to a detailed and uniform tax code.
The tax collection stations established by the provincial and xian governments in the pas
toral zones should all be eliminated.
6. Land already under cultivation in Mongolia should be regulated according to an
appropriate method. The temporary income and the annual tax should be evenly divided by
the Inner Mongolian unified supreme autonomous organization and the provincial govern
ments.
7. Before the Mongolian land already under cultivation is regulated, it should be
managed in the manner described below.
A. The Mongolian banners shall have complete authority over the income derived from ex
ploitation of their land, mineral deposits, forests, and rivers and lakes.
B. When the provinces, xians, and preliminary xians already established in Inner Mongol
ian territory collect tax and rent from the land, mineral deposits, forests, rivers, and lakes
[of Inner Mongolia], the Inner Mongolian unified supreme autonomous organization should
dispatch officials to collect the revenue together [with the provincial and xian officials],
and all revenue should be evenly divided [between the two sides].
C. The original private rents of the Mongolian offices and people should be guaranteed as
in the past.
D. The obligations of the Mongol people shall be toward their own banners, and the prov
inces and xians shall not increase the burdens of the Mongol people.
8. In the territory of the Mongolian banners, beside the provisions for land already
mentioned above, all tax collection offices in Mongolian territory established by the prov
inces and xians should cooperate with the officials sent by the Inner Mongolian supreme
autonomous organization in collecting the tax and immediately dividing it in an even man
ner.

9.When legal cases involving both Mongols and Han Chinese arise, the Inner Mon
golian supreme autonomous organization should dispatch special officials to the judicial
organizations already established in Inner Mongolian territory to sit together with Han Chi
nese judges.
10. All revenue of the Inner Mongolian supreme autonomous organization should be
designated as funds for [the improvement of] public health, education, industry, and com
munication and transportation.
1 l.The Inner Mongolian supreme autonomous organization should establish an office
for liaison work at the locations of the concerned provincial governments.
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A Breakthrough in the Talks
To use the failure of the negotiations to split up the Mongols and to put pressure
on Prince De, Huang Shaohong again indicated his desire to leave and ordered his atten
dants to prepare for departure. At this moment, though Prince De remained as obstinate
as ever and refused to compromise, Prince Yon and the leaders of the Ulanchab League
recognized that the failure of the negotiations might possibly draw greater oppression
from Suiyuan province. So to alleviate tensions, it was necessary to reach an agreement at
the negotiations. Wu Heling also urged that the negotiations not be permitted to end in
failure. He submitted his ideas to both Prince Yon and Prince De. Finally, Prince Yon
asked the Panchen Lama to mediate and to detain Huang and convince him to continue
the negotiations. Huang realized a possibility of compromise on the Mongolian side, so
he himself did not want to return to the capital without having achieved any concrete suc
cess at the negotiations. Consequently, he decided to remain and take advantage of the
Panchen Lama’s mediation.
By this time, the Mongol leaders in attendance at the conference could not avoid
a split of opinion. Prince De and the youths under him insisted from the beginning to the
end that the Mongols not compromise with Huang. Nevertheless, the cooler heads under
the leadership of Prince Yon realized that this type of emotional commitment to principle
was of no use. Wu Heling was a pragmatic man of affairs, and seeing that Prince Yon
was supporting his proposals, he suggested that it would be better to strive for a conclu
sion of the negotiations and demand self-rule but not concentrate on the abolition of
provinces and xiam. Prince Yon agreed with Wu’s opinions, and thought that the failure
of these negotiations would also increase the possibility of drawing Japanese pressure
into Mongolian politics. Under these circumstances, even if Prince De disapproved of
these proposals, he had to compromise with the suggestions of Wu Heling. After Prince
Yon’s reconciliation of the two. Prince De and Wu drew up a plan and an alternate plan
for dealing with the problems of Mongolian autonomy. The next day, they submitted the
following two plans to Huang for consideration:
Plan A
1. Titles: The titles [of the governments] shall be designated as the Government of
the First Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Government of the Second Mongolian
Autonomous Region, and so on.
2. Territory: The Shilingol League and the banners of the Chahar Tribe shall be or
ganized under the Government of the First Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Ulanchab
and Yekejuu Leagues and the banners of Turned, Alashan, and Ejine shall be organized un
der the Government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region. The other leagues and
banners shall also be organized according to this pattern, jurisdiction over all the govern
ments of the Mongolian autonomous regions should be directly under the administration of
the Executive Yuan. Matters relating to the provinces should be discussed and resolved
through consultation with the concerned provincial governments.
3. Functions: The governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall admin
ister all the administrative affairs of all leagues, tribes, and banners within their own re
gions.
4. Budget: Expenditures of the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions
should be met monthly by the central government.
5. Liaison: A joint conference shall be established between the governments of the
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Mongolian autonomous regions to negotiate and decide on matters common to the autono
mous regions.
Plan B
A unified Mongolian supreme autonomous organization known as the Mongolian
Autonomous Committee shall be established directly under the Executive Yuan for admin
istering the affairs of the leagues, tribes, and banners. Expenditures should be met by the
central government each month.

Huang felt that the method for establishing the first and second autonomous
regions in Plan A was quite close to the central government guidelines. If the eleven arti
cles submitted to him earlier were amended so that there was more than one autonomous
government, these articles could be presented to the central government for considera
tion. The two sides finally agreed to the draft of the following eleven articles.
1. The Organization of Mongolian Autonomy
A. Titles: The titles shall be designated as the Government of the First Mongolian
Autonomous Region, the Government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region, and
so on.
B. Territory: The Shilingol League and the banners of the Chahar Tribe shall be organized
under the Government of the First Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Ulanchab and
Yekejuu Leagues and the banners of Turned, Alashan, and Ejine shall be organized under
the government of the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region. The other leagues and ban
ners shall also be organized according to this pattern.
C. Jurisdiction over all the governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be
directly under the administration of the Executive Yuan. Matters relating to the provinces
should be worked out with the concerned provincial governments.
D. Functions: The governments of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall administer all
the affairs of all leagues, tribes, and banners within their own regions.
E. Budget: Expenditures of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be met monthly by
the central government.
F. Liaison: A joint conference committee shall be established between the governments of
the Mongolian autonomous regions to negotiate and decide on matters common to the
autonomous regions.
2. The ruling and administrative powers of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners
should remain unaltered.
3. From now on, there should be no further establishment of xians and preliminary xians
{she-zhi-ju) within the territory of the Inner Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners. Inade
quate xians, preliminary xians, and other lower-level political districts should be abolished.
4. The Mongolian territory that is currently not being cultivated should be designated as
Mongolian pastoral zones and should never be put under cultivation. Isolated poekets of
farmland in the midst of Mongolian pastoral areas should be eliminated.
5. Taxes in Mongolian pastoral zones should be assessed by the Mongolian autonomous
government according to a detailed and uniform tax code. The tax collection stations estab
lished by the provincial and xian governents in the pastoral zones should all be eliminated.
6. Land already under cultivation in Mongolia should be regulated according to an appro
priate method. The temporary income and annual tax [on such land] should be evenly di
vided by the Mongolian autonomous government and the concerned provincial govern
ments.
7. Before the Mongolian land already under cultivation is regulated, it should be managed
in the manner described below:
A. The Mongolian banners shall have complete authority over the income derived from ex
ploitation of Mongolian land, mineral deposits, forests, and rivers and lakes.
B. When the provinces, xians, and preliminary xians which have already been established
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in Inner Mongolian territory collect tax and rent from the land, mineral deposits, forests,
rivers, and lakes, the Mongolian autonomous government should dispatch officials to col
lect the revenue; all the revenue should be evenly divided [between the two sides],
C. The original private rents of the Mongolian offices and people should be guaranteed as
in the past.
D. Other than the Mongols’ obligations toward their own banners, the provinces and xians
should not increase any burdens of the Mongolian people.
8. In the territory of the Mongol banners, beside the provisions already made above for
land, all tax collection offices in Mongolian territory established by the provinces and xian%
should cooperate with officials sent by the Mongolian unified supreme autonomous gov
ernment in collecting the tax and immediately dividing it.
9. The Mongolian Autonomous Government should dispatch special officials to all of the
judicial organizations of all degrees already established in Mongolian territory to Judge to
gether on legal cases between Mongols and Han Chinese.
10. All revenue of the Mongolian Autonomous Government should be designated as expen
ditures for [the improvement of] public health, education, industry, and communication and
transportation.
11. The Mongolian Autonomous Government should establish an office for liaison work at
the locations of the concerned provincial governments.

Of the eleven articles agreed to by both sides, articles two to eleven were the
articles that had already been advocated by the Mongolian side in their original demands.
The main point of these eleven articles was to alter the phrase “Inner Mongolian unified
supreme autonomous organization” to “the governments of the Mongolian autonomous
regions.” In other words, this was the result of a compromise made on both sides. All
through the negotiations, Wu Heling acted as a mediator between the two sides.
The problems of resolving Mongolian autonomy claims that had existed for al
most half a year were solved. Both sides were able to save face. The central government,
of course, had to recognize Wu’s ability to persuade the Mongols to compromise. On the
other hand, cool-headed leaders also recognized that Wu was a capable person who could
persuade the central government to accept the Mongol proposals and was a man able to
protect the practical interests of the Mongols. However, from the point of view of Prince
De and the radicals under him, Wu was an opportunist prepared to sacrifice the cause of
Mongolia. Prince De thought that even though this result could not be recognized as a
complete failure, it could also not be recognized as a complete success. Only article two,
which stated that the ruling and administrative powers of the traditional Mongol political
units were to remain unaltered, was a relative success in his opinion, because article two
was similar to the points in the Regulations of Mongolian Treatment as issued by the
Beijing government in both 1913 and 1919.
Prince De argued earlier against Wu Heling’s great accomplishment (the Org
anizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners that had been issued by the
Nanjing government in 1931), because it did not offer solid protection of Mongolian
rights as the old regulations had. Nevertheless, Prince De insisted that the provision in the
Regulations of Mongolian Treatment stating that “the ruling power of the Mongol princes
should remain unaltered” be retained. Prince De now changed his mind and no longer
emphasized or insisted on the feudalistic privileges of the princes and nobles. This
change of mind was probably the result of his long interaction with the young Mongol
intellectuals.
From the beginning of the Autonomy movement, Ao Yunzhang had been the
behind-the-scenes advisor for Prince De. He was involved in formulating plans and
drawing up all important declarations relating to the Mongolian autonomy movement. He
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never once went public or claimed merit for doing these things; he was certainly not
seeking recognition or fame for himself Several years ago, a man [Chogbagatur] in Inner
Mongolia wrote his memoirs and in them falsely claimed to have been the person who
drew up all the declarations and plans of the autonomy movement. The Inner Mongolian
Autonomy Movement happened over half a century ago, but I still feel an obligation to
Ao Yunzhang, who was and is an unsung hero of the autonomy movement, and must at
last be given his just credit before the bar of history.

The Machinations of Huang Shaohong and Fu Zuoyi
The acceptance of the Mongolian proposals, although conditional, was a matter
worthy of celebration. Therefore, before Huang Shaohong, Zhao Pilian, and their group
left Beile-yin sume. Princes Yon and De carried out a great party of celebration and fare
well. Among the celebration activities were traditional Mongolian wrestling and horse
racing. According to the Mongolian custom of keeping one’s word, the Mongols trusted
the words of the emissaries from the central government and did not put this agreement
into written form for signatures. No Mongol in attendance at these negotiations foresaw
that this agreement would eventually be altered beyond recognition by the emissaries of
the central government." Later, even after experiencing failure with these Chinese emis
saries, when Prince De negotiated with the Japanese, he still followed the Mongolian
tradition and did not put the Japanese promises into writing or sign and exchange docu
ments. This created many regrettable results for him in the future. His behavior should be
recognized as derived from the Mongolian tradition of simplicity and trust and Mongol
ignorance of the practices of modem diplomacy.
While the celebrations were being carried out. Princes Yon and De and the
members of the presidium of the Mongolian conference representing the officials and
people of the Mongolian leagues and banners sent a telegram of thanks to the KMT party
and the government in Nanjing and reported to them on the resolution of the problems
associated with achieving Mongolian autonomy:
To Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang, the Chinese government, the Executive
Yuan, the Military Committee, the Interior Ministry, and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission:
The public advocacy of Inner Mongolian autonomy by the heads and officials of In
ner Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners is aimed solely at preventing external en
croachment and strengthening the struggle for existence and national defense. Fortunately,
the central government has realized that we are sincere and honest and has dispatched
Minister Huang and Deputy Chairman Zhao to come to Mongolia for observation. After
their arrival in Beile-yin sume, they truly opened their hearts and held open and honest dis
cussions with us. Through the guidance and persuasion of the Living Buddha Panchen and
through several sessions of negotiation and discussion, [they] followed the established
" In 1911, Outer Mongolian delegates went to St. Petersburg to discuss their independence with the
Russian prime minister and high-ranking officials and to win an agreement for Russian assistance
to Mongolia. After independence was declared, however, the Tsarist Russian government in 1912
dispatched Ivan Korostowetz as a special emissary to negotiate a Russo-Mongolian agreement with
the Ulaanbaatar government. This emissary utterly neglected the earlier agreement and promises by
his government to the Mongols. He could get away with this because the Mongols trusted the
words of their Russian counterpart and did not prepare and sign a document and exchange copies of
it.
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principle of the central government, took public opinion into consideration, and agreed to
designate the banners of the Shilingol League and the Chahar Tribe as the First Mongolian
Autonomy Region, the banners of the Ulanchab and Yekejuu Leagues and the Turned
Alashan Ejine Banners as the Second Mongolian Autonomous Region, and established
governments in each region. Other leagues and banners will also follow this precedent. A
combined office will be established among the autonomous regions to carry out public af
fairs. As for halting cultivation of pasture land and the division of local tax revenue, it was
also agreed that efforts would be made to arrive at a suitable solution. Thus, the former
shortcomings and overly brief agreements will be eliminated and a [bright] road for [the
future ofj Mongolia will be opened. We are grateful for the fostering mercy of the central
government and the accomplishments of the two Excellencies, Huang and Zhao. We are
encouraged by our favorable treatment and are greatly pleased. From now on, we will
struggle more resolutely for the defense of the nation. Therefore, we hereby telegraph and
express our thanks and hope that you will see fit to receive this telegram.
[Signed],
Members of the presidium:
Yondonwangchug, Demchugdongrob, Babudorji, Gendenjab
Shonodondub
Officials and delegates of the
leagues, tribes, and banners
Nineteenth day [of November]

On November 19, Huang, Zhao, Xu Tingyao, and their high-ranking attendants
left Beile-yin sume and returned to Hohhot. They also dispatched several of their atten
dants to the banners of Ulanchab and Shilingol for observation and alleviation of ten
sions. After the departure of the government delegates. Princes Yon and De discussed
matters with some other leaders and decided to send a delegation to Nanjing to express
their sincere thanks to the Chinese government and to continue the negotiations with the
government in an effort to resolve as yet unsolved problems.
This delegation was headed by Nimaodzar, who was not only the leader but also
the spokesman for this delegation. The delegation arrived in Nanjing by January, 1934.
They immediately visited with Wang Jingwei, head of the Executive Yuan; Shi Qingyang, chairman of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; and other members and
officials of the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang and of other ministries and
committees. The delegates expressed the Mongols’ gratitude for the acceptance of their
requests for autonomy. They also urged the Executive Yuan to implement the eleven arti
cles that were agreed to by Huang Shaohong and the Mongols. These delegates were
welcomed by both party and government officials. Because Huang and Zhao were still in
Hohhot and had not yet returned to the capital, the government did not voice any objec
tions to this delegation. Thus the delegates felt quite reassured. No Shilingol delegates
joined the delegation. This suggested that Prince De and his radical group did not agree
with the eleven articles negotiated through the endeavors of Wu Heling, and so Prince De
refused to dispatch delegates in order to show his disapproval of the articles.
After their arrival in Hohhot, Huang and Zhao again met with Fu Zuoyi and ne
gotiated for a long period. Ostensibly, Huang and Zhao were waiting to join a MongolChinese Goodwill Conference under the direction of Fu Zuoyi to show that MongolChinese relations in Suiyuan were friendly and that there were no conflicts and no need
to implement autonomy. Of course, the goal of this performance was to create a false
perception among the Mongols and manipulate public opinion. After attending this con
ference, Huang and Zhao went to Taiyuan at Yan Xishan’s invitation. In Taiyuan, Huang
and Zhao consulted with Yan Xishan on how to complete the eleven articles.
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After Huang and Zhao returned to Nanjing, they reported to Wang Jingwei and
submitted to him the version of the eleven articles they had ingenuously worked out in
Hohhot with Fu Zuoyi and in Taiyuan with Yan Xishan. Soon these “Eleven Articles for
the Solution of Mongolian Autonomy” were discussed and passed by a conference of the
Executive Yuan and forwarded to the Central Political Committee of the Kuomintang, the
supreme policy-making organ at that time. These “Eleven Articles” were passed by the
392nd meeting of the committee on January 16, 1934, with only a few minor changes in
wording. The following is the text of Huang’s misleading eleven articles.
The Resolution on Mongolian Autonomy
1.
Limitations on Inner Mongolian Autonomy Plan A, the final position of the Mon
golian delegates on the establishment of regional autonomous governments, is in accor
dance with the principles formulated by the central government and is therefore acceptable.
Issues of territory, jurisdiction, organization, power and functions, and expenditures shall
be decided according to the resolutions below and shall be established as law and ordi
nance.
2.
Agenda for Implementing Mongolian Autonomy Before the regional autonomous
governments are established, preliminary offices shall be established. However, it is neces
sary that officials be sent by the central government to supervise these thoroughly, or else
the governor of the concerned province will be appointed as a superintendent by the central
government. Regulations for the dispatched persons shall be established separately.
3.
Territories of the Mongolian Autonomous Regions The organization of the Mon
golian autonomous regions shall be limited to the territories where the xians are not yet es
tablished. In both Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, two regions shall be established. The ti
tles [of these two regions] shall be the First Mongolian Autonomous Region of the Repub
lic of China, the Second Autonomous Region, and so forth. But if the two autonomous re
gions of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces are willing to unify into one region, then this might
be submitted to the Interior Ministry and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission by
the provinces in question and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval [by the minis
try and commission]. As for the regions where xians are already established in Chahar and
Suiyuan and are completely under the jurisdiction of the provinces, and where the xians and
Mongolian territory interlock, detailed division shall be surveyed [and determined] by the
provincial government and the regional [autonomous] government and reported to the Inte
rior Ministry and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission for submission to the Execu
tive Yuan for approval. As for the two banners of Ejine and Alashan, which were originally
under the jurisdiction of Ningxia province, they should not be designated as being within
the autonomous regions.
4. The Organization of Autonomous Regional Governments
A. The members of the autonomous regional governments shall consist of five to fif
teen persons. Among them, one shall be chairman and two shall be deputy chairmen. They
must be persons native to the particular areas [they represent] and must be appointed by the
central government.
B. Sections shall be established within the regional governments to aid in administra
tion.
C. In order to solve the common matters among the autonomous regions, a joint con
ference of the autonomous regions may be summoned by a special appointee sent by the
central government.
D. The autonomous regions shall consist of two divisions; regions and banners. In
each region and banner, people’s autonomous organizations shall be established, the regu
lations of which shall be determined by law and ordinance.
E. The central government shall approve the location of the regional government.
5.
Jurisdiction Over the Autonomous Regional Governments The autonomous re-
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gional governments of Mongolia shall be under the direct jurisdiction of the Executive
Yuan and directed by the concerned ministries and commissions of the central government.
6.
The Powers of the Autonomous Regional Governments The authority to direct
military affairs and matters of diplomacy in the autonomous regions of Mongolia shall be
uniformly wielded by the central government or by such provincial governments as the
central government shall designate. Other matters recognized as having special characteris
tics shall also be delegated by the central government to the provincial governments as cir
cumstances dictate. Administration of Mongolian banners not delegated to the provincial
government by the central government shall be administered by the regional governments.
The regional governments may promulgate ordinances for the regions and special regula
tions within limitations if they do not conflict with the laws and regulations issued by the
central government and the concerned provincial governments. Limitations on the freedom
of the people and increases in the people’s duties shall not be implemented unless author
ized by the Chinese government.
7.
Relations Between the Provincial Governments and the Autonomous Regional
Governments As for the administration of Mongolian banners inside Mongolian autono
mous regions in which the central government has already granted the power to administer
these matters to the provincial governments, these administrative powers shall remain with
the provincial government. Powers not granted the provincial governments shall be retained
by the regional governments according to the direction of the central government. Matters
concerning administration of the provinces shall be discussed with the provincial govern
ment, which shall reach a decision. In areas where xians are already established, the ad
ministration of Mongolian banners and the entanglements between the Mongols and Chi
nese shall be handled by the provincial government. In times of need, a special committee
shall be established to solve problems between the provinces and the autonomous regions.
The central government may commission the provincial government to represent the central
government in directing the Mongolian regional governments in carrying out local auton
omy.
8.
Administrative Expenditures of the Governments of the Autonomous Regions
The budgets for expenditures by the governments of the autonomous regions should be
drawn up first and then authorized by the central government, which will then grant sup
plementary funds. All tax revenues must be allocated in accordance with the guidelines es
tablished by the central government and must be divided into national tax and local tax.
National tax revenue in the territories where xians are established should be collected by
the provincial governments. In areas where xians are not yet established, taxes shall be
collected by the autonomous regional governments.
9.
The Problems of Expenditures of the Autonomous Regions In areas where culti
vation has been undertaken andxm«s are established, all original Chinese and Mongol land
rights should remain as currently constituted. In Mongolian banners where uncultivated
land exists and there are no xians, animal husbandry shall be carried out as the main eco
nomic activity, with farming and cultivation as supplementary activities. There shall be no
discrimination against the people of the Republic of China, and anyone who lives in the ter
ritories for one year shall enjoy the rights to both husbandry and cultivation. The regional
governments, when recognizing the necessity to cultivate land inside the autonomous re
gions, may petition the central government at any time for authorization to open it to both
Mongolian and Chinese cultivation. In uncultivated areas, domestic animals shall be im
proved through breeding, and epidemic prevention stations for animals shall be set up, to
gether with branch stations for vaccination of the animals, all to benefit the domestic ani
mals and to promote their health. The forests and minerals belong to the nation and shall be
developed and exploited by the Ministry of Industry. In order to develop the monetary or
ganizations, the Ministry of Finance shall develop branches of the Central Bank in the
autonomous regions,
10. Problems of Education in the Autonomous Regions In order to change the Mon
golian educational system and supplement expenditures for Mongolian education, a thor-
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ough and concrete draft for solution shall be worked out by the Ministry of Education and
the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission.
11. Judicial Problems in the Autonomous Regions A concrete draft shall be worked
out by the Ministry of Judicial Administration and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commis
sion.

The Final Resolution
When this resolution appeared in the newspapers, the Mongolian delegation
(which had been sent to express appreciation) and the Mongols in Nanjing were shocked.
Cheated by the ministers of the central government, they resented the government’s du
plicity in dealing with them. When this news reached Bat-khaalag, the people waiting for
a positive answer from the central government were greatly surprised. They marveled
that the representatives of a government, the ministers of interior affairs, could be such
unfaithful and disingenuous people and cheat both the Mongol people and the central
government. The reputation of the Nanjing government dropped greatly in the eyes of the
Mongol people. Even in later days, when the government’s reputation was restored, this
incident still left many Mongols bitter. At this time. Prince De swore to his radical intel
lectual followers that no matter what kind of situation Mongolia might face, his decision
to sacrifice his life and family for the Mongol people would never change. This decision
was the main factor that placed him in the position of a tragic hero of his time.
According to Huang Shaohong’s eleven articles, not only did the Mongols fail to
achieve a higher degree of autonomy, but the guarantee of the original power and rights
of the Mongol leagues and banners was also jeopardized. This solution aimed to elimi
nate the leagues, put all banners under the control of the provincial governments, and
encourage Chinese cultivation of Mongolian pastoral land. It would have destroyed the
pastoral base of the Mongolian economy. This solution not only made it impossible to
divide the tax revenues but even put the original rights of taxation into the hands of the
provincial and xian governments.
On January 18, the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Dele
gates and the delegation from Beile-yin sume joined to protest to the Kuomintang Central
Headquarters and the Chinese government against the resolution for Mongolian auton
omy as passed by the Kuomintang Central Political Committee and to petition to change
this resolution. On January 19, a telegram of inquiry was sent to Huang Shaohong in the
name of Prince Yon, Prince De, and other members of the presidium of the Mongolian
conference. On January 24, all the Mongols in Nanjing—officials, students, young, and
old—mobilized and took to the streets with posters to demonstrate. They went to the
Kuomintang Central Headquarters, to the Chinese government’s Executive Yuan, and
other organizations to protest. They also explained in a press conference the reasons why
they could not accept the resolution of the Central Political Committee. They also gave
an account of their betrayal by Huang Shaohong.
When these protesters arrived at the Kuomintang Central Headquarters, the
Fourth Meeting of the Fourth Session of the Central Committee was convening, and all
party and government leaders were in attendance. Among them were the Mongolian
members Engkebatu, Bai Yunti, and Keshingge. Most of the Mongol demonstrators were
blocked from entering the gate. Only a few people, such as Wu Heling, Nimaodzar, his
delegation, and Mongols with higher official positions (for example, Bai Rui, a member
of the Control Yuan) were allowed to enter.
During their discussion, Bai Rui, who had earlier gone to Bat-khaalag and joined
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the Mongol conference as a private supporter of the movement, became highly agitated
and shouted, “At the beginning of the republic 1 was elected a member of the parliament.
From that time on, I followed Mr. Sun Yat-sen and went to Guangdong and joined the
revolutionary activities under Mr. Sun’s leadership. After twenty years, now I see that
there is a minister of Interior Affairs in the government who is cheating the Mongols, and
the central government and the party have believed his words. [Under these circum
stances] it would be better for me to die than remain alive!” Having uttered these words,
Bai Rui rushed to the railing of the building’s balcony and attempted to jump off, but
several people prevented him from doing so. At the same time, Khasochir, a young mem
ber of the Beile-yin sume delegation, also became agitated and attempted to jump, but he
was also restrained.
A riotous disturbance ensued, and the top leaders in the meetings immediately
reported this matter to higher authorities. Word soon came back from these higher au
thorities that the protesters should go home in peace; an investigation would begin imme
diately. Wu Heling, seizing the opportunity, privately told the responsible members of the
Kuomintang Central Headquarters about the seriousness of this problem. The next day
the Nanjing newspapers reported the Mongolian protest in blazing headlines. This at
tracted the attention of most citizens of Nanjing.
Following this event, Fu Zuoyi, again in the name of the ruling princes of the
banners of the Yekejuu League, sent out a public telegram stating that the ruling princes
did not attend the meeting at Beile-yin sume and had no desire to join with the other
leagues and banners in forming one autonomous region. This misleading telegram
brought great antagonism toward Fu Zuoyi among the Mongols in Nanjing. In response,
the Yekejuu delegates in Nanjing issued a declaration pointing out the false statements
made by Fu Zuoyi.
Realizing the seriousness of this problem, Wang Jingwei, the head of the execu
tive ywcfn, summoned a meeting to discuss the situation.'^ At first, Wang Jingwei empha
sized the continuing, consistent policy of his government toward the weak minorities, and
said that if the Mongols, in their requests for increased autonomy, were inclined toward
the central government, they would be nurtured according to Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s will and
teachings. On the other hand, Wang continued in a somewhat threatening tone, if this
movement were separatist in nature, it would certainly be suppressed.
This attempt at intimidation did not stop the Mongols from protesting. Bai Yunti, Wu Heling, Nimaodzar, Rong Zhao (a Turned Mongol educated in the Soviet Union)
and others spoke one after another in protest. Rong Zhao’s protests were the most viru
lent. He emphasized that the Mongols’ demand for autonomy was a purely indigenous
movement free of interference or assistance from any foreign country, and that the de
mands for autonomy were based on the teachings of Mr. Sun Yat-sen. He further ex
plained that the movement was inclined toward the central government and was not a

Persons in attendance from the government included Yu Youren, Head of the Control Yuan; Dai
Chuanxian, head of the Examination Yuan; Ju Zheng, head of the Judicial Yuan; Shi Qingyang,
Minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian, the two
special envoys sent to Mongolia; and other important government and party officials. From the
Mongolian side, Bai Yunti, Keshingge, Li Yongxin, and other Mongolian officials in the Kuomin
tang Central Headquarters attended. Wu Heling and the delegates of the Nanking Office of the
Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, Nimaodzar and the delegation sent from Beile-yin sume,
the Mongolian officials in the offices of the government in Nanking and Mongolian college stu
dents all attended the conference.
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separatist movement; the nation and Mongolia would both benefit from such autonomy.
A greater degree of autonomy for the Mongols, he continued, was the desire of all Mon
gols, not simply the personal goal of Prince De.
Rong and the others also pointed out that all the information issued by Fu Zuoyi
was propagandistic fabrication. They also demanded that Huang Shaohong explain why
he cheated the Mongols by altering the contents of the original eleven articles and
brought shame upon the government in doing so. The meeting ended on a very awkward
and tense note.
Wang Jingwei soon summoned Wu Heling for a personal consultation, and Wu
gave detailed answers to all of Wang’s questions; he used a map to illustrate the original
territories of the leagues and banners and the subsequent establishment of provinces and
xians which created a conflict within the dual system of political administration. In ac
cordance with the doctrine of jurisdiction based on ethnicity (shurenzhuyi), Wu ex
plained, the leagues and banners ruled over the Mongols and the provinces and xians
ruled over the Chinese. Violation of this traditional precedent created conflicts in Judicial
matters. Wu explained further that the provision in article three of Huang’s eleven false
articles which held that “the organization of the Mongolian autonomous regions shall be
limited to the territories where xians are not already established” meant that most of the
Mongolian districts and people could not enjoy self-rule. The effect of the provision for
tax revenue in Huang’s eleven articles, Wu continued, meant that the Mongols would get
nothing. Therefore, the Mongols could not accept the eleven articles passed by the Cen
tral Political Committee. Moreover, this kind of unfaithfulness on the part of the central
government would bring bad results in the future.
Wu continued by giving Wang a very detailed explanation of the eleven articles
that both sides had agreed to at the negotiations in Beile-yin sume. Wu also emphasized
that unless the central government allowed the Mongols to establish a unified autono
mous organization, it would be impossible to satisfy their hopes. Wang said that a rea
sonable and practical resolution should be quickly reached and demanded that Wu draw
up a draft of a solution for his (Wang’s) personal reference.
After receiving Wang Jingwei’s instructions, Wu Heling consulted with Nimaodzar and his delegation and drafted an eight-article method for achieving Mongolian
autonomy. The next day, he brought this draft to Wang. After reading it, Wang felt quite
satisfied but said, “I cannot make a decision on a matter as important as this by myself
This must be approved by Mr. Chiang [Kai-shek] himself” He then told Wu Heling,
“The Central Committee has already adopted a solution. A change [in this resolution] is
necessary. It would be best for you to visit several influential members and secure their
cooperation.”
Wu soon went to visit with Zhang Ji, Dai Chuanxian, and others to explain the
need to alter the resolution for Mongolian autonomy as passed by the Kuomintang Cen
tral Political Committee. These people expressed their willingness to consider his re
quests, offering no objections to the changes he proposed. Wang Jingwei made a few
changes in the wording of Wu Heling’s draft and sent it to the Headquarters of the Mili
tary Committee in Nanchang for Generalissimo Chiang’s approval. Chiang did not make
any changes in Wang’s revision other than adding the word “local” between the words
“Mongolian” and “autonomy.” After receiving this response from Chiang Kai-shek,
Wang summoned Wu Heling again, showed him the document, and said happily, “This
autonomous problem is now resolved, for the most part, according to the wishes of you
and your people.”
After receiving Chiang’s agreement, Wang Jingwei commended in his own
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name and in the name of Chiang Kai-shek the “Principles of Mongolian Local Auton
omy” to the 397th meeting of the Central Political Committee held on February 28, 1934.
There was no opposition; the resolution passed unanimously. Thus the Mongolian auton
omy problems eventually were resolved in a manner acceptable to both the central gov
ernment and the Mongol people. Following are the Eight Articles on Mongolian Auton
omy as passed by the Central Political Committee.
1.
A Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council shall be established at an
appropriate locality in Mongolia. The said council and its administration of the political af
fairs of the leagues and banners shall be under the direct jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan
and the guidance of concerned offices in the central government. Persons appointed as
chairman and members of the said council are to be Mongols. The budget of the council
shall be provided by the central government. The central government shall station a highranking official at the locality of the council to provide guidance and mediate in disputes
between the [Mongolian] leagues and banners and the [Chinese] provinces and xian$.
2.
All league offices shall be converted into league governments, and banner offices
into banner governments. Internal organization of these offices-turned-govemments are to
remain unchanged. Expenditures of the league governments shall be subsidized by the cen
tral government.
3.
The Chahar Tribe shall be classified as a league in order to put it on an equal footing
with the other leagues. The administration and organization of the Chahar Tribe shall re
main unchanged.
4.
The Jurisdictions and ruling powers of the leagues and banners are to remain un
changed.
5.
The current cultivation of the pasture lands shall cease. Henceforth, local [Mongol
ian] economic development shall be based upon improvements in animal husbandry and
growth of related industries. (In instances where leagues and banners give their consent,
cultivation shall be permitted.)
6.
The integrity of all taxes and rents of the leagues and banners, as well as of private
rents of the Mongol people, shall be ensured.
7.
A percentage of all local taxes collected in league and banner territories by the prov
inces and xians shall be returned to the leagues and banners for allocation as construction
funds. Decisions concerning the allocation of tax revenues shall be made separately.
8.
There shall be no additional xians or preliminary-xions established in league and
banner territories. (Even when exigencies dictate otherwise, the establishment of additional
xians and preliminary-xmns must still be approved by the concerned leagues and banners.)

Nimaodzar and his delegation telegraphed this good news to Princes Yon and
De and also expressed their gratitude for and acceptance of the resolution to the Central
Political Committee. At the same time, they personally expressed their sincere thanks to
Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek. The Mongols in Nanjing threw a party at the Central
Hotel to celebrate the success of the autonomy movement. The delegation returned to
Mongolia immediately; less important matters were referred to the Nanjing Office of the
Mongolian League and Banner Delegates.
After Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian left Beile-yin sume. Prince De also re
turned to his residence in Sunid. At the time when Huang and Zhao were fabricating their
false eleven articles and the Nanjing Mongols were protesting against these articles.
Prince De thought that the autonomous movement had ended in failure. He did not, how
ever, forsake his determination to struggle to the end. The intellectuals around him also
did not disperse or lose hope. This unyielding insistence encouraged the Mongols in
Nanjing to continue the struggle against the machinations of Huang Shaohong and Fu
Zuoyi. Eventually, the hopes and yearnings of the Mongols were realized. The establish-
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ment of a unified autonomous organization was especially satisfying to the supporters of
the autonomy movement. Nevertheless, they had some regrets that their goal of Mongol
ian autonomy was changed to “local autonomy.” The Mongol efforts in Nanjing and the
formation of a unified Mongolian autonomous organization somewhat restored the affa
ble relationship between Prince De and Wu Heling. It also decreased Prince De’s suspi
cions of Wu.
Since the Mongolian side expressed its willingness to accept the Eight Articles
on Mongolian Local Autonomy, on March 7, the 398th meeting of the Central Political
Committee passed the Provisional Outline of the Organization of Mongolian Local Auto
nomous Political Affairs Council, and the Preliminary Regulations of the Office of Su
perintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy. The following are the contents of these two
documents.
Provisional Outline of the Organization of the
Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council
Article I
The Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council shall be organized ac
cording to the principles of Mongolian Local Autonomy as issued by the Chinese govern
ment.
Article II
The said council shall be under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan and shall ac
cept the directions of the concerned organizations in the central government and the super
intendents dispatched by the central government. Matters pertaining to the provinces shall
be carried out through negotiation and consultation with the provincial governments.
Article III
The location of the said council shall be Beile-yin sume.
Article IV
Members of the council shall be nine to twenty-four in number. Members shall be
presented by the Executive Yuan to the Chinese government for appointment. One chair
man and two vice chairmen shall be appointed from among the members.
Article V
The council shall hold a meeting every two weeks. If it is necessary, a preliminary
meeting may be held. All meetings shall be chaired by the chairman. When a member is
unable to attend a meeting, a representative shall be sent in his behalf to attend the meeting
with no voting rights.
Article VI
The chairman of the council shall carry out the resolutions of the meetings as ex
plained in the former article and he shall also administer the affairs of the council and su
pervise the other officials and organizations under the jurisdiction of the council. In the
event that the chairman is unable to carry out his functions, one of the vice-chairmen shall
act as chairman in his behalf
Article VII
The council shall establish the following departments, bureaus, and commissions for
separate management of the council’s various affairs:
The Department of the Secretariat shall administer the documents, archives, records,
statistics, translations [of documents], accounting, and general affairs of the council.
The Department of Consultation shall draw up and examine the plans, bills, and ordi
nances of the council.
The Civil Affairs Bureau shall administer civilian affairs.
The Peace Preservation Bureau shall administer affairs pertaining to the preservation of
the peace.
The Industrial Affairs Bureau shall administer affairs pertaining to industry in general.
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The Bureau of Education shall administer education and related matters.
The Financial Commission shall administer financial affairs and concerns.
For each bureau, a bureau head [shall be appointed].
In the Financial Commission there shall be a chairman, and six to ten members shall
be appointed by the council chairman from among the secretaries, consultants, and coun
selors. All heads of the bureaus shall be members of the Financial Commission.
There shall be from twelve to sixteen section heads for the departments, bureaus, and
commission.
Forty to sixty clerks shall be in the departments, bureaus, and commission.
The council may appoint specialists of all kinds and employees [as needs dictate].
The aforementioned departments and bureaus, with the exception of the Department
of Consultation, shall be divided into sections for carrying out their functions. The council
may, as needs require, establish additional bureaus and commissions upon approval [of the
central government].
Article VIII
The following officials shall be appointed in the departments, bureaus, and commis
sion of the council:
one secretary general
four secretaries
one chief consultant
four consultants
honorary counselors, one from each banner, with renewable terms of one year.
Article IX
Members of the council shall be Mongols only. The officials of the departments, bur
eaus, and commission shall be appointed through selection by the Executive Yuan from
among those who have special knowledge of Mongolian affairs.
Article X
The regulations of the meetings and the administration of the council shall be passed
by the council and presented to the Executive Yuan for approval.
Article XI
This outline shall be carried out from the day of its promulgation.

The following is the text of the Preliminary Regulations of the Office of the Su
perintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy.
Preliminary Regulations of the Office of the Superintendent
for Mongolian Local Autonomy
Article I
The Superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy shall direct the Mongolian Local
Autonomous Political Affairs Council and intervene in confrontations between the [Chi
nese] provinces and xians and the Mongolian leagues and banners in accordance with the
principles of Mongolian local autonomy as issued by the Chinese government and ordered
by the Executive Yuan.
Article II
One superintendent and one vice superintendent shall be appointed by the Chinese
government through the recommendation of the Executive Y uan.
Article III
The senior counselors shall be appointed by the Executive Yuan through the recom
mendation of the superintendent.
Article IV
Appointment of other officials of the Office of the Superintendent shall be decided
separately.
Article V
At the meetings of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council, the
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superintendent and the deputy superintendent may dispatch the senior consultant for super
vision.
Article VI
All documents of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council pre
sented to the Executive Yuan and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission shall be pre
sented simultaneously to the office of the superintendent.
Article VII
If the management and orders formulated and issued by the Mongolian Local
Autonomous Political Affairs Council are recognized by the superintendent as being inap
propriate, he may correct or eliminate them.
Article VIII
Expenditures of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council shall be
provided for through the Office of the Superintendent.
Article IX
These regulations shall be carried out from the day of their promulgation.

In the same meeting, the important personnel of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Po
litical Affairs Council and its superintendent were selected and appointed by the Chinese
government.'^
In comparison with the eleven articles negotiated between Huang Shaohong and
the Mongols, these eight articles passed by the Central Political Committee provided
more gains and smaller losses to the Mongols. Because of this, many Mongol leaders
recognized that the attitudes of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters and the leaders in
the Chinese government toward the Mongols and the national minorities were quite fair.
However, hindered by the powerful officials of the border provinces like Yan Xishan and
Fu Zuoyi, implementation of these policies was impossible. Because of this, the Mongol
leaders still had to contact the central government over the heads of the borderlands pro
vincial officials and warlords. But in so doing, they only brought upon themselves more
obstruction by and animosity from the provincial governments. This situation in Inner
Mongolia continued until 1949, when the Chinese government withdrew to Taiwan.
Chairman of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council: Yondonwangchug
(head of the Ulanchab League); vice-chairmen: Sodnamrabdan (head of the Shilingol League) and
Shagdurjab (head of the Yekejuu League); members: Demchugdongrob (deputy-head of the Shilin
gol League), Altanwachir (deputy-head of the Yekejuu League), Babudorji (deputy-head of the
Ulanchab League), Nayantu (Prince of Khalkha and a senior advisor in the Executive Yuan), Yangsang (ex-head of the Shilingol League), Engkebatu (member of the Chinese government and of the
Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee), Bai Yunti (member of the Kuomintang Central Ex
ecutive Committee and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Keshingge (alternate member
of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission), Wu Heling (head of the Nanking Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Dele
gates and member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission), Jodbajab (superintendent of
Peace Preservation of the Chahar Tribe), Gonchograshi (amban of the Chahar Bordered White
Banner), Damzana {jasag of the Alashan Banner), Tobshinbayar (jasag of the EJine Banner), Rong
Xiang [amban of the Turned Banner), Nimaodzar (amban of the Chahar-Minggan Pa.sture), Yidechin (military consultant in the Chinese government), Khorjurjab (a “prince-in-leisure” of the
Sunid Left Banner), Togtakhu (tusalagchi of the Ujumuchin Right Banner), Pandeigungchab (jasag
of the Dorben Keuked Banner), Namjilsereng (deputy-head of the Jerim League), and Ayulugei
(deputy-head of the Josutu League); superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy: He Yingqin
(Minister of Military Affairs and In Charge of the Chairman of the Beiping Branch of the Military
Committee); and vice superintendent: Zhao Daiwen (Counselor-General of the Taiyuan Office
of Pacification).
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The Nanjing government realized that in order to satisfy the Mongols, it would
be impossible to put them under the supervision of the provincial governments and that
an autonomous region extending into the areas of several provinces under the direct jur
isdiction of the central government had to be established. However, because this would
evoke great opposition from the provinces, it was necessary to appoint a person whose
authority was above that of the provincial governments to bear the title of superintendent
for Mongolian Local Autonomy and to mediate conflicts between the Mongols and the
provinces. Unfortunately, this was not done, so the conflicts remained.
The goal in establishing and appointing members to the Mongolian Local
Autonomous Political Affairs Council (hereafter abbreviated as the Mongolian Political
Council) was to include in one organization all the Inner Mongolian territories except
those areas under Japanese occupation. The Council would unite influential Mongolian
nobility and outstanding commoner leaders to work for the good of Inner Mongolia and
to resist Russia and Japan. Hence the Khalkha Prince Nayuantu, the Jerim League Deputy
Head Namjilsereng, and the Josutu League Deputy Head Ayulugei were appointed as
members.
For years, the aim of Chahar, Hulunbuir and Dahur Mongols had been to change
their tribes into leagues. Not until this time did they achieve this goal. Unfortunately, the
Japanese had by then occupied the territory of both the Hulunbuir and Dahur Mongols.
From 1928 (when the Inner Mongolian leaders formally established contact with
the Kuomintang Central Headquarters and the Chinese government) to 1934, this was the
only harmonious moment in relations between the Chinese central government and the
Mongolian leaders. Perhaps this was one of the reasons why from this time onward
Prince De retained a good impression of the Chinese government. However, because of
Fu Zuoyi’s harassment and the Japanese military advances, this honeymoon period did
not last long. Prince De had to change his course of action and once again assume more
risks to his life.

VII
THE PERIOD OF THE MONGOLIAN
POLITICAL COUNCIL
APRIL 1934 - JANUARY 1936
Founding of the Council
The approved Eight Articles on Mongolian Local Autonomy became the legal
foundation for Mongolian self-rule that Mongolian leaders had desired for years. In ac
cordance with these principles, both the Temporary Outline of the Organization of the
Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council and its main personnel were all
announced. The hearts of both traditional and more modem-minded Mongol leaders were
gladdened, and they also perceived this as an unprecedented event in the history of the
Republic of China. Still, the Eight Articles also occasioned a counterattack from the
frontier provinces. Fu Zuoyi and his clique tried hard to destroy this great accomplish
ment. Because of this. Prince De and other leaders of the autonomy movement had no
choice but to concentrate their attention and energy on dealing with the pressure from
without. But they were unable to make progress solving internal problems and satisfying
the desires of the Mongol people because of Japanese westward expansion and changes
in China’s domestic political scene.
After the Mongolian delegates returned to Beile-yin sume and submitted their
report, both Prince Yon and Prince De took up their positions on April 3, 1934 and then
telegraphed the Chinese government that they would go ahead with ceremonies to mark
the establishment of the Mongolian Political Council and the inauguration of its mem
bers. Princes Yon and De invited General He Yingqin, the Superintendent of Mongolian
Local Autonomy, to come and “supervise” the ceremony.
On April 23, 1934 the Mongolian Political Council was founded and its mem
bers were sworn in. Those who attended this ceremony were Prince Yon, Prince De,
Khorjurjab, Togtakhu, Jodbajab, Nimaodsar, Gonchograshi, Babudorji, Bai Yunti, Keshingge, Yi-Dechin, Rong Xiang, Wu Heling, and three hundred other league and banner
delegates and guests. He Yingqin did not come but sent He Jingwu, the counselor of the
Office of the Superintendent, as his personal representative. Yan Xishan, Fu Zuoyi, and
Song Zheyuan all sent their own delegates and messages of congratulation. After this
ceremony was over, the first meeting of the members of the Mongolian Political Council
convened. The chairman nominated Prince De as the Secretary General of the Council,
the prince thereby accepting the de facto responsibility for running the administration.
Wu Heling was nominated as Chief Counselor to draw up plans for further development
and laws. Shirabdorji was nominated as Head of the Civil Affairs Bureau, Togtakhu as
Head of the Peace Preservation Bureau, and Sainbayar as Chairman of the Financial
Commission. I cannot recollect who was nominated to head the Bureaus of Education and
Industry. These nominations were passed by the council.
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Those intellectuals from Nanjing and Beiping who had Joined Prince De’s camp
were all installed in the bureaucracy of this newly established autonomous organization.
Under the Secretary General, Prince De, there were four secretaries: Chogbagatur, SaJirkhu, Jirgalang, and Sangbu. Oljeitu was appointed head of the Secretariat Section; Jalgamji as head of the Translation Section; Chen Kengyang as section head of the Ac
counting Department; Su Baofeng and Engkeamur were appointed as section heads in the
Industry Bureau, the former dealing with construction and the latter with transportation;
Guan Qiyi (who later went to Yan’an) was appointed the head of the Wireless Station.
Bai Haifeng and Zhu Shifli were both trained in Ulaanbaatar and the USSR. Yun Jixian,
Arbijikhu, and Khasbagan were trained in the Nanjing Military Academy. Kokebagatur
(Han Fenglin), a graduate of the Japanese Officers School, together with Buyandelger
(Bao Guiting), who had been trained at the Northeast Military Academy (Dongbei
Jiangwu Tang), were appointed as section heads of the Peace Preservation Bureau or as
drill instructors and officers in the Peace Preservation troops.
Evidence suggests that Prince De’s standards of appointment depended on a
man’s education and capability, not his political background. He also tried to give posi
tions of leadership to all who came and Joined his camp. Prince De made sure to select
Ao Yunzhang, who had devoted his energy to Prince De’s struggles against Wu Heling
and to the founding of the Mongolian Political Council, for appointment as a senior advi
sor, a position outside the administrative structure of the Mongolian Political Council.
The establishment of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Coun
cil immediately became the subject of newspaper headlines all over China. Journalists
abbreviated its name to the Mongolian Political Council {Mengzhenghui). The formal
name of the council in the Mongolian language was the Monggol gajar oron-u obesuben
jasakhu geshigud-un khural. The Mongols usually referred to it as the Batu-khagalagayin Khural, which means a meeting or committee located at Bat-khaalag.
The Inner Mongolian Autonomous movement originally held its meetings at the
Yungrung-sang section of the Beile-yin sume, the administrative center of the temple
itself Most of the people who came from elsewhere, if they could not be accommodated
in the houses of the monks or the nearby Chinese merchants, had to bring their own yurts
and tents. With the passage of time, the intellectuals, especially those from Nanjing and
Beiping who had less faith in Buddhism, made weary the monks in the temple. The lamas
began to ask that Prince Yon move the Mongolian Political Council and its staff members
out of the holy temple of the Buddha as soon as possible.
Before the formal establishment of the Mongolian Political Council, the meeting
of the leaders had already decided to direct the banners to provide yurts for temporary
office use by the council but there were delays in gathering the tents. Prince Yon, a very
devout Buddhist, did not want to transgress against the integrity of the temple. He re
quested that Prince De do something as soon as possible to protect the holy temple from
becoming defiled by worldliness. Prince De, also a devout Buddhist, did not want the
Mongolian Political Council to be criticized for offending the temple and disturbing the
“Law of Buddha.” He ordered all the staff members residing at the temple area to with
draw as soon as possible to the Chinese merchant quarters or elsewhere. This of course
created dissatisfaction among the intellectuals and increased their enmity toward the la
mas.
While these young people were gathered in the temple, the lamas, already wea
rying of them, named them gaming, a corrupted form of the Chinese term geming, or
“revolution.” This was also a term of derision which the Ulaanbaatar lamas and people
had applied to all Chinese officials after the founding of the Republic of China. This term
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connotes a man with no conscience and no sense of propriety, who opposes the Law of
Buddha and the old traditions. This usage marked the rift that had developed between the
old and traditional ways on the one hand, and the new and revolutionary activities on the
other.'
Prince So was unable to attend the first meeting because of his bad health, so
Togtakhu went as his personal representative. Prince Shagdurjab, head of the Yekejuu
League, was also unable to come because of Fu Zuoyi’s hindrance. Nevertheless, in order
not to be isolated from other Mongol leaders, he later came to Bat-khaalag once to show
his acceptance of the post of vice-chairman of the committee.^ From the beginning of the
movement. Prince Yon had given his full support to Prince De. Therefore, after he took
the position of chairman, he gave the real power to Prince De in order to give him a free
hand in doing the work of the council. From this time on, except for extremely important
affairs. Prince De had complete power in making decisions on behalf of Prince Yon.
Prince Yon never rejected any of the proposals of Prince De. Because of his great age,
Prince Yon usually stayed at his own residence, about forty kilometers north of the loca
tion of the council, and rarely came to the headquarters. His nephew Shirabdorji, who had
great admiration for Prince De, acted as go-between for the two princes. The relationship
between Shirabdorji and Prince De was cordial and productive.
As mentioned earlier, the conflict between the lamas and intellectuals also
marked the gap between the traditionalists and the radicals and was difficult to compro
mise. Prince De was supported by both parties, and so he was sandwiched between the
two groups. His circumstances were probably similar to those of Prince Gungsangnorbu,
the Mongol leader in the early period of the Chinese Republic. This deadlock was not
resolved until the last days before the Communist takeover, when Prince De was forced
off the political stage.
The Mongols did not wish to be ruled by aliens, i.e. Chinese, and they certainly
never wanted their pasture lands to be converted into cultivated farms for an alien people.
This was the main reason why the Mongols demanded self-rule. Not to be ruled by others
was the common desire of Mongols, from the princes to the common herders. But during
the 1930s, when drastic changes were taking place in East Asia, the ordinary people and
the conservatives could not understand how to achieve the goal of self-rule. Some of
them thought that self-rule was nothing more than tenaciously hanging on to the estab
lished institutions and obstinately refusing to implement change. Of course, this kind of
old-fashioned thought could not accommodate itself to the policy of the Mongolian Po
litical Council to achieve a form of autonomy suitable for the modem world. The conflict
between the Beile-yin sume authorities and the Mongolian intellectuals from other areas
' In the late sixteenth century, Mongolian society was completely converted to Buddhism. The
temples and lamaseries became the centers of culture, economics, and politics. Ulaanbaatar, the
capital of Outer Mongolia, also developed in this manner. Later, because of the increasing impact
of politics, an atmosphere deleterious to religion evolved, a fact clearly known to the leaders of the
Inner Mongolian monasteries. Beile-yin sume had become a political center, and of course this was
of great concern to the leading lamas of this temple. Because of the political impact of Mongolian
autonomy, this famous temple was eventually destroyed and plundered by Fu Zuoyi’s troops in the
winter of 1936.
^ Prince Yangsang, the former head of the Shilingol League; Enkebatu, a member of the Chinese
government in Nanjing; Prince Nayantu of Khalkha; Ayulugei, the deputy head of the Josotu
League; and Prince Namjilsereng, the deputy head of the Jerim League (the last three of whom
were in Beiping), were unable to come because of old age and illness. Their absence, however, had
no political significance in the founding of the Mongolian Political Council.
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was a minor example of the conflict. The chance such petty quarrels provided for some
Chinese regional officials to play divide and rule tricks against the Mongols was not lost
on Fu Zuoyi and his Suiyuan provincial government.
The pressure from outside, though very heavy, did nothing but stimulate nation
alistic spirit and lead the Mongols toward national unification in the face of external ag
gression. However, the internal conflict had reached a deadlock. The most serious con
flict was the confrontation between the feudalistic, localistic traditions and the movement
for unification.^ The newly established Mongolian Political Council tried to push through
its program of local administration. This brought it into serious conflict with the firmly
rooted feudalistic traditions and patterns of thought. Because the leagues and banners had
no experience of being ruled over by their own unified Mongolian organization, they
wished to have the Mongolian Political Council deal only with external oppression but
not have it rule over them. Because of this, the Mongolian Political Council became
bogged down in its work. The most serious conflict, the “Prince Shi Incident,” used by Fu
Zuoyi to destroy the Mongolian Political Council, was not to occur until the second year
of the council’s existence.

Togtakhu’s Visits with Chiang Kai-shek
After the founding of the Mongolian Political Council, the Mongolian authori
ties appointed Togtakhu as their representative and sent him to Nanjing to present two
hundred military mounts to the central government as a token of appreciation. Kokebagatur and Namur were assigned as assistants to Togtakhu, the former as a secretary and
the latter as an attendant charged with looking after the horses. The goals of Togtakhu’s
travels to Nanjing were twofold; as a member of the Mongolian Political Council he was
to represent Prince Yon and Prince De to the Chinese government; as an official of the
UJumuchin Banner, he was to personally represent Prince So, the leader of the Shilingol
League.
Because Togtakhu was a good friend of my father, he stayed at my home after
his arrival in Beiping. 1 learned from him that Prince So’s support of Prince De was sin
cere. If Prince So had not supported Prince De, the Mongolian autonomy movement
might never have materialized. Prince So’s purpose was to establish inner unity the better
to oppose external oppression. He also wanted to implement self-rule in order to protect
the national existence of the Mongolian people. These were his only aspirations. The ru
mor that he did not support the autonomy movement is false.
Togtakhu’s trip to Beiping was to meet with General He Yingqin, Minister of
Military Administration and Superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy. Because
Togtakhu was displeased with Kokebagatur’s relations with the Japanese, he did not want
Kokebagatur to know what he was going to say to General He Yingqin. Knowing that
Kokebagatur had his wife and family in Beiping, Togtakhu told him to take a few days
off and spend them at home. Togtakhu asked me to contact General He and remain with
^ As I mentioned in Chapter I, the Manchus had used a divide-and-conquer policy to establish tight
limitations on the grazing activities of the Mongol tribes, in addition to the already existent vassalage relationship binding the Mongol and Manchu ruling classes. By confining the Mongols to cer
tain designated parcels of land the Manchus reinforced the existing strong feudalistic tribalism and
feelings of localism. At a time when everyone zealously resisted outside aggression, the Mongols
came to think that a unified autonomous organization would be the best way to deal with all forms
of alien encroachment.
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him as an interpreter. Because Togtakhu was the formal representative of the Mongolian
Political Council, General He treated him very cordially. He Jingwu, the counselor of the
superintendent of the Mongolian Local Autonomy Commission, was also at the meeting.
After formalities. General He asked what the real attitude of Prince So was toward the
Mongolian Autonomy Movement. Togtakhu immediately and frankly answered this deli
cate question by stating that Prince De and Prince So were working together wholeheart
edly and hoped that the founding of this Mongolian Political Council would unify all the
leagues and banners and contribute positively to the unity and security of China.
At the same time, Togtakhu also reported to the general about Japanese activi
ties in Ujumuchin and the concern of Prince So about these activities. Togtakhu, who
hoped that General He and the central government would do something to stop the Japan
ese activities, asked for the general’s advice on this matter. Under these conditions. Gen
eral He was able to say only that he would convey Prince So’s concerns and reports on
the situation in Mongolia to Chiang Kai-shek and the central government. General He
also hoped that Togtakhu would do his best to delay the Japanese advance. This common
desire to halt the Japanese advance into western Inner Mongolia helped establish a deep
friendship between General He and Prince So. Although the general did not ask whether
Prince De had any association with the Japanese, he was concerned that might be the
case. From General He’s conversation it was easy to see that he wanted Prince So to use
his influence to reduce the tensions in Inner Mongolia.
After his arrival in Nanjing, Togtakhu, who had consistently trusted Wu Heling,
depended on Wu to schedule all his activities. Togtakhu visited with Wang Jingwei, Head
of the Executive Yuan; Shi Qingyang, Minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Com
mission; and other important political figures in the capital. Of course, Togtakhu dis
cussed all his initiatives with Wu Heling before making them. Although it was difficult to
keep Kokebagatur out of meetings with these persons, Wu Heling acted as Togtakhu’s
interpreter. During these days, the Jiangxi “Iron Ring” campaigns against the Commu
nists had almost reached an end. Even so, Chiang Kai-shek was still staying at Lushan
Mountain.
Chiang summoned Togtakhu by telegraph, and of course Wu Heling accompa
nied him. At Lushan, Chiang was hospitable to Togtakhu and expressed his personal con
cern about the health of Prince So. General He had, of course, reported to the generalis
simo his conversation with Togtakhu. At a formal banquet, Togtakhu was placed in the
first seat of the seats of honor, to show the generalissimo’s personal regard for Prince So.
As expected, Kokebagatur did not confine himseelf to his official activities. As the per
sonal representative of Prince De, he met with Gui Yongqing and other members of the
generalissimo’s “kitchen cabinet.” Because Togtakhu himself was the head of the Peace
Preservation Bureau of the Mongolian Political Council, he asked for military supplies
for the Peace Preservation troops during his visit with the generalissimo and other people
in the capital. He also requested that the Mongolian Political Council be strengthened.
Although all his requests were received positively, none of the aid he asked for material
ized.
When Togtakhu returned from Nanjing to Beiping, Kokebagatur was not with
him. Because this was during the university summer vacation, Togtakhu invited me to go
with him to Ujumuchin via Bat-khaalag and Sunid to report to Prince So. At Hohhot,
Togtakhu did not meet anyone, but went directly to Bat-khaalag to report his activities in
Nanjing to Prince Yon, who consoled and encouraged him. Because Prince De was not at
Bat-khaalag, Togtakhu went to Sunid the next day. By then, the yurts that had been de
manded by the Mongolian Political Council had already been sent from the banners and
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were already erected on the eastern side of the river. This sight of hundreds of yurts
erected on the green steppelands caused me to shiver with emotion and led me to reflect
on the past glory of the Mongol Empire.
The next day, Togtakhu and I arrived in Sunid by way of the Shiramoren Tem
ple. After Togtakhu made his report to Prince De, I had my first one-on-one visit with the
prince. Prince De, however, asked only about the health of my father and, thinking that I
was merely a young student, did not discuss Mongolian politics with me.

The First Japanese Sounding Out of Western Inner Mongolia
When I arrived in Ujumuchin together with Togtakhu, it was on the occasion of
a great Buddhist ceremony at the Kholtu sume, about fifty kilometers southeast of the
residence of Prince So. The Kholtu Temple—where Prince So’s older brother had once
been an abbot—was the site of this ceremony, which was being conducted in order to
bring back the reincarnation of the abbot. Because this was an important occasion, the
Japanese Guandong Army sent Prince Badmarabdan of Jalaid, Commander of the South
ern Kinggan Defense Troops, and Wu Guting, Commander of the Western Kinggan De
fense Troops, as “private individuals” in order to show their personal regard and friend
ship for Prince So. Because Wu Guting’s headquarters was in Linxi, where the Uju
muchin people bought agricultural products, Wu Guting normally was willing to give aid
to the Ujumuchin people.
Although Prince So knew that these two “individuals” were lobbyists of sorts
sent by the Guandong Army, he and Togtakhu treated them politely. They did, however,
avoid the subject of politics and instead merely engaged in ceremonious niceties. At the
end of the religious ceremonies, a great tournament of wrestling and horse racing was
held for three days, during which the seating was carefully arranged. Because Badmarab
dan was a prince and a guest of honor from afar, he was given the first seat. Sungjingwangchug. Prince of Khauchid, was Prince So’s most intimate friend, so he was given the
second seat. Wu Guting, as commander of the Linxi district, assumed the third seat. As
the son of an old friend of Prince So, I was given the fourth seat. The Japanese Major
Honma Makodo—advisor of Wu Guting’s army and the behind-the-scenes leader of
Prince Ba’s mission—was purposely given the fifth seat, to show that no undue respect
was to be given to the Japanese, whose plot in this instance did not have the support of
the people of Ujumuchin. This situation greatly embarrassed Honma and me. But it did
make it impossible for Prince Ba and Wu Guting to accomplish their purposes.
Because of this failure with Prince So, Badmaratan, Wu Guting, and Honma
decided to go to Sunid and see Prince De. But because Prince De was at this time in Batkhaalag, he was unable to meet with them. After they had left. Prince De learned of their
departure and rushed to catch up with them. When they eventually met, Badmarabdan’s
group told Prince De of the Japanese policy of supporting the Mongols in Manchukuo. At
the same time, they said that the Japanese army would eventually enter Inner Mongolia
and that it would be best to do something in preparation prior to its arrival. These tempt
ing and threatening words made Prince De, who had a great interest in politics, unable to
resist taking further steps, unlike Prince So and his group. This was the prelude to great
future changes in Inner Mongolia. Prince De sent his secretary, Chogbagatur (Chen Shaowu), to Lushan to report this matter to Chiang Kai-shek. When Chogbagatur returned, he
brought with him a letter from the generalissimo instructing Prince De to deal with the
Japanese in a nonviolent yet nonservile manner.
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Chinese Terrorism Against the Mongols

The founding of the Mongolian Political Council immediately attracted the at
tention of the Japanese Guandong Army and the Chinese intelligence organizations. A
man named Li Caigui was stationed at Bat-khaalag to gather intelligence. Kokebagatur’s
contacts with the Japanese had by this time become an open secret. The Chinese govern
ment should not have tolerated these relations with the Japanese. Regardless of whether
Prince De was actually collaborating with the Japanese, the attention of the entire Chi
nese nation was focused on him. Kokebagatur was an important member of Prince De’s
group of advisors.
It was under these circumstances that Kokebagatur, for personal reasons, re
turned to his home in Beiping in August of 1934. The night after he arrived in Beiping,
he was abducted from his home. His Chinese wife quickly asked Sainbayar, the head of
the Beiping Office of the Mongolian Political Council, for help. The next day, Sainbayar
went to ask General He Yingqin to investigate this matter. General He accepted this re
quest and sent a person to comfort Kokebagatur’s family. At the same time, Sainbayar
reported the incident to the Beiping Association of Fellow Mongols. The association
quickly convened a general conference of all Mongol members in Beiping and sent out
members to conduct an investigation and to plead for the release of Kokebagatur.
Several days of searching yielded no results. People then began to suspect that
this abduction was not the work of ordinary kidnappers, but had been carried out by the
Third Regiment of the Military Police, the unit responsible for all “special activities” in
northern China. Public anger within the Mongol community arose. The Mongols did not
sympathize with Kokebagatur for political reasons, but they were angry because they felt
that this kidnapping indicated a lack of law and order. The Mongols strongly opposed
assassinations or abductions. The Association of Fellow Mongols in Nanjing also issued
protests. Of course, the members of the Mongolian Political Council at Bat-khaalag were
infuriated. Prince De directly requested that Generalissimo Chiang release Kokebagatur,
but no release came. Chiang merely transferred Li Caigui away from Bat-khaalag.
Several years after this abduction, during the Japanese occupation of Beiping,
Kokebagatur’s body was found. This strengthened the belief that he had been executed by
the Third Regiment of the Military Police at the order of high authorities. This terrorist
incident, far from suppressing future Mongolian contacts with the Japanese, increased the
hatred of the Mongols toward the Chinese regime. Moreover, because it was Prince De’s
confidant Kokebagatur who was assassinated, a psychological gap developed between
Prince De and the central government.
During this period, many people suspected that Namur (Liu Jianhua) and Jagunnasutu were involved in the matter. However, forty years later, Liu Jianhua (who was no
longer impersonating a Mongol and was not using a Mongolian name) told me: Koke
bagatur was innocent and died a wrongful death. He was a Mongolian nationalist and not
a traitor to the Mongols.”

Prince De’s Second Visit with Chiang Kai-shek
Following the government’s nearly successful siege of the communists in Jiang
xi and the subsequent communist escape from the KMT encirclement of the Jiangxi So
viet, the communists moved northwestward into Northern Shaanxi. Because the active
military theater had changed to die north. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek visited Kalgan,
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Datong, and Hohhot after inspecting military units at Lan2diou and Beiping. He then sent
Xiao Zhengying, the confidant of Song Zheyuan, to Bat-khaalag to invite Prince Yon and
Prince De for a visit. Chiang arrived in Hohhot on the sixth of October; the next day,
Prince Yon and Prince De visited him. Chiang first asked Prince Yon about the situation
in Inner Mongolia since the establishment of the Mongolian Political Council. Prince
Yon said that he was old and in poor health, and that everything rested on the shoulders
of Prince De. The generalissimo expressed his good will toward Prince De and encour
aged him to be diligent in the council’s work. After giving a brief account of the Mongol
ian Political Council, Prince De asked for instructions.
Prince De then talked about the matter of Kokebagatur. Chiang responded by
saying that he would order an investigation into the matter. The two leaders of the Mon
golian Political Council then presented the generalissimo with three hundred horses to
show their military support of the Chinese government. Later, these horses were brought
to Nanjing by Buyandalai and Chogbagatur. Chiang Kai-shek received them and gave
words of encouragement to Prince De. He also arranged to provide additional financial
resources to the Mongolian Political Council and to make more armaments available for
the peace preservation troops under the council. Thereafter, the promised armaments ar
rived in a piecemeal fashion. This enabled Prince De to gradually reinforce the troops
under his command.
After visiting with Chiang Kai-shek, Prince De did not return to Bat-khaalag
together with Prince Yon, but went to EJen Khoroo with a small group of attendants and
guards to represent the Mongolian Political Council and offer sacrifices at Chinggis
Khan’s shrine. He also met with the leaders of the Yekejuu League to strengthen their
political allegiance. On his way back, his escorts discovered that a group of Chinese
“bandits” blocked their way. Because the weaponry of Prince De’s troops was better than
that of the Chinese “bandits,” the guards wanted to open fire. But because he realized that
these Chinese were not really bandits. Prince De said, “It is better for enmity to be dis
solved than intensified. Let us go on our way unless they insist on a confrontation.” His
group then rushed up against the blockade. The Chinese, seeing Prince De’s weaponry,
allowed him and his group to pass. Of course, Fu Zuoyi had sent this group of “bandits”
to kill Prince De. This plot was a carbon copy of the previous (1913) assassination of the
Kanjurwa Khutugtu by an army force disguised as a bandit group. The Kanjurwa Khutugtu was assassinated because of his sympathy for Outer Mongolian independence.

Contacts with the Guangdong Clique
It was almost at this same time that Prince De secretly dispatched Namur (Liu
Jianhua) to Hong Kong and Guangzhou as his personal representative to consult with Hu
Hanmin and his anti-Nanjing political clique. Prince De wished to get Hu’s support to
increase pressure on Nanjing. The following information is taken from a conversation
between Liu Jianhua and me in Taipei in 1981.
Liu initiated this initiative. After the Mongolian Political Council was estab
lished, its budget for each month was no more that 24,000 yuan, and it was impossible to
take any kind of initiative. So one day Prince De summoned Kokebagatur, Jagunnasutu,
Mergenbagatur, and Liu to meet with him and discuss how to break through this isola
tion. Kokebagatur said, “For Inner Mongolia, there are only three paths to take: Japan,
Outer Mongolia, or the Soviet Union.” Prince De disagreed, “The Japan route is too dan
gerous, because Japan has territorial ambitions, and we might be absorbed by the Japa-
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nese. Outer Mongolia, after its communization, persecuted the lay nobles and the lamas.
We have heard too many reports about this matter from Dilowa Gegeen and those Outer
Mongolians who have fled from their homeland. The Outer Mongolian route is too dan
gerous. The Soviet Union is the power that controls Outer Mongolia. Every move that
Outer Mongolia makes is in response to instructions from the Soviet Union. To follow
the Outer Mongolian model would be a dangerous thing. Now we desire to find a break
through, but we should be very careful about the delicate situation in Inner Mongolia. We
should not be too impetuous in our actions.” Liu then suggested trying the “Guangdong
line.” Prince De asked how contact with Guangdong could be established. Liu answered,
“We could send somebody to Beiping to contact Qiu Niantai.”"*
Prince De sent Liu to make secret contact with Hu Harunin. After his arrival in
Beiping, through Qiu Niantai’s recommendation, Liu represented himself as a member of
the KangriJiuguotuan (Association for National Salvation and Resistance Against Japan)
and contacted a member of the Chinese Communist party, Wang Pingnan, who had very
close relations with Chen Duxiu. Wang Pingnan then made it possible for Liu to go to
Tianjin and proceed to Hong Kong by sea. At the same time, Wang made secret contact
with the regime in Guangzhou. After his arrival in Hong Kong, someone immediately put
Liu up in a hotel.
That night, Liu was brought to a secret place to meet with Hu Hanmin. Hu asked
about the real intentions of Prince De. Liu gave a brief rundown of the situation in Inner
Mongolia and said, “As for the present situation, if the Mongols cannot save themselves,
they will have no more national existence. The Japanese invasion was not requested by
the Mongols, but the Mongols were unable to resist this invasion. The central government
in Nanjing is hearing only one side of the story and does not understand the real inten
tions of the Mongols. The arrival of Huang Shaohong and Zhao Pilian brought only
threats to the Mongols, not sympathy or sincerity. Although the Mongolian Political
Council was established, it has been hindered from all sides. The budget of the Mongol
ian Political Council was not enough to do anything. The Mongols’ hope is to fulfill Mr.
Sun Yat-sen’s promises of self-determination and self-rule and achieve a high degree of
political autonomy, with only national defense and foreign affairs being handled by the
central government. This is the hope of all the Mongols and is not the personal ambition
of Prince De, Nevertheless, Prince De recognizes that for the continued existence and
development of the Mongol people, Mr. Hu is the only one to whom they can look for
help.”
After hearing these words, Hu nodded his head in agreement and said, “China is
the China of the Chinese. It is not the China of a certain person [Chiang Kai-shek]. For
the future of China, we can cooperate. You should go to Guangzhou to contact the
commrades in authority in the Xi 'nan zhengwu weiyuanhui [The Southwestern Political
Affairs Committee]. They will give you a satisfactory answer.” Hu sent a personal letter
to Zou Lu, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Deng Zeru, Chen Jitang, and others, Liu proceeded
to Guangzhou, where he met with all the people mentioned above and received an enthu
siastic welcome. Finally, Zou Lu gave their response to Prince De’s proposal for an alli
ance with Hu and agreed to establish cooperative relations between the Southwest and
Mongolia. He said that they would soon send someone to Bailingmiao for a return visit.
At the same time, the Southwestern Political Affairs Committee sent Prince De eight
bolts of yellow satin and silk gauze, a carved ivory pagoda with the names of the mem'* Qiu Niantai was a Taiwan activist protesting the Japanese rule of Taiwan who had by this time
fled to mainland China.
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bers of the Southwest Political Affairs Committee, and 10,000 Hong Kong dollars to
support the Mongolian Political Council.
After having achieved so successful a result, Liu returned to Bat-khaalag from
Hong Kong by way of Shanghai, Tianjin, Beiping, and Hohhot. By then, the Nanjing
government had already got word of his activities. Fortunately he was able to accomplish
his mission without any problems. Because of this, he merited greater trust from Prince
De. After half a month, an envoy from Hu Hanmin—Yan Menghua, a representative of
the Southwestern Political Affairs Committee—arrived secretly in Bat-khaalag. Yan met
with Prince De and conveyed Hu Hanmin’s desire to establish contacts with the Mongols.
Prince De was greatly pleased by this.
By that time the extent of Japanese influence in Inner Mongolia was apparent;
Japanese intelligence agents were even in Bat-khaalag. Also, in all of northern China
there were great political changes. Under these circumstances, the arrival of Yan Meng
hua established a good working relationship between Prince De and Hu Hanmin. By this
time, however, the time for such a connection had passed, and Yan Menghua returned to
the south greatly disappointed. At his departure he said, “For future contacts, we should
let Qiu Niantai and Pei Mingyu’ take care of the communications between Guangzhou
and Bat-khaalag.” After this incident. Prince De came to feel that Mongolia and Guang
dong were too far apart to effectively collaborate. Even though contacts between the two
were established, no great benefit was derived from them, and the entire plan fizzled out.
During these events, Jagunnasutu brought Yu Yifu, a Heilungjiang man and a
member of the Communist party, to Bat-khaalag to talk with Prince De. Yan Menghua
was later elected as a member of the Legislative Yuan and passed away in Taiwan.

Contacts with the Kokonor Mongols
In Kokonor (Qinghai), there were two Mongolian leagues that contained twentynine banners. In 1723, Lubsangdanjin Joined with the Juungar Mongols in an alliance to
fight against Manchu domination. The next year, the Manchu commander Nian Gengyao
carried out indiscriminate butchery, robbery, and burning in Kokonor and defeated the
Kokonor Mongols, leaving their property destroyed and their population decimated. In
the early years of this century, a Joke in Mongolia about the Kokonor situation shows
how desperate that situation was: “There is a banner in Kokonor, and that banner has a
ruling prince. He has only one subject and a dog. His subject is his own younger brother.”
In the 1930s, it was known that among the twenty-nine Kokonor banners, only one, under
the high lama Chagan Nomun Khan, was fairly well off.
After the founding of the Republic of China, Kokonor was subject to the extor
tions of the Ma family of Northwest Moslems. The situation of the Kokonor Mongols
greatly deteriorated, especially at the time of the domination of Ma Buqing and Ma Bufang, when the political situation went from bad to worse. In addition, a group of Kazakh
people escaped from the Soviet Union and roamed the Kokonor, robbing the Mongols.
After the founding of the Chinese government in Nanjing and the establishment of the
Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates, the Mongolian Office
had four representatives from Kokonor stationed in Nanjing as liaisons in order to give
help to the Kokonor Mongols. Among the four delegates, however, two were Chinese
appointed by Ma Bufang to watch the two Mongols.
’ Pei was later elected to the Chinese National Assembly as a representative of Shandong Province.
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When the Mongolian Political Committee was established, the Kokonor Mon
gols desired to join in order to get some outside support and recognition. Prince Yon and
Prince De, of course, immediately responded to this by petitioning the Chinese govern
ment for recognition of the Kokonor Mongols. In Nanjing, because of Wu Heling’s ac
tivities, the government appointed the head and deputy head of the two Kokonor leagues
as members of the Mongolian Political Council. Although the Kokonor Mongols could
not receive real benefits, nominally and legally they gained permission to exercise selfrule.

Conflict Within the Peace Preservation Corps
Before the establishment of the Mongolian Political Council, the delegates of the
banners at Bat-khaalag had already decided to select one thousand cavalry to guard the
Council’s future head office. After the establishment of the Mongolian Political Council,
reinforcement of the military was one of the main goals that Prince De espoused. During
those days, a sudden conscription of mounted peace preservation troops was not easily
accomplished. The first of these troops were conscripted from the purely pastoral Shilingol League. The people from Shilingol were unable to speak Chinese. After this came
men from other leagues, the greater part of them from Hohhot Turned. They were very
nationalistic but had been sinicized and were unable to speak Mongolian. Among them
were people who had already had modem military training, such as Zhu Shifu and Yun
Jixian, who were appointed as drill instmctors. In addition, Bai Haifeng (Dugurengsang),
Arbijikhu, and Khasbagan, who had received military training in Moscow and Nanjing,
were appointed as officers of the Peace Preservation Bureau.
During the time of training and exercise, conflict was inevitable. Those who
could not speak Chinese saw those officers who could as non-Mongols. Those officers, in
turn, regarded these monolingual Mongols as simpletons. Many problems arose, and both
sides complained to Prince De. Prince De, however, could not resolve the situation. This
kind of conflict continued and became one of the factors which precipitated the rebellion
of the Peace Preservation troops led by Zhu Shifu and Yun Jixian in 1936. Some suspect
that Kokebagatur’s abduction and murder were also caused by this conflict. At any rate,
before the intervention of the Japanese militarists in western Inner Mongolia, these Peace
Preservation officers and soldiers gave their greatest support to the Mongolian Political
Council.

Problems Caused by Prince So’s Arrival in Beiping
In the winter of 1934, accompanied by Togtakhu, Prince Sodnamrabdan went on
a pilgrimage to Wutaishan to be cured of his obesity. Upon their arrival in Kalgan, they
were warmly welcomed by Song Zheyuan, the governor of Chahar Province. The gover
nor appointed Xiao Zhengying as host of this group. In those days. Prince So was the
only one with enough power and influence to limit Prince De’s activities. For this pur
pose, the Chinese authorities had to win him over to their side and secure his cooperation.
Prince So was a faithful person, and although he was not entirely satisfied with Prince
De, he refused to say a bad word about him. Consequently, during this trip he usually
used his physical ailment as an excuse not to discuss political matters. His conversations
with Song Zheyuan did not extend beyond formalities.
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In Beiping, Prince So got many additional polite receptions. Because Prince So
was a friend of my father, he declined the invitations of other officials in Beiping and
lodged at my father’s house. At this time, the Janggiya Khutugtu had an office in Beiping
and ordered the head of the office, Gong Ziwan, and the demchi, Bai Fashan of the great
Janggiya monastery Songzhusi, to invite Prince So to stay at the monastery. At this time I
was very anxious, afraid that the Janggiya Khutugtu had been greatly influenced by Yan
Xishan and was strongly opposed to Mongolian autonomy. If Prince So stayed at the
monastery, the Janggiya Khutugtu and his associates might create political rumors saying
that Prince So was dissatisfied with the Mongolian Autonomy Movement. Fortunately,
Prince So responded to this invitation by saying that it would be more discreet for him to
stay at a friend’s private house for the healing of his sickness; after he was able to recover
a bit, he would proceed to Wutaishan and then stay at the Songzhusi monastery until his
return to Mongolia.
Evidently, Prince So wished to avoid staying at a place where there might be
unwanted political entanglements before he visited the top military and political authori
ties in Beiping, such as General He Yingqin and Huang Fu. After he visited with these
people, then he would talk to Janggiya about what he wanted to discuss, but he would not
be taken advantage of by those who might do harm to the autonomy organization.
During this period, I handled all contacts and interpretation between different
individuals. Prince So used his sickness as a pretext to refuse any visitors, thus avoiding
any problems. He saw only General He Yingqin and Huang Fu. These two men visited
him because there was no way for him to avoid their visits—they were top-ranking lead
ers. Even so, Prince So did not discuss political matters with Huang. In his conversation
with He, Prince So gave a brief report on the situation in Shilingol. Then he told him
about Japanese intentions, especially the attention they paid to him. He asked why the
central government associated with these Japanese. He also asked what he should do un
der these circumstances. General He told Prince So very frankly that the central govern
ment could not take any drastic or positive actions to resist the Japanese, but maintaining
a subdued manner was important in limiting Japanese activities.
Of course, General He praised Prince So and approved of his rejection of the
Japanese overtures. At the same time, he expressed hope that Prince So would do his best
to mollify the Japanese so as to limit their activities in his league. As for the problems of
the Mongolian Political Council and Prince De, General He asked for Prince So’s opin
ions. Prince So’s answer was that Prince De was acting in accordance with the general
will of the Mongolian people and not on his personal initiative or to feed his own ambi
tions. Prince So expressed hope that the Mongolian Political Council would provide
guidance for the officials and give them more assistance. These words made General He
quit asking questions; the conversation clearly showed what kind of a man Prince So was
and signalled his high regard for Prince De. After this episode, nobody posed these types
of questions to Prince So.
After another month in Beiping, Prince So made a pilgrimage to Wutaishan in
Shanxi. On his way, he passed through Hebian Village, the native village of Yan Xishan.
Yan gave Prince So a great welcome party. 1 did not accompany Prince So on this trip.
Later, I heard that Prince So used his ailment as a pretext to go worship the Buddha. By
so saying, he again avoided discussions of Mongolian politics. In Wutaishan, he stayed at
the monastery temple of the Janggiya Khutugtu and soon returned from Wutaishan to
Beiping. At the Janggiya Khutugtu’s invitation, he stayed at the Songzhusi. Soon after
ward, Janggiya also came to Beiping, and General He Yingqin gave a big banquet for the
lama and the prince. I served as Prince So’s interpreter, and on this occasion the conver-
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sation between Prince So and General He was polite; no political issues were discussed.
After staying in Beiping for another half month, Prince So returned to Shilingol.
Prince So’s stay in Beiping caused great concern to many young intellectuals
working at the Mongolian Political Council. They feared that if this influential and con
servative leader of Shilingol were to say negative words about the Mongolian Political
Council and Prince De, it might create a serious problem. In reality, these worries were
unnecessary because they had an erroneous impression of Prince So.

The Prince Shi Incident
In 1935, the second year in the life of the Mongolian Political Council, the peo
ple who worked with the Council received some basic training. This was a time during
which the Council began to move forward with its tasks. Unfortunately, a new confronta
tion broke out between the Council and Fu Zuoyi, and the opportunities for furthering the
tasks of the Council were destroyed. The main problems between the Mongols and the
Suiyuan provincial government were caused by the Prince Shi Incident and the issue of
taxation at Khashaat.
The Baruun Gung Banner was a banner of the Ulanchab League under the juris
diction of Prince Yon, offically called the Urad Front Banner. In late 1929 or early 1930,
the ruling josog, Keshigdelger, died without descendants. His relatives Shirabdorji and
Batubayar aspired to the position ofJasag. The jakirugchi Serinbu supported the former,
but lusalagchi Erkedorji supported the latter. A confrontation resulted. Because Shirabdorji’s group worked efficiently and amicably, it achieved its goals; and in 1930, through
the recommendation of the Ulanchab League head and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission, they received the approval of the Chinese government.
Nevertheless, after Shirabdorji assumed the position ofjasag, he put heavy pres
sure on his opponents and created discontent among the people of his banner. After the
establishment of the Mongolian Political Council, he even sent out his soldiers to confis
cate the properties of the opposition faction, including the possessions of Dagdan Lama,
the younger brother of the former jasag. The abbot of Mergen Juu, the largest temple in
that banner, was also an opponent of Shirabdorji. Erkedorji was an enthusiastic supporter
of the autonomy movement and therefore went to Bat-khaalag to seek protection.
Because Prince Yondonwangchug was the chairman of the Mongolian Political
Council as well as the head of the Ulanchab League, he sent an envoy to the Baruun
Gung Banner to summon Shirabdorji to Bat-khaalag to explain matters and to explore
ways to settle his problems. Because of his own wrongdoings Shirabdorji did not dare
face Prince Yon. To strengthen his position, Shirabdorji went to Hohhot to ask for Fu
Zuoyi’s help. This provided Fu with a good opportunity to use Shirabdorji as a weapon
against the Mongolian Political Council. In addition to sending a report to Nanjing in
defense of Shirabdorji, he also ordered Division Commander Wang Jingguo to send his
troops to be stationed in the Baruun Gung Banner and crush the power of Shirabdorji s
opponents. Fu’s real purpose, however, was to put pressure on the Mongolian Political
Council and make it bow to his Suiyuan provincial government.
Because Shirabdorji had disobeyed orders and abused his power, mistreating the
people and trying to use the military power of the provincial government to oppose the
league head, the Mongolian Political Council issued orders not to fire him but to post
pone his appointment as jasag of Baruun Gung Banner. This action would maintain the
integrity of the league and banner system and avoid illegal interference from the province
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against Mongolian leagues and banners. Prince Yon reported this to the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission and requested that the Chinese government approve this
action. In order to protect the opponents of Shirabdorji and not be hounded by Wang
Jingguo’s forces, the Mongolian Political Council also dispatched its Peace Preservation
troops to Mergen Juu. This military confrontation almost gave rise to an upheaval.
The Suiyuan provincial government not only spoke up for Shirabdorji but also,
in an effort to destroy the integrity of the original Mongolian political system, asked the
central government to accept its opinion. Fu Zuoyi used a group of ignorant Mongol
princes in an attempt to make it appear that the Mongolian Political Council’s actions
were aimed at the alteration of the Mongolian banner system. Fu’s purpose was to pro
voke the ruling princes into reasserting their feudalistic privileges and petitioning the
central government for protection of the Mongol banner system’s hereditary feudalistic
institutions.
At this time, the minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was a
Cantonese military man, Huang Musong, who had no knowledge of Mongolian affairs.
Consequently, he could not Judge properly between the two opposing sides. He was also
too ignorant to know the political prerogatives of the league heads during the Manchu
period. Hence, resolution of the conflict was delayed, and no settlement was reached. The
central government ordered an eight month suspension of Shirabdorji’s authority over his
own banner. In this way, the Prince Shi Incident was temporarily resolved. Nevertheless,
this compromise solution still brought some damage to the prestige of the Mongolian
Political Council and the integrity of the Mongolian league and banner political system.
During this crisis, because the prerogatives of the league heads were interfered with by
the Suiyuan Provincial Government and also because of the incompetence of the Mongol
ian-Tibetan Affairs Committee, Prince Yon was unable to carry out his political respon
sibilities. He angrily resigned in protest. The Chinese government, attempting to mollify
the situation, did not accept his resignation. Because of the resolute attitude of the Mon
golian side, it was impossible for the central government to favor Fu Zuoyi.
Two years later, in the spring of 1936, rebellion broke out among the Peace
Preservation troops of the Mongolian Political Council. The Council troops stationed at
the Urad Front Banner withdrew to Bat-khaalag. Seeing this as an opportunity, Shirab
dorji accused the Dagdan Lama and others of collaborating with the Japanese and
brought in Wang Jingguo’s troops to attack Mergen-juu and kill the Dagdan Lama and
the entire families of Batubayar and Mergen Gegeen. Erkedorji barely escaped with his
life. These tyrannical activities infuriated the people of the banner; even including his
supporter, Serinbu, who forsook him and went over to the other side.
In the summer of 1937, the second Sino-Japanese War broke out, and soon
Prince De and his Mongolian troops pulled back away from the westward expedition of
the Japanese army and entered the Ulanchab League. Shirabdorji escaped with the re
treating troops of Fu Zuoyi, and this ended the Prince Shi Incident.

Khashaat and the Conflict Over Taxation
Khashaat (Khashiyatu), in the Urad Central Banner of the Ulanchab League,
was a key node along the route followed by the Chinese opium traffic from the Gansu
and Ningxia areas to Beiping and Tianjin. This route went through Mongolian territory to
avoid the numerous tax collection stations in Chinese areas. Even though opium was ille
gal, it was a major source of revenue for the local warlords. After the merchants paid
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their “special tax,” they obtained official permission to transport opium to its destination.
In order to accomplish its financial purposes, the Suiyuan Provincial Government secretly
established a tax collection station in this Mongolian territory, \vith a reported tax income
for each year that was about two million silver dollars. The Chinese administration never
paid this kind of toll to the Mongolian banners. Besides, Khashaat was also the key center
of the Suiyuan-Xinjiang Automobile Company. All vehicles from Hohhot to Urumchi
(Dihua) had to pass through Bat-khaalag and Khashaat. Yet the tax collected at these toll
stations was insignificant in comparison with the funds derived from the opium tax. This
was why the Mongolian Political Council struggled against the Suiyuan Provincial Gov
ernment for equitable division of the opium tax.
According to article seven of the Principles of Mongolian Local Autonomy, “A
percentage of all local taxes collected in league and banner territories by the provinces
and xians shall be returned to the leagues and banners for allocation as construction
funds. Decisions concerning the allocation of tax revenues shall be made separately.”
However, no clear procedures were outlined for implementing the provisions of this arti
cle. Because the Chinese controlled administration of provinces and xians, implementa
tion was purposely delayed. Prince De, determined to gain a share of these tax revenues,
ordered Sainbayar, the head of the Beiping Office of the Mongolian Political Committee,
to negotiate with General He Yingqin, superintendent for Mongolian Local Autonomy.
These negotiations, however, were all inconclusive. The Prince then sent Ao Yunzhang,
an advisor to the Mongolian Political Council, to Hohhot to negotiate with the Suiyuan
provincial government. These negotiations also failed.
In the fall of 1935, Prince De went to the Ordos Right Central Banner (the Otog
Banner), which was contiguous with the Chinese Communist stronghold in northern
Shaanxi, to visit the Panchen Lama, who was on his way back to Tibet. This was the last
meeting between a Mongolian leader and a Tibetan leader. On the way back to Batkhaalag, Prince De passed Khashaat and observed the taxation situation there. After he
returned to the Mongolian Political Committee, he also established tax collection in Kha
shaat in accordance with article seven of the Principles of Mongolian Local Autonomy.
Hearing of this, the Suiyuan authorities sent the troops of Wang Jingguo from Baotou to
forcefully expel the Mongol tax officials. The Mongolian Political Council also sent its
Peace Preservation troops to the vicinity of Khashaat to block the transportation and
taxation of opium, a confrontation that almost erupted in violence.
To bring about a solution to this confrontation, both sides sent delegates to
Beiping to ask General He Yingqin, the supreme political military leader in Beiping, to
make a judgment. The Mongolian side demanded that the army from Suiyuan withdraw
first, or else the responsibility for bloodshed would rest with the Suiyuan provincial gov
ernment. Finally, General He persuaded both sides to withdraw simultaneously, to avoid
a military clash, and to follow the principles issued by the central government in deciding
on a procedure for the allocation of local tax revenues. According to these principles, in
Mongolian territory the tax was to have been collected by the Mongolian Political Coun
cil; the transportion tax for goods moving through Mongolian territory should have been
fairly divided between the Mongolian Political Council and the Suiyuan Provincial Gov
ernment. It was decided that eighty percent of the goods taken in taxation should be allo
cated to the Mongolian Political Council. Of course this kind of decision favored the
Council. The Suiyuan Provincial Government did not openly oppose this decision be
cause of General He Yingqin’s prestige, but it never complied with the decision either.
To implement this decision, the Mongolian Political Council established direct
contact with the Suiyuan provincial government and also compromised by withdrawing
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from the tax collection station it had established. The council also agreed to allow pro
vincial officials to collect the opium tax and to deliver thirty percent of the tax money
from opium to the Council. Although an agreement to this effect was formally established
at that time, it was completely ignored by the Suiyuan authorities. Finally, in October
1934, the Council sent a delegate to the Suiyuan Provincial Government to negotiate and
to demand that 500,000 yuan be allocated from the “special tax.” The Suiyuan authorities
agreed to pay only 50,000
and so the negotiations collapsed.
During these negotiations, the Chahar provincial government disagreed with
Suiyuan over matters of taxation. Song Zheyuan, the governor of Chahar province, osten
sibly remained neutral but secretly supported the Mongolian Political Council and Prince
De. The purpose of this action was not to follow the principles issued by the government,
but rather to take advantage of this confrontation and make it possible for Chahar’s vehi
cles to transport opium through Mongolian territory and avoid taxation by Suiyuan prov
ince. This question dragged on for a year; and though it approached both conflict and
resolution, it never achieved either. Nevertheless, Suiyuan authorities boycotted the
Mongolian Political Council in order to get the tax revenues, and in this they succeeded.
On the other hand, this incident provided clear proof that the central government’s poli
cies, principles, and solutions had no real impact on the actions of the powerful officials
in the frontier provinces.

Chahar’s Disregard for Mongolian Territorial Integrity
The establishment of the Mongolian Political Council did not hinder Chinese
political and economic encroachment into Mongolian lands. The Prince Shi and Khashaat
incidents were the only two occurrences which made sensationalistic headlines in Chi
nese newspapers. The settlement and cultivation of Mongolian pasture land was largely
ignored. For instance, Wang Jingguo, the person involved in these two incidents, was a
division commander and also the commander of cultivation in western Suiyuan. He en
couraged cultivation from his headquarters in Baotou. Perhaps this was the reason he
interfered in Mongolian politics.
During the period of the autonomy movement, the Chahar Provincial Govern
ment tried to avoid direct conflict with both the Mongols and Prince De personally. The
Chahar Provincial Government was only seemingly more moderate in its attitude toward
the Mongols. In reality, since Fu Zuoyi was the spokesman for all Chinese border prov
inces, there was no need for Song Zheyuan to be offensive toward the Mongols and to
gratuitously create trouble for himself thereby. Nevertheless, political encroachment into
Mongolian territory did not stop or change because of this ostensibly moderate attitude.
According to article three of the Principles of Mongolian Local Autonomy, the Chahar
Tribe was allowed to reorganize into a league; and according to article eight, no xians or
preliminary-jc/c/ns were to be established in Mongolian territory unless first approved by
the concerned leagues and banners. The Chahar Provincial Government under Song
Zheyuan completely ignored these two articles. On the one hand. Song blocked estab
lishment of a league for the Chahar Mongol Tribe, and on the other hand, he established
the Huade preliminary xians at Jabsar in the Shangdu Banner of the Chahar Tribe. The
word Huade in Chinese means “winning over Prince De.” Of course this policy of “nib
bling away” at Mongolian territory aroused the anger of the Mongol people and prepared
the way for the Japanese advance into western Inner Mongolia.
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The He-Umezu Agreement
By January 1935, the Japanese army had already increased its pressure from
Doloonnor in the eastern part of Chahar, and this created several scattered conflicts. In
North China, the Japanese army in Tianjin carried out large-scale military maneuvers to
openly demonstrate its intentions. Also, because of the activities of Chinese volunteers
along the Great Wall line, the Japanese accused the Chinese of subversion of the SinoJapanese Tanggu Agreement, which was signed at the end of May 1933. Under this
heavy Japanese military pressure. He Yingqin signed an agreement with Umezu YoshiJiro, commander of the Japanese Tianjin Army, commonly known as the He-Umezu
Agreement. According to this “agreement,” the military forces of the Nanjing govern
ment and the Kuomintang Headquarters in the Beiping-Tianjin areas were forced to with
draw.
In the midst of this unstable situation. Prince De, who had realized that Japanese
influence had already entered Inner Mongolia and would lead to a drastic change in the
balance of power, went to Beiping by way of Kalgan to meet with General He Yingqin,
to whom he reported Japanese activities in western Inner Mongolia. Prince De also
wanted to know what the policies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese
government were in this matter and what instructions they had for him. He also wished to
make it clear that Fu Zuoyi’s propaganda against him to the effect that he was collabo
rating with the Japanese was entirely false. He also asked for ammunition from General
He to strengthen the military power of the Peace Preservation troops of the Mongolian
Political Council.
Responding to Prince De’s questions and requests, General He emphasized the
use of “nonresistance and nonprovocation,” as Chiang had instructed earlier. Other than
these instructions, no other measures were suggested. As for the arms requested by Prince
De, He said that even the great army of the central government still could not resist the
Japanese, and that a small Mongol army could not possibly be of use in resisting the
Japanese aggression. From these conversations. Prince De realized that, at least for the
moment, the Chinese authorities and their government had no power to halt the Japanese
invasion and also did not have a decisive policy mandating resistance against the Japan
ese invaders. The Mongols would have to find their own measures to deal with the Japan
ese invasion of their land if they wished not to be sitting ducks. Reliance only on the
central government would not solve the problem.
Moreover, the loyalty of the Mongols was already doubted by the authorities
and journalists because of the false propaganda of Fu Zuoyi. Prince De saw that while
Japanese oppression was on the rise, it would be impossible to win the confidence of the
Chinese government and the great majority of the Chinese people. Prince De also re
ported to General He on the Prince Shi and Khashaat incidents from the perspective of
the Mongolian side. He’s response was again merely an encouragement for both sides to
reach a mutually agreeable solution.
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Japanese Advances and Mongol Criticisms
of the Mongolian Political Council
During this time, the central government’s armies were still stationed in North
China. A division commander, Guan Linzheng, who had fought the Japanese invaders
along the Great Wall line at Gubeikou, came to Prince De’s temporary residence at
Songzhusi, along with several news correspondents. In their conversation, Prince De told
them of Japanese activities in Mongolia and their establishment of Special Service Of
fices (tokumo-kikan) and radio stations, in order to show that he could not halt these ac
tivities. In reality, there were already Japanese radio stations. Special Service Offices, and
even armed forces in Beiping. Prince De posed a question: If the Chinese government
could not stop the Japanese in Beiping, how could the weak and feeble Mongols resist the
Japanese advances? These words were later published in the newspapers, and the Japa
nese military in Beiping protested against Prince De and asked him to stop pointing to
evidence of Japanese activities in Mongolia. In reality, these matters were open secrets.
While Prince De was in Beiping, he also held a news conference at the wel
coming party for him by the Association of Fellow Mongols at Laijinyuxuan at Sun Yatsen park. As one of the attendees at the party, I still remember the people who accompan
ied Prince De: Sainbayar, the head of the Beiping Office of the Mongolian Political
Council; Guan Qiyi (Jorigtu), the head of the radio station of the Mongolian Political
Council, and others. At this party, Prince De gave a brief report on the two years of work
of the Mongolian Political Council and expressed hopes that the persons present would
give him suggestions to consider as future tasks for the Council. In the conclusion of his
speech, he said, “Self-rule is an inalienable right. The Mongols are not a subjugated peo
ple. Mongol relations with the Manchus were based on a cooperative alliance. The Re
public of China that succeeded the Manchus, of course, certainly inherited this historical
relationship.” This speech received enthusiastic applause.
After that, one person after another stood up and expressed their opinion. At the
beginning, they praised the Mongolian Political Council; then they turned to serious facts
and criticisms. Some of them concentrated their inquiries on the Prince Shi and Khashaat
incidents, and the disappearance of Kokebagatur. Some of them criticized the Mongolian
Political Council for not working hard enough to achieve its stated goals. Some of them
pointed out that many things were in need of reform. Among them, the most stinging
criticisms were given by Tegshibuyan and his younger brother Nasutu. Tegshibuyan was
an advisor of the Beiping Branch of the Military Committee, and Nasutu was a law stu
dent at Beiping University.*
At this party, no one asked about Japanese activities or Prince De’s contacts
* Later, these two brothers were appointed by Prince De to posts in his government. Tegshibuyan
was specifically appointed as one of the ministers and diplomatic representatives of the Mongolian
government and was stationed in Tokyo. This is evidence that Prince De tried to use capable people
and was able to forget his earlier incarceration. But I still remember that their stinging words made
Prince De angry and red-faced, and that he drew a large, full puff on his cigarette and then force
fully crushed it. Even so. Prince De controlled himself in listening to these two brothers and did
not respond. Such was Prince De’s personality: even if a man severely criticized him but had sin
cere intentions, he was able to contain himself and did not debate. If he disagreed with an opinion,
he would try to avoid using harsh words to keep others from losing face. This party became a dress
rehearsal for Prince De to test the limits of his patience. Because Prince De was a prince by birth,
people rarely denied him his way. So it was very difficult for him to withstand open criticism.

118

The Last Mongol Prince

with the Japanese. This shows that the Mongols in Beiping, whether they were antiJapanese or pro-Japanese, avoided the subject of Prince De’s supposed collaboration with
the Japanese and thus did not fall into the trap laid for them by Fu Zuoyi, which trap
would have undone the steps already taken toward Mongolian political autonomy. After
this gathering, because of his forbearance. Prince De was able to win more favorable
opinion from the Mongols, especially the Mongol students in Beiping.

The Zhangbei Incident
After Prince De returned to Mongolia, General He Yingqin, under the pretext of
regularizing the withdrawal of the central government’s military forces from northern
China, reported the conclusion of an agreement with the Japanese to resolve the problems
in northern China. In the later part of August, the Chinese government appointed Song
Zheyuan as garrison commander of the Beiping-Tianjin area and Qin Dechun, a follower
of Song, as the governor of Chahar province. In this manner, the areas of Beiping and
Tianjin were snatched from the hands of the central government and placed in the hands
of the local militarists.
Of course, all these things were carried out in the face of the conspiracy by the
Japanese to expand their influence in North China. The Japanese militarists created the
“Second Zhangpei Incident” along the Great Wall line outside Kalgan in order to squeeze
the power of the central government from northern China. Using this as a pretext, the
Japanese had Qin Dechun sign an agreement with Doihara Kenji, the head of the Tianjin
Special Service Office. In this way, the Japanese forced Song’s troops out from the vari
ous xians north of the Great Wall and allowed only a small number of police and peace
preservation troops to be stationed there, thus cutting off the Chahar banners and the
Shilingol League north of Kalgan from the authority of the Chinese government.
It was in the spring of this year that Itagaki, the deputy chief of staff of the Japa
nese Guandong Army, came to Ujumuchin to meet with Prince So and Prince De. This
Japanese general was snubbed by Prince So, but he did have a serious talk with Prince De
about future problems facing Mongolia that would have considerable impact on the des
tiny of the area.

Secret Plans for Mongolia’s Future
In mid-October 1935, the third meeting of the members of the Mongolian Politi
cal Council convened. Wu Heling arrived from Nanjing together with the newly ap
pointed members of the Mongolian Political Council: Sodnomrashi, the head of the Left
Flank League of the Kokonor Mongols; and Sogdar, the son of the head of the Right
Flank League. This improved relations between the Kokonor Mongols and the Mongolian
Political Committee.
Unfortunately, offical copies of the proposals made at this meeting chaired by
Yi Dechin have all been lost. However, I have in my possession a copy of Wu Heling’s
proposals, which includes the following items: outlines of (1) the organization of the
training of Mongolian Peace Preservation troops, (2) the organization of the Mongolian
Public Health Bureau, (3) the organization of the new experimental Mongolian villages,
(4) the organization of the Mongolian Cultural Institute, (5) the organization of the Mon
golian Normal School, (6) the organization of the Mongolian Productive Cooperatives,
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(7) the organization of the Mongolian Trade Cooperatives, (8) the organization of the
Mongolian Credit Cooperatives, (9) the organization of the Mongolian Self-Rule Train
ing Center, (10) the organization of the Mongolian Highway Management Bureau, (11)
the organization of the Mongolian Electrical Management Bureau, and (12) the organiza
tion of the Mongolian Courier Route System.
From these proposals, it is evident what the main projects of the Mongolian Po
litical Council were. Because of changing circumstances, none of these plans were im
plemented immediately. However, after Japan occupied Inner Mongolia, many of the new
projects carried out by the Mongols were based on these proposals.
Besides these formal meetings. Prince De and Wu Heling had several secret
talks. Wu told Prince De about his personal experience in a secret meeting with higherlevel KMT authorities in Nanjing. At this meeting, Feng Yuxiang had requested permis
sion to make war against the Japanese invaders immediately. Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek responded to this request by saying that he could not gamble with the destiny of
China by risking everything in a single venture in such a manner. Chiang insisted on
pacifying the domestic situation before resisting foreign aggression, and unless all pros
pects for peace were exhausted, the search for peace would not be forsaken. He added
that unless the situation reached crisis proportions, there would be absolutely no irrespon
sible talk of making desperate sacrifices for the nation. The generalissimo continued by
stating that even though the land north of the Yellow River was occupied, it might still be
possible to wait for an opportune moment and then carry out a war of resistance. If war
did ever break out, he vowed, it would be fought to the finish. He Yingqin, Minister of
Military Affairs, made a comparison of the real power of China and Japan, testifying that
if war broke out immediately, there would be only one way for the Japanese to defeat
China. Since the Chinese were not able to protect northern China, how could they defend
Mongolia?
Prince De also told Wu Heling about his contacts that year with the Japanese.
Wu suggested to Prince De that cooperating with the Japanese would require a man on
the Mongol side to talk, negotiate, and draft a document with the real holders of political
power in the Japanese government. It was absolutely necessary, he said, that they contact
neither the lower-ranking intelligence officers in the Special Service offices nor the ronin
(rebel) element, and then do something reckless. He also expressed a wish to return to
Mongolia and work with Prince De to open a new road for Mongolia’s future. Prince De
was an open-minded and magnanimous man who did not dwell on past wrongdoings or
grudges. He sincerely welcomed Wu’s return. Moved by Prince De’s sincerity, Wu
promised to come back, a matter of top secrecy at this time.

Wu Heling’s Meeting with Chiang Kai-shek
In the middle of November 1935, the KMT convened its Fifth National Con
gress in Nanjing. Nimaodzar attended the congress as a delegate and was elected a mem
ber of the Central Executive Committee. However, the senior Mongolian party member,
Bai Yunti, lost his bid for reelection. While Nimaodzar was in Nanjing, Wu Heling dis
cussed the future problems of Mongolia with him. Both of them recognized that the de
velopment of the present situation should not be neglected, but that it would be better in
the long run to check further Japanese advances. Nimaodzar also agreed that Wu Heling
should go back to Mongolia.
Before Wu Heling left Nanjing, he passed his post as head of the Nanjing Office
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of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates to his friend Dai Qinglian (a man from
the Turned Left Banner and a delegate from the Josotu League to Nanjing), Dai and his
successors continued Mongolian relations with the Nanjing government to the very last
day of that government’s existence.’
Although Wu Heling decided to return to Mongolia, he still thought that Japan
ese expansion was only a temporary problem that could not possibly last long. Therefore,
he reported his plan of returning to Mongolia to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek through
General Yu Jishi. Chiang thereupon summoned Wu Heling to an audience. At this audi
ence, Wu reported all he knew about Japanese activities in Mongolia and his own objec
tives’ and then asked Chiang for instructions. Chiang, recognizing the nature of the situa
tion, saw the possibility of infiltrating the enemy’s lines. He said, “You may go back, but
you must adopt your actions as circumstances dictate and try your best to check the Japa
nese western campaign. If it is impossible to halt it, it would be best to at least attempt to
delay it. Even if you can merely delay this advance, your return to Mongolia will not
have been for nothing.” At the same time, the generalissimo gave him funds for travel
expenditures. All of these things were related to me by Wu Heling.
While the political inclinations of the Mongolian leaders were changing, the
situation in northern China greatly worsened. Because of Japanese oppression, the North
Chinese regime was given a special designation and became a “region,” having “selfrule.” Under the auspices of the Chinese government, Japanese militarists and the Chi
nese local authorities of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee appeared in
Beiping. Song Zheyuan was nominally appointed by the Nanjing government as the
committee chairman. Many of the members of the committee were old North Chinese
politicians, not affiliated with the KMT, and therefore outside the control of the central
government in Nanjing. At this very time, the Japanese militarists created more “specially
designated” areas in the eastern part of Hebei Province, which had previously been “spe
cially designated” by the Japanese through the Tanggu Agreement and the He YingqinUmezu Yoshiro Agreement, and established the Eastern Hebei Autonomous Government.
They made Yin Rukeng the head of this regime. In the area north of Kalgan, the Japanese
Guandong Army mobilized the Eastern Chahar Garrison Forces under the command of Li
Shouxin to occupy the six xians. Both the Chahar Tribe and the Shilingol League fell to
the Japanese.

The Emergence of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council
To deal with the developments in Inner Mongolia, the Chinese government or
dered the reorganization of the Mongolian Political Council on January 8, 1936, and ap
pointed the pro-Nanjing and anti-Japanese head of Shilingol, Prince Sodnamrabdan, as
chairman of the Mongolian Political Council. Prince De was appointed as vice-chairman.
The central government accepted the resignation of Yondonwangchug from his posts as
Chairman of the Mongolian Political Council and head of the Ulanchab League, and
promoted Babudorji, the deputy head of the Ulanchab League, to the position of league
head. At the same time, the Chinese government appointed Prince Yon as a member of its

’ After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, this office followed the Chinese government
first to Hankou and then to Chungking, By then, Dai Qinglian had already died, and the post of the
head of this office went to Wu Yunpeng, a delegate from the Juu-uda League. In late 1949, this
office under Wu Yunpeng again followed the Chinese government in its retreat to Taiwan.
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governing body, a post of high honor but little real power. The goals of these personnel
reshufflings were (1) to retain the minds and hearts of the Mongols and gain solid control
over the Mongolian Political Council, so as to halt the activities of Prince De, and to re
duce Japanese influence in the area, and (2) to remove Prince Yon and appoint Prince Ba,
who had comparatively distant relations with Prince De and could thus be more easily
influenced by Fu Zuoyi, so as to control the Ulanchab League. Nevertheless, these steps
were ineffectual.
Earlier, to reduce the influence of Prince De in the areas under the control of
Suiyuan Province, Fu Zuoyi, under the pretense of handling the disturbances along the
frontier areas and the Chinese Communist occupation of Shaanxi province, had sent a
false telegram to the Chinese government in the names of the princes of the Ulanchab and
Yekejuu Leagues. This false telegram petitioned Chiang Kai-shek, then head of the Ex
ecutive Yuan, for permission to establish a Mongolian autonomous organization in the
territory of Suiyuan. On January 25, 1936 the Chinese government issued an order to
establish the Mongolian Political Council of Suiyuan Provincial Territory and appointed
Shirabdorji, the head of the Yekejuu League, as the chairman of this newly established
council.*
On February 23, 1936, the founding ceremony of the Suiyuan Mongolian Politi
cal Council was formally carried out at the public hall of Suiyuan Province in Hohhot
city. The committee was established under the supervision of Fu Zuoyi and a delegate of
Yan Xishan. On the same day, a declaration drafted by the Suiyuan Provincial Govern
ment was issued:
The leagues and banners in the territory of Suiyuan province adjoin Outer Mongolia on the
north, and Shanxi and Shaanxi on the south. At this very moment, the Chinese Communists
are fleeing like frightened mice to the north and are trying to open a road beyond the fron
tier. Because the territory of the Mongol banners is broad and vast, and because the Mon
gols are scattered in pockets all over, it will be impossible to defend ourselves against the
propaganda of the Reds unless we establish a very tight relationship between ourselves and
the original Mongolian organizations. Unless we can unify the leagues and banners and re
inforce their strength, it will be impossible to stop the disturbances and encroachments of
the Communist bandits. In order to deal with these situations, the central government has
brilliantly issued an order to establish this council. The central government has placed great
faith in this council and in the sincere support of the Mongol masses. Therefore, we have to
make an oath to follow this main objective under the principle of good neighborliness and

* Babudorji, Pandeigungchab, and Altanwachir, the deputy head of the Yekejuu League, were all
appointed as vice chairmen of this new council. Chesedbaljur Chimidbaljur?], the jasag of the
Darkhan Banner, Ulanchab League; Chimedrinchinkhorlowa, jasag of Muuminggan, Ulanchab
League; Rinchinsengge,_/asag of the Urad Central Banner, Ulanchab League and son of Babudorji;
Shirabdorji, the notorious pro-Fu Zuoyi Jasag of the Urad Front Banner, Ulanchab League, also
known as the Prince Shi of the Prince Shi Incident; Shirabdorji, the tusalagchi of the Darkhan Ban
ner, Ulanchab League, and nephew of Prince Yon; Galsangrolmawangjiljamsu, the jasag of the
Ordos Right Front Banner, Yekejuu League; Khangdadorji, yasog of the Ordos Left Rear Banner;
Tobshinjirgal,yajag of the Ordos Left Central Banner; Tegusamugulang,yajag of the Ordos Right
Rear Banner, Rong Xiang, amban of the Turned Banner; Damringsumng, amban of the Chahar
Right Flank Pure Yellow Banner; Balgunjab, amban of the Chahar Right Flank Bordered Red Ban
ner; Mongkeochir, amban of the Chahar Right Flank Bordered Blue Banner; and Oljeibayar, acting
jasag of the Ordos Left Flank Front Banner, were all appointed as members of the council. The
Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan was made the superintendent of this new council, and Shi Huayan was
made the chief advisor of the office of the superintendent.
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anti-communism in order to raise the livelihood of the Mongol people, develop the culture
of the Mongol banners and improve economic construction in general. In increasing our
real strength and marching forward toward the goal of anti-communism, we hope that the
mission will not be neglected and that the border defenses will be strengthened. This decla
ration has been issued after considerable thought and deliberation.

Among the VIPs attending the ceremony were Major Haneyama, a Japanese
military officer stationed at Hohhot. In this declaration, there was no mention of the
Japanese invasion; indeed, it emphasized “good neighborliness and anti-communism.”
The words “good neighborliness” in this context meant friendly relations with Japan.
Evidently, this declaration showed that the establishment of this Suiyuan Mongolian Po
litical Council had no connection with the anti-Japanese movement. However, Prince
De’s involvement with the Japanese was a direct cause of the dissolution of the original
Mongolian Political Council at Bat-khaalag. In the eyes of the Mongol people, it ap
peared that the Chinese government was establishing better relations with the Japanese,
while at the same time rebuking the Mongols for their involvement with the Japanese.
How could this kind of wrongdoing pacify the hearts of the Mongol people? Earlier,
Outer Mongolian independence and the Tibetan pro-British movement also had been oc
casioned by similar inappropriate policies of the Manchu imperial government.
All in all, through the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, Fu Zuoyi was able
to split the unified Mongolian autonomous organization into two camps. Prince Sodnamrabdan did not approve of this kind of plot. However, he continued to support the Nanjing
government. Prince De sent out an open telegram in the name of Prince So saying that the
founding of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council was destroying the unity of the
Mongolian Political Council and was not congruent with the Eight Principles of Mongo
lian Local Autonomy. However, there was no positive response to this protest.

Japanese Penetration and Disintegration of the
Mongolian Political Council
The Japanese Guandong Army took advantage of the desire of the Chahar lead
ers to establish a league. The Japanese started to establish a league organization of Cha
har directly after their occupation of the Zhangbei xians and supported the elderly Chahar
politician Jodbajab as the head of the new league. The Chahar League Office was for
mally established on January 20, 1936. At the same time, the Guandong Army supported
Prince De in actively organizing a Mongolian army and allowed him to recruit men from
the Mongolian banners which had already been put under the Manchukuo administration
by the Japanese. On February 12, of the same year, the General Headquarters of the
Mongolian Army was established in the Sunid Right Banner, and Prince De himself be
came its commander in chief
Fu Zuoyi’s oppression had negative effects on the Mongol people but also en
couraged the nationalistic aspirations of the Mongols. The Mongols became more unified
as a result of resisting Fu, and struggled for the common goal of self-rule. A few people,
fearing Fu Zuoyi’s oppression and the oppression of the border officials, turned to Japan
for assistance. However, the Japanese involvement again strongly stimulated Mongolian
nationalistic feelings and divided the Mongols based on how each man weighed the rela
tive dangers of the enemy within and the enemy without. Thus, this situation immediately
caused yet another split in Mongol unity. One group turned to the Japanese, and one
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group remained strongly anti-Japanese. Moreover, Japanese agents were forever showing
up in the Bat-khaalag area. Their activities in Chahar and Shilingol and their creation of
the General Headquarters of the Mongolian Army led the anti-Japanese Mongols to con
sider that Japan’s activities amounted to a nefarious, intolerable conspiracy aimed at the
swallowing up of Mongolia.
Soon after the founding of the general headquarters in Sunid, there broke out a
rebellion of the Peace Preservation Troops of the Mongolian Political Council in Batkhaalag. These troops had been organized through the devoted efforts of Prince De, as I
have described above. At the time of the Khashaat Incident, these troops were sent by the
Mongolian Political Council to confront Fu Zuoyi’s Chinese troops. This suggests that
until the early winter of 1935, they were still loyal to Prince De and the Mongolian Po
litical Council. The Japanese involvement, however, led them to prefer to be oppressed
by Fu Zuoyi rather than to be manipulated by the Japanese. Of course this decision was
influenced by the educational backgrounds of their officers.
When this rebellion first broke out. Prince De was occupied with the establish
ment of his new headquarters and was not at Bat-khaalag. Ao Yunzhang, the senior advi
sor appointed to take care of the administration of the Mongolian Political Council, to
gether with Chogbagatur, a confidant of Prince De, and some others were all summoned
to Sunid by Prince De. The administration of the Council was being managed by Secre
tary Jirgalang. The head of the Peace Preservation Bureau, Togtakhu, was in Ujumuchin.
Two anti-Japanese officers, Zhu Shifti and Yun Jixian, used these absences to carry out
their own plots. Also, because most of the soldiers were from Turned—the native banner
of Zhu and Yun—they collaborated with Su Ludai, a section head of the Civilian Ad
ministration Bureau; Ren Bingjun, a section head of the Finance Commission; Kang
Jimin, a counselor of the Advisory Committee; and J&kljunju (Ji Zhenfu), a section head
of the Education Bureau, in raiding an ammunition store at Bat-khaalag and then fleeing
southward to Wuchuan, where they were welcomed by Fu Zuoyi’s troops. These rebel
lious Mongols issued an open telegram explaining that their rebellion was purely moti
vated by patriotism. They did not, however, make any personal attack on Prince De.
Having heard the news of this rebellion. Prince De rushed to Bat-khaalag, but it
was too late. Dugurengsang (Bai Haifeng), another top military officer, left Bat-khaalag
after the rebellion broke out. According to a reliable report, he was captured by soldiers
sent in pursuit and brought back to Prince De. The prince, though very angry, said, “Eve
ryone has his own will. Perhaps you have another course to follow in struggling for the
national survival of the Mongol people. You may go.” Prince De then ordered the sol
diers who captured him to release him unharmed. This event was related to me personally
by Liu Jianhua, who was an eyewitness to this event and an agent for the Nanjing gov
ernment at the time.
These rebellious Mongolian forces under the leadership of Zhu Shifu and Yun
Jixian were not trusted by Fu Zuoyi. After the propaganda value of these troops was ex
hausted, Fu Zuoyi disarmed them, kept an eye on them for a while, and then allowed
them to escape. Nevertheless, this event greatly damaged the prestige of the Mongolian
Political Council and the personal prestige of Prince De.
As for Prince So, because of these concerns, his health took a turn for the worse,
and he passed away in the latter part of June. On July 17, the Chinese government in
Nanjing appointed Prince De as the new head of the Shilingol League and Rinchinwangdud, the ruling prince of the Sunid Left Banner, as the deputy head of the league. Conse
quently, the ten banners of the Shilingol League were now completely under the leader
ship of Prince De.
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The Nanjing government realized that because Prince So had exerted much in
fluence on Prince De, he had been able to halt the Japanese advances. Therefore, after the
death of Prince So, the Chinese government in Nanjing ordered the disbanding of the
Mongolian Political Council and the establishment of a new Chahar Provincial Mongol
ian Political Council at Jabsar. The Chinese government appointed Prince De as the
chairman of this new council, and Jodbajab and Rinchinwangdud as vice-chairmen; they
also appointed Sungjingwangchug, Shonodondob, Dorji, Sangdagdorji, Budabala, Sodnamnorbu, Balgunsurung, Khorjurjab, Togtakhu, Mugdenbuu, Gonchograshi, Temurbolod, and Serengnamjil as members. At the same time, the Chinese government ordered all
the Mongolian Political Council officials to withdraw from Bat-khaalag (Bailingmiao).
Thus the Mongolian Political Council which was established on April 23, 1934, and had
lasted for two years and three months, was now officially abolished.
The reason for these actions by the Chinese government was evidently because
Prince De had still not openly declared Mongolia’s independence and his intention to
cooperate with the Japanese in resisting the Chinese. Consequently, the Chinese govern
ment did not wish to force his hand and wanted to maintain some kind of contact with
him for as long as possible. On the other hand. Prince De and his advisors, especially Wu
Heling, also felt that under these difficult circumstances it would be best to accept this
solution and not sever relations with the Chinese government and fall completely into the
Japanese basket.
As for Nanjing’s demand that the old Mongolian Political Council withdraw.
Prince De did not accept it. Nevertheless, Beile-yin sume was no longer the center of
Mongolian politics. The main officials of the Mongolian Political Council had already
been transferred to Sunid and Jabsar. Those who still remained at Bat-khaalag were only
a small contingent of military forces who were reorganized after the rebellion of the
Peace Preservation troops.
Earlier, when the Mongolian Political Council was first established, the two spe
cial banners of Alashan and Ejine were listed as being located within the autonomous
region. Soon thereafter, the twenty-nine banners of the Right and Left Flank Leagues of
the Kokonor Mongols were also allowed by the Chinese government to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Mongolian Political Council. Since the Mongolian Political Council
was now ordered to disband, and the above-mentioned leagues and banners had no way
to be designated as part of the newly established Suiyuan and Chahar Mongolian Political
Councils, they were thus excluded from the autonomous region.

VIII
JAPANESE INTERVENTION AND THE
MONGOLIAN ARMY GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
JANUARY - MAY 1936
The Early Activities of Japanese Agents
and the General Headquarters
September 18, 1931, the date of the “Manchurian Incident,” represented the
overt renewal of Japanese expansion on the Asian continent. Because of the changing
world situation. Inner Mongolia could not entirely control its own destiny. Prince De and
other Mongolian leaders could only seek out a way for the weak Inner Mongolia to con
tinue its national existence in the face of the mad tide of worldwide disturbances. Parallel
to the changing situation in northern China, Japanese advances into Inner Mongolia fol
lowed one after another. Except for the Ordos, Alashan, and Ejine areas, all Inner Mon
golia was swallowed up by Japanese armies. Faced with this overwhelming force. Prince
De and the other leaders working together with him exerted themselves to the utmost in
their struggle to maintain the existence of the Mongol people. Differences in political
orientation and ideology have led different people to evaluate this period of history dif
ferently. Nevertheless, the honor and disgrace imputed to Prince De’s efforts by alien
peoples and alien ideologies cannot alter established historical fact.
The activities of Japanese intelligence agents such as Morishima, Sasame, and
others, and the establishment of the Japanese Special Service Offices in Doloonnor and
Ujumuchin, together with the open intervention of Japanese military officers like Colonel
Matsumoro Koryo and Major Tanaka Hisashi and the response of the Mongols and the
changing situation of North China, have all been described in previous chapters and will
not be further discussed here.
According to the records of Nakajima Manzo, who Joined the Mongolian regime
under the Japanese occupation from the beginning, early in September of 1932, the
Guandong Army had already established a Mongolian Research Group to carry out intel
ligence and strategic work under the direction of Major General Okamura Yasuji, its dep
uty chief of staff. Among the members of this group, Nakajima Manzo and Yamamoto
Nobunaga were involved in Mongolian matters from beginning to end.
After the Guandong Army’s occupation in 1933 of Rehe and the Josotu League,
the Japanese appointed as advisors (jshoku-taku) the Kharachin students who had studied
in Japan during the Gungsangnorbu era. These students included Altanwachir, Engkeburin, and Bayantai. These people and Bai Yunti had been the founders of the Inner Mon
golian People’s Revolutionary Party in 1924. Their political ideology was originally quite
leftist in orientation. Later, because they were attacked by their even more leftist com
rades in Ulaanbaatar after their escape to Inner Mongolia, they became more moderate in
their political views.
Nevertheless, because these men still desired to alter Mongolian institutions and
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unify Outer and Inner Mongolia, they wanted to use the Japanese to effect a great change
in Mongolia. However, because they accepted appointment as advisors to the Guandong
Army, most of the Mongol people were quite suspicious of them. As mentioned earlier,
Li Shouxin, the Mongolian military leader in Doloonnor, could not speak Mongolian
even though he was a Mongol. Moreover, the fact that his troops were all Chinese made
the Mongols even more suspicious of him. Such suspicions were justified. Because the
eastern Inner Mongolian banners were under the jurisdiction of Manchukuo, the power to
administer these banners was entirely controlled by Japanese officials. The Mongols
came to fear and greatly suspect the Japanese westward advances.
When the Japanese started their “Mongolian work,” they met many hindrances.
For instance. Prince Yangsang, the senior among all Mongolian ruling princes and former
head of the Shilingol League, and Prince Sodnamrabdan, head of the Shilingol League
and the ruling prince of Ujumuchin, were two radically anti-Japanese leaders. Some of
the Inner Mongolian intellectuals were educated in China, and at least half of them felt
somewhat apprehensive about Japan. Yondonwangchug, Chairman of the Mongolian
Political Council, though he had no biases against the Japanese, had no good feelings for
them either.
As for the minds of the Mongolian leaders of that time, ever since the Manchus
began encouraging Chinese migration to border areas to fortify national defenses during
the late imperial era, there had existed a desire to escape Manchu domination. Later,
Governor Yigu of Suiyuan pushed hard to encourage takeover of Mongol pastureland by
Chinese immigrant farmers and promoted other policies harmful to the Mongols. After
the establishment of the Republic of China and the advent of warlordism, both Zhang
Zuolin from the East and Feng Yuxiang from the West carried out military cultivation
schemes and occupied Mongolian territory by force. Although the republican Chinese
government had promised to foster the weak and minority nationalities and to help them
implement self-determination and self-rule, this promise never materialized. In addition,
there was heavy oppression and extortion of Mongols by Fu Zuoyi and other border offi
cials. On the one hand, Fu and his group were unable to resist the Japanese; on the other
hand, they blamed the Mongols for not being sufficiently faithful to the nation.
After its establishment, the Mongolian Political Council, hindered on all sides,
was unable to accomplish anything. Members of the Council feared that the Mongols
would eventually disappear as a nationality. Some of them considered the Japanese ad
vances impossible to ignore. The Chinese government could not possibly stop these ad
vances, nor could the Mongols resist them. These Mongols thus felt that it would be wis
est to make some contact with the Japanese rather than just wait like sitting ducks for the
invasion. They thought that by doing so, there would perhaps be some opportunity for
constructive change. This stance might be criticized by some as drinking poisoned wine
in order to quench one’s thirst. The Mongols, however, had no other choice, especially
give the changing situation in northern China. This was the background for the new de
termination of Prince De and his group to negotiate with the Japanese.
Perhaps the purpose of Prince De’s change of mind on negotiations with Japan
was to seek to preserve Mongolian national existence by exploiting the contradictions
among the great powers. If so, he had no resolve to sever Inner Mongolia completely
from the central government of China. Moreover, from beginning to end. Prince De
thought that the legal government of China should recognize the independence of Mon
golia. Given the range of possibilities under the balance of power policy he hoped to pur
sue, he did not want to irritate the leader and the government of China. Because he did so,
some have mocked him as an opportunist. In reality, it was a very difficult decision for
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him to reach for him to distance himself somewhat from China; but as the leader of a
weak minority people, he could not avoid doing so.
Japanese activities in Mongolia were at first carried out by the Japanese Special
Service Offices and the Good Neighbor Association {Zenrin Kyokai). This association
first appeared in the guise of a nonprofit organization designed to help the Mongols.
Formally established at the end of 1933, it was the idea of Sasame Tsuneo and was sup
ported by General Hayashi Senjuro and Major General Mazumoro Koryo and agreed to
by the Japanese military staff. Its main tasks were to gather intelligence for the Japanese
military and encourage Japanese-Mongolian friendship. It also administered educational
and cultural programs, provided clinical and medical services, and encouraged research
on Mongolian culture. To solidify its reputation, the association made Duke Ichijo Sanetaka its president and Lt. General Inoue Aratama its chief administrator. The real admin
istrators of this association were Sasame Tsuneo, Maikawa Hirokichi, and Oshima Yutaka. Sasame and Maikawa managed the “field work,” i.e. the Japanese activities in
Mongolia; Oshima dealt with the internal administration of the association. The forma
tion of this association made it possible for Japanese intelligence agents to do covert
work and extend their activities in Mongolia. Nakajima Manzo and Yamamoto Nobunaga
also entered “Mongolian work” through the association.
In the summer of 1934, at the recommendation of Sasame, Maikawa arrived in
Sunid and visited with Prince De. Soon afterward, Inoue, the chief administrator of the
Good Neighbor Association, also came to visit with the prince. After receiving the sup
port of the prince, they founded a branch headquarters of their association, and Maikawa
became the leader of the headquarters. At the same time, the Japanese Guandong Army
sent Nak^ima to serve as an associate of Maikawa. Ostensibly, this association promoted
educational, cultural, and medical services. At the same time, a similar branch of the
Good Neighbor Association was established in the Right Banner of UJumuchin; Yama
moto Nobunaga was sent there as an associate. However, this branch of the Good Neigh
bor Association was extremely restricted in its activities by Prince So, and the develop
ment of its work did not match that of the office established in Sunid.
With the help of this Sunid branch office of the Good Neighbor Association
Prince De selected several of his trusted intellectual followers and sent them to Japan to
study.' At this time, the Good Neighbor Association also supported many Inner Mongol
ian students from the Manchukuo area by bringing them to Japan to study.

Itagaki’s Arrival in Ujumuchin
Following the founding of the Good Neighbor Association branch headquarters
in Ujumuchin, the Guandong Army sent Morishima Kadoftisa to the center of Shilingol,
to the well-known Buddhist temple Pandita Gegeen Keid (commonly known by its Chi
nese name as Beizimiao), to establish a Special Service Office. Later, the Japanese called
it the Abaga Special Service Office, and it became the base for control over the Shilingol

' These youths were Ruiyong, a Dahur Mongol; Chogbadarkhu, a Kharachin Mongol studying in
the Political Academy of the Kuomintang in Nanjing; Khatanbagatur, a Kharachin youth and ex
treme nationalist; Chogtumanglai, a Kharachin youth studying in Nanjing; Jorigbagatur, also a
Kharachin youth studying in Nanjing; Namsereng; and Namur, the Liu Jianhua mentioned in for
mer chapters, a Chinese disguised as a Sinicized Mongol who, after his arrival in Japan, clashed
with the association and subsequently was sent back to Mongolia.

128
League.

The Last Mongol Prince

From the beginning of 1935, Japanese military personnel frequently visited with
Prince De in Sunid. Among these Japanese visitors were Doihara Kenji, head of the
Tianjin Special Service Office; Tanaka Ryukichi, staff member of the Guandong Army;
and Major Shishiura Naonori, who had already been involved in “Mongolian work.” In
the early summer of that year, Itagaki Seishiro, deputy head of the Guandong Army staff;
Ishimoto Torazo, head of the Second Section of the Guandong Army Headquarters; Ta
naka Ryukichi, a staff member of the Guandong Army; together with their advisor Altanwachir as interpreter, arrived in Ujumuchin and visited with Prince So. Because the
Japanese had contacted Prince So about their imminent arrival in Ujumuchin, Prince De
was invited by the Ujumuchin authorities to discuss this matter with their prince. The two
princes’ attitudes toward this matter were quite different. Prince De wanted to make prog
ress during this visit with very important, high-ranking Japanese. Prince So wanted, how
ever, to keep them at a respectful distance and not give them any definite answers. He
used his poor health as an excuse to bow out of the negotiations and had Itagaki conduct
talks directly with Prince De.
Prince So had initially told the Japanese that these “problems” were not prob
lems that he himself could resolve, and that it was necessary to discuss them with the
Chinese government. The Japanese visitors began their discussions with Prince De at
Prince So’s request. First, Itagaki expressed Japan’s sympathy for, and good will toward,
the Mongol people. He then expressed Japan’s willingness to help the Mongol people
struggle for national existence. Prince De immediately conveyed to Itagaki his desire for
Japanese support in establishing an independent Mongolian nation and to unify both east
ern and western Inner Mongolia. Itagaki was willing to support an independent Mongolia.
But because of the establishment of Manchukuo, he said he had no right to respond to the
request for the unification of eastern and western Inner Mongolia because that involved
Manchukuo’s sovereignty.
This was the first negotiation between the Inner Mongolian top leaders and highranking Japanese military officials. From the Mongols’ point of view, the conclusion of
this meeting was a conditional Japanese agreement to Mongolian independence. How
ever, it was unclear whether Itagaki’s promise represented the view of the Japanese gov
ernment, the military, the Guandong Army, or only Itagaki himself Prince De, eager to
obtain a Japanese promise of support for Mongolian independence, neglected to initiate
an exchange of documents. During this time, the Mongolian leaders, ignorant of modem
diplomatic practices, felt that a man’s word was his bond; it never occurred to them that
this kind of agreement should be officially recorded. This was the era during which the
first formal contacts between the Mongols and the Japanese occurred. Because of this
mistake, from the time of Prince De’s contacts with Itagaki until the end of the Second
World War in 1945, an unsolvable political problem remained between the Mongols and
both the Japanese and the Wang Jingwei regime in Nanjing.
I learned of Itagaki’s visit to Ujumuchin from Ujumuchin friends and the main
interpreter, Altanwachir. According to Altanwachir, Itagaki’s arrival was preceded by the
arrival of Japanese guards. In an act of intimidation they deployed mortars and machine
guns and trained them on the residence of the Prince of Ujumuchin. Upon Itagaki’s arri
val, Prince So did not come out to welcome him; instead, he sent an official to guide Ita
gaki to the great yurt where he would meet with his guests. Prince So sat stolidly on a
chair in the middle of the yurt and did not stand up to greet Itagaki, citing his extreme
corpulence. He then asked the guests to sit on his left side and reserved the right-hand
side for Prince De. (In Mongolian tradition, the right-hand seat was reserved as the seat
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of honor.) Even though Japanese weapons were deployed against his residence, Prince So
remained cool and collected. This coolly formal reception of so important a Guandong
Army representative, did not anger Itagaki; instead, Itagaki regarded Prince So’s behavior
as truly characteristic of a great prince.
Although Prince So did not agree to Japanese involvement in Inner Mongolian
issues, Itagaki’s arrival gave Prince De a new perspective concerning Mongolian inde
pendence. This brought a shift in his political stance and also changed the course of mod
em Inner Mongolian history. It enhanced Prince De’s belief that the Japanese military
was sincere in its support of Mongolian independence.

Expansion of Japanese Aetivities
Tanaka Ryukichi sent an Indian agent by way of Bat-khaalag to Xinjiang to
gather intelligence. The interpreter for this Indian was a Mongol named Togtakhu. They
were disguised as merchants. Togtakhu, realizing that such a journey was dangerous,
went to see Prince De and asked to be hired as the prince’s interpreter. Because Prince
De’s interpreter, Kokebagatur, had been killed, nobody was interpreting for him with the
Japanese. Seeing that this Mongol youth was headed for certain death in Xinjiang, Prince
De agreed.
Togtakhu, a man from the Surug Banner, had been expelled while studying in
Japan, and so had returned to Mongolia. During this very awkward and embarrassing
return from Japan, Tanaka Ryukichi discovered him and gave him this dangerous as
signment to Xinjiang; however. Prince De’s use of him gave him a new lease on life.
Togtakhu was a treacherous and selfish person. Outwardly he showed a false veneer of
patriotic, zealous Mongolian nationalism, but secretly he used his knowledge of the Japa
nese language to exchange Mongolian secrets for personal gain. At the same time, he
gave Prince De false intelligence reports on the Japanese in order to win his trust. With
an interpreter like Togtakhu, the results were predictable. Togtakhu created problems for
both the Japanese and Mongols and gained many personal benefits from both sides. His
personality as interpreter was opposite to that of Altanwachir and Engkeburin.
In June of 1935, following the establishment of the Good Neighbor Association
branch in the Sunid Right Banner, a Guandong Army’s Special Service Office was also
placed there. The head of this office was Major Shishiura Naonori; the main members of
the office were Nakajima Manzo and Yamamoto Nobunaga. Nakajima was assigned to
the Mongolian Political Council at Bat-khaalag; Yamamoto was assigned to work within
the sphere of the Dilowa Khutugtu and the people who had settled in Sunid from Outer
Mongolia, and he also was to gather intelligence on Outer Mongolia. In mid-July of that
year, the Guandong Army presented Prince De with a small six-seat airplane, which the
Japanese called the “airplane of Prince De.’’^
On November 5, 1935, the Good Neighbor Association established a primary
school at the Pandita Gegeen Keid temple in the Abkhanar Left Banner. Those who par
ticipated in the dedicatory ceremonies were the Japanese schoolmaster Hiroji; a Chahar
Mongol associate named Damirinjab; a Japanese teacher named Yoshimura; Agdungga,
the jasag of the Abakhanar Left Banner; Maekawa, the head of the Good Neighbor Asso^ Prince De, however, called the plane keimori, which means “heavenly horse.” Its pilot was Japan
ese; but only three or four years later, a Kharachin youth named Borjigid, who graduated from a
Japanese air navigation school, would become the pilot of this airplane.
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ciation headquarters in Inner Mongolia; Khuturi, the representative of Ujumuchin Ban
ner; Bazargurda, the nominal principal of this school and former tusalagchi and a truly
pro-Japanese person; Morishima, then the head of the Abaga Special Service Office; and
thirty or more students. Except for the students and Agdungga, all of them delivered
speeches. Morishima emphasized Japanese-Mongolian friendship and Mongolian inde
pendence. He finally led the crowd in chanting the slogans “Dai Nippon Teikoku banzaiV'
(“Long live the great Japanese empire!”), and then “Long live great Mongolia!” The peo
ple in attendance wondered why they chanted the slogan about Japan first. The Japanese
had thought that Prince So would not send any delegates to this ceremony. But the arrival
of the moderate Khuturi greatly satisfied the people of the Good Neighbor Association.
Before the dedication of this school, the Good Neighbor Association had already
established clinics in the territories of both Pandita Gegeen Keid and the Sunid Right
Banner. A primary school was also founded in Sunid. Soon afterward, another clinic was
established at the Borotolgai Temple in Chahar. The good medical techniques of these
clinics helped increase the reputation of the Good Neighbor Association. Under the slo
gan of Japanese-Mongolian friendship, these clinics indeed made great contributions to
the health of the Mongol people. However, the Japanese schools were not successful be
cause they put too much emphasis on learning the Japanese language and on propagating
the doctrine of Japan’s supremacy. This aroused feelings of resentment and concern
among the Mongolian upper classes.
From the beginning of the Japanese involvement in Inner Mongolia, Bazargurda
became very pro-Japanese, and he greatly assisted the Abaga Special Service Office. As a
reward, the Japanese granted him ever more trust. Later, a member of the Japanese intel
ligence office, Nonaka Tetsuya, stayed at Bazargurda’s home to study the Mongolian
language. Bazargurda’s home virtually became a branch of the Special Service Office.
This evoked Mongolian resentment and Bazargurda’s reputation fell. Even the Shilingol
elites began to distance themselves from him. Later, after the Japanese had occupied all
of western Inner Mongolia, they made him director of the Mengjiang Bank to reward him
for his assistance to the Special Service Office. At his retirement, the Japanese asked
Prince De to give him the title of Councilor in the Mongolian government. This request
was denied because of his excessively pro-Japanese leanings.

Prince De’s Secret Visit to Manchukuo
After Itagaki’s visiti to Ujumuchin, the Japanese Guandong Army, as part of its
“Mongolian work,” sent out a formal invitation to Prince De to visit Xinjing (Chang
chun), the capital of Manchukuo, for discussions. Prince De received this significant in
vitation through Major Shishiura, the head of the Guandong Army’s Special Service Of
fice in Sunid. Prince De discussed this secret invitation with his best friend, the Dilowa
Khutugtw, both agreed to go ahead and assume the risks of this new political adventure.
In the middle of November 1935, Prince De and this Khutugtu, accompanied by Major
Shishiura, Nakajima Manzo, and Altanwachir as interpreter, flew to Xinjing on the air
plane the Guandong Army had donated to Prince De.
In Xinjing, Prince De met with General Minami Jiro, the commander-in-chief of
the Guandong Army, and obtained his promise of support for Mongolian independence.
Itagaki Seishiro, who had already been promoted to the position of chief of staff, pre
sented to Prince De 500,000 units of Manchukuo currency as the Guandong Army’s con
tribution to Mongolian political and military programs.
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On his way back, Prince De took a route passing through Doloonnor, where
Major Asami Kikuo, the head of the Special Service Office, introduced him to Li
Shouxin, the commander of the garrison troops in east Chahar. This was the first meeting
between Prince De and Li Shouxin. Prince De and Li agreed to work together. From this
time on, these two persons with very different historical backgrounds and goals would
work for cooperation between Mongolia and Japan. Nevertheless, their cooperation, from
beginning to end, though outwardly amicable was Inwardly very tense.
After returning from Xinjing, Prince De immediately went to Beile-yin sume to
report on his visit to Prince Yon. Although Prince Yon had exerted himself in promoting
the autonomy movement and had very bad feelings against Fu Zuoyi, he still had no de
sire to ask for Japanese help. Hearing Prince De’s reports and realizing that there was no
going back, he said to Prince De, “Since you have done this, the only thing for you to do
now is to be careful and do your best. Because of my personal circumstances, I cannot
take any open action. Nevertheless, I will give you my support. You can carry out your
plans, and I here will try to maintain the existence of the Mongolian Political Council.”
Prince De got the response he had expected. This was one of the reasons that he had sup
ported Prince Yon as the nominal leader.

Wu Heling and Bai Yunti Return to Mongolia
The Chinese KMT convened its Fifth National Congress in Nanjing November
12-23, 1935. Both Wu Heling and Nimaodzar attended the congress as Mongolian repre
sentatives. Bai Yunti and Engkebatu Joined the congress because they were members of
the Central Executive Committee, On November 19, Chiang Kai-shek delivered his re
port on diplomacy and announced that “until all hopes for peace have been dashed, we
will never cease in our efforts to maintain peace; until a crisis is absolutely inevitable,
there will be no reckless talk of sacrifice.” This statement made the Mongolian leaders
feel that the Chinese government would not resist militarily even if the Japanese army
moved further into Inner Mongolia. In their minds, it was therefore better to move ahead
to make some contacts with the Japanese before a Japanese invasion occurred. They
wanted to take a position because the future was uncertain. This policy accelerated Prince
De’s decision to establish closer relations with the Japanese. Wu Heling and Nimaodzar
also recognized that the situation in western Inner Mongolia made it impossible to escape
from Japanese power looming on the horizon. Even if they continued to be subject to the
Chinese government in Nanjing, there would be no real help from that direction for Mon
golia. Perhaps it would be possible to find a solution through a new method.
At this time, Wu Heling told Nimaodzar about his informal secret talks with
Prince De at Bat-khaalag. Nimaodzar also agreed that Wu should return to Mongolia and
cooperate with Prince De. Wu and Nimaodzar decided to contact Mandaltu (Li Fenggang
or Li Danshan). Mandaltu was then a member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Com
mission and head of its Beiping office. He was also an old friend of Bai Yunti and a
founder of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. He would establish contact
with the Japanese agents in Beiping and Tianjin. Just at this time, through the recommen
dation of Bayantai (Yu Lanjai), Nakazawa Tatsuki, an agent of the Japanese Tianjin Spe
cial Service Office, came to Beiping and established contact with Mandaltu. In this way,
their work paved the way step by step for Wu Heling’s return to Mongolia.
During the election for Central Committee members of the Fifth Congress of the
Kuomintang, Bai Yunti lost his bid for reelection. Nimaodzar was elected a member of
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the Central Executive Committee. The results of this election, however, were unfortunate
for both. After his defeat, Bai was angry and left Nanjing for Tianjin. This was the ideal
opportunity for Mandaltu to introduce Nakazawa to Bai. Through Nakazawa, Bai ex
plained to Prince De his willingness to return to Mongolia and help establish Mongolian
independence. Prince De immediately responded to Bai’s offer. Also, through his old
friends Altanwachir and Bayantai, Bai was recommended to the Guandong Army; and
Tanaka Ryukichi, thinking that Bai’s arrival would make Japanese-Mongolian coopera
tion more respectable, also welcomed Bai. All these things were carried out in high se
crecy and remained undiscovered by outsiders.
An account of Wu Heling’s departure from Nanjing will not be repeated here.
After Wu reached Beiping, he stayed at my house because I was one of his relatives. My
father, as a senior relative of Wu, admonished him, saying that he should not have left
Nanjing and travel through areas occupied by the Japanese. My father further urged him
to return to Nanjing. Wu did not accept this advice.
Not long afterward, Wu’s second-youngest brother, Wu Chunling (who was then
a counselor of the Rehe Provincial Office of Manchukuo and had some political clout as
a representative of the Mongolian banners in that province), came to Beiping to persuade
his older brother to return to Mongolia. But Wu continued to conduct secret contacts with
Prince De by radio and received Prince De’s welcome. These contacts were made possi
ble by the assistance of Sainbayar, the head of the Beiping Office of the Mongolian Poli
tical Committee.

Japan’s Occupation of Kalgan’s Outskirts
and the Formation of the Chahar League
In December 1935, a contingent of Li Shouxin’s East Chahar Garrison troops
under the command of Yin Baoshan occupied the city of Baochang-x/ow. Soon afterward,
another contingent of the same unit under Liu Jiguang’s command took the city of Guyum-xian. These occupying troops were all Chinese under Japanese command. Song
Zheyuan’s Twenty-ninth Army troops had already withdrawn from this area in accord
ance with the settlement between Doihara and Qin Dechun, the governor of Chahar
Province. The remainder were only military police who had no way of resisting Li
Shouxin’s troops.
Following this victory, Doihara again put pressure on Song Zheyuan to stop all
Chinese military resistance north of the Great Wall. That allowed Li Shouxin’s troops to
occupy the six xians—Baochang, Guyuan, Zhangbei, Shangyi, Shangdu, and Kangbao—with virtually no bloodshed. Taking advantage of this changing situation, the Cha
har Tribe established itself as a league, and the city of Zhangbei was designated as the
site of the league office. Prince De appointed Jodbajab as head of the League, and Damrinsurung as the deputy head. Earlier, in the spring of 1934, when the Central Political
Committee of the Kuomintang passed the Eight Principles of Mongolian Local Auton
omy, article three had declared that the Chahar Tribe was to be reorganized as a league.
However, this was blocked by the Suiyuan and Chahar provincial governments and was
not realized. Prince De’s move, which won for him the hearts and minds of the Chahar
Mongols, was issued at this opportune time because the border provinces could now no
longer interfere in Mongolian affairs. At the same time. Prince De sent a secret telegram
to Wu Heling in Beiping, informing him that he should arrive in Zhangbei no later than
noon of 20 January, 1936.
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Wu Heling’s Meeting with Itagaki in Beiping
While Wu Heling was in Beiping, Mandaltu and Sainbayar introduced him to
Nakazawa Tatsuki, and the two had a long discussion. Nakazawa discovered that Wu’s
capabilities and personality were superior to those of the Mongolian leaders he had pre
viously met, and he recommended Wu to the Japanese military authorities in Tianjin. On
the other hand, the Guandong Army was greatly suspicious of Wu.
When news of Wu’s activities reached Sunid, Togtakhu persuaded the Japanese
Special Service Office that Wu’s arrival was an omen that he probably was on a mission
for the Chinese government aiming to destroy Japanese-Mongolian cooperation. There
fore he must be killed on arrival. Tanaka Ryukichi also insisted that Wu be assassinated.
Tanaka asked Prince De if Wu had returned to Mongolia to make mischief. Tanaka im
plicitly threatened Prince De by saying that Wu would be killed if he came. Prince De
defended Wu, assuring Tanaka that Wu would not work for the Chinese government, and
said, “It was I who invited Wu Heling to come. You absolutely should not kill him.” Af
terward, Prince De realized that although the Japanese did not insist on openly killing
Wu, he still might be assassinated, and the assassination would be blamed on the Lanyishe (the Blue Shirt Brigade) of the KMT. So Prince De sent a secret telegram to Wu,
instructing him to come to Zhangbei while the prince himself was there, and saying that
he would speak of secrets to Wu and provide him protection. Nakazawa also strove to
protect Wu Heling. After his meeting with Wu, Nakazawa introduced Wu to a very influ
ential Japanese political broker, Matsui Seikun, and arranged for them to meet at the
Yiseikan, a Japanese geisha-type restaurant in Beiping. The following Mongol leaders in
Beiping were invited: Mandaltu, Sainbayar, Ayulugei, and Temgetu (a former student in
Japan and manager of a Mongolian publishing house in Beiping) as interpreter. Although
I was only a student at this time, I was invited to this secret meeting because I was a close
relative of Wu Heling.
Nakazawa introduced Matsui to his guests as the president of the Shokoto (a
political organization for Japanese officials) and an intimate friend of General Itagaki.
Wu Heling explained his intention to return to Mongolia and support Prince De in real
izing Mongolian independence. He also pointed out that an independent Mongolia would
benefit Japan in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Matsui agreed with Wu’s views
and also spoke openly: “Mister Wu, I think you know that your situation is very danger
ous. For the purpose of Japanese-Mongolian cooperation and Mongolian independence,
you are a man of top importance. I would like to do my best to support you. Tomorrow,
General Itagaki, the chief of staff of the Guandong Army, will come here. I will arrange
for a time for you to see him. If his impression of you is favorable, I will let you know.
From now on, if you meet any problems, you can call on me and I will do my best to help
you.”
The next day, Nakazawa asked Wu Heling to go to a Japanese hotel, the
Fusankan, for an afternoon meeting with General Itagaki. Because Wu was staying at my
house, he brought me along with him. Itagaki received us, and after the formalities said,
“1 am very busy. Would you talk with Colonel Kawabe?” Itagaki thereupon ordered a
military aide to show Wu to Kawabe’s room. Colonel Kawabe Torashiro was the head of
the Second Section (the intelligence division) of the Guandong Army. When he met with
Wu, Kawabe arrogantly asked, “Is your return to Mongolia not a mission for Chiang Kaishek?” When Wu argued with him, Kawabe just shook his head. The encounter ended on
an unfriendly note. After leaving the hotel, I admonished Wu not to risk his life. It would
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be better for him to return to Nanjing and seek other ways to help the Mongols. Wu also
realized that under such circumstances it would be very difficult to return to Mongolia.
However, Nakazawa had Mandaltu tell Wu Heling, “After hearing Matsui’s explanation
of your matters, Itagaki has changed his mind about you. It is now possible for you to go
back to Mongolia to cooperate with Prince De.” This strengthened Wu Heling’s resolve
to return to Mongolia.

Wu Heling’s Narrow Escape from Assassination
After Wu Heling decided to return to Mongolia, he asked some Mongols he ad
mired to go with him: Wang Ziyang, a Kharachin Mongol and former parliamentarian of
the Beijing government; Li Jie’an, a Kharachin graduate of the Law School of Beiping
University; Mergen, a graduate of the China College and an active member of the Bei
ping Association of Fellow Mongols; Qin Shiyuan, an elderly Chinese who had worked
in Beiping as Wu’s secretary for years; and Namsaraijab. At this time, the Japanese ex
pansion and the formation of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee under Song
Zheyuan (which was taken to be pro-Japanese) stirred up opposition among the students
of Beiping’s colleges and universities. These students demonstrated and boycotted
classes. Wu also asked me to go with him to Mongolia to observe the changes in the
situation there.
Thinking this would be an important turning point in the history of Inner Mon
golia, at length 1 obtained my father’s pennission to go. We left Beiping on January 19,
1936, traveling with Wu Heling from Beiping to Kalgan to Zhangbei and finally to Sunid.
In Kalgan, we were warmly greeted by our Chahar friends and stayed at Nimaodzar’s
house. Nimaodzar had already been invited by Jodbajab to go to Zhangbei to help him
prepare to establish the Chahar League Office.
The next morning, we traveled in Wu’s truck to Zhangbei, arriving at ten
o’clock. We went directly to the old site of the xian government at Zhangbei, which was
currently the league office of the Chahar League, and met with the senior Chahar politi
cian, Jodbajab, who was the assigned league head. Jodbajab welcomed us, but tried to
avoid holding formal talks, especially in the presence of several Japanese advisors. He
seemed unable to offer any assistance. Nimaodzar already realized that everything was
being handled by the Japanese and that the Mongols had no avenue for the expression of
their own views. He was angry and regretted that he had come fi'om Kalgan, a place of
freedom, to Zhangbei, a place without freedom. He urged us to go back to Kalgan after
the ceremonies.
The ceremony to open the Chahar League Office and to inaugurate its league
head and league deputy head should have begun at noon that day. After eleven o’clock.
Prince De, the Dilowa Khutugtu, and Damrinsurung (the amban of the Pure Yellow Ban
ner of the Right Flank Chahar League and the designee for the position of Chahar deputy
head) arrived in Zhangbei in Prince De’s airplane.^ The ceremony took place in the
courtyard of the old Zhangbei xian government headquarters. When Prince De walked
into the courtyard, he glanced at Wu Heling and did not utter a word. During the cere^ Damrinsurung’s own banner was within the jurisdietion of Suiyuan provinee and was not yet
oceupied by the Japanese army; but due to his deep hatred of Fu Zuoyi because of Fu’s oppression
of the Mongols, he was willing to risk his future by leaving his own banner, and aecepting Prince
De’s offer of appointment.
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mony, in addition to Prince De and Jodbajab, the Japanese Major Tanaka Hisashi (as rep
resentative of the Guandong Army) delivered a speech emphasizing Japanese-Mongolian
friendship and cooperative action—the first time a Japanese had openly delivered a
speech in western Inner Mongolia. The many Japanese advisors accompanying this Japa
nese major evoked strange and uneasy feelings among the Mongols and suggested that
Japanese domination would soon overturn Mongolian self-rule. Nevertheless, except for
Nimaodzar, no one said anything.
We were not treated as guests and were not invited to the luncheon following the
party, and so we only wandered about in the courtyard. Soon Prince De came out from
the hall in which the luncheon was taking place, and Wu Heling went to talk with him.
Prince De’s appearance was cool and aloof, but in a low voice he told Wu, “You must go
to Sunid immediately. Diluwa Gegeen will tell you why. Follow my instructions.” Prince
De then walked away without so much as a glance at Wu Heling. To those of us in atten
dance, it appeared that the prince had no desire to talk to a man despised by the Japanese.
Immediately afterward. Prince De and his entourage boarded the airplane and flew back
to Sunid.
Dejected, Wu Heling returned to the temporary residence Jodbajab had prepared
for him. Just at that time, Dilowa Khutugtu and two officials from Prince De’s banner,
Nasunbayar and Altangerel, came to visit Wu. Batu, captain of a small contingent of
Prince De’s personal guard, accompanied these two officials on a truck loaded with ten or
more well-armed soldiers. Diluwa Gegeen realized that of the people in the room where
Wu Heling was, he recognized only me. Therefore, he asked for all the other people in
the room to leave, and then said, “The cold appearance of Prince De toward you was de
liberate, for the Japanese to see and put them at ease. Right now, the situation is very
unfavorable to you. Consequently, Prince De did not want the Japanese to know what he
was doing for you. Now you have to use the truck that the prince has prepared for you,
and the soldiers will accompany you to the residence of Prince De. For your own safety,
you should definitely not return to Kalgan. In order to stay out of the sight of the Japa
nese, I cannot stay here.” After saying this, he got on another truck heading for Kalgan
and Beiping.
After receiving this advice, Wu Heling discussed it with the people who came
with him. Wang Ziyang, Li Jie’an, and Mergen felt that under such Japanese pressure, it
would be impossible to work for Mongolia; they decided to return to Beiping. I insisted
that Wu Heling follow the instructions of Prince De and go north immediately; Qin Shiyuan and Namsaraijab also urged Wu to accept this advice, indicating their willingness to
accompany him to Sunid. Just then, Nimaodzar arrived, and Wu told him of Prince De’s
advice and suggested that he too consider going to Sunid. Nimaodzar, disappointed, said,
“Since Prince De asked you to go, then do as you please. You may go, but 1 am going
back to Kalgan to celebrate the new year."* Since Mr. Wang and others have decided not
to go to Sunid, they may return with me.”
Wu Heling, the others, and I immediately got on the truck that Prince De pre
pared and rushed to the north. When we reached the north gate of the city, the guards
under Li Shouxin’s commmand said, “Since you have no passport from the military
headquarters, you may not leave,” Wu Heling had no choice but to return to the newly
established league office and meet with Nimaodzar. After Wu told Nimaodzar of his
problem, Nimaodzar said, “The headquarters of Li Shouxin will not give you passports.”
Nimaodzar ordered a clerk of the Chahar League Office to issue a passport for Prince
^ January 24 of that year was the new lunar bingzi year.
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De’s officials and furnish documentation for the truck.
We took our passport with its official seal back to the north gate and showed it
to the guards. The guards, overwhelmed by such a large and impressive-looking official
seal, allowed the truck to leave. By this time it was already three o’clock. After leaving
the city gates, the driver accelerated quickly, even though that winter was very snowy and
it was difficult for the truck to keep a grip on the road. Altangerel and Batu had ordered
the soldiers to shoot any attackers. The sun had set, and automobile lights appeared to be
approaching from behind. In order to avoid attack, the driver accelerated the truck and we
pulled away, arriving at Jabsar in the middle of the night. After arrival, Nasuinbayar said,
“We have arrived at the place where the military forces are under the domination of our
prince. We should be able to stay safely for the night.”
In Jabsar, the Mongol military forces were under the command of Buyandelger
(Bao Guiting). When we went to his headquarters, he kindly offered us lodgings. He also
had Wu Heling’s younger brother under his protection. This was Wu Pengling (a gradu
ate of the Beiping Police Academy who gathered a group of Kharachin youth to join
Buyandelger’s troops for service to the Mongolian cause and was assigned as a regiment
al commander). He came to see Wu Hellng. When Wu Heling and 1 were alone, Wu
Pengling came and advised his brother that we should not spend the night there but in
stead should fill our stomachs and go directly to Sunid. Taking seriously such advice
since it came from his brother, Wu discussed the matter with Batu and the two Sunid of
ficials and decided that after supper, we should briefly feign sleep and then depart to
Sunid. In the early hours of the next morning (January 21), we arrived safely at Prince
De’s residence in the Sunid Right Banner.
Later, according to Wu Pengling’s words, 1 learned that though Buyandelger had
been hospitable to Wu Heling that night, he had asked for advice from his Japanese advi
sor, Tabakoya, about what to do with Wu and his group. Tabakoya’s answer was that
since he had no orders from his superiors, he could not offer any advice. Thus Buyandel
ger did not take any action. These words were diametrically opposed to those of Buyandelger’s report, which says that Tabakoya asked Buyandelger to detain Wu Heling, but
that he had rejected this request.’

The Assassination of Nimaodzar
After Nasunbayar and Altangerel had fully reported on the matter. Prince De
had Wu Heling, Wu’s group, and me stay at the house of the banner office, east of his
own residence. The prince still refused, however, to receive Wu’s party. When the lunar
new year arrived, Wu Heling and I went to Prince De’s residence to celebrate. While we
were walking into the guest parlor, we were surprised by the presence of Bai Yunti ac
companying Prince De. The second event that surprised us was the news of the January
23 assassination of Nimaodzar while he was on his way back from Zhangbei to Kalgan.
While Prince De was relating this news, he appeared very sorrowful and trou
bled and said, “According to the intelligence reports of the Japanese Special Service Of
fice, Nimaodzar amban was assassinated by Chinese agents at Houtou River north of the
great mountains, fifteen kilometers south of Zhangbei. I should have prevented him from
remming to Kalgan, but I did not foresee that this would happen. Why did Jodbajab am
ban not forsee this?” Bai Yunti was also distressed at the death of his old friend. This

’ Lu Minghui,, p. 104.
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death was also very unsettling to Wu Heling and me because we had just left Nimaodzar,
and Nimaodzar had issued the passport allowing us to escape. During this visit, Bai Yunti’s presence prevented Wu and Prince De from discussing their own circumstances and
the future of Mongolia.®
The Japanese military had supposedly become more suspicious of Nimaodzar
after he was elected as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese
Kuomintang and because of his anti-Japanese opinions. Thus when they saw that he was
vulnerable while returning to Kalgan, the Japanese decided to kill him. According to later
conversations I had with Wang Ziyang, Li Jie’an, and Mergen, at two o’clock in the af
ternoon of January 23, their vehicle arrived at a small bridge over a bend of the Houtou
River when suddenly from behind a dip in the road several men in blue uniforms came
out and blocked the way. They said, “We have been dispatched here by the Chahar Pro
vincial Government. Which one of you is the Excellency Member Ni[maodsor]?’’ Ni
maodzar, deceived by this, identified himself, whereupon one of the uniformed men
raised a pistol and shot him to death. The assassins then turned to the remaining men on
the truck and said, “We want nothing from you. You may go.” The Mongols took Nimaodzar’s body to Kalgan and delivered it to his family.
This secret plot against Nimaodzar gradually became known. It had been engin
eered by Morishima Kadofusa, and the assassin was probably Ogi. They wore blue uni
forms to make it appear as if this assassination had been carried out by the Lanyishe, or
the Blue Shirt Brigade of the Kuomintang, in order to stir up Mongolian antagonism
against the KMT. Japanese newspapers such as the Tokyo Nichinichi and the monthly
Survey of the Good Neighbor Association reported that because Nimaodzar’s attitudes
were becoming more and more hostile to the central government in Nanjing, the Kuomintang’s Blue Shirt Brigade had eliminated him. At the time and since I believed that
these underhanded tactics in reporting the assassination were like the behavior of a bur
glar who covers his own ears while stealing a bell.
Nimaodzar’s death intimidated Jodbajab and silenced his expression of opposi
tion to the Japanese. He even gave his own personal seal to his Japanese advisors and let
them use it as they pleased. In so doing, all power of the Chahar League fell into the
hands of the Japanese “advisors,” At the same time, the death of Nimaodzar damaged
“Japanese-Mongolian Cooperation” and created a hostile atmosphere between the Mon
gols and the Japanese.
Prince De welcomed Bai Yunti’s arrival, but because Bai had made almost no
contribution during the period of the autonomous movement and also because of the
whirlwind of political change, he knew that Bai was an opportunist. To protect Mongol
ia’s future. Prince De avoided talking with him in detail about political matters. After
Nimaodzar’s assassination, Bai felt quite unsafe and recognized that under Japanese con
trol, not only was there no political freedom, but they were all in danger of losing their
lives; it would be better to leave. Therefore, after the lunar new year and under the pretext
of going to Tianjin to get rid of his opium habit, Bai Yunti flew to Tianjin on the Japan® As for the death of Nimaodzar, it seems he was zealous in his promotion of the Chahar League,
and he tried to help the Chahar people become more tightly unified through the organization of this
new league. He discussed these matters with his old friend, Jodbajab, but during the discussion,
Jodbajab expressed his fear of Japanese threats. He had obviously lost his former convictions and
zeal for the Mongolian struggle, thus becoming only a yes-man, unable to accept Nimaodzar’s pro
posals. This perhaps was largely why Nimaodzar had left for Kalgan, along with Wang Ziyang, Li
Jie’an, and Mergen.
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ese Special Service airplane. After his arrival in Tianjin, Bai received a welcoming tele
gram from General Chen Cheng and traveled safely to Hankow, After a time, he was able
to regain his position on the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, but never restored his
former prestige and respect, a great loss for his personal career. Eventually he was even
made minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, but remained without in
fluence in Mongolian politics.

The General Headquarters of the Mongolian Army
Soon after the lunar new year celebration, Prince De made public the hitherto
secret establishment of a headquarters of the Mongolian army. The high-ranking cadres
under him likely already knew of this matter, but Wu Heling did not become aware of
this great change until Prince De’s announcement.
After all the conflicts between the Mongolian Political Council and the Suiyuan
authorities had ended in defeat for the Mongols, Prince De felt that unless he could draw
upon real military strength, talk of autonomy would not have any substance. Thus in his
November 1935 visit with General Minami Jiro, commander-in-chief of the Guandong
Army, and Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro, chief of staff of the Guandong Army,
Prince De obtained a promise for support of Mongolian independence and decided to
organize an army. On his way back to Sunid through Doloonnor he met with Li Shouxin,
and they agreed to cooperate. But because Li had no deep relationship with Prince De and
because all his troops were Chinese, Prince De could not depend on Li in military mat
ters. So on returning to Sunid, Prince De dispatched his followers who had received basic
military training in eastern Inner Mongolia to the Josutu, Juu-uda, and Jerim Leagues to
recruit young military Mongols for service under his personal control.
Also at this time, Sainbayar left Beiping and arrived in Sunid. Sainbayar was
also willing to return to his homeland in the Jerim League and recruit Mongol troops for
Prince De. In order to help in the organization of this general headquarters. Prince De
summoned some of his trusted cadres from the Mongolian Political Council in Batkhaalagh to Sunid.
On the morning of February 12, in a big yurt supported by four red pillars deco
rated with carved golden dragons, in front of a portrait of Chinggis Khan, Prince De an
nounced his ascent to the position of commander-in-chief of the Mongolian Army. In his
speech. Prince De said, “I swear to continue the spirit of Chinggis Khan and accomplish
the great enterprise of recovering Mongolian national sovereignty.” The top Japanese
guest was General Nishio Toshizo, chief of staff of the Guandong Army, who empha
sized Japanese-Mongolian cooperation. The other Japanese guests were Major Shishiura,
head of the Japanese Special Service Office in Sunid, and Maikawa, the delegate of the
Good Neighbor Association. The Mongol dignitaries in attendance were Buyandalai
(who had just arrived from Kalgan) and officials of the Mongolian Political Council such
as Chogbagatur, Oljeitu, Makhashiri, Jalgamji, Saijirakhu, and Engkeamur. Altanwachir
also attended the ceremony as a consultant of the Guandong Army. Togtakhu was the
main interpretor. Wu Heling had been declared persona non grata, and he and I were, of
course, not allowed to attend the ceremony. Engkeamur, the older brother of my wife,
reported the situation to Wu and me in the afternoon of that day.
Because of Prince De’s superficially cool treatment of Wu Heling, the people
believed that Wu could not accomplish anything noteworthy. Consequently, the Japanese
paid him much less attention. As a result, more people began to risk visiting Wu Heling,
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and he could visit Prince De without raising too much attention. During these visits, Wu
was finally able to express his thanks to Prince De for looking out for him so well. Prince
De also said that from then on, he would have more things he needed Wu to help with.
Soon Prince De summoned Tegshibuyan, Nasutu, Sainbiligtu (from Beiping),
Sangdugureng, and Nomundalai (from eastern Inner Mongolia) to join the newly estab
lished headquarters of the Mongolian Army. Headquarters was just west of Prince De’s
residence.
The following is a brief account of the organization of the Mongolian Army and
its personnel. Under the commander-in-chief. Prince De, was a deputy commander-inchief, Li Shouxin. Under the headquarters of the commander-in-chief there were the
Military Department, the Political Department, and the Secretariat. Prince De himself
took the position as head of the Political Department, Li Shouxin the Military Depart
ment, and Buyandalai the Secretariat. Under the Political Department were three bureaus:
Internal Affairs, Financial Administration, and Cultural Affairs and Education. The heads
of these bureaus were Altanwachir, Sainbayar, and Khorjurjab, respectively. Under the
Military Department were three sections: the first section managed military affairs, or
ders, and law; the second section managed armaments and military logistics; the third
section administered military strategy and plans. Ao Yunzhang, Tegshibuyan, and Bayantai were respectively designated as the three section heads. Under the Secretariat were
four sections: Documentary, Personnel, Accounting, and Management, together with a
confidential secretary and secretaries. Makhashiri, Oljeitu, Wangragjab, and Meng
Chaoyi were appointed as these four section heads. Togtakhu was made the confidential
secretary; Chogbagatur and Makhashiri were made secretaries. As for Engkeamur, be
cause of his intimate relations with Wu, he was not appointed to an important position.
In reality, Li Shouxin, Khorjorjab, and Ao Yunzhang, although appointed, did
not join in the work of the general headquarters. Because Li Shouxin had full Japanese
support, he did not take Prince De’s offer seriously. As for Khorjurjab and the officials
from Shilingol, they did not come because of an enormous snowstorm. After Ao Yun
zhang, a trusted friend of Prince De and a very important counselor, came to Sunid from
Bat-liaalag, he was astonished at the assassination of Nimaodzar and felt that coopera
tion with the Japanese was not wise. Therefore, he went to Beiping on the pretext of get
ting treatment for an illness, and never came back. Even though this general headquarters
was established, morale among its leaders was very low and did not compare with the
morale that existed at the beginning of the autonomous movement at Beile-yin sume.
As for military organization, two armies were established. Because Li Shouxin
already had a very solid foundation under his Chinese troops, he was made commander
of the First Army and had his headquarters in Zhangbei. Prince De made himself the
commander of the Second Army, which was then recruiting in the Mongol banners.
Prince De planned to have the Mongol troops become the military foundation for the re
covery of Mongolian sovereignty, and therefore established his headquarters at Sunid.
After the establishment of this general headquarters, the Japanese Major Shishiura, head of the Special Service Office in Sunid, was transferred. It seems that Prince De
was favorably impressed with this Japanese officer, but none of the Mongols knew where
he was transferred to or why he never returned to participate in the “Mongolian work.”
The Mongols came to think that perhaps he had failed to carry out some instructions from
his superiors. Instead of Shishiura, another Japanese, Major Asami Kikuo, was appointed
as head of the Sunid Special Service Office. Asami, though a good-hearted man, had a
very bad temper. He made no great accomplishments.
Bayantai, a man from the Jagchid clan, then a councilor of the Guandong Army,
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arrived in Sunid and came to visit Wu Heling. Finding me at Wu’s residence, he asked
what I was doing there. I replied, “Because the students in Beiping are boycotting class, I
came here to observe the changing conditions in Mongolia.” Bayantai answered, “This is
extremely foolish! Return to Beiping for school at once! Your father is certainly greatly
anxious about you! The snow is very deep, and cars are not able to move. Asami, the
head of the Special Service Office, is going to Zhangbei tomorrow. You can go on his
airplane to Zhangbei and from there to Kalgan. I will bring you to visit Asami.”
After this, he took me to the Special Service Office, and when I entered the of
fice—a place where I was not welcome—I met a Japanese who spoke some Mongolian.
Bayantai introduced this man as Nakajima Manzo. Major Asami asked about my rela
tionship to Bayantai and why I had come to Sunid. After Bayantai explained the situation, Asami said, “Yes, you can go with me tomorrow." So I rushed back, told Wu He
ling, and went to Prince De’s residence to tell him that I was leaving. The next day, I left
Sunid with Asami, and after arriving in Zhangbei, I went to visit Jodbajab, whose secre
tary put me on a vehicle bound for Kalgan. At Kalgan, I went to Nimaodzar’s house and
expressed my condolences to Nimaodzar’s wife; 1 then returned to Beiping.
From what Wu Heling told me, I learned that because the formation of the gen
eral headquarters of the Mongolian Army had been too hasty, preparations were incom
plete. Prince De had encountered a series of setbacks. First of all, formation of the gen
eral headquarters was without Prince Sodnamrabdan’s authorization. Also, no good con
tact was established with the banners of the Shilingol League. With the exception of
Khorjurjab, a “prince-in-leisure” in the Sunid Left Banner, no other leaders in the Shilin
gol League helped establish the general headquarters. In the Ulanchab League, Prince
Yon knew little about the matter. Although he personally did not express any opposition,
he could not give any open support either. Moreover, Prince Pandeigungchab, the jasag
of the Dorben Keuked Banner, a western neighbor of Sunid, was a man manipulated by
Fu Zuoyi.
The Chahar banners were already under tight Japanese control, and Jodbajab,
because of his age, did not come under Prince De’s leadership. Also, from the beginning
of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy movement, the common desire of the Mongols was for
a unified self-ruling, self-protecting, and self-sustaining movement. Now, Prince De’s
relations with Japan had become too intimate, and this contradicted the original Mongol
goal. Thus he could not obtain unanimous support from the elements who had originally
formed the Mongolian Political Council. A rebellion occurred among the Mongolian Po
litical Council’s Peace Preservation troops, led by their officers, Yun Jixian and Zhu
Shifu. Prince De’s efforts in Bat-khaalag were frustrated, and the image of the Mongolian
Political Council was also tarnished. And because of Prince De’s visit to Manchukuo and
the foundation of the General Headquarters of the Mongolian Army, rumors of “treacher
ous plots” for independence launched by him were circulated throughout China.
This provided a good opportunity for Fu Zuoyi to persuade the authorities of the
Chinese government to split the Mongolian autonomous organization. On January 25,
1936, the Chinese government ordered the establishment of the Suiyuan Provincial Mon
golian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council.
In addition to these man-made obstacles. Prince De also met with a natural dis
aster—heavy snow. More than eighty percent of the Mongols’ livestock froze to death or
starved. The importation of foodstuffs from the Manchukuo area and the xians, of Suiyuan
Province, which had already boycotted exporting foodstuffs to areas under Japanese
domination, were additional problems that Prince De faced. Under such desperate cir
cumstances, even though the general headquarters had been established, it could not
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achieve a breakthrough. Morale at the headquarters was at a low point.
The Japanese westward advances were not hindered by these Mongolian diffi
culties. On January 12, 1936, a Japanese Special Service Office for Suiyuan was estab
lished at Hohhot, Fu Zuoyi’s stronghold. Following the Japanese expansion in Manchuria
and Inner Mongolia, great concern was felt by the Soviet Union and the Mongolian Peo
ple’s Republic. A Soviet-Mongolian agreement was concluded on March 12. This agree
ment angered the Japanese and led them to exert greater efforts in Inner Mongolia to
check the influence of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic.
After their “Long March,’’ the remaining Chinese Communists established their
power base at Yan’an and turned northern Shaanxi Province into a new Communist
stronghold. From here, the Chinese Communists joined ranks with the Ordos Right Mid
dle (Otog) Banner and the Ordos Right Front (Uushin) Banner, the active areas of the old
leftist Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. This new development became a
thorn in the side of Fu Zuoyi, and later in the side of the Japanese. It also accelerated the
Japanese “Mongolian work.’’ Because of pressure from the Chinese Communists and the
Japanese, Fu Zuoyi had to win the Mongols over to his side. Therefore, he made Prince
Pandeigungchab commander of the Mongolian Banner Bandit Extermination Forces. On
February 16, he appointed Prince Khangdadorji of the Ordos Left Rear (Dalad) Banner as
commander of the Allied Forces of the Seven Banners of the Yekejuu League and the
commander of the Dalad Bandit Extermination Forces. Soon, Fu established the Com
mission on Anti-Communist Training within the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council.
Under the pretext of anti-communism, Fu sent his agents into the Suiyuan Mongolian
Political Council to spy on the Mongols.

The First Mongolian Congress
After Wu Heling’s three months of isolation, Japanese suspicions of him de
creased; his life was no longer in danger. This made it possible for Prince De to consult
with him openly. After several discussions, De and Wu decided that from then on, all
actions must be supported by the base of public opinion, in order to avoid isolation from
the Mongol people. Deciding further to dissolve the general headquarters as an ineffec
tive organization, they planned to reorganize it as a military government which might
increase its prestige. However, in order to push their plans forward, they had to have the
support of Prince So and the ten Shilingol banners. To achieve a breakthrough, Wu
Heling proposed to go to Ujumuchin and to use the deep and solid relationships my father
had with Prince So, Togtakhu, and other influential people of Ujumuchin to persuade
Prince So to agree to the plan. Wu’s proposal was of course welcomed by Prince De.
Wu advised Prince De as follows: “Since our goal is independence, it would be
better to enlarge the general headquarters into a military government. In the earlier days,
when the KMT was carrying out its revolution, it started out with the establishment of a
military government. Since Japan has promised to support Mongolia in establishing an
independent country, we should list Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia, Kokonor Mon
golia, North Xinjiang, and other originally Mongolian territory as our territory. A modem
nation must have a seaport in order to maintain its national existence. We should have
Huludao as our seaport. We have to stmggle for this goal.” These were Wu Heling’s
words to me while we were living in Japan (in 1938).
These words were very agreeable to Prince De, who immediately asked Wu to
persuade the anti-Japanese Prince So. At the same time. Prince De requested Prince Yon
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to send Shirabdorji as his personal representative to Ujumuchin in order to increase sup
port for his plan. Prince De also tried, through Dewagenden, a senior influential official
of the Dorben-keud Banner, to persuade his Jasag, Pandeigungchab, who was being ma
nipulated by Fu Zuoyi, to go along with Wu.
After Wu Heling, Shirabdorji, and Pandeigungchab arrived, they did not talk
immediately to Prince So about Mongolian independence with Japanese assistance. In
stead, they began by saying that the situation was changing, and that China could no
longer handle the new situation. In reality, both the Shilingol and Chahar Leagues had
already been separated from China; the action proposed by Prince De was the only viable
option. If the Mongols were not able to grasp this opportunity and do something before
Japan openly declared Mongolia as occupied territory, then the eventual Japanese domi
nation would be much worse. After hearing this argument. Prince So also realized that the
die had already been cast—alteration was impossible. Prince So turned to Tusangga, the
tusalagchi of Ujumuchin after the retirement of Togtakhu due to bad health, and said
with a deep sigh of resignation, “Since this situation has become like this, perhaps the
policies of our league deputy head [Prince De] are for a reason. Now let him do as he
sees fit.”
Following this decision, Wu Heling and his party asked Prince So to agree to
convene the Mongolian delegates at his residence to decide on the future of western Inner
Mongolia. Prince So agreed to this request. This meeting had to be held in Ujumuchin,
for two important reasons: first, it would be easy to show both domestic and foreign audi
ences that this conference accorded with the general will of the Mongol people; and sec
ond, because of Prince So’s high prestige and his anti-Japanese attitude, it would be eas
ier for the Japanese to compromise and accept the Mongols’ demands.
This conference to decide the future of western Inner Mongolia was eventually
held in Ujumuchin on April 24, 1936 in a great yurt with a capacity of five hundred peo
ple.’ At the preliminary meetings, Sodnamrabdan, Demchugdongrob, Li Shouxin, Jodbajab, and Shirabdorji were elected as members of the presidium. Wu Heling was ap
pointed as secretary general, and Togtakhu was assigned as an interpreter for the Japan-

’ Persons attending included Prince Sodnamrabdan, head of the Shilingol League; Prince De, dep
uty head of the Shilingol League; Tusangga, tusalagchi of the Ujumuchin Right Banner; Dorji,
jasag of the Ujumuchin Left Banner; Dobdan, tusalagchi of the Ujumuchin Left Banner; Sangdagdorji,7flsflg of the Khauchid Right Banner; Sungjingwangchug,ya^ag of the Khauchid Left Banner;
Shonodondob.y'a^ag of the Abaga Right Banner; Budabalayarag of the Abaga Left Banner; Gungsang, tusalagchi of the Abaga Left Banner; Balgunsurung, Jasag of the Abkhabnar Left Banner;
Rinchinwangdud, jasag of the Sunid Left Banner; Jodbajab, head of the Chahar League; Temurbolod, deputy head of the Chahar League; Serengnamjil, amban of the Taipus Left Banner; Norbujana, amban of the Taipus Right Banner; Gonchograshi, amban of the Bordered White Banner;
Mugdenbuu, amban of the Bordered Yellow Banner; Yindege, amban of the Pure Blue Banner;
Bayan, representative of the Pure White Banner; and Shirabdorji, representative of Prince Yon and
the Ulanchab League. Because the Yekejuu League was under Fu Zuoyi’s strict control, it was
unable to send delegates to this conference. Nevertheless, Nasundelger, a Yekejuu man, then sec
tion head of the Mongolian Political Council in Beile-yin sume, was assigned as a delegate of that
banner. Su Baofeng attended the conference as a delegate of the Ejine banner; at this time, Su was
the delegate of that banner and was stationed at Nanking and at the same time, he was a section
head of the Mongolian Political Council. Chen-Nasunbatu was a delegate from the Alashan Banner
sent to negotiate some business with the Mongolian Political Council, so he was assigned as a dele
gate of Alashan. In addition to these delegates, Wu Heling, Li Shouxin, Altanochir, and Bayantai
also attended this conference as delegates.
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ese. The Japanese Guandong Army sent Tanaka Ryukichi and others to attend as guests.
This was the first time that the Japanese openly attended an official Mongolian confer
ence.

Prince So, as the convener and host of this conference, while presiding over the
first session, announced simply that this meeting was very important: its purpose was to
discuss the future of Mongolia and methods for dealing with the current situation. Aside
from these remarks, he said nothing else. Prince De, the main speaker at this conference,
delivered a report on the establishment of the General Headquarters of the Mongolian
Army and of his contacts with the Japanese Guandong Army. Following his report, the
conference discussed principles for Mongolia’s national construction, the establishment
of the military government and military forces, and the goal of independence and friendly
ties with Japan and Manchukuo. Plans for relief work to compensate for the heavy snows
were also discussed. The outline of the organization of the Mongolian Military Govern
ment, as passed by this conference, follows:
Mongolian Military Government Organizational Outline
Article One
In order to prepare for national construction, the Mongolian Military Government shall be
established. The name of this government shall be changed to the Government of the Mon
golian State when Mongolian sovereignty is established.

Article Two
One chairman shall be designated as head of the government and shall be responsible to all
of the Mongol people. One or two deputy chairmen shall be designated, and one of them
shall be appointed to carry out the responsibilities as chairman pro tempore whenever the
chairman is unable to attend to his duties. Both the chairman and deputy chairmen shall be
nominated by the Mongolian Congress from among elderly and upstanding Mongolian
leaders.

Article Three
A general director shall be designated to receive the chairman’s orders and mle over Mon
golia, and he shall lead all governmental organizations and the military. He shall also han
dle all matters of national construction and be responsible to the chairman. The general di
rector shall be carefully selected and then appointed by the chairman from among compe
tent Mongols able to assume great responsibility and having the ability to undertake na
tional construction.

Article Four
This government shall designate four to six members, four to six consultants, and four to
six military consultants. These shall be carefully selected by the general director from
among outstanding, competent, and meritorious Mongols and shall be appointed by the
chairman.

Article Five
The following department, boards, and bureaus shall be established in the government.
Their organizations and authority shall be determined by law: Department of Administra
tion, Consultative Board, Military Staff Board, Internal Affairs Bureau, Bureau of Educa
tion, Military Affairs Bureau, Bureau of Finance, Bureau of Communication and Trans
portation, Bureau of Industry, Judiciary Bureau, and Bureau of Foreign Affairs.

Article Six
The following officials and clerks shall be designated to the departments, boards, and bu
reaus. . . . Regulation of their work shall be determined by separate law: [Personnel shall
include] one department head, two board heads, eight bureau heads, forty to fifty consult
ants, one chief of staff, four to six staff members, eighteen to twenty-six section heads,
thirty to thirty-six supervisoiy clearical officers, eight personal secretaries for the general
directors, eight aides-de-camp for the general director, thirty-six to forty-four clerks, and
forty to fifty junior clerks and recorders. The above-mentioned heads of the department.
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boards, and bureaus and staff members must be carefully selected by the general director
from among persons with broad knowledge, full experience, and capabilities for national
construction, and shall all be Mongols. These persons shall be appointed by the chairman.
The consultants shall be nominated by the banners from among their high-ranking officials
and shall be submitted by the general director to the chairman for appointment. The mili
tary staff members, section heads, supervisory clerical officers, personal secretaries, and
aides-de-camp shall be selected by the general director from among capable persons and
appointed by the chairman. The clerks, junior clerks, and recorders shall be selected by the
general director from among capable persons.

Article Seven

An advisory office shall be established with one head advisor and eight to sixteen special
advisors. These advisors shall be carefully selected by the general director and be appointed
by the chairman. Assistants and interpreters shall be appointed by the general director. The
administrative regulations of the advisory office shall be decided by separate law.

Article Eight

A committee of the members of this government shall be established. The following mat
ters shall be carried out after being agreed upon by the committee:
1. Promulgation of law and ordinances with legal effect as law
2. Budget and closing of books and extrabudgetary expenditures
3. Administrative plans
4. Organization, mobilization, and demobilization of the military
5. Appointment and discharge of important officials of the offices and military organiza
tions
6. Important negotiations [with foreign countries]
7. Jurisdictional conflicts between the department, boards, and bureaus
8. Matters which, according to law, must be decided by this committee
9. Cases submitted by the general director and the department, boards, and bureaus to this
committee

Article Nine

The committee of the members of this government shall be organized by the general direc
tor and other members [of the government]. The heads of the department, boards, and bur
eaus shall, of course, be members of this committee. In times of necessity, the head of the
advisory office, consultants, military consultants, and chief of staff shall be ordered to at
tend committee meetings [but shall have no voting rights]. At meetings of this committee,
the general director shall be the chairman. Under special circumstances, the chairman and
vice-chair of the government may be invited to visit [the meetings of the committee]. At
times when the general director is unable to preside [over committee meetings], he shall
appoint one person from among the members [of the government] and heads of the depart
ment, boards, and bureaus as a chairman pro tempore.

Article Ten

All documents, except for those specially regulated by this outline, shall be issued in the
name of the chairman, deputy chairmen and the general director.

Article Eleven

During times of necessity, this outline may be amended by the committee of the members
of this government and be recognized by the next Mongolian Congress.

Article Twelve

This outline shall be effective the day it is passed by the Mongolian Congress.

After this outline was passed, the election was carried out. After discussion and
consultation, Prince Yon was elected as chairman, and Sodnamrabdan and Shagdurjab
were elected as deputy chairmen. The congress ended on May 1, 1936.
At the time of this congress, no definite name existed for this kind of confer
ence. Later, because this meeting established the political foundation of the Mongolian
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Military Government, it was named the Monggol-un Yeke Khural, or the Great Mongol
ian Congress, in order to express its historical significance and show that it was a con
tinuation of the historical khuraltai, which had roots in Mongolian tradition, to decide on
important national matters. This conference was called the First Mongolian Congress,
and subsequent conferences were called the Second Mongolian Congress, the Third
Mongolian Congress, and so on.
At the election of the presidium, this conference still followed the pattern of the
conferences that had been held in Beile-yin sume and of conferences held by the Chinese
Kuomintang and the Chinese government. This was the first occasion when there was
sincere cooperation between Prince De and Wu Heling, and it was also an example of
Prince De’s ability to trust a former political opponent and have him do great work. All
the plans for this meeting and the organization of the government were from Wu’s pen. In
the outline above, the old and high-ranking senior Mongol leaders were exalted to exag
gerated heights, but real political power was put into the hands of Prince De. This ar
rangement provided the only viable solution to the deadlock in Mongolian politics at this
time between the old aristocracy and the young intellectuals. Of course. Prince So yielded
to the results of this conference precisely because he wanted to distance himself from the
dark circumstances enabling the Japanese to exert influence on the conference.
From the beginning,with Wu Heling’s persuasion of Prince So ,o the end of this
first congress. Prince So provided only material support and did not actively participate in
current Mongolian politics. Prince So felt that he was powerless to do anything in the
face of great historical changes. Although he could not stop the Japanese encroachment,
he did not want to just sit and wait for the Japanese to assume all political power in Mon
golia. He was, therefore, willing to allow Prince De to assume the burden of responding
to the Japanese invasion and doing something for the Mongols. Since he himself was
very anti-Japanese, he did not want to completely reverse his personal stance; he thought
it better to stand aside and allow others to respond to the Japanese. In other words, in
convening this congress, he did his best as a host, but his support and participation was
only nominal.
Prince So’s attitude by this time was entirely different than it was at the begin
ning of the autonomy movement in 1933. The autonomy movement had aimed at unifi
cation of and self-defense by the Mongols. This congress, however, changed the aim to
include an inclination toward Japan. This was very different from the desires that he and
the higher-ranking officials of Ujumuchin originally expressed.

Extent of Participation in the First Mongolian Congress
Before the first Mongolian Congress, Pandeigungchab of the Dorben Keuked
Banner had accompanied Wu Heling to Ujumuchin in an attempt to win over Prince So.
After Pandeigungchab’s return, however, Fu Zuoyi showed great favor to him in order to
win him back over to his side. By the end of March, Pandeigungchab, Shagdurjab, and
Altanochir were sent by Fu Zuoyi to Nanjing as leaders of the Suiyuan Mongolian Politi
cal Council. Hence, Pandeigungchab was not available to attend the First Mongolian
Congress. Nevertheless, because of geographical proximity, he could not ignore Prince
De’s activities. Moreover, his banner was sandwiched between Sunid and Bat-khaalag,
and he therefore had to continue his connection with Prince De. Dewagenden, the
tusalagchi of Dorben Keuked and a former supporter of the autonomous movement,
similarly acted as a liaision officer between Sunid and Dorben-keud.
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After the “Prince Shi Incident,” Prince Yon lost his interest in political affairs
and devoted his attention to Buddhism. Because he had given great support to Prince De
at the beginning, he did not want to make an abrupt change. Following Prince De’s es
tablishment of close relations with Japan, Fu Zuoyi’s pressure on Prince Yon became
more and more intense. The strong-willed old prince, however, did not bow to Fu’s pres
sure. Later, even when circumstances changed from bad to worse. Prince Yon did not
issue one word in opposition to Prince De and, in order to show his resolve to resist Fu
Zuoyi, did not budge from his princely residence. On the other hand, the new head of the
Ulanchab League, Babudorji, and the three Urad banners under his special leadership,
with the exception of the divided Urad Front Banner, took a superficially pro-Fu attitude.
In reality, they merely assumed a wait-and-see attitude. Of course it was impossible for
Babudorji, who was under Fu’s shadow, to send official delegates from the Ulanchab
League to Join the congress.
As for the four Right Flank Chahar banners, they had already been placed under
the jurisdiction of the Suiyuan Provincial Government in 1928 and therefore could not
send delegates to the conference in Ujumuchin. Among these four banners, the Pure
Yellow Banner was the most powerful and rich. The amban of this banner, Damrinsurung
had been a good friend of Prince De. At the time the Chahar League was established, he
went to Sunid and returned to Zhangbei together with Prince De on the same airplane to
take the position of deputy head of the Chahar League. However, after the assassination
of Nimaodzar, Damrinsurung became very suspicious of the Japanese domination and left
Zhangbei, never to return. Because of this. Prince De had to appoint Temurbolod, the
amban of the Shangdu Banner, as deputy head of the Chahar League.
Not long after the establishment of the General Headquarters of the Mongolian
Army, the rebellion of the Mongolian Political Council Peace Preservation troops broke
out. When Yun Jixian and Zhu Shifu issued their statement, Jakhunju also signed the
document. This man was treated by Damrinsurung as a trustworthy junior. Jakhunju’s
uncle, Ji Songling, was a top aide to Damrinsurung. Under these changing circumstances
and with Ji Songling’s making the arrangements, Fu Zuoyi appointed Damrinsurung
commander of the Bandit Extermination Forces of the Four Right Flank Chahar Banners
of Eastern Suiyuan Province. This suspended, temporarily, the intimate relationship be
tween Prince De and Damrinsurung.
jasag of Alashan, Damzana, very angered by the pressure from the Moslem
warlord Ma Hongkui, then govemer of Ningxia Province, looked to the Mongolian Pol
itical Council for assistance. Prince De also tried to win over Damzana by sending him a
complete wireless radio transceiver set, as well as Wang Zhenhua, a Kharachin Mongol
who had joined the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party during the 1920s, who
was to serve as operator of the transceiver set. Relations between Prince De and Damzana
then greatly improved. Later, Chen-Nasunbatu was sent to Bat-khaalag to receive the
armaments that Prince De had designated for Alashan. This Chen Nasunbatu was there
fore able to participate in the Ujumuchin Congress. The Jasag of the Ejine Banner was in
the same situation as Damzana. Also, for the same reason, he was inclined toward the
Mongolian Political Council. This was why his delegate in Nanjing, Su Baofeng, was
assigned as the section head in the Mongolian Political Council. Su participated in the
congress under the same circumstances that had brought Damzana’s delegates there.
By then, both the Yekejuu League and the Turned Banner were thoroughly un
der the control of Fu Zuoyi. Because Prince Altanochir, the deputy head of the Yekejuu
League, worked during that time as the secretary general of the Suiyuan Mongolian Poli
tical Council, the Yekejuu League could not support Prince De’s activities openly. Nev-
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ertheless, Prince De’s connections with the Yekejuu leaders were not completely severed.
Attendance at the First Mongolian Congress in Ujumuchin by the so-called delegate of
Yekejuu, Nasundelger, was not officially sanctioned by the Yekejuu leaders. Neverthe
less, through him, the proceedings of the congress could be reported back to Yekejuu.
Rong Xiang, the amban of the Turned banner who had originally been a supporter of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomy movement in 1933, became an active leader in the Suiyuan
Mongolian Political Council because of his strong anti-Japanese feelings. Of course, he
wanted absolutely nothing to do with the Mongolian Congress at Ujumuchin.
In short, from the point of view of national unity of the Mongols, this Mongolian
Congress in Ujumuchin, because of Japanese intervention, was not comparable to the
virtually unanimous response of all Mongols at the time of the 1933 autonomy move
ment. Consequently, it was not able to enlist the support of the Mongol intellectuals in
Beiping and Nanjing. The reason was not that Prince De had tost his charisma, but that
foreign involvement created an atmosphere of suspicion.
The attitudes of the attendees at the congress toward the participation of dele
gates from the Japanese Guandong Army, such as Tanaka Ryukichi and others, differed
greatly. For Prince De and the activists of the independence movement, it was a good
gesture of Japanese support for Mongolian national construction, but from the point of
view of Prince So and the conservative leaders, it was an ominous omen of the subjuga
tion of Mongolia to Japan. In his address to the congress, Tanaka Ryukichi again and
again emphasized Japanese-Mongolian friendship and cooperation, the good will of the
Imperial Japanese Government, Japan’s support of Mongolian national independence,
and the continuation of the great enterprise of Chinggis Khan. This naturally made most
of the Mongolian participants happy, but this happiness did not last long and it was al
most immediately replaced by feelings of distress and regret.

The Japanese Execution of Lingsheng
During these changes in western Inner Mongolia, a series of military conflicts
between Japan and the Soviet Union broke out along the border of Hulunbuir and Mon
golia. In order to reach a cease-fire agreement, a series of negotiations were held. In order
to show that Manchukuo was an independent sovereign nation, Japan sent the governor of
Khinggan North Province, Lingsheng, as the chief delegate of Manchukuo. For the same
purpose, the Soviets sent the Mongolian People’s Republic’s foreign minister, Sangbu, as
the chief delegate of the Mongolian Peopie’s Republic. These negotiations gave Ling
sheng and Sangbu an opportunity to establish secret contacts with each other. Lingsheng’s goal was to use the power of Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union to release
Inner Mongolia from Japanese control. Sangbu’s purposes were to use Japanese power to
eliminate Soviet domination of Outer Mongolia. The Japanese soon discovered these
secret contacts and arrested Lingsheng as a traitor to Manchukuo. Beside this political
conspiracy, Lingsheng was hated by the Japanese for his personal relationship with Puyi
and the proposed marriage between Lingsheng’s son and Puyi’s daughter. Originally,
Lingsheng intended to gain tight control over the administration of Kinggan Northern
Province, and thus prevent Japanese officials from exercising control over the province.
His insistence on maintaining the original administrative power of the Mongols was un
acceptable to the Japanese.
Lingsheng’s secret contacts with “the enemy” gave the Japanese a good pretext
to eliminate him and his group. On April 24, while the First Mongolian Congress in
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Ujumuchin was in session, the Japanese executed Lingsheng, his second youngest bro
ther, Puling, who was then the commander of the Northern Kinggan Garrison troops;
Lingsheng’s younger sister’s husband, Chunde, then a bureau head in Northern Kinggan
Province; and Khuwalintai, a graduate of Waseda University in Tokyo and then the chief
secretary of the Kinggan Northern Province Office.
The trials of these people were carried out in secrecy. Prince De and Wu Heling
nevertheless obtained some information about these trials later. When Prince De met Ta
naka Ryukichi prior to the congress. Prince De expressed his deep concern over Ling
sheng’s trial and asked Tanaka to convey his hopes for the release of Lingsheng by the
Guandong Army. When the congress convened. Prince De and Wu Heling asked again, in
the name of the Mongolian Congress, that the Guandong Army release Lingsheng. Ta
naka’s answer was that Lingsheng and his associates had already been executed. This bad
news spread immediately to the congress, and as a result, the spirits of the Mongols in
attendance were very much dampened. Prince So, Prince De, Prince Sungjingwangchug,
Jodbajab, and Wu Heling, all personal acquaintances of Lingsheng, were all distressed at
this news.
Lingsheng’s execution led the Mongols in attendance at the congress to doubt
Japanese support for Mongolian independence. This execution and the still-fresh memor
ies of Nimaodzar’s assassination made the Mongols realize what the future of Mongolia
would be like under Japanese domination. These matters not only greatly distressed and
disappointed the Mongols in attendance at the congress, but also had a very negative im
pact on the leaders of Alashan, Ejine, Turned, and Yekejuu. Damzana even ceased his
contacts with the Mongolian Political Council because of its entanglements with the
Japanese Guandong Army. Su Baofeng, the delegate from Ejine Banner, after returning
to Bat-khaalag from Ujumuchin, left for Nanjing, never to return. The leaders of the
Yekejuu League and the Turned Banner of course also tried to avoid entanglements with
Mongols under Japanese domination.
The death of Lingsheng greatly affected the Mongols in Manchukuo. Those
Mongol officials who dared resist the Japanese officials altered their hard lines toward
the Japanese. The governor of the Southern Kinggan Province, Prince Yeshikhaishun,
who was very proud of his ancestral marriage relationships with the Manchu emperors,
also tried to keep as quiet as a cicada in winter. The prince of Gorlos, Chimedsampil,
then the minister of Mongolian Administration, who already had a reputation for being a
submissive political subject, now became even more obsequious. Those nationalistic
Mongols with sincere hopes for Japanese assistance to Mongolia in the ftiture were also
greatly disappointed. This might be why they left Manchukuo and came to western Inner
Mongolia, placing themselves under the leadership of Prince De or secretly contacted the
international Communist organizations in search of a new path for Mongolia’s future.
News of the execution of Lingsheng and his group under the pretext of putting
down their conspiracy with Outer Mongolia attracted the attention of the Soviet intelli
gence organizations. The Soviets discovered the activities of the Outer Mongolian foreign
minister, Sangbu, and carried out a grand-scale liquidation of Sangbu and his associates.

IX
THE MONGOLIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT
MAY 1936 - OCTOBER 1937
Establishment of the Mongolian Military Government
After the congress elected the chairman and vice chairmen of the Mongolian
Military Government, Prince De went to Bat-khaalag and the residence of Prince Yon,
together with several delegates of the congress, to present a certificate of election to
Prince Yon and ask for his instructions. Prince Yon explained that he was well along in
years and in bad health, and therefore unable to assume so heavy a responsibility. He did
say, however, that he was gratified by the support of the delegates and hoped that the
people at the congress would join together and work for common goals. Prince Yon espe
cially hoped that Prince De would assume more responsibility for these tasks. Since
Prince De and his group received the support of Prince Yon and Prince So, and had no
way to establish contact with Prince Shagdurjab in Yekejuu, Prince De was made the
general director of the military government in the names of Chairman Yondonwangchug
and Deputy Chairman Sodnamrabdan and authorized to carry out the tasks of the new
government.
After the congress in UJumuchin approved the organization of the government
and the election of its chairman and deputy chairmen and received promise of Japanese
support for Mongolian independence and national construction. Prince De was able to
carry on with the preliminary tasks of establishing the Mongolian Military Government.
He first moved the personnel and facilities of the headquarters of the Mongolian Army
from Sunid to Jabsar. On May 12, 1936, the Mongolian Military Government was for
mally established in Dehua, and it began to use the number of years since Temujin be
came Chinggis Khan (1206) for its official calendar; thus 1936 was year 731 under the
new calendar.
The government also created a new national flag with a canton of three stripes—
red, yellow, and white—against a field of blue. The blue represented the color of heaven,
a symbol of traditional Mongolian veneration for Mongke Tenggeri, or the everlasting
heaven. Blue is also the national color of the Mongol people, who sometimes call them
selves the Koke Monggol, or Blue Mongols. Red represented fire, a symbol of holiness
and prosperity. Yellow represented the Mongolian religious faith in Shira-yin Shashin, or
the Yellow Sect of Tibetan Buddhism. Yellow is also a symbol of the fullness of Bud
dhism. White, according to Mongolian tradition, symbolizes holiness and abundance.
Thus this flag symbolized the unification of the Mongol people under the light of Bud
dhism to enjoy holiness, abundance, and prosperity forever and ever. Prince De designed
this flag himself, aided by Prince Khorjurjab, a learned Mongolian elder. No Japanese
were involved. Later, some Japanese claimed that the red stripe represented Japanese
leadership, but this was baseless.
Attending the ceremony of the formation of the Mongolian Military Government
along with Prince De were the Mongolian dignitaries Wu Heling, Li Shouxin, Jodbajab,
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Buyandalai, and others. Japanese participants were the deputy chief of staff of the Guandong Army, Imamura Toyojiro; Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka Ryukichi; head of the Dehua
Special Service Office, Tanaka Hisashi; chief Japanese advisor to the Mongolian military
government, Muratani Hikojiro; and other Japanese advisors; and the representative of
Manchukuo, Yuchun. In his address. Prince De emphasized that the goal of the Military
Government was to enlarge the military forces in preparation for construction of a Mon
golian nation. He continued by affirming that all Mongols were unified under the assis
tance of the friendly nation, Japan, and were marching together toward their common
goal. In his address, Imamura emphasized Japanese-Mongolian friendship and congratu
lated the Mongols on their success in establishing the Mongolian Military Government.
Yuchun first read the congratulatory telegram from the Manchukuo Emperor Puyi and
then emphasized the friendly relations existing between Japan, Manchukuo, and Mongol
ia.
At this point, a short introduction to Muratani and Yuchun would be helpful.
Muratani Hikojiro was bom in Iwate-ken and graduated from the Tokyo Imperial Univer
sity. After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, he was assigned as an official to Manchu
kuo, where he became acquainted with Itagaki Seishiro. At the time of the foundation of
the Mongolian Military Government, Itagaki introduced Muratani as the chief advisor to
the Mongolian Military Government. Muratani was faithful and elegant, and never as
arrogant and overbearing as other Japanese “advisors.” While dealing with the Mongols,
he was always sincere and ingenuous. Because he was also quite sympathetic to the
Mongol demand for independence, he was able to win the confidence of Prince De and
later of Prince Sung. Some Mongols even called him Yeke bagshi, or “Great Teacher.” In
times of conflict between the Japanese and Mongols, he usually tried to mediate and iron
things out. Nevertheless, because he was tmsted by the Mongols, the Japanese military
regarded him as unzealous in carrying out Japanese objectives. As a consequence he later
lost his position as chief advisor. He remained part of the entourage of Prince De until the
end of World War II.
Yuchun was a Mongol whose ancestors had lived in the Zhenjiang district south
of the Yangzi River. Yuchun and the other Zhenjiang Mongols had been sinicized early
on but retained Mongolian nationalistic aspirations. In 1928, when the Mongolian Dele
gation first arrived in Nanjing, the Zhenjiang Mongols invited members of the delegation
to Zhenjiang and showed them their geneaologies. The earlier portions of these docu
ments had been written in Mongolian, but the later portions in Chinese. After his atten
dance at the ceremony marking the establishment of the Mongolian Military Government
as the Manchukuo delegate, Yuchun had been permanently assigned as the Manchukuo
delegate to Mongolia. In spite of this, he always thought of himself as a Mongol, some
times deliberately leaking information from the Japanese to Prince De and other trusted
Mongol friends. Probably for this reason he was transferred to another post in Manchu
kuo when the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government was founded in Kalgan in
1939. He resigned, however, rather than take this new position, remaining instead in
Mongolia.
The establishment of the General Headquarters of the Mongolian Army and the
Mongolian Military Government did not satisfy the Mongolian desire for real independ
ence. This issue had earlier caused a split in the Mongolian Political Council, and
prompted some of the council’s earlier supporters to leave. The Military Government’s
establishment was nonetheless a very exciting and heartening event for the Mongolian
intellectuals and military personnel in Manchukuo. These Mongols saw it as a step to
ward Mongolian independence. Under the slogan of “Japanese-Mongolian-Manchukuo
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friendship and cooperation,” many of them went to Mongolia and openly worked toward
that goal. Many Mongols left Manchukuo for Jabsar so as to work with Prince De.
Among them were Jirgalang, Kogjintei, and others who later became quite active and
influential in western Inner Mongolia.
Jirgalang (De Gulai), a Dahur Mongol of the eastern Budkha area, had originally
studied at Beiping Normal University. He later went to Japan, where he graduated from
the Nagasaki Commercial College. In 1931, at the outbreak of the “Manchurian Inci
dent,” Jirgalang and other Mongolian youth organized a Mongolian military force and
carried out various activities for Mongolian national construction. Soon, because of the
Guandong Army’s decision to establish Manchukuo and not allow the Mongols within
Manchukuo to be active in any separatist movement, this military force was disbanded
under Japanese pressure. After the establishment of Manchukuo and the formation of the
Kinggan General Bureau (for Mongolian administration), Jirgalang was assigned as an
official in this bureau. He was soon transferred to his native land, to the newly estab
lished office in Kinggan Eastern Province. After the Mongolian Military Government
was established, Jirgalang quit his job and went to Jabsar. He was careful and prudent,
very well versed in Japanese language and literature, and deeply appreciated by Prince
De. Out of Jealously, Togtakhu fabricated some unfounded charges of “errors of thought”
against Jirgalang and reported him to the Japanese. Kogjintei was also a Budkha man
who knew some Japanese. After Kogjintei’s arrival. Prince De appointed him as his sec
retary. Because of this, Togtakhu no longer needed to do all the translation and interpre
tation, much to the relief of those who disliked him.
Another man, Ihengge, was a rich conservative of the Turned Left Banner of the
Josotu League. In his early days, he Joined the Loyalist Party (Zongshedang) of the Manchu Prince Su and worked for the restoration of the Manchu monarchy. Later, he cooper
ated with the well-known “Mongol bandit” Babujab and struggled for the restoration of
the Manchus. He always felt unhappy about the establishment of the Republic of China.
Later, when Manchukuo was established, he viewed Puyi as nothing more than a puppet,
and was greatly disappointed. Naturally, he responded to Prince De’s call and mobilized
the militant youth of his Josotu League area on the side of Prince De.
Bayanoljei, a Turned Right Banner man from the Josotu League, was the fourth
son of Prince Gungbujab. As a young man, he was recognized as a khubilgan (rein
carnation) and designated as an abbot of the great lamasery in the city of Gurban-Subraga
(Chaoyang). He was commonly known as “the fourth living Buddha.” After his father’s
death, because all his elder brothers had passed away during their youth, his younger
brother Chinbudorji succeeded to the position of jasag of his banner. So when he re
ceived news that Prince De was establishing a military force, he shed his religious robe,
took up a gun, and recruited those young Mongols in his neighborhood who did not want
to serve Manchukuo to come and give military service to Prince De.
The career and activities of Wu Guting have been discussed in earlier chapters
and will not be covered in detail here. At the time of the founding of the Mongolian
Military Government, he was already assigned as commander of the Western Kinggan
Garrison forces. When he heard the news of the military government’s founding, he gath
ered his old followers in the Western Kinggan Garrison Forces and Joined in Prince De’s
activities.
Once the core personnel had arrived. Prince De was able to make key appoint
ments for the Mongolian Military Government. Acting as chairman of that government,
he made Buyandalai head of the Department of Administration, Wu Heling the head of
the Consultative Board, Li Shouxin head of the Military Staff Board, Sodnamnorbu head
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of the Internal Affairs Bureau, Altanochir (Jin Yongchang) head of the Bureau of Educa
tion, Tegshibuyan head of the Military Affairs Bureau, Jirgalang head of the Bureau of
Finance, Bayantai head of the Bureau of Communication and Transportation, Wang
Chingsan head of the Bureau of Industry, Temurbolod head of the Judiciary Bureau, and
Togtakhu head of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs. Soon, Altanochir was designated as the
delegate to the newly established Mongolian Delegates Office in Manchukuo and Khorjurjab was assigned as head of the Bureau of Education.
Although these appointments were made at the behest of Prince De, they none
theless deferred to Japanese desires. For example, Wu Heling made great contributions at
the First Mongolian Conference in Ujumuchin, and even authored the organization
document of the Military Government. Although the Japanese military recognized Wu
Heling’s prestige and capability, they still did not dare to trust him, and of course would
not assent to his being the head of the Department of Administration. Prince De, taking
advantage of this situation, made Buyandalai, his most trusted confidant, the head of the
Department of Administration to administer all the affairs of the Military Government.
Altanochir, Bayantai, and Togtakhu, who had special relationships with the Guandong
Army and possessed the titles of “consultant,” were made heads of the bureaus. This
move suggests that the Guandong Army had considerable influence in selecting these
appointees. Togtakhu’s assignment as head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau was especially
pushed by Tanaka Ryukichi.
Sodnamnorbu was the jasag of the Abkhanar Right Banner of the Shilingol
League, and Temurbolod the amban of the Shangdu Banner and vice head of the Chahar
League; both men were regional representatives. Li Shouxin’s assignment as head of the
Military Staff Board was merely to satisfy Li’s personal ambitions for political position.
At any rate, both the Consultative and Military Staff Boards were organizations with no
real power. Of the above-mentioned persons, most were from eastern Inner Mongolia:
five from the Josotu League; three from the Kharachin Right Banner. The Mongols of
Eastern Inner Mongolia had greatly supported Prince De’s activities in establishing the
military government.
These appointments had advantages and drawbacks. They attracted the people of
eastern Inner Mongolia, who were more zealous for Mongolian independence and more
dissatisfied with the Japanese administration of Manchukuo, to come and fight alongside
Prince De for true Mongolian independence. On the other hand, because an unqualified
person such as Togtakhu was appointed to a high position, several more competent and
qualified persons in eastern Inner Mongolia refiised to join with Prince De. For instance,
Wang Chingsan, a man from the Surug Banner and a graduate of the Civil Engineering
School of the Imperial Hokkaido University, even resigned his post as head of the Bureau
of Industry and returned to Manchukuo.
In order to accelerate the work of his newly established government. Prince De
appointed Li Shouxin, Buyandalai, Wu Heling, and Togtakhu as assistants of the general
director; Chogbagatur as assistant to the head of the Internal Affairs Bureau; and Jirga
lang (from Jerim League) as assistant to the head of the Bureau of Education. These last
two appointments helped Sodnamnorbu and Khorjurjab, who had no knowledge of the
Chinese language. The prince also appointed Wu Guting as the chief of staff of the new
army. Wu retained this position until 1944. An office for personal secretaries and aidesde-camp was also established, and Prince De appointed Saijirakhu as head of this office.
Once the military government was established, more Japanese advisors, such as
Muratani Hikojiro, Yamamoto Nobunaga, Nakajima Manzo, Seikizawa Okichi, and oth
ers appeared. This was the first time that Japanese “advisors” were formally involved in a
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Mongolian government that symbolized central authority.

Organization of the Mongolian Army
After establishing the Mongolian Military Government, Prince De actively
worked to achieve a stronger military force. He organized Li Shouxin’s former troops,
the newly recruited volunteers Irom eastern Inner Mongolia, and conscripts from the
Chahar and Shilingol Leagues into two armies, nine divisions, and two artillery compa
nies. Following the establishment of the General Headquarters of the Mongolian Army,
Li Shouxin was appointed as commander of the First Army, and Prince De made himself
commander of the Second Army. The First Army was composed of four divisions and
one artillery company: the First Division, led by Liu Jiguang; the Second Division, by
Yin Baoshan; the Third Division, by Wang Zhenhua; the Fourth Division, by Buyandelger; and the artillery company, by Ding Qichang. The Second Army was also made up of
four divisions and one artillery company, together with a garrison division. Ihengge was
appointed as the head of the Fifth Division, Buyanoljei as head of the sixth, Mugdenbuu
as head of the seventh, Sayanbayar as head of the eighth, Wang Yunwu as head of the
artillery company, and Shonodondub as commander of the garrison division. In addition,
a military police unit was formed, with Namur as its head. Wu Guting was appointed as
chief of staff over both armies; Liu Xinghan (a Chinese) was appointed as deputy chief of
staff.
The First, Second, and Third divisions of the First Army were all old followers
of Li Shouxin; some were his old bandit comrades-in-arms, and some were followers of
his former superior, Cui Xingwu. The backgrounds of these troops were diverse and
complex, and they were all Chinese. Only the Fourth Division recruited Mongols, mainly
from the Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues. The Second Army, under Prince De’s command,
was composed only of Mongolian troops. Recruited mostly from eastern Inner Mongolia,
these troops were really the core of Prince De’s military efforts to achieve independence
for Inner Mongolia. The Seventh Division soldiers were conscripted from the Chahar
League, and all garrison soldiers were conscripts from the Shilingol League.
Sainbayar recruited the Eighth Division; most of these soldiers had been “Mon
golian bandits” and were very undisciplined, although they were accustomed to fighting.
Their morale and nationalistic aspirations were high. One brigade of the Eighth Division
was associated with one division head named Hei He, or Black River, the notorious
“Mongolian Bandit,” the “Bearded Bandit,” or the “Bandit on Horseback.” This brigade
soon gained a reputation for being formidable and fond of battle, but the attitudes of its
men tended to create ethnic hatred and tensions between Mongol soldiers and Chinese.
The head of the military police unit, Liu Jianhua, was a Heilongjiang Chinese
disguised as a Mongol named Namur. Because of his capabilities and loyalty to Prince
De, he was able to win the confidence of De and become head of the military police unit.
It was during this period that Liu Jianhua joined the secret intelligence organization of the
Blue Shirt Brigade of the KMT, which later developed into the core of the Chinese gov
ernment’s intelligence network. This was told to me later by Liu himself after the gov
ernment had withdrawn to Taiwan.
At that time, the highest rank in the army was lieutenant general, a rank held
only by Li Shouxin, Sainbayar, and Shonodondub. All division heads were major gener
als. When Saijirakhu was made a major general because he was the head of the office of
aides-de-camp, many military men became angry.
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All the Mongolian military forces were cavalry; each division comprised
roughly twelve hundred men, although not all divisions were at full strength. Support and
supplies for these armies were provided by the Japanese Guandong Army, which gave the
Japanese considerable influence over the Mongolian military, especially over the First
Army under Li Shouxin’s command. The Second Army, under Prince De’s own direc
tion, retained a degree of autonomy, but this was taken away by the Japanese in 1938,
when a new general headquarters of the Mongolian Army was established and Li
Shouxin was named the commander in chief.
Prince De had a great interest in military affairs. Before the Inner Mongolian
autonomy movement, he had already formed a garrison drawn from Ude and Pangjiang
and a student brigade in Sunid. He had also negotiated with the Military Committee of
the Chinese government to establish a branch of the Chinese government’s Military Offi
cers Academy in Mongolia. These negotiations ended in failure, however. In 1936, when
the Mongolian Army was founded, he established the Mongolian Military Officers Acad
emy and made himself director of the academy. He selected youth from each of the divi
sions to be trained at the academy as cadres of the military forces. It was modeled after
Chiang Kai-shek’s Whampoa Military Academy.
The Mongolian Military Government, because its relations with the Chinese
government and Fu Zuoyi were tense, and also because its internal affairs had to be at
tended to, was unable to administer the banners. The xians in the Chahar League also did
not attract any attention from the Mongolian leaders. The Japanese advisors in these xians
consequently assumed the positions of xian magistrates, and the Chinese xian magistrates
became nothing more than advisors to their Japanese leaders.
The new government was placed in the town of Jabsar. Because of Jabsar’s im
portance, Li Shouxin was appointed mayor of this city; Li’s close friend Burinbiligtu
(Zhang Zirong) was appointed vice mayor and assumed the duties of the mayoralty.

Japan’s Westward Advance
The heavy snows of the winter of 1935 were disastrous to Shilingol, parts of
Chahar and Ulanchab, part of Hulunbuir in Manchukuo, and parts of Outer Mongolian
territory. In Shilingol, about eighty percent of the animals froze to death, and almost all
transportation was cut off. The establishment of the General Headquarters of the Mongol
ian Army provided the Suiyuan authorities with a good excuse to declare a boycott on
grain sales to areas under Japanese influence. The flow of provisions from Khonggortu
and Ulaankhua was severed. This threatened the people of the western Shilingol banners
with starvation and also provided the Japanese with good political propaganda. In addi
tion to economic support from Japan and Manchukuo, the Japanese encouraged grain
exports to Mongolia from the areas of Tuquan, Kailu, Lindong, Linxi, and Jingpeng.
These actions ensured popularity for the Japanese among the Mongol people.
The formation of the Mongolian Military Government and Prince De’s new
openness in establishing closer ties with the Japanese opened the door for the Japanese to
carry out their westward expansion. In the summer of 1936, the Guandong Army estab
lished a Special Service office in Beile-yin sume and appointed Morishima Kadofiisa as
the head of this office, with Nakajima Manzo as his assistant. The Japanese sent two
agents disguised as students of Mongolian literature and Buddhism to be stationed at the
temple of Mergen-juu in the Urad Front Banner. This temple had been the focal point of
conflict between Prince De and Fu Zuoyi ever since the outbreak of the Prince Shi Inci-
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dent.
The appearance of these two agents aroused intense feelings in Mergen-juu.
Shirabdorji (Prince Shi) used their appearance as a pretext to ask Wang Jingguo (a gen
eral under Yan Xishan’s domination) to dispatch troops. These Chinese soldiers arrived
disguised as Peace Preservation troops from the Urad Front Banner. They attacked the
temple and slaughtered the families of Shirabdorji’s Mongolian political opponents.
However, Mergen Gegeen escaped death. The two Japanese agents were captured and
forwarded to Baotou, where they were immediately released by the Chinese authorities.
The Mongols murdered by Wang Jingguo’s forces were not even mentioned by the Chi
nese. This indicates that (1) the Suiyuan authorities had no way to stop the Japanese from
moving westward; (2) the Chinese were still powerful and brutal enough to deal with the
Mongols; and (3) because Prince De had no real power to protect those who were on his
side, his prestige was damaged. Some short-sighted Mongol leaders turned toward Fu
Zuoyi for protection.

Diplomatic Activities of the Mongolian Military Government
After settling at least some of his internal problems. Prince De started his diplo
matic activities. His first step was to visit Manchukuo under arrangements made by the
Guandong Army. In June, Prince De and Li Shouxin, Wu Heling, Jodbajab, Altanochir,
and Togtakhu went to Xinjing, the capital of Manchukuo. They first visited the head
quarters of the Guandong Army and talked with its chief of staff, Itagaki Seishiro, re
garding the Guandong Army’s continued assistance to the Mongolian Military Govern
ment in carrying out its task of national construction. Following this, they visited the
Manchukuo government and had talks with Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Zhang Yanqing, Minister of Military Affairs Yu Shenzheng, and Minister
of Mongolian Administration Chimedsampil. In order to arrange a meeting with Puyi,
they visited with the minister of the Imperial Household, Xiqia.
These ceremonial visits were followed by talks on the subject of the ManchuMongol Agreement. The Mongol participants were the general director of the Mongolian
Military Government, Prince De and Togtakhu. Manchukuo was represented by the min
ister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Yanqing, and the vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi
Chuichi. Tanaka Ryukichi and Senda represented the Guandong Army. This agreement
concerned the establishment of a military alliance, the fostering of economic cooperation,
making a common cause against communism, and the exchange of diplomats. Although
the two sides had some divergent views, the army encouraged them to reach an agree
ment. Ohashi Chuichi, an ambitious Japanese diplomat, argued with Prince De over the
amount of military assistance to be given by Manchukuo’s army to Mongolia. Yet this
argument did not damage their mutual respect and friendship.
During this visit. Prince De had an audience with “Emperor” Puyi. Because he
met with Puyi alone, rumors about the protocol of this audience began to circulate. To
ward the end of the Manchu dynasty, Puyi’s relationship with Prince De was basically
that of lord to vassal. After the Republic of China was established, this feudalistic rela
tionship should have been abolished, but within the conservative Mongolian society of
the Mongolian princes, this kind of time-honored relationship still existed. At this time.
Prince De was representing Mongolia as an independent country, one on an equal footing
with Manchukuo. Nevertheless, when Prince De met with his old lord, he submitted to
him and then told Puyi what was in his heart. In his book The First Half of My Life {Wode
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qianbamheng), Puyi had the following to say about Prince De.
After the Lingsheng Incident, my interview with Prince De created another greater anxiety
for me. Prince De is Demchugdongrob of the Mongolian Military Government established
under Japanese manipulation. Originally, Demchugdongrob was one of the Mongolian
ruling princes. While 1 was in Tianjin, he presented me with a lot of money and gave ex
cellent horses to [my younger brother] Pujie. In many ways he was sincerely loyal to me.
This time, he had some business with the Guandong Army. Taking advantage ot this op
portunity to gain the permission of the commander in chief of the Guandong Army, he
came to visit me. He talked to me about his experiences during the past few years culmi
nating with the establishment of the military government, but implied that the Japanese
were exercising too much control and that the Guandong Army made many promises to
him which it did not fulfill. Demchugdongrob felt most uncomfortable about his inability to
make his own decisions. His words brought forth my own complaints, because persons
with common plights have similar abilities to pity each other. I comforted him.

This suggests that during the four months between the founding of the General
Headquarters of the Mongolian Army and Prince De’s visit with Puyi, Prince De had
already grown suspicious of Japanese promises.
During this visit, Puyi, conferred upon Prince De the honorary rank of Wude
Qinwang, or “Prince of Military Virtue,” an honor afterward greatly mocked by Wu
Heling. Wu pointed out that Prince De’s subservience to Puyi was a disgrace to all Mon
gols. “You claim to devote yourself to Mongolian independence and national construc
tion. Then how could you have kowtowed to a foreign sovereign? In what position does
this put Mongolia? Conferring of a title from him to you was nothing but an attempt to
make Mongolia subordinate to him.” These words made Prince De realize that Wu
Heling was correct, and as a result, he never used the title conferred by Puyi.
Later, when people asked De to write his name in calligraphy, he usually wrote
De Qinwang, or “First-Ranking Prince De.” Again, Wu Heling mocked him by saying,
“The Chinese character qin in qinwang means that a person with this title has especially
close relations with the emperor. It means ‘intimate’ and ‘trusted.’ If in your signature
you use the character qin, you express that you are a subordinate of a lord with superior
power. That is, you recognize that above you there is an emperor! Do you feel that this is
respectable?” Prince De, realizing his mistake, later eliminated the character qin from his
signature and merely used De Wang, or “Prince De,” instead. This is one example of how
accomodating Prince De was, even when he was being mocked. These things were told
me by Wu Heling.
Through these negotiations, both the Mongols and the Manchukuo government
agreed to establish delegations in the government center of each country. Manchukuo
dispatched Yuchun as its delegate to be stationed at Dehua, and the Mongols sent Altanochir as their delegate to be stationed at Xinjing. Inside sources said that Altanochir was
assigned because Prince De and Wu Heling suspected him of pro-Japanese leanings; they
therefore wanted to isolate him in Xinjing. On the other hand, Altanochir was a man with
great political experience. He was fluent in Japanese, and also enjoyed cordial relations
with the Japanese military. All these attributes made Togtakhu Jealous of Altanochir and
eager to see him depart from the center of Mongolian politics.
The second diplomatic accomplishment of the Mongolian Military Government
was an agreement with the Eastern Hebei (Jidong) regime. This agreement was signed by
Togtakhu, head of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, and Yin Rugeng, head of the Eastern
Hebei Autonomous Government. This pro-Japanese political regime was the result of the
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withdrawal of the Chinese troops from eastern Hebei province, according to the agree
ment signed by Generals He Yingqin and Umeizu Yoshijiro on June 10, 1935. Because of
this, local Peace Preservation troops were assigned to this buffer zone, and Yin Rugeng
was sent by the Chinese government to administer this special area. By the end of 1935,
the Japanese military took advantage of the changing situation in North China and the
establishment of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Council. With the approval of Yin
Rugeng, the Japanese made this “special zone” even more “special.” The Eastern Hebei
Anti-Communist Autonomous Government was established in Tongzhou (fifteen kilo
meters east of Beiping), and Yin Rugeng was made the head of this government. Through
this Mongol-Eastern Hebei Agreement, Yin Rugeng provided one million yuan in support
of the Mongolian Military Government.

The Death of Prince So
and Prince De’s Subsequent Ties with Nanjing
After his visit to Manchukuo, Prince De devoted himself to establishing a mili
tary force. Although recruitment in eastern Inner Mongolia was easy, conscription in the
ten banners of Shilingol proved difficult. Since the middle of the nineteenth century,
Mongolian military institutions were merely for show. Now, conscription was abruptly
instituted, evoking great opposition, especially in the Ujumuchin Banner, where the
population was large and conscription was disproportionately burdensome.
Moreover, Prince So and his colleagues in the Ujumuchin Banner were hostile
to the Japanese and were very unhappy at the idea of conscription. Some of the banner
leaders directed their anger toward the retired tusalagchi, Togtakhu, who was ill in bed at
his home and who had supported Prince De ever since the beginning of the autonomy
movement. Duchingge, the officer of the banner forces, led an assassination attempt
against Togtakhu at his house. Because Togtakhu was informed of this plot beforehand,
he escaped. The group headed by Duchingge then went to the princely residence to de
mand that Prince So arrest Togtakhu and punish him. At this time. Prince So’s health had
deteriorated because of worry about the Japanese invasion. Nevertheless, he was able to
calm the rebels and prevent bloodshed. He died soon afterward. Later, even after Prince
De became the most powerful figure in western Inner Mongolia, he did not attempt to
punish Duchingge—further evidence of his magnanimity.
The death of Prince So made Prince De the head of the Shilingol League. In all
of western Inner Mongolia, now that Prince So was gone, nobody dared to openly refuse
to cooperate with the Japanese. After Prince So’s death, the Nanjing government’s influ
ence in the Shilingol League was almost completely eliminated. After news of Prince
So’s death arrived in Nanjing, the Chairman of the Chinese government, Lin Sen; the
Head of the Executive Yuan, Chiang Kai-shek; and the heads of the other yuans issued a
formal order to praise Prince So:
The Head of the Shilingol League and the Chairman of the Mongolian Local Autonomous
Political Affairs Council, Sodnamrabdan, directed the administration of leagues and ban
ners for years. He was brilliant and competent, and his reputation was great. In recent years,
he protected the Mongolian territory with an unbending will and the utmost loyalty. These
[attributes] should be lauded. Now, with his passing, we must express our deepest condo
lences. ... It is necessary to discuss his merit in order to glorify him for his loyalty and ef
fort as an example for future emulation.
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These words make apparent the Chinese government’s admiration of Prince So.
Prince So’s resolute anti-Japanese stance was also praised by the Chinese government.
Prince De’s succcession to the headship of the Shilingol League was according
to precedent. Although the Mongolian Military Government had been established, rela
tions between the Nanjing government and this group of Inner Mongolian leaders still
had not been completely severed. On July 17, 1936, the Chinese government appointed
Prince De as chairman of the new Chahar Mongolian Political Council, and Rinchinwangdud and Jodbajab as vice chairmen. However, in reality, this Chahar Provincial
Mongolian Political Council was never established. These appointments indicate that the
Chinese Chinese government knew something about Prince De’s activities. Even though
the Chinese government was aware of his activities, it still appointed him to these posts,
to emphasize that until Prince De formally severed relations with the central government,
Nanjing would still like to continue its nominal and tension-reducing ties with Inner
Mongolia. For the same reasons. Prince De also did not reject these appointments.
During August of 1936, while the universities in Beiping were on vacation, I
went to Dehua. Before leaving, I visited with Professor Tao Xisheng of Beiping Univer
sity and told him that I was going back to Inner Mongolia to visit with Prince De. My
reason for the visit was that at the time of the autonomy movement, 1 had accompanied
the professor to visit Huang Shaohong and explained to Huang the desires of the Mongol
ian students concerning Mongolian autonomy. By 1936, the college students in Beiping
were generally very antigovemment because Nanjing was not resisting Japanese aggres
sion. However, Professor Tao, because of his personal connections with the Nanjing gov• emment, was able to calm the students. This is why 1 told him that I was going to Inner
Mongolia. Professor Tao said to me, “You might as well ask Prince De whether he still
has any hopes of collaboration with the central government.”
After I arrived in Dehua and visited Prince De, I asked Professor Tao’s question.
Prince De did not give a direct answer but said, “I will let Wu Heling tell you.” Before I
returned to Beiping, Wu Heling told me, “After discussing the matter, both Prince De and
1 agree that we hope that the central government will take a stronger stance against the
Japanese. If so, it will still be possible for us to check the Japanese aggession and act as a
buffer. If the central government remains soft on Japanese aggression, then there will be
no way for us to delay the Japanese westward advances.”
When I returned to Beiping, I related all this to Professor Tao and asked him to
tell the KMT authorities. However, the government did not respond to these words. The
situation in Prince De’s camp was clear: Prince De wanted Mongolia to maintain a dis
tance from the Sino-Japanese confrontation and use the breathing space thereby created
to help the cause of Mongolian independence.

Japan’s Further Westward Movement and Conflict with Suiyuan
Once the army organization began to become efficient. Prince De carried out the
first military review since the establishment of the Mongolian Army. He also invited
General Itagaki Seishiro to come and observe. After the review, Itagaki flew to the
Yekejuu League to meet with Prince Shagdurjab, and then went to Alashan to visit with
Prince Damzana. However, Itagaki was unable to forge any agreement with these leaders.
Nevertheless, the Japanese military established Special Service Offices in Dingyuanying,
Alashan, and the princely residence of Ejine. This evoked great concern among the local
people. Damzana, the Jasag of Alashan, originally had great hopes for the Mongolian
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Political Council and felt benevolent toward Prince De, but after his delegate returned
from the Mongolian Congress at Ujumuchin and Damzana heard of the Japanese interfer
ence in Mongolian affairs, he became very anti-Japanese. Not only did this make it im
possible for Itagaki to persuade Damzana to cooperate, but it also caused him to isolate
the Japanese Special Service offices from his people. Soon the Ejine Banner followed the
pattern of Alashan. The Special Service office in Ejine was burned down, and the Japa
nese withdrew.
After the Mongolian Army was organized, the Guandong Army pushed its
“Mongolian work” westward. The army assigned Tanaka Ryukichi as the head of the
Dehua Special Service Office to replace Tanaka Hisashi. After his arrival, Tanaka Ryuki
chi pushed the Mongolian Military Government to take military action against Suiyuan.
The Mongolian Army, especially its Second Army, having barely been trained and or
ganized, was not ready for battle. As mentioned. Prince De did not want a military con
frontation between the Chinese and Japanese to break out too quickly. When Wu Heling
was leaving Nanjing, he received special instructions from Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek to delay the Japanese westward aggression. Wu Heling did secretly try to delay the
Japanese westward advances.
To the Mongols, Tanaka Ryukichi was a barbaric, unreasonable, adventurous,
and reckless man. Tanaka assumed that his personal relationship with Prince De and his
efforts to drive Fu Zuoyi out of Suiyuan and establish Mongolian independence would
make him welcomed and accepted by all the members of the Mongolian Military Gov
ernment and that they would obey him unconditionally. However, Prince De did not ex
press great support for Tanaka’s plan. In a discussion with Prince De and others, Tanaka
became greatly angered, and using derogatory language, declared that the Mongols were
interested only in womanizing and eating meat and could not possibly achieve independ
ence. The interpreter at this discussion was Togtakhu, and Tanaka’s insulting words
gradually became public knowledge. Those who heard about Tanaka’s words realized
that this was an open insult by the Japanese. The Mongol people also realized that this
insult was the result of Mongol cooperation with the Japanese. This public enmity was
the first negative Mongol response to Japanese involvement in Mongolian affairs since
the beginning of the autonomy movement.
Seeing that Prince De and his camp were not convinced by his arguments, in
order to achieve quick success, Tanaka altered his policy of sacrificing Mongol troops on
the front lines and tried to organize Chinese troops to suffer that fate. He recruited three
to four thousand bandits and irregular Chinese troops from Hebei and Chahar, placing
them under the command of Wang Daoyi. In August, Tanaka concentrated Wang Daoyi’s
troops at Shangdu and rushed them to eastern Suiyuan, without any rest along the way, to
attack Khonggortu (Honggeertu). These troops were, of course, thoroughly defeated.
Wang Daoyi was assassinated by his own troops. Fu Zuoyi used this attack as grist for his
propaganda mill, claiming that “twenty thousand bogus autonomous army troops invaded
Taolin.”
After the failure of this adventure, Tanaka Ryukichi again established contact
with Wang Ying through the Japanese agents in Tianjin, and asked him to organize the
Da Han Yijun, or the Great Chinese Upright Army. Wang Ying was the richest and great
est landlord in Suiyuan and also the most notorious bully.' After Fu Zuoyi began gov‘ Wang Ying’s father, Wang Tongchun, was a one-eyed bandit and hence was known as “Wang the
Blind.” Near the end of the Manchu monarchy, Wang Tongchun arrived in the Great Bend of the
Yellow River and began cultivation in Mongolian territory. Because of his natural knack for irriga-
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eming Suiyuan, he pressured Wang Ying to be obedient. However, Wang would not
submit to Fu and instead fled to the foreign concession in Tianjin. Secretly, however,
Wang still was able to control the areas west of Baotou, the richest grain-producing area
in Suiyuan, and to continue his defiance of Fu Zuoyi. While in Tianjin, the Japanese per
suaded him to cooperate with Tanaka Ryukichi in an effort to topple Fu Zuoyi, to restore
his own property, and to resume power over all of western Suiyuan.
Wang Ying soon gathered several thousand people, made himself the com
mander in chief of the Great Chinese Upright Army, and appointed Lei Zhongtian the
vice commander.^ To assure that the establishment of the Great Chinese Upright Army
went very smoothly, Tanaka Ryukichi brought a man from Taiwan named Zhang to be a
member of Wang Ying’s staff. Zhang was the son-in-law of Ju Zheng, a senior official of
the KMT. At the same time. Prince De was told by Tanaka that he would like to have
Wang Ying’s Great Chinese Upright Army fight on the front line and have the Mongolian
Army fight on the second line. It was impossible for Prince De to refuse so modest a re
quest. If Prince De had rejected this offer, Tanaka might have had Wang Ying carry out
the entire war effort against Fu Zuoyi. Prince De feared that if this were allowed to hap
pen, Wang Ying would conquer Suiyuan and become another Fu Zuoyi. Nevertheless,
things did not develop as Prince De and Tanaka had planned. The troops under Prince De
were eventually drawn into warfare with Fu Zuoyi, and Tanaka Ryukichi s plan proved a
complete failure. Instead, Fu Zuoyi became the most admired hero in all of China for his
monumental struggle against Japanese aggression.
With the end of the Rehe War, as it came to be called, it became evident that all
Japanese diplomatic and military activities (the Shanhaiguan Incident, the He-Umezu
Agreement, the Zhangbei Incident, the Doihara-Qin Dechun Agreement, etc.) had given
Japan the upper hand, and Chinese forces had been forced to make retreat after retreat.
The Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee and the Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist
Autonomous Government were then organized. Tanaka Ryukichi thought that if a mili
tary threat to Suiyuan materialized, Fu Zuoyi would possibly give in, thereby facilitating
the Japanese occupation of Hohhot.
tion, all the land he put under cultivation had sufficient water and produced crops abundantly, and
thus he became very wealthy. His wealth made it possible for him to establish close relations with
corrupt Manchu and Mongol officials, especially the jasag and other officials of the Ordos Left
Front (Jungar) Banner. Using anti-foreign and anti-Christian sentiment prevalent in the area during
the Boxer Rebellion, Wang Tongchun was able to get officials in the Jungar Banner area to kill
those Christian Chinese settlers who were his opponents. (This information was drawn from an
interview with Father Van Hecken in Sehlid, Belgium, on July 18, 1980. Father Van Hecken had
lived in the Ordos region for years.)
Later, because of the Treaty of 1901 between China and the Western Powers, the Mongol
officials of the Jungar Banner were punished. Wang Tongchun, however, remained untouched.
Soon afterword, the Manchu General Yigu arrived in Suiyuan. He used heavy-handed policies to
force the Ulanchab and Yekejuu Leagues to open up their grazing fields to Chinese agricultural
settlement. Wang Tongchun again established a personal relationship between Yigu and his follow
ers to exploit Mongolian land and become wealthy. As the tyrant of the entire area, he exploited
Mongol and Chinese alike. After Wang Tongchun’s death, his son Wang Ying continued his he
gemony over the area. After Fu Zuoyi expelled Wang Ying and confiscated most of the illegally
obtained land of the Wang family, Wang Ying’s sister remained in the area around the Great Bend
of the Yellow River and carried on the Wang family enterprise.
^ It has been said that while Wang Ying was recruiting troops. Song Zheyuan dressed a group of his
Twenty-ninth Army men in civilian clothes and had them infiltrate Wang Ying’s newly recruited
army. Song had given orders to these men to eliminate Wang Ying at an opportune moment.

IX: The Mongolian Military Government

161

However, by this time, the situation in China had greatly changed. Both the gov
ernment and the people felt that they had yielded enough to the Japanese; there was no
more room for compromise. On November 10, 1936 Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed the
foreign minister, Zhang Qun, saying “We must know that the integrity of our sovereignty
over North China is the only key for the life or death, the existence or fall, of China. We
must prepare for everything in order to readjust our nation-to-nation relations [with Ja
pan]. No matter what the sacrifice, we will have no regrets.”^ Moreover, Fu Zuoyi him
self was a military man who had nowhere to retreat. He had no choice but to fight back.
On the Mongolian side. Prince De and his followers had no confidence in Wang Ying
and, of course, were not willing to shed Mongolian blood to help him. How could the
Mongols fight alongside Wang Ying and his men?
In spite of this clash of opinions and interests, and the fact that the goals of the
Mongols, Chinese, and Japanese were all different, the war against Suiyuan was inevita
ble because of the insistence of Tanaka Ryukichi. The final outcome was that Wang Ying
and his Great Chinese Upright Army marched forward as the first-line of the attack on
Honggeertu. The divisions of the First Army of the Mongolian Army under Li Shouxin’s
command stationed at Nanhaozhan and the divisions of the Second Army under the
command of Prince De were deployed in the western part of Chahar to protect Dehua
(Jabsar). Since there was no alternative to any of these actions, on November 5, Prince
De had to stand up and issue an ultimatum to Fu Zuoyi in the name of the chairman of the
Chahar Mongolian Political Council.
Three days later he received Fu Zuoyi’s stem reply, thereby sparking the war.

The Battle Of Bat-Khaalag
At this point, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Prince De, in an attempt to
persuade him to recall his forces lest they be quickly destroyed. Preparations were al
ready underway, however, and could not be altered by a mere telegram. With Tanaka
Ryukichi directing the Japanese forces, the Battle of Eastern Suiyuan soon broke out.
Wang Ying’s and Li Shouxin’s troops gathered at Khonggortu (Honggeertu) and Nan
haozhan and marched on the city of Taolin. When Fu Zuoyi led his troops in a counter
attack, both sides soon bogged down. On November 19, in an effort to break the dead
lock, Wang Ying led his troops southward to attack Xinghe, where they were repelled by
Fu Zuoyi’s forces.
Just before this confrontation. Prince De ordered Mugdenbuu and the Seventh
Division to take up positions at Beile-yin sume, in order to defend the temple from occu
pation. Tanaka tried to use Mugdenbuu’s troops to help attack Hohhot from the north. He
was supported by retired Japanese Colonel Obama Ujiyoshi, Mugdenbuu’s advisor. All
this activity did was draw the Chinese toward Beile-yin sume. There were good reasons
for this. First of all, it was the center of the Mongolian autonomy movement, and it was
well-known throughout China. When the Japanese used Beile-yin sume as a base from
which to attack Suiyuan, their actions took on great symbolic import, stirring the nation
alistic conscience of the Chinese people. Second, an attack on Beile-yin sume would be
important if it was effective; attacks on the central core of power tend to be more deci-

’ Qin Xiaoyi, ed., Zhonghua Mtnguo Zhonguo shiliao chubian dui Ri kangzhan shiqi (Preliminary
collection of important historical materials of the Republic of China-^the anti-Japanese war pe
riod), Taipei; The Kuomintang Historical Committee, 1981, vol. 3, p. 680.
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sive than attacks on the peripheries, both strategically and psychologically. A psycho
logical defeat would be more painful for the Mongols than a military one.
Prince De had no intention of turning Beile-yin sume into a military post. Prince
Yondonwangchug was especially opposed to turning this famous religious center, long
held holy by his banner, into a battlefield. Unfortunately, though, with the expansion of
the war into Suiyuan, Beile-yin sume was soon engulfed in the conflict, and became the
very center of the confrontation.
Amidst this already tense situation, both Yem Xishan and Fu Zuoyi began to plan
their attack on Beile-yin sume. In their communications with Chiang Kai-shek, they re
peatedly exaggerated the importance of the site, together with the scale of Japanese mili
tary movements and the power of “the Mongols, the false puppets, and the bandits”
{Meng, wei, fei), as they called their opponents. Accordingly, Chiang ordered them to
attack Beile-yin sume. In his telegram of November 16, Chiang told Yan that “[your]
telegram of the 16th has been received. It is suggested that Governor Fu be ordered to
carry out the occupation of Beile-yin sume immediately. It is also necessary to find the
opportunity to attack in the direction of Shangdu. Since there are no diplomatic ramifica
tions, you need not hesitate. In my opinion, there will be no stability for Suiyuan unless
Beile-yin sume and Shangdu are occupied immediately.”''
On the next day, November 17, Chiang Kai-shek went to Taiyuan to meet with
Yan Xishan and discuss strategic procedures for this new movement. Tanaka Ryukichi
and his fellow Japanese militarists had not foreseen such a move by the Chinese. In addi
tion, the military authorities in Shanxi and Suiyuan clearly understood the situation of
their opponents; they had especially accurate intelligence on Wang Ying’s troops. How
ever, they did not know the exact goals of the Guandong Army, and neither could they
accurately foresee exactly how the battle would unfold. Despite this, Yan and Fu were
confident of victory. In order to heighten national attention and win greater support from
the government, as well as to boost their own prestige, Yan and Fu undertook a policy of
blatantly exaggerated propaganda so as to inflate the sense of strategic threat. By so
fooling the Nanjing authorities, they painted themselves as great national heroes.
On November 23, for example, Yan sent Chiang a telegram that read as follows:
“Yesterday, a secret report was received. The Japanese are using airplanes, tanks and
poison gas to help the false bandit troops. If this does not achieve their goal, [Japan] will
send its regular army into the war, with the intention of occupying Suiyuan and northern
Shanxi. As a precaution, I would like to ask Your Excellency to arrange for 50,000 troops
to be stationed at a strategic locale. Please send your instructions.” Chiang soon replied,
“I will gather enough troops to prepare to meet the situation. Do not be concerned.”’ By
this time, units of the Chinese central government’s armies were already forward posi
tioned in Shanxi and Suiyuan. They were under the nominal control of Yan Xishan, vice
chairman of the Military Committee, though in fact they were under the actual control of
Chen Cheng. As for the allusion to tanks, airplanes, and poison gas, it was a complete
fabrication of Yan’s, made in order to exaggerate the power of the enemies he faced.
With the Battle of Eastern Suiyuan deadlocked, Fu Zuoyi received instructions
to prepare an attack on Beile-yin sume. On the evening of November 23, a brigade under
the command of Sun Lanfeng of Fu Zuoyi’s 35th Army, marched forward from Wuchuan, together with the Seventh Division under Wang Jingguo. The Shanxi troops under
Zhao Chengshuo headed from Guyang to Beile-yin sume. The Seventh Division of the
* Ibid, pp. 680-1.
’ Ibid, p. 683.

IX: The Mongolian Military Government

163

Mongolian Army, under the command of Mugdenbuu, was caught off guard by the Chin
ese advance and, outnumbered, was forced to retreat. During the resulting chaos, the
monks in the temple escaped. The Japanese advisors, together with members of the Spe
cial Service Office, fled northeast with Mugdenbuu. By dawn, Fu Zuoyi’s forces had
occupied Beile-yin sume, the center of the Mongolian autonomy movement. This socalled “Great Victory of Bailingmiao” was greatly exaggerated in the Chinese press.
The Battle of Bailingmiao was the first real Chinese victory against Japanese or
Japanese-dominated forces since the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931. Swept
up in the national fervor, universities and colleges in Beiping sent delegations to the front
to congratulate the victorious troops. Fu Zuoyi became a national hero overnight; lauda
tory articles and pictures adorned Ae front pages of China’s newspapers. As one newspa
per read, “The plot for the creation of the great Yuan Empire by a ‘certain’ side [Japan] is
entirely crushed. It has been reported that during the great Battle of Bailingmiao, 300
Suiyuan troops were killed or wounded; on the enemy side, 300 were killed, 600 wound
ed and 600 captured.”
In reality, reports such as these were all false. Contrary to what some believed,
Fu’s troops did not set fire to the temple at Beile-yin sume after the escape of the monks,
though they did destroy its images, scriptures, instruments, doors, and windows, and also
looted and destroyed the dormitories of the lamas. The real death toll on the Japanese side
is not known, but we do know that only 100 Mongols were killed or wounded. I visited
Beile-yin sume several times in the years following the battle and talked with the monks
there about the events of that terrible night. They reported that except for Fu’s occupation
of the temple, the Chinese reports of the battle were fabricated. During Fu’s occupation
of Beile-yin sume. Prince Yondonwangchug stayed at his residence thirty-five kilometers
away. The prince’s refusal to meet Fu was widely applauded by fellow Mongols.
The loss of Beile-yin sume was not only a great blow to Prince De, but it also
had a terrible effect on all of Inner Mongolia. The division under Mugdenbuu’s com
mand, along with its Japanese advisors, retreated eastward to the Shira-Muren monastery
in the Derben Keuked Banner, where they awaited reinforcements. Prince De dispatched
Tegshibuyan, the head of the Military Affairs Bureau, to observe the situation and relay
orders to Mugdenbuu to maintain the strength of his division. Since they could not afford
to sacrifice men and material, the Seventh Division, the one under Mugdenbuu’s com
mand, was ordered to retreat in the event of further Chinese attacks.
From the outset of the battle Tanaka Ryukichi’s opinions differed substantially
from those of Prince De and the other Mongol leaders. Seeing that Wang Ying’s troops
were bogged down in eastern Suiyuan, Tanaka moved his Chinese troops from Shangdu
to Shira-Muren in order to carry out reprisals against Beile-yin sume, and placed them
under the control of Colonel Obama. The counter-attacks were unsuccessful; Fu repelled
each successive attacking wave. After this second defeat and retreat, Obama centered his
troops at Shira-Muren and ordered them to hold it to the last man. Mugdenbuu, hearing
Obama’s orders, told him about Prince De’s instructions that the division was to be
maintained mobile and ready to retreat, and about the need to preserve precious material.
A great argument ensued, which Obama, because of his narrow-minded stubbornness,
won. Even so, Obama distrusted the Mongolian Army under Mugdenbuu, and accord
ingly the Mongol sentries at Shira-Muren were replaced with Chinese troops under Wang
Ying.
On the night of December 9, Shi Yushan, Jin Xianzhang, and other troops under
Wang Ying, while also making contact with the Suiyuan Army, suddenly besieged the
headquarters of the Japanese advisors. With the exception of the telegraph operator, all
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the Japanese advisors and members of the Special Service Office, including Colonel
Obama—a total of twenty-nine men in all—^were killed in the attack. At the same time,
the Chinese attacked the headquarters of the Mongolian Seventh Division, disarming
some of the troops and forcing Mugdenbuu and his staff to flee. Fu Zuoyi then proudly
proclaimed victory in the short Battle of the Shira-Muren.
On December 18, An Huating and the Chinese troops under his command de
fected to Fu Zuoyi’s side. At the same time. Song Zheyuan and his 29th Division de
serted en masse, taking their weapons with them. This, together with other desertions,
brought about the complete collapse of the Great Chinese Upright Army.
When Wang Ying’s troops rebelled and the Mongolian Seventh Division tee
tered on the brink of collapse, Tanaka Ryukichi, fearing that Prince De would ask for
control of the decimated division, secretly sent the errant Wang to Tianjin. At the same
time, Wang’s chief political counselor, a Taiwanese named Zhang, also disappeared; it
appears likely that Tanaka sent him back to his island home.
After the loss at Beile-yin sume and the rout of the anti-Chinese front, both the
Japanese Guandong Army and the government of Manchukuo issued a statement in
which they said they would not tolerate the war’s negative repercussions on the security
of Manchukuo. The KMT countered with a communique of its own, which reiterated the
antiquity of China’s claims to the territory and the animosity with which they viewed
outside interference. Eventually, after Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Axis anti
communist agreement, Italy extended diplomatic recognition to Manchukuo. This dip
lomatic maneuver had a great negative impact on the KMT anti-Communist policy, and
provided the Chinese Communists, who remained adamantly anti-Japanese all along,
with a propaganda coup which greatly increased their influence.
Following Fu’s victory, Chen Cheng, a Nationalist general, arrived in Hohhot to
discuss with Fu Zuoyi the possibility of bringing the army of the central government into
the war on the side of Suiyuan. At this point, the Mongolian Military Government was at
a real impasse: Mongol forces were weak, and the Guandong Army, despite its bold
promises, remained practically impotent. Tanaka Ryukichi, feeling that he had lost face,
contemplated hara kiri. In the midst of this political chaos, as Chen Cheng and Fu Zuoyi
plotted their imminent eastern campaign, Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped on December
12, in Xi’an, by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the so-called Xi’an Incident. This
unforseen development radically altered the situation in East Asia and gave the Mongol
Military Government some much needed breathing space.

The Truce and Rehabilitation of the Mongolian Army
From the beginning of the war. Prince De and Wu Heling had disagreed on the
nature and degree of Tanaka Ryukichi’s personal adventurism. Given the problems with
Wang Ying, their relations with Tanaka deteriorated even further. After the defeat, it
seemed impossible to improve relations with Tanaka; seeking to capitalize on the Xi an
Incident, they sought to end the war that Tanaka had started. Moreover, Wu Heling, who
had been assigned a secret mission to delay Japanese expansion, saw this as a way to halt
the Japanese invasion. Tanaka, eager to cut his losses, was unable to stop this decisive
move by the Mongol leadership to end the war. On December 16, the Nationalists issued
a communique condemning Zhang Xueliang and his associates.
On the same day, Prince De called an important meeting of his supporters, say
ing that “though Chiang Kai-shek opposes the independence of Mongolia, he was kid-
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napped by Zhang Xueliang, who was himself manipulated by the Communists. Our twin
aims are autonomy for the Mongolian people and anti-communism. Facing many prob
lems in the realm of national defense, we have to end this war so as to allow the Chinese
central government to focus all its attention on the rebellious factions manipulated by the
Communists.”
Tanaka, like all others in attendence, immediately endorsed this recommenda
tion. Prince De then asked Wu Heling to draft a telegram announcing a truce. The tele
gram stated:
Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, both of whom are pawns of the Chinese Communist
Party, kidnapped Chairman Chiang, the supreme leader; disturbed national law; and dam
aged the roots of the state. Now, although Fu Zuoyi has sent troops to disturb the situation
between the Mongols and the Chinese, at this time of Chairman Chiang’s captivity, we
would like to cease hostilities temporarily, so as to allow the entire nation to join together
in attacking the rebels and saving our leaders. As for the problems in Suiyuan, we will wait
for the decision of the central government.

Of course, this sort of truce was willingly accepted by Nanjing. Fu Zuoyi tried
to take advantage of the new situation by moving his troops eastward; but because the
nation was preoccupied with the Xi’an Incident, public sentiment demanded unity, and he
was forced to retreat. Prince De asked Song Zheyuan and Xiao Zhengying to negotiate
the truce with Suiyuan. Song accepted the role of mediator for several reasons. First of
all, the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee, which he headed, was under sustained
Japanese pressure, that he was eager to alleviate. Second, Song was eager to boost his
personal prestige. Many had seen him as rather pro-Japanese, and he felt a great need to
better his image and position in China, at the expense of Fu Zuoyi.
As for the Mongol military during this period, Li Shouxin’s troops were sent to
defend the second line; because they were not front-line forces, they suffered very few
losses. As for the divisions under Prince De’s personal control, they had no casualties
except for those in the Seventh Division. Responsibility for the defeat lay with Tanaka
Ryukichi, but because he was a foreigner, the Mongol leaders could not punish him for
his reckless adventurism. The Mongols had retreated from Beile-yin sume for the simple
reason that the Chinese outnumbered them. The loss of Shira-muren resulted from
Obama’s trust of Wang Ying’s Chinese troops and his rejection of Mugdenbuu’s Mongol
forces. In addition, he had foolishly rejected Prince De’s orders to not expend men and
material. This led to the collapse of the Seventh Division, though fortunately, with only
limited casualties.
Mugdenbuu was stripped of his command, though not formally punished. This
sort of leniency was typical of Prince De’s generous spirit. Nevertheless, the defeat had
great impact on the morale of both the civilians and military throughout the Mongol na
tion. So as to maintain control over his army and boost their sagging morale. Prince De,
speaking with great emotion, told the youth that followed him, “Our goal is cooperation
with whoever may be of some benefit to us.” When word of this reached the Japanese,
they became rather angry at their opportunistic ally.
Among the officials of the Guandong Army, there was little inclination to ex
pand the scope of the confrontation. They had felt their defeat keenly. Following the
truce, Tanaka was recalled, and the Guandong Army dispatched Colonel Moto Akira, the
head of its second bureau, to Jabsar (Dehua) to appease and comfort Prince De and the
leaders of the Mongolian Military Government. Moto urged them not to lose their confi-
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dence in the Japanese. On the other hand, he had to deal with the reality of Tanaka’s de
feat. He led preliminary discussions on the renovation of the Mongolian Army, but took
no concrete action in that direction. Moto, a prudent and cautious man, judiciously gave
support to the Mongol independence movement. The diplomatic Moto was at least able to
reunite the formerly divided factions. After conditions settled down in Jabsar, Moto was
recalled, and Colonel Morioka was sent to take his place. Soon after his arrival, Morioka
was removed, and the Guandong Army sent Colonel Kawazaki to head the Dehua Special
Service Office.

Reorganization of the Army and New Maneuvers
After the collapse of the Seventh Division, and at the recommendation of Colo
nel Kawazaki, the Mongolian Army underwent a far-reaching reorganization. Prince De
remained commander in chief, Li Shouxin the vice commander, and Wu Guting chief of
staff. Liu Xinghan, a longtime Chinese associate of Li Shouxin, was made deputy chief
of staff. The General headquarters was divided into six administrative sectors: military
supply, armaments and equipment, aides-de-camp, general staff, military law, and health
and medicine. The original First and Second Armies were abolished, and all remaining
divisions were put under the direct control of the General Headquarters. The Seventh
Division was reorganized, and the regiment of guards previously attached to it was trans
ferred to the Ninth Division. All the previous divisional commanders remained, with the
exception of the Seventh Division, which was commanded directly by the General Head
quarters. Two graduates of the Nanjing Military Academy, Khorongga and Fu Xiande,
commanded the division’s two battalions. Shonodondub was placed in command of the
chairman’s guards, but was soon replaced by Sangdugureng.
By the time that these reorganizations took place, the Mongolian Military Gov
ernment had been in existence almost one year. Prince De and the other Mongol leaders
had focused their attention on fighting exterior oppression, as well as on beefing up mili
tary forces and coming to terms with the influx of Japanese advisors. Despite the leaders’
preoccupation with questions of external security, they were able to bring about some
changes in the domestic realm.
Steps were taken to train Mongols in telecommunications. To facilitate the use
of the telegraph, the Mongolian alphabet was romanized. Transportation networks were
improved as well, with the formation of the Mongolian Highways Bureau under the di
rection of Enkeamur. Many trucks and buses were imported from abroad, and roads were
built between Dehua and Kalgan, as well as between the various leagues and banners.
Rather quickly, a stiff competition developed with the Mechanized Transport Company, a
subsidiary of the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway Company, which was ef
fectively under the control of the Japanese Special Service Office. Despite efforts by the
latter to put pressure on the Mongolian Highways Bureau, the competition continued un
abated. Because of the limited real gains involved, the Japanese soon backed down.
Another important event was the establishment of the Mongolian Livelihood
Association, as advocated by Wu Heling.® This nonprofit organization, originally formed

^ The Mongols traditionally had no interest in commercial activities, which until this point had
remained in the hands of Chinese merchants and traders. Other foreign nations also had major in
vestments in Inner Mongolia, especially the Soviets and Japanese. One large Japanese conglomer
ate, the Great Mongolian Company (Daimo), had been particularly active in the wool and hide
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to help in disaster relief following the bitter winter of 1935, continued into the spring and
used its remaining funds to plant windbreaks and organize tree nurseries in Jabsar, Sunid,
and Pandita-gegeen-keid (Beizimiao). In order to fund its service wing, the organization
also undertook some commercial activities, such as the export of domesticated animal
stock and import of necessary goods.

The End of the Mongolian Military Government
During the first half of 1937, the Mongolian Military Government concentrated
its energies on repairing the damage done by the defeats in eastern Suiyuan and Beile-yin
sume. However, they soon suffered another blow, which in time led to the collapse of the
Mongolian Military Government. In the summer of 1937, the Japanese issued a series of
demands to Song Zheyuan, who wholeheartedly resisted these blatant attempts to ma
nipulate him. This did not bode well for the Japanese; in fact. Song’s opposition dimin
ished Japanese leverage in North China, and fanned anti-Japanese sentiments in Song’s
29th Army. In order to increase its power in the region, Japan boosted its troop strength
in Tianjin, and carried out a series of provocative maneuvers in the Beiping area. On the
evening of 7 July, a clash broke out between Chinese and Japanese forces at the Marco
Polo Bridge, fifteen kilometers southwest of Beiping. The Second Sino-Japanese War
had begun. This conflict was to have a decisive impact on the Inner Mongolia situation.
On August 7, the Japanese occupied Beiping, and six days later overran Shang
hai. In a move of anti-Japanese solidarity, the Chinese Communist Party announced that
it would henceforth follow the orders of the Chinese government. At this point, Chiang
Kai-shek, as Chairman of the Military Committee, appointed Zhu De as commander of
the Eighth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, with Peng Dehuai as vice com
mander. Soon after, the Soviets and Japanese signed a nonaggression pact, which was to
further influence the situation in Inner Mongolia.
Following the outbreak of general war, Fu Zuoyi changed his military policy
from one of defense to offense. Accordingly, he sent Dong Biwu to invade Shangdu;
there he clashed with the First Division of the Mongolian Army, under the command of
Yin Baoshan, an old Chinese follower of Li Shouxin. Dong’s forces were stronger,
though, and soon Shangdu was occupied. While in retreat, a Mongolian battalion under
the command of Jing Dequan surrendered to Dong’s forces. At the same time, Shi Yushan, who had formerly surrendered to Fu Zuoyi at Shira-Muren, Joined forces with Dong
and headed for Jabsar.
The Japanese forces quickly won a series of decisive victories along the Beiping-Tianjin Railway. Another Japanese army, headed by Itagaki Seishiro, headed westtrade in the years following the Manchurian Incident. Another foreign firm, Wali Yanghang, was
also active in the Ujumuchin region. Consequently, foreigners, especially the Chinese and Japan
ese, effectively controlled Mongolia’s economy. In order to protect economic autonomy, the Mon
golian Livelihood Association was formed. Several years later, in the winter of 1940, the organiza
tion was enlarged and expanded and its name was changed to Khorshiya (Cooperative). It became,
in effect, a production, consumption, and transportation cooperative. Khorshiya, a powerful force in
the Mongolian economy, won back much of the economic advantage previously lost to Chinese and
Japanese interlopers. However, corruption soon ran rampant within the Khorshiya when its leader,
a greedy Chinese named Luo Lipu, appointed by Wu Heling, involved the cooperative in many
illegal and unsavory activities. Soon the cooperative lost its integrity, and Wu Heling’s prestige
suffered accordingly.
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ward along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway in an effort to attack Nankou. The war north of
the Great Wall, in the area near Kalgan, proceeded differently. The Guandong Army, in
an effort to protect Zhangbei, transported some Mongolian forces to the area in small
airplanes, but with little success. They were still unable to confront Dong’s forces west of
Jabsar. Unable to resist. Prince De entered into negotiations with Colonel Kawazaki, head
of the Japanese Special Service Office, and on August 16, ordered his troops to retreat to
Doloonnor. With insufficient transportation available, Prince De was able to evacuate
only his staff and some of his men, and a small amount of material; the rest had to be left
behind in Jabsar, which was soon occupied by Dong’s forces.
While the staff of the Military Government was moving toward Doloonnor,
Prince De and a small group of his followers were moving northward to the prince’s offi
cial residence at Sunid. There, he planned a reorganization of his loyal forces and to as
sume a defensive posture. However, before the reorganization could be put into place,
reports arrived that the Suiyuan Army was about to attack Sunid. Prince De immediately
fled to Buyandalai’s residence in Chahar, losing contact with his staff back in Doloon
nor. Confusion descended on the Military Government; indeed, some thought that the
prince had fled to Outer Mongolia.
By this point, the Japanese Army, under the command of Tojo Hideki, arrived at
Doloonnor. Tojo, realizing that Prince De’s leadership was essential to the stabilization of
the Mongolian situation, accordingly ordered Colonel Kawazaki and Wu Heling to find
the prince and bring him to Doloonnor for consultations. By the time the prince was re
trieved and brought to Doloon-nor, though, Tojo had already moved on. Taking matters
into his own hands. Prince De ordered his staff into the temple at Doloonnor to reorgan
ize the Military Government and await changes in conditions.
Some time later, Wu Heling related to me the details of the situation then faced
by Prince De and his advisors. Prince De’s initial disappearance had caused much distress
among his staff; Tojo, too, was concerned and dispatched Wu and others in a small air
plane to find the missing leader. When they found him, they could see that Prince De was
himself greatly distressed. Prince De told his staff that under these circumstances, “coop
eration with Japan may be considered less than a blessing.” The Mongols were forced
into this marriage of convenience for lack of an alternative. The prince thus figured that
he had no choice but to go to Doloonnor and reassume leadership of the Mongol nation.
Though the Military Government nominally still existed, in reality it had ceased to func
tion, eclipsed, as it were, by the new Mongol-Japanese alliance.

X
THE MONGOLIAN ALLIED LEAGUE
AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT
OCTOBER 1937-AUGUST 1939
The Emergence of Japanese Puppet Regimes
in Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which
broke out in 1937, eventually led to the demise of the Mongolian military government.
As the war expanded and as Tojo Hideki pushed his troops westward into Mongolian
territory, new political alternatives opened up for the Mongols. On August 27, Tojo’s
forces, advancing from Doloonnor and Zhangbei, attacked Chinese-occupied Kalgan
from the north; Itagaki’s men approached from the south, following the successful Japan
ese occupation of Beiping and Nankou, thus placing Prince De in a difficult position.
Clearly, he wanted to use the Japanese to drive Fu Zuoyi from Suiyuan, but he was re
luctant to fuel an expansion of the war between Japan and China. Yet above all, he still
hoped to build a new Mongol nation. He initially hoped to pit Japan’s considerable power
against the persistent Chinese threats to Mongolian autonomy, while at the same time
using his ties with the Chinese government to offset the Japanese threat. Soon, however,
it became clear that there could be no balance of power between the warring parties, no
hope of setting each force up as a check and balance to the other. Inner Mongolia had no
choice but to side with the powerful Japanese.
Prince De originally had great hopes for the Japanese connection, but after years
of personal experience, he realized that the results of the alliance with Japan differed sub
stantially from his initial hopes. As the promised Japanese support for Mongolian na
tional reconstruction lay fallow, interference from the Japanese Special Service Office
flourished. Mongolia’s long hoped for self-rule soon revealed itself as alien rule, chilling
Prince De’s once hospitable feelings towards Japan. Prince De, though suspicious of
Japanese motives, was pressured into an alliance with Japan by circumstances beyond his
control. Mongol morale was boosted, however, by plans to counterattack the much-hated
Fu Zuoyi. The Japanese could tell that Prince De resented their presence, and this further
heightened the conflict between them.
Following the westward expansion of the Japanese forces, the Mongol and Chi
nese troops under Prince De and Li Shouxin rapidly organized. Li’s target was Pingdiquan (Jining), whereas Prince De’s troops were headed for Beile-yin sume. By Septem
ber 30, 1937, Beile-yin sume, the former center of the autonomous movement, had been
liberated. The Japanese took Datong on September 13, and then on October 14, together
with the troops of Li and Prince De, occupied Hohhot, the focal point of the antiMongolian movement.
While Tojo’s forces headed for Kalgan and Datong, the Japanese advisors as
signed to the Chahar League, under the leadership of Anzai Kinji, organized a military-
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political administration for the occupied areas. The league head, Jodbajab, surrendered
much of his power to the insistent Anzai, who envisioned gaining total freedom to rule
the occupied areas according to his wishes. Nevertheless, the Mongol troops under Prince
De advanced to Baotou and Hohhot, and Prince De quickly appointed a trustworthy Chi
nese administrator without first notifying Anzai. This enraged the Japanese advisors,
negatively affecting Prince De’s relationship with them.
The similar appointment of a magistrate for Wuchuan xian is another example of
Prince De’s stubborn independence. Wuchuan, an important spot between Beile-yin sume
and Hohhot, was formerly occupied by Fu Zuoyi and used as his base for attacking Beileyin sume. Naturally, Mongolian control of Wuchuan was an important psychological
boost. Soon after reoccupation, Prince De appointed a long-time associate, Xu Ronghuo,
to be the new magistrate. Xu’s appointment infuriated the Japanese, who felt that their
power was being eroded by the upstart Mongolian leader. Prince De’s headstrong inde
pendence complicated his relations with the Japanese, causing long-term difficulty for the
Mongolian independence movement.
Following Japan’s impressive array of victories in East Asia, there was much
debate about what to do with Mongolia. Some favored independence, others integration.
Even within the Guandong Army, which had previously supported Mongolian national
construction, conflicting opinions arose. It seemed that those opposed to Mongolian in
dependence had increased in number and prestige since before the war. Soon after the
occupation of Kalgan, the Guandong Army dispatched Kanai Shoji to be the new su
preme advisor for the occupied territories. Kanai brought Chen Yuming, Chen Yousheng
and other high officials from Manchukuo to be his entourage. Kanai was firmly against
Mongolian independence, and his posting to Kalgan created a great rift between the
Mongols and the Japanese. For the Mongols, Kanai’s arrival threw a great roadblock in
the Mongols' path to political autonomy.
Kanai, bom in Nakano ken, was a medical doctor and the former governor of
Jiandao province in the Manchukuo puppet regime. Later, he was appointed by Tojo to
supervise Mongolian political development. It is impossible to know Kanai’s true feel
ings about Prince De and his drive for Mongolian autonomy, but judging from his actions
and deeds, Kanai was a great enemy of Prince De. He thwarted plans for Mongolian in
dependence at every step. Though he was not the official policy maker for the Japanese
forces in Mongolia, his policy recommendations were usually followed. Kanai Shoji’s
arrival created a veritable chasm between Mongol and Japanese leaders, where once there
had merely been a rift.
Following the retreat of the Chinese Army under Liu Ruming, Kalgan fell im
mediately into the hands of the Japanese, who selected Yu Pinqing, the president of the
city’s chamber of commerce, and Du Yunyu, a clerk in the former Chahar Provincial
Government, to form a committee for peace maintenance and to solve some of the ad
ministrative problems at hand. Yu, bom in Hebei Province, was a textile merchant and a
man totally devoid of political ambition. Du, from Shandong province, had studied in
Japan, where he married a Japanese. Exploiting his Japanophile background, Du at
tempted to turn the situation to his advantage. He suggested formation of the Committee
for Peace Maintenance, and picked the lackluster Yu for an administrative position.
Of course the Japanese were glad to have some local assistance; Kanai did what
he could to enlarge these sorts of local activities. On September 4, the committee was
reorganized into the Autonomous Government of Southern Chahar (Chanan zizhi
zhengfu). The main administrative body of the new government was a committee, with
Yu Pinqing at its head, and Du Yunyu and others as committee members. Takagi Ichinari
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was the chief political advisor to the new regime. In reality, though, supreme power lay
with Kanai Shoji. Chen Yuming and Chen Yousheng occupied important administrative
positions in the new government.
Similar steps were taken in northern Shanxi, where a committee for peace
maintenance was organized under the leadership of Xia Gong and Ma Yongkui. Xia was
an old-fashioned, prosperous scholar who had passed the national examination in North
ern Shanxi at the end of the Manchus’ Qing Dynasty; he lacked political ambition, as did
Ma, a shopkeeper. Both entered public life under Japanese compulsion. As had happened
in Southern Chahar, the committee soon evolved into the Autonomous Government of
Northern Shanxi (Jinbei zizhi zhengfu), under the effective control of Kanai Shoji. Xia
Gong headed the administrative committee, with Ma Yongkui, Tian Rubi, and others as
committee members, and Maejima Noboru as chief advisor. Tian was a reputable gentle
man from Hunyuan xian of Shanxi Province who, like the others, had been forced into
public life by the Japanese. His father, Tian Yinghuang, had been elected a senator to the
Beijing government in 1913. Maejima, the Japanese advisor, was Kanai Shoji’s old
friend.
Kanai Shoji was a shrewd and prudent politician who, by putting trusted friends
in as chief advisors to the regimes of Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi, effectively
controlled both territories. These arrangements would prove useful in his fiiture confron
tations with Prince De. Kanai spent this period in Kalgan, where he devoted most of his
time to plotting the formation of a Mongolian puppet regime (Mokyo Seiken or Mengjiang-zhengquan). He sought to use economic and other organizations to manipulate
Prince De.
The Mongolian Army marched westward and had little problem in occupying
Hohhot. Yan Xishan, trying to follow orders to protect Shanxi, had almost totally evacu
ated Hohhot. However, the Mongol forces held out there, waiting to unite with a Japanese
force that had become bogged down along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway. Hohhot fell
under joint Mongol-Japanese occupation on October 14. Soon after, the Japanese asked
He Bingwen, head of a local trade union, to form a committee for peace maintenance.
Although He was a traditional merchant, he had many political skills and steered a suc
cessful course between the two occupying armies and their various administrations. Be
cause of the presence of a Mongol occupation army, the Hohhot Committee for Peace
Maintenance did not have the same function as corresponding committees in Southern
Chahar and Northern Shanxi. Soon after order was established, the committee dissolved.

The Conflict Between the Mongol Leadership
and the Japanese Militarists Over Mongolian Nationhood
Faced with this difficult situation. Prince De decided to shuffle his cabinet soon
after his arrival in Doloonnor. Because of the need to maintain open contact with the
Japanese, Togtakhu, generally perceived as a skilled diplomat, was given control of the
Secretariat. Chogbagatur had an intimate knowledge of Chinese administration and was
given control of the Interior Bureau. Oljeitu was appointed head of the Transportation
and Communications Bureau and charged with pacifying occupied areas.
Wu Heling, Jirgalang, and Tegshibuyan arranged for a Japanese airplane to take
Prince De to Hohhot on October 18, 1937 for important meetings with Japanese officials
there. The Japanese intelligence officer. Major Inamori Toshisuke, was also on the air
plane as the official host for the visiting prince. Altanochir, because he was in Xinjing
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(Changchun) as Mongolia’s chief representative to Manchukuo, could not attend Prince
De’s meetings with the Japanese. This enabled the ambitious Togtakhu to manipulate the
meetings to his own advantage. Taking the role as interpreter and mediator between the
two sides, Togtakhu created an environment for the talks that was favorable to his posi
tion. He cleverly drew both the prince and the Japanese officials close to himself, playing
one off against the other to his own benefit. He was able to carry out this role throughout
the duration of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, from 1937 until
1939.

The successful reoccupation of both Beile-yin sume and Hohhot boosted the
prince’s sagging morale and sense of confidence, and led him to believe that these victor
ies might be the precursors to the establishment of a truly independent Mongol state. In
deed, Wu Guting, the chief of staff of the Mongolian Army, and members of the com
mittee for peace maintenance had done a fine job of restoring order in Hohhot. By the
time of the prince’s visit, the Chinese forces under Wang Jingguo that had previously
threatened the Mongolian Political Council at Beile-yin sume had been hastily withdrawn
from Baotou. Soon after, a Japanese-Mongol force occupied this important site at the end
of the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway, Joining it to the transportation network of the Yellow
River, and giving Beile-yin sume great political, economic, and strategic importance.
This occupation also opened up the way for Japanese forces to eventually march into the
Yekejuu League.
Prince De’s renewed courage and heightened morale soon spread to the staff that
had accompanied him to Hohhot. With the better outlook, Wu Heling, Li Shouxin, and
other senior Mongolian officials decided to convene another Mongolian Congress to de
termine Mongolia’s future.
The highest ranking Japanese officials at Hohhot—^Lieutenant Colonel Kuwabara Araichiro, head of the Special Service Office, and Muratani Hikojiro, chief advisor
to the Mongolian Military Government—^were not opposed to the convocation of a new
Mongolian Congress. They attempted to explain the Mongolian position to their superi
ors, but were unable to win support. They soon realized that it would be best not to bring
up the topic of Mongol nationalism.
Prince De then decided to meet with Major General Sakai Takashi, commander
of Japanese forces in the area, to ask him to convey the opinions of the Mongol nation to
the commanders of the Guandong Army in an attempt to solicit their support. Sakai real
ized that Mongolian independence was a very vital and important issue that could not be
decided by the Guandong army; it could only be decided by the Imperial Government, of
Japan. Prince De related Tanaka Ryukichi’s former promises, but Sakai told the prince
that Tanaka was an unruly adventurer whose word could not be trusted. Greatly dis
tressed, Prince De left without mentioning his negotiations with Itagaki Seishiro and
other prominent Japanese officials.

Preparations for the Mongolian Congress and
the Response of the Beiping Mongols
Although Sakai rejected Prince De’s proposals, Wu Heling, Prince De, and the
other Mongol leaders refused to abandon their plans for Mongolian nationalism. They
wanted to harness the unified spirit of the Mongolian nobles and people and push for a
new congress. Invitations were issued for a second Mongolian Congress, to be convened
in Hohhot on October 27, 1937.
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The Mongols in Beiping had traditionally been active in Mongolian politics.
Some were motivated by personal reasons, others by nationalism. Many Mongols in
Beiping became dispirited, however, when the Japanese arrived, and some emigres from
the western parts of Inner Mongolia fled Beiping for Hohhot. Fearing Japanese reprisals,
they joined Rong Xiang, amban of the Turned Banner, and retreated south of the Yellow
River, there linking up with the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, and in time Joining
forces with the Yekejuu Banners. Those Mongols who escaped from eastern Inner Mon
golia felt particularly threatened by the Japanese. The nobles who remained in the city
and refused to acknowledge the puppet Puyi’s enthronement in Manchuria were none
theless allowed to remain in peace. Mongols who were deeply involved in politics, espe
cially those who had contact with Nanjing, felt threatened by the Japanese presence in the
city. Jagunnasutu, head of the Beiping Office of the Chahar Mongolian Political Com
mittee, capitalized on the new situation in the city, set himself up as the official repre
sentative of the Mongolian Military Government in Beiping and became an important
liaison figure with the Japanese forces in that city.
At this point, I graduated from Beiping University, long known as a center for
anti-Japanese protest. I had previously been elected president of the Beiping Mongolian
Students Association. Though it would have been prudent to flee, I was persuaded by
Jagunnasutu to remain in the city, and soon became an officer in the Beiping Mongolian
Association. Most of the Mongols in the city had great confidence in the abilities of that
organization and the Beiping Committee for Peace Maintenance to protect their interests.
Accordingly, the committee grew ever more active.
Following the Mongolian occupation of Hohhot and the news of the convocation
of a new Mongolian Congress, Jagunnasutu gathered together the Mongols in Beiping to
discuss the organization of a delegation from the Beiping Mongolian Association to at
tend the Congress. Several delegates were elected: Ao Yunzhang, Wubao, Mandaltu,
Jagunnasutu, Sangbu, Mongkebagatur (head of the Nanjing office of the Janggiya Lama),
Mergen, Li Haishan, and myself I was appointed to draft a proposal for the future gov
ernment of an autonomous Mongolia. The hopes of the Beiping Mongols were high at
this point because they could not foresee the roadblocks that were to be placed in their
way by the Japanese military authorities. The chief goal of the Beiping delegates was to
construct a new and free Mongolia. Some of the delegates were anxious to escape Beip
ing as well, where they had run into trouble with the Japanese officials. Ao Yunzhang,
Mandaltu, and especially Li Haishan, because of his previous role as leader of an antiJapanese guerrilla force, wanted to flee the ancient capital.
Because of the difficult circumstances of wartime travel, the Beiping delegates
needed three days to travel to Hohhot. Upon arrival, they found that order had been es
tablished in the city, which had been thoroughly decorated with banners and flags for the
congress. After paying a ceremonial visit to Prince De, the delegates registered for the
congress. 1 heard the latest political news from my friends Wu Heling and Wu Guting;
and like them, I was aghast at the slow progress of the Mongolian autonomy movement.
The Beiping delegates were also surprised to learn of the rising role of the manipulative
mediator Togtakhu, with the exception of Jagunnasutu, who had become friendly with
Togtakhu during the preceding weeks and had built up a private secret alliance with him.
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The Second Mongolian Congress

The Mongolian Congress began, as scheduled, on October 27, 1937. It was
characterized by the conveners as the continuation in task and in spirit of the previous
congress held at Ujumuchin. This meeting was held in the city hall at Hohhot, with 300
guests and attendees.’
Among the delegates, the ambans of the four Right Flank Banners of the Chahar
League, including Damringsurung, the amban of the Pure Yellow Banner and a long-time
ally of Fu, had refused to follow Fu Zuoyi during his retreat. Another former ally of Fu’s,
Prince Pandeigungchab, vice-head of the Ulanchab League, left Fu’s service as an antiPrince De agitator and attended the congress. Soon after his arrival, though, he was “vis
ited” by members of the Japanese Special Service Office, who threatened him if he aban
doned his former activities. When Prince De arrived in the city, however, Pandeigung
chab sought Prince De’s protection, and the Japanese soon left him alone. He was greatly
agitated by these strong-arm tactics, however, and soon after developed heart problems
and died.
Prince Yondonwangchug, discouraged by the dissolution of the Mongolian
Council at Beile-yin sume and feeling the effects of his advanced years, all but dropped
out of politics, refusing to attend the sessions and remaining at his residence without even

’ I recognized several non-Beiping delegates who were present:
1. Representatives from the Mongolian Military Government, including Prince De, Wu Heling,
Buyandalai, Altanochir, Togtakhu, Jirgalang, Khorjurjab, Tegshibuyan, Bayantai, Saijirakhu, Engkeamur, Jalgamji, Jirgalang (Ji Zhixiang), Chogbagatur, Oljeitu, Mergenbator, Khasochir, and other
senior officials.
2. Representatives from the Mongolian army headquarters, including Li Shouxin, Wu Guting, Liu
Xingan, Arbijiku, Jorigtu, Cui Qinglan, Ji Shuxun, Sainbayar, Ihengge, Buyanoljei, Tobgereltu,
Sangduureng, Jachingjab, Nomundalai, Buyandelger, Liu Jiguang, Yin Paoshan, Wang Zhenhua,
Ting Qichang, Li Xiuchun, Namur (Liu Jianhua), Golminse, and other senior officials.
3. Delegates from the various leagues, banners andx/ans:
a. Shilingol League: Rinchinwangdud, league head and jasag of the Sunid Left Banner; Sungjingwangchug, vice head of the league and jasag of Khauchid Left Banner; Tusangga, tusalagchi ot
Ujumuchin Right Banner; Dobdan, tusalagchi of Ujumuchin Left Banner; Shonodondub, jasag of
Abaga Right Barmer; Budabaia, jasag of Abaga Left Banner; Balgunsurung, jasag of Abkhanar
Left Banner; Dugursurung,yasag of Sunid Right Banner and son of Prince De; and others.
b. Chahar League: Jodbajab, league head and amban of Minggan Banner; Temurbolod, league
vice head and amban of Shangdu Banner; Serengnamjil, amban ofTaipus Left Banner; Norbuzana,
amban ofTaipus Right Banner; Mugdenbuu, amban of Bordered Yellow Banner; Yindege, amban
of Pure Blue Banner; Damrinsurung, amban of Pure Yellow Banner; Esegjirgal, amban of Pure
Red Banner; Balgunjab, amban of Bordered Red Banner; and others.
c. Ulanchab League: Babudorji, league head; Pandeigungchab, league vice head md jasag of Dorben-Keud Banner; Dewagenden, tusalagchi of the same banner; Shirabdorji, tusalagchi of Darkhan
Banner and personal representative of Prince Yondonwangchug; Chimedrinchinkhorlowa,7asag of
Muuminggan Banner; Erkedorji, tusalagchi of Urad Front Banner; Rinchinsengge, jasag of Urad
Central Banner; Jmtaibmjakirugchi of Urad Rear Banner; and others.
d. Turned Banner: Mergenbagatur (Kang Ren), Sengge, He Yunzhang and Changsen.
e. Yekejuu League: Ochirkhuyagtu,7asag of Ordos Right Rear Banner and personal representa
tive of his father; Shagdurjab, league head; and other representatives of the Ordos Banners.
4. Also in attendence were the lamas and officials of both Shireetu-juu and Udan-juu (Badgar); He
Bingwen, president of the Hohhot Committee for Peace Maintenance; Xu Ronghuo, magistrate of
Wuchuan xian, and Bao Chongxing, magistrate of Guyang xian.
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receiving visitors. The prince sent his nephew, Shirabdorji, to attend in his stead.
The Urad Front Banner, after the unfortunate Prince Shi Incident, had split into
two factions. After Fu Zuoyi’s defeat, the Gegeen and Erkedorji clique allied against
Shirabdorji (Prince Shi) and took control of the banner—hence Erkedorji’s representation
of the banner at the congress. After the death of Erkesechenjambal, jasag of the Urad
Rear Banner, his son, Gungasereng and widow, Ba Yunying, Joined the Suiyuan Mongol
ian Political Council and allied themselves with Fu Zuoyi. Leadership of the banner fell
on Juutaibao, who represented the banner at the congress. Prince De appointed Mergenbator to be amban of the Turned Banner, following the defection of the former amban,
Rong Xiang, to Fu’s side. Sengge had been an official of that banner for years. He Yunzhang, a well-connected Japanese-educated gentlemen from the Turned Banner, was ap
pointed by Fu Zuoyi to run the Hohhot woolen textile mill. He was later killed by the
Japanese for his extensive contacts with Chinese intelligence officials.
The Yekejuu Banners were in an anomalous situation: Baotou, even though oc
cupied, was not added to the league; Fu Zuoyi’s defeat temporarily stripped him of his
control over the seven banners, and it was initially unclear what their fate would be. In an
effort to bring about greater pan-Mongol unity, Prince De sought Japanese permission to
send the prince’s personal airplane to the Ordos Right Rear Banner to invite Prince Shagdurjab to attend the conference. Uncertain of the outcome, the aged Shagdurjab sent his
eldest son and jasag of the banner, Ochirkhuyagtu, to attend in his stead. Although Ochirkhuyagtu’s attendance in and of itself did not satisfy Prince De, it at least symbolized
unification of the Mongol leadership for the common goal of national reconstruction.
Delegates from both the Shireetu-Juu and Udan-juu monasteries, both of which had a
recognized special status because of their lamas and lands, also attended the congress.
The coming together of all the delegates at Hohhot was an affront to the Japan
ese, who had also assembled there. Since declarations of immediate independence went
unheeded by the Japanese, Prince De, Jirgalang, and other leaders advocated the con
tinuation of the Mongolian Military Government in an effort to make some breakthrough.
The old military government’s raison d'etre had been the use of military force to recover
Mongolian territory—a preliminary step toward the eventual building of a free Mongol
nation. Because all talk of a truly independent Mongol state had been merely tentative
under the Mongolian Military Government, Prince De and the others felt that the Japan
ese would favorably view adherence to the former government’s title. The Japanese,
however, wanted the new regime to take a new name, symbolically breaking with the
past. After a long deadlock in negotiations, the Mongols yielded, and drawing on the
unanimous support rendered to the congress by the leagues and banners, settled on the
name “Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government.”
Despite all their dealings with the Japanese, the Mongolian leadership still set
tled for autonomy, even as they had in 1933 at Beile-yin sume. This lack of progress dis
tressed Prince De and his faithful associates. The devious Togtakhu, however, won great
support from the Japanese in his role as mediator between the two negotiating parties,
and soon became known as the most reliably pro-Japanese agent in the region. The Mon
gols saw him as a worthless traitor who, by purposely misrepresenting Mongol wishes,
effectively undermined his nation’s bid for independence.
After the arrival of the Shilingol League delegates. Prince De had them relay a
message to the ranking Japanese official in Hohhot, Muratani Hikojiro: “The authorities
of the Guandong Army have clearly promised that they would support Mongolian inde
pendence. But now it appears that they oppose Mongolian national construction. This we
cannot understand. We hope that you will report these discrepancies to the Guandong
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Army; if not, then it would be better for all of us to go home.” Such protests put Muratani
in a very uncomfortable position. Previously, he had asked the Mongols to trust Japan, to
believe that Japan was interested in helping the Mongols. Having said this, Muratani had
no choice but to convey the Mongol message to the military authorities. Hereafter, his
sympathy for the Mongol cause was a major stumbling block in his career.
As soon as the staff of the Mongolian Military Government entered Hohhot,
they had immediately begun making preparations for the congress. Prince De, as general
director of the military government, issued orders to convene the Second Mongolian
Congress, and ordered establishment of a preparatory committee to draft suitable propos
als. Though as a matter of protocol the committee studied later proposals from various
delegates, the committee drafted all the important proposals later discussed by the con
gress. The congress followed parliamentary procedure, though any truly significant pro
posal needed prior Japanese approval. When the congress learned that Tojo Hideki, chief
of staff for the Guandong Army, would be attending, they delayed making any important
decisions until his arrival.
During this preparatory period, the head of the Japanese Special Service office,
Kuwabara Araichiro, announced that he detected some communistic elements among the
delegates from the Beiping Mongolian Association and that a prompt investigation was in
order. Later, Wu Guting told me that the Japanese Special Service Office had read my
proposal and had suspected it of being communistic. After further consultations with Ao
Yunzhang, Mandaltu and Jagunnasutu, I burned that proposal, at Wu’s recommendation.
My proposal had been based on the common assumption that the congress had been
called to discuss Mongolian independence; accordingly, 1 drew up a proposal for an inde
pendent state, relegating power and sovereignty to the people. Likewise, I had called for
free elections, responsible parliamentary government, and a planned economy. It was for
these reasons that Kuwabara suspected my proposals of being communistic. I called for a
unicameral parliament, built along the lines of the House of Commons, with a cabinet
responsible to parliament. Such ideas were branded communistic by the reactionary Japa
nese. Of course their criticisms were ridiculous, and this was just another example of
Japanese oppression of a subjugated people. Luckily for me, the preoccupied Japanese
authorities soon dropped the issue.
At 11:00 a.m. on October 27, 1937, the Second Mongolian Congress officially
began. Prince De, as general director of the Mongolian Military Government, delivered
the opening speech:
After the last congress at Ujumuchin, the staff of the Mongolian Military Govern
ment took upon itself the responsibility of laying the foundations for a new regime. For
over one year now, they have done their very best in this task. In these difficult days, we
have put forth great effort and sacrificed much. Today, both leaders and people work to
gether with equal effort; with the kind assistance of a friendly nation, our officers and staff
have wholeheartedly and consistently struggled for the recovery of Mongolia’s original ter
ritory north of the Great Wall, and have prepared for the establishment of a new regime.
For this purpose we have gathered together here this day to focus the wishes of both leaders
and the nation as a whole, to establish common principles for the foundation of a new na
tion. We should start this endeavor as a people forever united, with the interests of a peace
ful East Asia taken into account.
We are meeting here at the previously appointed day. The officials of all the districts,
the representatives of the military, the delegates of the Mongolian and Chinese people all
attend this great conference today with high morale. I, as General Director, must make my
happiness and gratitude manifest at this point. I especially welcome our guests from
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friendly nations who have clearly shown their desire to assist us. I, as General Director, ex
press my great appreciation and thanks at this time, especially to all of you who have at
tended this congress, which has been founded on the twin principles of anti-communism
and international cooperation. We are here to discuss the establishment of a new political
regime, to start a brilliant new era for the Mongol people, to lay new foundations for the
benefit of our people forevermore. This is my solemn hope at this time.
Following this opening speech, Prince De himself proposed eight other men to
join him as the nine chairmen of the Presidium. Seven of these were Prince Yondonwangchug, chairman of the military government; Prince Shagdarjab, vice-chairman of the
military government and head of the Yekejuu League; Li Shouxin, vice-commander in
chief of the Mongolian army; Babudorji, Ulanchab League head; Prince Rinchinwangdud, head of the Shilingol League; Wu Heling, head counselor of the military govern
ment; and Jirgalang, head of the Financial Bureau. Prince De’s nominations were unani
mously accepted by the delegates.
Though it had previously been decided that the opening session would begin at
9:00 a.m., the meeting started two hours late, because of the late arrival of Tojo. Prince
De and his associates went to the airport to welcome the important Japanese official, and
the congress waited until they returned. Tojo was a powerful man, and Prince De and his
staff felt it necessary to discuss important political matters directly with him, rather than
with lower-ranking officials who could not decide anything significant on their own
authority. Also, it was necessary to work out some preliminary agreements with Tojo
before the opening session of the congress. Tojo’s decision to attend the congress greatly
enhanced its prestige and authority. Many Mongols felt that his presence was proof of
tacit Japanese support for the basic principles of Mongolian nationhood. He himself had
insisted on appearing at the conference in a bid to win Mongolian goodwill and support
for the Japanese Empire. Representatives of the various Japanese puppet regimes also
attended and expressed their goodwill: Yuchun was Manchukuo’s official observer; Yu
Pinqing represented the Southern Chahar Autonomous Government, and Tian Rupi rep
resented the Northern Shanxi Autonomous Government.
Tojo’s speech was the highlight of the congress:
It is my great pleasure and honor to attend this preparatory conference for the estab
lishment of an autonomous Mongolian government, and to meet here this day with such an
august body of gentlemen. Last winter, during the Suiyuan War, Fu Zuoyi greatly stirred up
the military forces in Suiyuan, and took upon himself the “honorable” title of “antiJapanese hero.” The Nanjing government’s efforts at centralization grew ever more con
certed. Now, with the outbreak of this wretched war, Inner Mongolian troops have attacked
Chinese forces all across the front; they have taken cities and fortresses with great speed
and adeptness. [They have] marched forward and occupied Baotou and cut it off from the
forces of international communism! The great heroic enterprise of Mongolian self-rule has
now reached fruition!
We are now meeting in the ancient capital of the early Yuan Empire, the old city of
Guihua [i.e. modem Hohhot], once the most glorious city in the world [this is historically
an incorrect statement—author’s note]. We are now looking forward to a more glorious
reputation for the Mongol people, for a more profound happiness than they have ever had
before. I feel a great surge of ecstasy when I think of these things, more so than I have ever
felt before. Though Rome itself was not built in a day, we can, on this day, record that the
truly glorious enterprise of Mongolian national construction has reached fruition. This is
due to the year-long efforts of you unbending gentlemen, overlooking all difficulties and
persecutions. Nevertheless, there are still many problems before you; you must unite to-
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gether, putting aside small differences that divide you. Please, delegates, march unitedly
and courageously toward the goal of fortifying the new autonomous government; exert
your entire energies toward this goal. These are my heartfelt sentiments, gentlemen, and I
give you my congratulations.
After the guests had delivered their opening remarks, the opening session ended.
When the congress reconvened in the afternoon, it passed the following six items pro
posed by the Presidium:
1. To establish a Secretariat according to the Seventh Article of the Ordinance of the Or
ganization of the Second Mongolian Congress, with Togtakhu at its head.
2. To express appreciation and thanks for the cooperation of the local Suiyuan Committee
for Peace Maintenance.
3. To express thanks to the Japanese Guandong Army, for recovering Inner Mongolia’s
western territory.
4. To express thanks to the government staff and personnel because on April 24, 1936, the
First Mongolian Congress was held in Ujumuchin and led to the establishment of the Mon
golian Military Government. We owe our present accomplishments to their devoted, year
long efforts.
5. To praise the mentorious effors of Li Shouxin, vice-commander in chief of the Mongol
ian army, and all the generals and other officers who have fought in this western campaign.
They paid with much personal sacrifice to recover all our original territories.
6. To build a special shrine in honor of the casualties of the recent western campaign and to
give relief to their families.
The next day, October 28, the congress passed a proposal made by the presidium
outlining the organization of the new Mongolian Allied Leagues Autonomous Govern
ment. After passing the proposal, congress elected officers for the new government. The
presidium’s proposals, presented by Li Shouxin, received unanimous delegate approval.
Yondonwangchug, former chairman of the military government, was installed as chair
man of the new government, with Prince De as vice-chairman. Next, a congressional
declaration was passed (see below), and the wording of the Secretariat s telegram of
thanks was approved. In addition, the delegates decided to cast a medal in remembrance
of the new congress and present it to all in attendance. After the closing ceremonies, a
huge banquet was held, and then the delegates retired to the Hohhot opera house for some
entertainment.
Important Documents Passed by the Congress
I.
The Declaration of the Mongolian Congress, October 18, 732nd year of Chinggis
Khan [1937].
Mongolia has its territory, people, social organizations, as well as the glorious history
of the Yuan Dynasty. Although during the Ming period we retreated to the area north of the
desert, we have always possessed a balanced position against [the Chinese]. At the begin
ning of the Qing Dynasty, many Mongolian tribes gave their military assistance to the new
rulers; and accordingly, we Mongols were granted a fraternal position in the new empire
and were entitled to feudalistic institutions. However, we never lost our original territory,
people, and sovereignty. After the establishment of the Republic of China as a common
wealth of five peoples, we Mongols, because of our trusting and innocent nature and be
lieving that we would be treated equally, supported the Republic wholeheartedly. For over
twenty years, however, [the Chinese Government] has looked upon Mongolia as a veritable
colony; they have divided up our lands and territories, establishing new provinces and
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xians. It has not mattered which party or government has been in power—each has en

croached on our sovereignty. Because of this, the Mongols have grown ever poorer. The
traditional rights of the leagues and banners have severely declined. It has been impossible
to maintain our self-existence; how then can we speak of equality?
The masses are angered. They have foreseen the many disasters to befall us, and have
stood up to demand a greater measure of self-rule. Following much hardship, we achieved a
measure of autonomy at Beile-yin sume. Though [we] formally achieved these freedoms,
the feelings of hate and envy have continued against us. They openly granted us use of the
word “autonomy,” but then set about to destroy our [actual] autonomy.
The tyranny of the warlords and challenges from border officials have continued and
expanded with each passing day. Military pressure and economic isolation have pushed us
to the brink of national suicide. Though we Mongols sincerely supported [the Chinese Re
public] for twenty or more years, all we have gotten in return is maltreatment and discrimi
nation. If this situation continues, how then can Mongolia survive? After the [1911] revo
lution in China, the nation was divided up by warlords and civil war spread. People contin
ued to suffer, and enterprise declined. Recently, because of diplomatic failure, the nation
has been led in the wrong direction; war has broken out with neighboring countries, and the
land has once again been subdivided. The nation simply cannot protect itself. How then can
it deliver Mongolia? Recalling the actions of our ancestors, we cannot neglect our people
and wait for national extermination by passing up this opportunity. Therefore, in April of
last year, the Mongolian Congress was convened in Ujumuchin; it was decided to establish
the Mongolian Military Government and to train the Mongolian Army, to protect the nation
from the external threat of communism and to maintain peace and unification at home. An
important foundation has been laid.
This fall, war broke out between Japan and China following the incident at Lukouqiao [Marco Polo Bridge]. Border officials took advantage of the situation to take mili
tary action against us. We, the Mongols, in order to carry out a proper defense, had no
choice but to strengthen our army and prepare for war. Fortunately, because of the fine en
deavors of our soldiers and with the assistance of a friendly [Japanese] army, we have been
able to reconquer all the old Mongolian territory north of the Great Wall. Heaven has be
stowed upon us this opportunity for national revival; therefore, we [Mongols] should cou
rageously stand up and march forward for our national salvation. For this cause, delegates
from all the leagues and banners, cities and xians have convened here today in this city of
Suiyuan in order to discuss all important matters before us.
On October 28, the Second Congress, in the spirit of Chinggis Khan and in order to
cooperate with various peoples and nationalities, passed a resolution to establish the Mon
golian Allied Leagues Autonomous Government, taking originally Mongol lands as its ter
ritory. Pledged to anti-communism, the resolution outlined six important founding princi
ples: livelihood, unification, education, development, nourishment, and defense. In order to
strengthen friendliness and cooperation with neighbors and maintain the great hope of
peace in East Asia, [we] elected Yondonwangchug and Demchugdongrob as chairman and
vice chairman of the new government. The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Gov
ernment will be established at Hohhot. All our people, officials, and soldiers should unite
together in support of this new government. We also hope for assistance from sympathetic
nations, for the benefit and peace of all peoples evei^where. This will not only benefit the
Mongols, but all people everywhere. This [declaration] should be judged by both heaven
and man, and it shall stand forever and ever.
II.
The Principles of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government:
(1) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government should establish the posts of
chairman and vice chairman. The chairman and vice chairman should be selected by the
Mongolian Congress from among those prestigious and meritorious leaders who have
played a prominent role in the Mongolian national survival movement.
(2) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government should take Mongolia’s
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original territory as its own territory. At the present time, however, this will temporarily in
clude [only] Ulanchab League, Shilingol League, Chahar League, Bayantala League, Yekejuu League, and the cities of Baotou and Hohhot as the districts under its jurisdiction.
(3) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government takes defense against com
munism, and unification and cooperation of peoples and nationalities, as its basic founding
principles. The six principles of livelihood, unification, education, development, nourish
ment, and defense are the goals of the administration.
(4) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government continues to use the flag
formerly used by the Military Government.
(5) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government continues to use the chro
nology of Chinggis Khan, with months and days delineated with the solar calendar.
(6) The headquarters of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government shall be
established in Hohhot.
(7) The powers assigned to both the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
and the various local governments should be regulated by law according to the principle of
balance.
(8) The Mongolian Allied Leagues Autonomous Government’s organizational law should
be established separately.
III. The Preliminary Organizational Law of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous
Government:
(1) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government should be organized with the
following two departments, each governed by the chairman: Political Affairs Department
and General Military Headquarters.
(2) The chairman, selected by the Mongolian Congress, should serve for a five-year term.
The organization and power and function of the Mongolian Congress should be separately
decided by the law.
(3) The chairman takes all responsibility for the administration of the Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Government.
(4) The vice chairman of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government is to
support and aid the chairman; should the chairman be unable to supervise the government,
then this responsibility falls to the vice chairman. The vice chairman must be approved by
the Mongolian Congress, but the vice chairman is appointed and discharged by the chair
man.
(5) The Political Affairs Department manages governmental administration. A department
head should be established for the Political Affairs Department.
(6) The General Military Headquarters governs matters concerning the military. A com
mander in chief should be established over the General Military Headquarters.
(7) When the chairman issues orders affecting the General Military Headquarters, the
commander in chief must cosign these orders; the head of the Political Affairs Department
must cosign all others.
(8) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government establishes the position of
top advisor to the General Military Headquarters and Political Affairs Department. Each
top advisor supports and aids the chairman in political and military matters, and each
should reach mutual agreement with the chairman separately.
(9) The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government establishes counselors to
make inquiries of the chairman on important issues.
(10) The organization of the ministries of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous
Government and of the local government offices should be regulated by law.
(11) This organizational law becomes effective on the day it was issued.
As is evident, the declaration was an attempt to understand and explain the poli
tical environment that surrounded the delegates as they met to form a new future for
Mongolia. Its pro-Japanese slant was simply a matter of expediency rather than brotherly
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devotion. The organizational outline of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Gov
ernment contains some very significant details, such as Article 1 (see above). With the
death of Prince Sodnamrabdan, Prince Yondonwangchug became the most prestigious
member of Mongol society. Prince Shagdurjab was also prestigious, but was of more
limited experience; unlike Yondonwangchug, his experience was limited to the Yekejuu
League. In addition, he had not attended the congress in person. Prince Yondonwang
chug, on the other hand, had been a long time faithful supporter of Prince De. Though he
was interested in Mongolian politics, he was without political ambition. As chairman, he
would neither make an effort to become active in the daily running of government, nor
would he interfere with Prince De’s activities.
The young Prince De needed to show respect to his elders, especially the honor
able Prince Yondonwangchug; Prince De’s position as vice-chairman nonetheless al
lowed him free rein to do as he saw fit. By observing this important protocol. Prince De
made it clear that this new government was following Mongolian tradition, and the gov
ernmental outlines of the former Beile-yin sume Political Council and the Jabsar Military
Government. Recently, some people have speculated that this was originally Tojo Hideki’s idea. This, however, seems to be a propagandist distortion. Aside from the aged
Yondonwangchug, Prince De was the only prestigious and meritorious leader to have
played a prominent role in the Mongolian autonomy movement. It seems the wording of
this article was intended to place Prince De in a position of power.
Article 2 states that the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government was
to “take Mongolia’s original territory as its own territory.” Prince De and his followers
were aiming for the ideal of an independent Mongol state. The term original territory
was a flexible one, and could include anything under it from the region then under their
control, to all of Inner and Outer Mongolia, parts of Xinjiang and Kokonor (Qinghai),
Buryatia, and other previously Mongol territories absorbed into the Soviet Union. Nor did
the term original territories exclude previously Mongol territories in Manchukuo; there
fore, the Japanese were initially reluctant to agree to this article. But since the wording
was sufficiently vague and the proposal to take all these lands as Mongolian territory was
clearly preposterous, the Japanese, under persistent Mongol pressure, gave in on this
point.
Article 2 later states that initially the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous
Government would concern itself merely with areas under the control of the Ulanchab,
Shilingol, Chahar, Bayantala and Yekejuu Leagues, and the cities of Hohhot and Baotou.
This shows that despite the high-sounding proposals, the Mongol leadership had an astute
understanding of the political realities of their situation.
The Bayantala League was a new league created by Prince De at the outset of
the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government period. The League subsequently
disappeared following the end of the Second World War and collapse of the Mongolian
government. Establishment of the new league came about after long discussion among
Prince De, Wu Heling, the leaders of the Turned Banner, the four Chahar Right Flank
Banners, and the various Japanese advisors. Half of the land used by this new league
originally came from Turned.^ By the time of the establishment of the new Mongolian

^ Before the Manchu occupation of this area, the Turned had been a powerful and prestigious tribe.
After the Manchu occupation, the tribe was accused of disloyalty to the court; its feudal institutions
and self-rule were abolished, and it was placed under the control of a Manchu amban, who was
himself dominated by the Manchus. Later, following the Manchu-Jungar War, the Manchus estab-
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regime, Turned had been all but obliterated by xians.
The other half of Bayantala’s territory was the land of the four Right Flank Ban
ners of Chahar. In 1928, when the Nanjing government created the new provinces of
Chahar and Suiyuan, these lands were placed under the administration of Suiyuan. When
the new Mongol regime was in the process of being organized, the Right Flank Chahar
Banners wanted to be reorganized into the new Chahar League. At the same time. Turned
was struggling for its existence, for the restoration of its rights of administration, and for
the abolition of the xians in its midst. In reality, though, it was very difficult to put so
many Chinese settlers under the jurisdiction of the Mongol Banners. Besides, if Turned s
lands were put under the control of Ulanchab, then the total number of Chinese living
there would surpass the Mongol population in that league, destroying the traditional
Mongol nature of Ulanchab.
In addition to these contradictory factors, there were the problems of heavy
taxation and opium production in the region. The Japanese advisors proposed that the
Chinese xians already established should not be dismantled; the example of the Chahar
League should be followed instead. The xians and banners should be separated and
placed under the general supervision of the league office. It was for this reason that a new
league was established. North of Turned and south of Ulanchab, there were two great
monasteries, the Shireetu-juu and Udan-juu, both of them with lands and shabinar, or lay
disciples, under their control. Because of the strong Chinese elements in the soon-to-be
created Bayantala League, these monasteries sought incorporation in the more tradition
ally Mongol Ulanchab League. The name Bayantala means “a bountiful plain.” During
Yuan times, the administrative center of this district was Fengzhou, the “bountiful” pre
fecture.

In Article 3 of the outline, the principles of anti-communism and the unification
and cooperation of nationalities were espoused. Anti-communism was an important prin
ciple for the Japanese advisors, though it also represented the interests of the Mongol
leadership, who were horrified by conditions in the Mongolian People s Republic. The
credo “unification and cooperation of nationalities” was borrowed from the Manchukuo
regime, for whom it was an official slogan. The real goal of the Japanese was to be at the
center of things and have the other nationalities in the area—the Chinese, Koreans, Manchus, and Mongols—bound together with them in a single cooperative unit. During their
expansion into northwest China, the Japanese saw the importance of winning over the
region’s Moslems. Accordingly, they pressured the Mongols, as a subservient regime, to
adopt the Manchukuo slogan of “unification and cooperation of nationalities.” Initially,
this had not been an important point for the Mongols, though they realized the impor
tance of placating the Manchus, Moslems, and Han Chinese living under their jurisdic
tion, as well as the insistent Japanese advisors. In the end, the Mongols adopted the slo
gan, simply because there was no real reason to oppose it.

lished a new city on the eastern end of the old city of Hohhot, calling it Suiyuan. For greater secu
rity, a general was stationed there, and put in charge of the Turned,
From the middle of the Manchu period on, because of the increased number of Chinese
settlers in the area, the Manchu court established several administrative units in the area. These
gradually evolved into xians placed under the control of the governor of Shanxi Province. At the
end of the Manchu era, the number of Chinese settlers in the area greatly increased at the bidding of
the governor of Shanxi, Cen Chunxuan, and the general at Suiyuan, Yigu. The influence of these
Chinese settlers, especially in the fields of business and politics, greatly expanded as well. Fu
Zuoyi’s power base was built on this foundation.
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The six guiding principles of livelihood, unification, education, development,
nourishment, and defense were the proposals of Wu Heling. Wu later told me where he
had found these proposals. Livelihood, unification, education, and nourishment {sheng,
ju, jiao, yang) were, according to Chinese philosophy, the basic responsibilities of any
good government, common among responsible governments in ancient and modem
times. The Mongols, because of their weak national spirit, needed these basic principles
reemphasized, lest the morale of the people diminish and die. At this point, outsiders
were encroaching on the Mongol people, who were ill-prepared to defend themselves.
Obviously, self-defense was necessary to preserve the fledgling society. Hence, devel
opment and defense were added to the traditional four goals of livelihood, unification,
education, and nourishment.
Article 4 prescribes the continued use of the old Mongolian flag used by the
Mongolian Military Government. This was done to build a sense of continuity between
the old and new regimes. Details on the appearance of the flag have been covered in the
previous chapter’s section on the Mongolian Military Government.
Article 5 prescribes the continued use of the chronology of Chinggis Khan. New
chronologies, according to Chinese tradition, express independence from the old dynasty
or regime. By using Chinggis Khan’s chronology, the Mongol leadership recalled the
glorious days of the Mongol Empire.
Article 6 states that the new government was to be headquartered in Hohhot.
This had been an important city in earlier times under other names and locating there had
great political significance for the regime. Referring to it by its Mongolian name as
Koke-Khota instead of by its newer Chinese appellations—Guihua, Suiyuan, or Hohhot
(the latter being the official transliteration of Koke-Khota and the name employed in this
work)—^was an important symbolic move for the fledgling Mongol state.
Below are some important points to consider in the examination of the Prelimi
nary Organizational Law of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government:
1) Articles 1, 5, and 6 indicate that in this newly established regime, political
and military interests are divided and evenly weighted, with a system of checks and bal
ances between the administration and military. Because of this division of powers, the
civil administration could not effectively dominate the military. This plan was the pro
posal of the Japanese military authorities, who hoped to have Prince De lead the civil
administration, and Li Shouxin lead the military. Earlier, during the Military Government
period. Prince De had been both general director and commander in chief, though in real
ity, power was divided between the prince and Li. The separation of powers emphasized
in this new regime had the goal of taking away some of Prince De’s military power and
giving it to the more obedient, subservient Li Shouxin.
2) Article 8 states that “the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
establishes the position of top advisor to the General Military Headquarters and Political
Affairs Department. Each top advisor should support and aid the chairman in political
and military matters, and should reach mutual agreement with the chairman separately.”
Compare this with the corresponding article in the Preliminary Law of the Mongolian
Military Government, which reads, “An advisory office shall be established, with one
head advisor and eight to sixteen special advisors. These advisors shall be carefully se
lected by the general director and appointed by the chairman. Assistants and interpreters
shall be appointed by the general director. The administrative regulations of the advisory
office shall be decided by separate law.” This article clearly points out that the advisors
were guest officials appointed by the senior Mongol political authority.
Article 8, however, does not make clear the origins of the new top advisors.
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Though it appears that the advisors need the approval of the chairman, it was in reality
the other way around; the role of guest and host had been reversed. In other words, fol
lowing Japan’s great military victory, the power of the Mongol leaders diminished in
relation to that of the Japanese “guest” advisors. A discrepancy existed between these
provisions, which I found in the collected laws and ordinances published in 1939 by the
Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, and documents published by Zenrinkyokai, Chosa-geppo, #68, Tokyo, 1938. The first documents indicate that Article 8 of
the preliminary organizational law of the Mongolian Allied Leagues Autonomous Gov
ernment does not stipulate the need for the chairman’s separate approval for senior advi
sors.

3) The wording of Article 9, “The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Gov
ernment establishing counselors to answer the inquiries of the chairman on important
issues” indicates, on the surface at least, that counselors were the true advisors to the
chairman. Significantly, this article was placed after the article providing for special
(Japanese) advisors, indicating the primacy of the advisors over the counselors. This arti
cle was included for convenience in the arrangement and organization of personnel.
Some outstanding and potentially valuable individuals, because of various circumstances,
were effectively barred from power; the role of counselor was a nonfunctioning but hon
orable position that would keep them occupied but isolated. Wu Heling was made a
counselor in order to placate him and allow greater Japanese supremacy.

Founding of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
After a month of work following the Mongolian Congress, the Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Government was founded, on December 1, 1937, in the newly re
named Koke-Khota (Hohhot). Headquarters were set up in the old Suiyuan Provincial
Government compound, the former headquarters of Fu Zuoyi. On the same day, several
important personnel orders were issued in the name of the chairman and vice-chairman.
Prince De was appointed head of the Department of Administration, Li Shouxin as com
mander in chief, and Togtakhu as Minister of General Affairs of the Department of Ad
ministration. Jirgalang was installed as Minister of Finance, and Shonodondub as Minis
ter of Peace Preservation. On December 2, the new government appointed Temurbagatur
(a Mongol from Zhenjiang, Jiangsu province, and the nephew of Yuchun, the Manchukuo
delegate at Hohhot) as the head of the General Affairs Bureau of the General Affairs De
partment. The following four men were also appointed to the General Affairs Depart
ment: Mandaltu as the head of the Bureau of International Affairs, Jagunnasutu as head
of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, Makhashiri as head of the Legal Codification Bureau, and
Engkeamur as head of the Construction Bureau. Bayar was appointed as head of the
Taxation Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, Sangdugureng as head of the Police Affairs
Bureau of the Peace Preservation Ministry, and Jorigtu (Guan Yinnan) as head of the
Judiciary Bureau of the Peace Preservation Ministry. On the same day, league heads were
appointed: Rinchinwangdud as head of the Shilingol League, Jodbajab as head of the
Chahar League, Buyandalai as head of the Bayantala League, and Shagdarjab as head of
the Yekejuu League. He Pinwen was made mayor of Hohhot, and Liu Jiguang mayor of
Baotou.

As prescribed in Article 9 of the preliminary organizational law, counselors
were appointed. Wu Heling took the position of Chief Counselor; Khorjurjab, Buyanoljei
and Yin Baoshan also accepted counselor posts.
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The problems of personnel appointments were among the more serious issues
Prince De had to face. The General Affairs Department was the functional head of the
new government, and Togtakhu was placed in control of it, following persistent Japanese
pressure based on their mistrust of Prince De. Togtakhu, in a move to build up his power
base, pushed out Wu Heling, putting him in the weak position of counselor. The Japan
ese, ever mistrustful of Wu, actively sought his political demise. Khorjurjab was given
the post of counselor because of his loyalty and long service to Prince De; and Yin Baoshan was maneuvered into a new position as well, thus effectively cutting them all off
from the powerful military divisions nominally under their control.
Among those who came from Beiping, Jagunnasutu soon allied himself with
Togtakhu and was accordingly appointed to the position of head of the Foreign Affairs
Bureau. On the basis of Wu Heling’s recommendation, Mandaltu and Sangbu also ob
tained positions in the new government. Mandaltu was really too qualified to accept a
post in the Internal Affairs Bureau under Togtakhu, but frightened by the possibility of
falling into Japanese hands back in Beiping, he accepted the post; it offered protection, if
nothing else. Sangbu had been one of the highest ranking Chinese officers in Urga
(Ulaanbaatar) during Xu Shuzheng’s 1919-1921 occupation of Outer Mongolia. The re
luctant Ao Yunzhang, faithful to Prince De, refused any important appointment in the
new regime and returned to hiding in Beiping. The ambitious Wubao craved an important
position in the new government, but because of his incompetence, was offered only an
insignificant junior position. He had once been a Jasag\ having a keen sense of protocol,
he recognized the appointment as an insult and returned to Beiping in a fury.^ Mongkebagatur, evading the surveillance of the Japanese, made contact with the followers of the
Janggiya Khutugtu in the northwest, and Joined up with anti-Japanese forces south of the
Yellow River. On the basis both of Wu Heling’s recommendations and my father’s long
time friendship with Prince De, I was appointed as an administrative assistant to Man
daltu in the Interior Affairs Bureau. Because of this, 1 was in a good position to observe
the top leaders, and 1 clearly recall conditions surrounding the founding of the Mongolian
Allied League Autonomous Government.
Feelings of both Joy and pessimism pervaded the foundation of the new Allied
League Government. A new sense of hope had been instilled among the movement’s
leadership by the defeat of Fu Zuoyi and the unification of all of western Inner Mongolia
under one regime. Nagging worries about Japanese intentions plagued the new leaders,
however, and the new regime was in reality impotent because the Japanese effectively
controlled the Mongolian military. The Mongol leadership was concerned about the per
vasive feeling that the Japanese were conducting an anti-Mongol conspiracy, not a sit
uation conducive to optimism. At this time, I could not meet with Prince De, though I
heard from Wu Heling, Wu Guting, and Mandaltu of the leader’s concerns.
On December 14, the new government established the chairman’s secretariat
with three divisions: the General Affairs Division to handle official government docu
ments, hold the government’s official seal, and regulate accounts and other general af
fairs; the Social Relations Division to supervise community affairs, ritualistic and relig
ious matters, and normal social relations; and the Security Division to handle the gov
ernment’s bodyguards, horses, and wagons. Prince De appointed Sairjikhu as office chief
Among the secretaries, two of the perhaps more important ones were Ruiyong and KogJintei. Both were from the Dahur area in eastern Inner Mongolia. Kogjintei, introduced
’ When Prince De and a group of his associates retreated to Beiping after World War II, Wubao
used his position there to betray the prince.
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previously, does not need be discussed further here. Ruiyong, a graduate of the political
science department at Tokyo’s Waseda University, played an important role as Prince
De’s part-time translator, partially supplanting the manipulative and opportunistic Togtakhu.
The office of advisor did not appear in the Organizational Law of the Secretar
iat. Despite this, the Japanese military authorities recommended Muratani Hikojiro to be
the chief advisor to the Secretariat, and Prince De had a difficult time rejecting their of
fer. Muratani, a soft-liner on Mongolian affairs, had previously been passed over as Chief
Advisor to the Allied League Government in favor of the much more doctrinaire Kanai
Shoji. Nonetheless, the military authorities were anxious to use the good contacts Mu
ratani had established with the Mongol leaders. Both Muratani and Prince De were un
comfortable when the Japanese authorities recommended Kanai as the top advisor; Mu
ratani, interested primarily in developing sound and just relations with the Mongol peo
ple, was loathe to accept the position of informer. He intervened as little as possible in the
Secretariat, leaving affairs in Mongol hands. He acted as a mediator between Prince De
and the Japanese military authorities, supporting the prince in all things as an impartial,
concerned advisor. By so doing, he won the respect and admiration of the Mongol leaders
and was popular throughout his stay in Mongolia. He was the only advisor among many
who truly advanced the much-heralded cause of “Mongol-Japanese friendship.”
Prince De’s appointment of league heads prudently preserved the status quo.
Shagdarjab’s appointment as head of the Yekejuu League was an attempt to win the sup
port of the many Mongols living under Chinese domination. The appointment of Buyandalai as head of the Bayantala League was somewhat more complicated. Though Buyandalai could not effectively administer the newly formed league, he was a longtime sup
porter and relative of Prince De. Buyandalai had initially coveted the position of Minister
of General Affairs, but this position went to Togtakhu, at the insistence of the Japanese.
As a reward for his dedicated support of the independence movement, though, Buyanda
lai was appointed head of the newly created and wealthy league of Bayantala. He was,
however, an outsider, with roots neither in the Turned Banner nor in the four Right Flank
Banners of Chahar; thus his appointment caused much discord. In an effort to calm the
tempest. Prince De appointed a much respected Turned man, Mergenbagatur, a graduate
in political science of Beijing University, to be the league vice-head. The head of the
league’s Industrial Bureau was another Turned man, the Japanese-educated He Yunzhang, formerly director of Fu Zuoyi’s textile enterprise in the area. Chogbagatur, a
graduate of the Kuomintang Political Academy in Nanjing, was given charge of the Ci
vilian Affairs Bureau, with the responsibility to assist the neophyte Buyandalai.
Control of the Mongolian Army’s Seventh Division fell to Damrinsurung, the
most prestigious amban in the four Right Flank Banners of Chahar, a man whose political
knowledge was exceeded only by his military prestige. Fu Xiande, a graduate of the
Nanjing Military Academy, was appointed amban in his stead. In addition. Prince De
attempted to place qualified Mongols in control of the various Chinese xians in the area.
The municipal government of Hohhot was based on the now-defunct Suiyuan
Committee for Peace Maintenance, with He Bingwen appointed as mayor. A loyal fol
lower of Li Shouxin, Liu Jiguang, who was the commander of the First Division of the
Mongolian Army, was under heavy Japanese suspicion and surveillance and was pushed
out of office. Li Shouxin then recommended that Prince De appoint Liu as mayor of
Baotou. Namur (Liu Jianhua) became the new chief of police at Hohhot, and concurrently
and secretly held the position of regional agent for the Military Statistics Bureau of
Chiang Kai-shek’s Military Affairs Committee in that area.
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Following the appointment of Li Shouxin as commander in chief of the Mongol
ian Army, Wu Guting became the chief of staff, with Liu Xinghan as the vice chief of
staff. Six bureaus fell under their leadership. Li staffed the various bureaus with many of
his old Chinese followers, except for Wu Guting, Arbijikhu, Sainbiligtu, and one or two
others.
After Liu Jiguang and Yin Baoshan were released from their military responsi
bilities, control of the First and Second Divisions passed to Ding Qichang and Chen
Sheng, respectively, with Wang Zhenhua commanding the Third Division and Buyandelger remaining in control of the Fourth Division. Ihengge resigned as head of the Fifth
Division and returned home to eastern Inner Mongolia; control of the division fell to Han
Fenglou, a brother of the Kokebagatur who had been kidnapped and killed by Chinese
agents in Beiping several years before. Tobgereltu, a Kharachin man who had previously
served in the Ude-Pan^iang Defense Forces, commanded the Sixth Division after Buyanoljei was appointed counselor to Prince De.
The Seventh Division had been disbanded following its defeat at the hands of Fu
Zuoyi. The position of commander of the division remained open, however, until the di
vision was reorganized with Japanese approval under the control of Damrinsurung. Long
time Prince De supporter Sainbayar was forced out of control of the Eighth Division,
which was in turn placed under the command of Jachin^ab. Sangdugureng remained as
commander of the Ninth Division. More Mongols than Chinese populated the senior
ranks of the Mongolian Army, With so high a percentage of Mongol leaders. Prince De
could be more powerful in this governmental endeavor than his sinicized commander in
chief, Li Shouxin. This improved Wu Guting’s position as well.

Kanai Shoji and the Japanese Advisors
With the occupation of Hohhot, rumors began to circulate that Kanai Shoji had
been appointed top advisor to the Allied League Government. Despite this, however, Ka
nai failed to actually receive this post, sparking more political rumors. To counter the
gossip, the authorities appointed Muratani Hikojiro as chief advisor to the Secretariat; in
addition, they delivered their “suggestions” on other candidates for other senior advisory
posts. As suggested, Nakajima Manzo was put in as advisor to the General Affairs Min
istry, Kushibe Masateru as advisor to the Ministry of Finance, and Omada Hisayoshi as
advisor to the Ministry of Peace Preservation. Kanai soon turned up in Kalgan, and under
the pretext of being too busy there, he appointed Uyama Heishi as his deputy advisor in
Hohhot. Before long, though, Uyama was officially made top advisor to the Allied
League Government—this being the fhiit of Kanai’s devious plot to elevate himself at the
expense of the senior Mongol leadership.
Kanai planned to combine the current Mongol regime with the two puppet re
gimes in Northern Shanxi and Southern Chahar to form a new regime named the Joint
Committee of Mongolian Territory. Kanai hoped to offset the increasingly autonomous
Mongols with the other two puppet regimes. Kanai was placing himself above Takaki
Ichinari and Maejima Noboru, the senior advisors to the Southern Chahar and Northern
Shanxi regimes. By himself taking the position of senior advisor to the Allied League
Government, Kanai would have put it above the Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi
regimes; by instead putting an assistant in as senior advisor to the Allied League Mon
gols, he would be putting the Allied League Government on a par with the two puppet
regimes, and effectively would control all three himself. Kanai’s goal was to bring Prince
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De down to the same level as Yu Pinqing, the former Kalgan shopkeeper, and Xia Gong,
the tired old Confucian scholar, as ruler of a puppet regime on the same level as Southern
Chahar and Northern Shanxi. Though the Mongols knew full well what Kanai was up to,
they could not stop his formation of the Joint Committee of Mongolian Territory.
Uyama Heishi maintained a healthy distance between himself and the Mongols.
However, he also felt himself out of step with Kanai’s policies. Despite all his efforts, he
could not influence Prince De to accept Japanese orders from Kalgan; he was equally
unsuccessful at helping the Japanese understand Prince De’s opinions on points of mutual
concern. Finding himself in this difficult position, Uyama resigned his post and left Mon
golia during the winter of 1938-39. Following his departure, the Japanese appointed Itsuna Ei as the new senior advisor to the Allied League Government.
Kushibe Masateru, one of the Japanese advisors who left a good impression on
the Mongols, cooperated with Jirgalang, the minister of finance, to organize the economic
institutions of the young regime. In 1939, with the dissolution of the Allied League Gov
ernment, Kushibe resigned his post in disappointment, and left Mongolia for Shanghai.
Nakajima Manzo, because of his powerful role as advisor to the General Affairs Depart
ment, supported the devious Togtakhu, helping him to become better entrenched. The
lackluster Omada Hisayoshi failed to leave any special impression on the Mongol people;
nevertheless, his duties as advisor to the Ministry of Peace Preservation placed him in
effective control of the Allied League police forces, through which he took steps to create
a secret police force. Though he was merely doing the job he had been sent to do, these
actions provoked both Mongols and Chinese living in his Jurisdiction,

Kanai’s Plot to Create the Joint Committee
of Mongolian Territories
While Prince De and his associates were focusing their attention on domestic
problems, Kanai was winning support from the Japanese military authorities to go ahead
with his proposed organization of the Joint Committee, headquartered in Kalgan. A\^en
he realized that Prince De was furious about the plan, Kanai calmly welcomed the prince
as a delegate to the Joint Committee then being planned. Following the prince’s angry
refusal, Kanai appointed Jodbajab, the Chahar League head, to be the official representa
tive of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government to the new Joint Com
mittee of Mongolian Territories. Kanai then notified Prince De of his underling’s ap
pointment in order to force the prince to comment. On November 22, 1937, the agree
ment for the establishment of the Joint Committee of Mongolian Territories was ratified,
with Jodbajab signing as the official delegate from the Allied League Government. Yu
Pinqing was the representative from the Southern Chahar Autonomous Government, and
Xia Gong was the delegate from the Northern Shanxi Autonomous Government. The
agreement is as follows:
Article I. This Joint Committee, officially to be titled the “Joint Committee of Mongolian
Territory” [Mengjiang lianhe weiyuanhui], sets about to organize the industry, commerce,
finances, and other important affairs of the territory under its jurisdiction. All other political
regimes within this territory should surrender a measure of their power to this committee, to
allow it to exercise its authority.
Article II. The Joint Committee establishes committees for general affairs, industry, fi
nance, communications, and other important issues. These committees should be staffed by
officials dispatched from all local regimes.
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Article III. The General Affairs Committee shall represent the Joint Committee in the ad
ministration of affairs.
Article IV. The Joint Committee establishes the posts of [Japanese] top advisor, advisors,
and consultants.
Article V, The decisions of the Joint Committee must be agreed to by its members, as well
as the top advisors and other related advisors. The Committee’s decisions are then consid
ered ratified.
Article VI. The Joint Committee is to issue ordinances concerning its administration and
control. All regimes are then required to observe these ordinances.
Article Vll. The Joint Committee’s finances are to be provided separately by the three po
litical regimes.
Article VIII. The Joint Committee, at the request of the three regimes, shall administer their
common properties.
Article IX. This committee shall not be permitted to disband save with the permission of all
three regimes.
Article X. This agreement shall be written in Japanese, Chinese, and Mongolian. Should
there be any disagreement between the three texts, then the Japanese text shall be consid
ered official.
signed this 22 November,
26th Year of the Republic of China
732nd Year of Chinggis Khan at Kalgan.
After signing this agreement, Kanai nominated officers for the new committee.
Kanai, of course, was put in as top advisor and chairman of the General Affairs Commit
tee. Jodbajab, Yu Pinqing, Xia Gong, Togtakhu, Altanochir, Du Yunyu, and Ma Yongkui
were appointed to the General Affairs Committee. The Industrial Committee consisted of
Togtakhu, Yu Pinqing, and Ma Yongkui. Togtakhu, Altanochir and Du Yunyu headed up
the Transportation and Communications Committee. The Monetary Committee consisted
of Du Yunyu and Ma Yongkui, under the direction of Muratani Hikojiro.
As can easily be seen, Kanai Shoji held the balance of power in the new Joint
Committee. All other committee members and consultants were office holders in name
and title only; real power lay in Kanai’s hands. The three Mongols holding positions on
the Joint Committee—^Altanochir, Togtakhu and Jodbajab—served at the bidding of Ka
nai, without need for the approval of Prince De. Though he did not really approve of
them. Prince De was forced to accept the fait accompli of their appointment. Sadly,
though, by letting these Mongol leaders drift into the Japanese camp, Prince De was in
effect encouraging others to defect too. Kanai did all he could to elevate Jodbajab, and
seemed to be systematically turning him into a new, subservient yes-man to take over in
the new Mongolian puppet regime from Prince De. It had become obvious to Kanai that
Prince De would persist in his stubborn opposition to the Joint Committee and that a
more compliant Mongol “leader” would be needed.
Following the formation of the Joint Committee, a new name for Mongolia en
tered the East Asian lexicon—Mengjiang. The Japanese called the region Mokyo. The
Joint Committee was thus called the Mengchiang or Mokyo regime, to the consternation
and detriment of the now-weakened Allied League Government. Politically, the Meng
jiang Committee took the place of the Allied Leagues Government in dealing with for
eign interests. Domestically, too, it effectively controlled the situation in finance, trans
portation, and communication. The committee did whatever it could to aid Japan in its
rapid expansion and quest for raw materials. Soon the committee opened the Mengjiang
Bank, the Mengjiang Railway Bureau, the Longyan Iron Mine (in Xuanhua), the Datong
Coal Mine, the Mengjiang Daily News, and the Mongolian Wool and Hide Export Coop-
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erative, all centered in Kalgan. Politically and economically, Kalgan became the regional
center, overshadowing Hohhot, which soon came to be regarded as the unofficial head
quarters of a second-rate political regime. Clearly, a political battle was heating up be
tween Kanai and the prince, a confrontation that Prince De sadly seemed fated to lose.
Soon after the establishment of the Joint Committee, the Mengjiang Bank was
formally chartered, with assets totaling twelve million Mengjiang yuan, the yuan being
almost equal in face value to the Japanese yen. Most of these assets came from two
smaller banks in Chahar and Suiyuan which had been taken over by the Mengjiang Bank.
Some assets had also been transferred from the Shanxi Provincial Bank. This bank soon
became intimately associated with Japanese political power in Mongolia.
In an effort to win the goodwill of the Mongols, the Japanese authorities dis
cussed with Prince De the possibility of giving Sainbayar the position of General Director
of the Mengchiang Bank, with the assistance of Yamada Moichi. The prince agreed, but
unfortunately, Sainbayar, unfamiliar with the complexities of modem finance, was com
pletely dominated by Yamada and soon became nothing more than a figurehead. Because
only a handful of Mongols had studied modem finance, the Mongols had little recourse to
forestall this blatant Japanese domination of their economy.
After having been relieved of his military responsibilities, Sainbayar used his
poor eyesight as a pretext to avoid becoming openly involved in politics. However, this
does not mean that he eschewed politics; he remained one of Prince De’s more influential
personal advisors, though he had no official title. Remaining in Beiping, he contacted
officials of the Soviet consulate there to discuss the possibility of using Soviet and Outer
Mongolian assistance to counter the Japanese presence in Inner Mongolia. It is difficult to
determine whether Prince De approved of these actions or not, though some degree of
complicity seems likely. Sainbayar soon fell under Japanese suspicion, though the Japa
nese were unable to prove any wrongdoing on his part. Before he passed away in 1938,
he discussed with Prince De the possibility of using the prince’s plane to defect to the
Mongolian Peoples Republic. However, realizing that this would surely have a negative
effect on the Mongolian cause. Prince De was able to discourage Sainbayar from making
this adventurous move. It thus appears that Prince De at least knew of Sainbayar’s Soviet
contacts.

Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Mongolia
Soon after the establishment of the Joint Committee, the Japanese Army estab
lished its new headquarters in Mongolia, and its commander in chief and staff began to
manipulate the Mengjiang regime. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Japanese
western campaign was carried out by both the Guandong and North China Armies. The
North China Army originally had no contact with the Mongolian independence move
ment; but the opposite was true of the Guandong Army, which had long championed the
notion of Mongolian autonomy. The Guandong Army became the new Japanese Army in
Mongolia and was placed under the authority of the North China Army. Cut off from the
more sympathetic Guandong Army, Prince De and the Mongolian autonomy movement
fell onto hard times in the face of the ascendancy of the North China Army.
The Japanese Army in Mongolia was formally organized on January 1, 1938.
Important personnel included Lieutenant General Hasunuma Shigeru as commander in
chief. Major General Ishimoto Torazo as chief of staff, Lt. Colonel Okabe Eichi as staff
director for warfare. Lieutenant Colonel Ohashi Kumao as staff director for intelligence.
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and Lieutenant Colonel Nakamura Gijuro as staff director for political affairs. All had
been formerly attached to the Guandong Army.
On January 4, the new Japanese Army in Mongolia issued a proclamation in the
name of the Emperor of Japan, directed to the peoples and territories under its domain. It
reads as follows:
Article I: Order and peace should be maintained by the commander in chief of the army
stationed in Mongolia, in the areas of Inner Mongolia, Southern Chahar, and Northern
Shanxi.
Article II: The combat zone for the army stationed in Mongolia and the Guandong Army
shall be composed of Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, and Chahar province. The North China
Army is to take control of areas south of the Great Wall, including the two provinces of
Suiyuan and Shanxi,
The Japanese Army in Mongolia had previously (on December 24, 1937) issued
a communique entitled “Important Outline for Chinese Incidents” regarding political
policy in the region just before the establishment of its headquarters. The document
pointed out that “at a suitable time. Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi should be uni
fied with the North China political regime, the preliminary government of the [new] Re
public of China.”'* Of course this policy was initiated by the North China Army and, in a
bid for compromise, was agreed to by the Guandong Army. The principle behind the
communique was the separate existence of the three so-called Mengjiang regimes, agreed
to in principle by Prince De. This basic policy was anathema, however, to the powerful
Kanai Shoji, who had gone to great lengths to arrange for the Joint Committee’s unifica
tion of the three regimes. At the same time, however, in a bid to support the newly or
ganized pro-Japanese North China regime, Kanai announced that his Joint Committee
was still a part of China, and had not been established with the goal of Mongolian inde
pendence in mind.
Naturally, these negotiations were strictly confidential. Had Prince De and the
other Mongol leaders been aware of them, perhaps they could have persuaded the provi
sional Chinese government in Beiping to press for the dissolution of the Mengjiang re
gime and the incorporation of Northern Shanxi and Southern Chahar into their govern
ment. This would have left a separate (and hence more likely to be independent) Mon
golia. At the very least, such a move would have increased Prince De’s power base.
However, the Japanese officials had decided to keep the Mongol leaders uninformed.
Wang Kemin, head of the North China regime, did not know Prince De’s feelings on this
subject, and so complied with the Japanese demands. Nonetheless, Wang Kemin, reluc
tant to incorporate Northern Shanxi and Southern Chahar into his new regime, remained
sympathetic to the idea of Mongolian autonomy.
The Japanese remained antagonistic to the development of real autonomy for
Mongolia, and they sought to use Inner Mongolia’s desire for independence to further
their own ends. With Kanai’s incorporation ploy temporarily set aside, the Japanese re
quested Chinese recognition of Mongolian sovereignty, ironically based on the principles
of Mongolian self-determination. On January 2, 1938, a solution was presented to China
and Japan by Dr. Todmann, the German Ambassador to China who had volunteered his
services as a mediator at the outset of the war. Article V of the solution states that “an

■* See Morimazu Shisao, “Mokyo Hachinen no Mamori—Chumogun no Rekishi," Omoite no Naimoko (Tokyo, 1975), p. 32.
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independent government should be established in Inner Mongolia.” The Chinese refused
to respect such blatant Japanese manipulation. Undoubtedly, the terms of this peace treaty
were decided upon by the Japanese, prior to the formation of the headquarters of the
Japanese Army in Mongolia.

The Death of Prince Yondonwangchug and
Prince De’s Appointment to the Chairmanship
Prince Yondonwangchug’s health declined, and disadvantaged by his advanced
age and Buddhist lack of interest in worldly affairs, as well as his distrust and abhorrence
of the Japanese, he played a relatively passive role in Mongolian politics. He had even
avoided the important preliminary meetings at Jabsar and Hohhot, and though elected to
the chairmanship, he always left the daily matters of administration to the younger and
more active Prince De. He was, nonetheless, a very popular individual, and his support
lent great prestige and acceptance to both Prince De and the government of the Allied
Leagues in Hohhot, especially among the leagues and banners outside Shilingol and Chahar.

• uj
u
On March 20, 1938, Prince Yondonwangchug died at his home. Shirabdorji, the
late Prince’s nephew, left Prince Yon’s official residence to give a personal report of his
death to Prince De and to present him with a copy of Prince Yon’s will as dictated to his
daughter. The following is a translation of the will from the Chinese.
From my youth, I have always taken the recovery of the Mongol people and nation as my
personal goal. Even as an old and tired man, 1 have persisted in this calling, never releasing
myself from these endeavors. Unfortunately, I am now gripped with a deadly disease, ^d
there is no hope for my recovery. I sincerely hope that all the civilian and military officials
under our vice-chairman, the leaders of all the leagues, banners, cities, and xians, together
with the nation as a whole, cooperate with a spirit of love. Working together with other
peoples and nations, march forward for the reconstruction of our people. Be diligent in the
great task of national construction.’
It is impossible to obtain a copy of the prince’s will in Mongolian, and even the
origin of the Chinese translation is obscure. His exhortation to “cooperate with a spirit of
love [and] work together with other peoples and nations” was a meaningful and symbolic
phrase. Perhaps Prince Yondonwangchug had felt that the failure of die Mongolian Poli
tical Council at Beile-yin sume was a result of the plotting of Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi.
Nevertheless, it was internal disunity that ultimately had destroyed the council. The
struggle continued after the Japanese occupation. This malicious plotting, backed by for
eign elements, disappointed Prince Yon greatly. He included warnings against this in his
final will, in an effort to increase love and cooperation. His plea to cooperate with other
peoples and nations was probably a reference to the East Asian situation of the time.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that he did not specifically refer to Japan or any
other bordering nation.
After news of Prince Yondonwangchug’s death reached Hohhot, Prince De left
for the official funeral. Upon his arrival, he delivered one simple phrase of condolence—
’’Where, then, shall I go?” In light of the long-term cooperation between the two princes.

’ Menggu lianmeng zizhi zhengfu fating huibian (Collection of Laws and Orders of the Mongolian
Allied Leagues Autonomous Government).
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these words represent Prince De’s heartfelt mourning for his departed friend and ally.
According to Mongolian tradition, the mourning continued for one hundred days; Prince
De thus refused to accept the post of chairman until July 1 of that year, when the Third
Mongolian Congress convened and elected him chairman.

Wu Heling’s Japanese Exile
Another problem that greatly agitated Prince De was the position of Wu Heling.
Wu had been placed in important and trusted positions following his return from Nanjing,
and had played an important role in drafting many of the important plans for Mongolian
autonomy. Nevertheless, he was continually under Japanese suspicion, and frequently
attacked by Altanochir and Togtakhu. He roused Kanai Shoji’s anger by guiding Prince
De into leading the Mongolian resistance to Kanai’s plans. As evidence of his slipping
political fortunes, Wu’s name was not included in the official proceedings of the Second
Mongolian Congress at Hohhot. With the organization of the Allied League Government,
Wu was given an “honorable” though powerless position as head of the Committee of
Counselors. Secretly, he still influenced Prince De on important matters, a fact that
greatly agitated the Japanese.
In an effort to dispose of the troublesome Wu, Kanai asked the military to per
suade him to go to Japan as a private citizen, there to devote himself to the study of Japan
and the Japanese mind, so that when he eventually returned to Mongolia, he would be
able to help build Mongol-Japanese relations. This was the superficial reason for Wu’s
involuntary Japanese exile. In reality, Kanai needed to dispose of him so he could build
and develop the new Mengjiang regime unhindered. Realizing the difficulties he faced.
Prince De encouraged Wu to accept the invitation and go to Japan. He instructed Wu to
undertake a secret mission there to try to weaken the new Mengjiang Committee in Japan
and to unofficially represent the Allied League Government in Tokyo.
The Allied League Government promised Wu a secretary if he went to Japan; a
Japanese advisor/assistant, Yamamoto Nobunaga, would also accompany him. Wu, real
izing that he had no choice, left Hohhot for Beiping on his way to Japan. While in Beiping, during the spring of 1938, Wu contacted several young Mongolian intellectuals in a
futile attempt to find a secretary to accompany him. Finally, he asked me to accompany
him, and because I was related by marriage, I could not refuse. Leaving Beiping in April,
we sailed to Japan via Tanku. I spent one and one-half years with him in Japan. Since
there was much free time to talk, I was able to learn many political secrets from Wu. To
gether, we began graduate school at Tokyo’s Waseda University. Still, these were not
happy times for me; I found the elderly Wu’s way of thought, principles, and lifestyle
uncomfortably different from my own. Accordingly, in the fall of 1939, I resigned my
post of secretary and left Wu’s company. From that point onward, we two were unable to
cooperate freely, even on matters of mutual interest, like the Mongolian independence
movement.
Despite my departure, Wu Heling stayed in Tokyo until the spring of 1941.
During this time, he was permitted two visits to Mongolia. During the first half of his stay
in Japan, when I accompanied him, things were arranged by Oshima Yutaka, a member
of the governing board of Zenrin Kyokai. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also appointed
Nakane Naosuke to help coordinate matters. Formerly, Nakene had been stationed in
Ulan-khada (Chifeng) as a consul, and thus was acquainted with Mongolian affairs.
While in Japan as Wu’s secretary, I had the opportunity to meet many prominent
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Japanese people, including some members of the government, such as Tojo Hideki, Araki
Sadao (former minister of the army), Hirota Koki (later to be prime minister), Toyama
Mitsuru (leader of the Kokuryukai), Kasame Yoshiaki (a leading right-wing philosopher),
Hayashi Senjuro (former viceroy of Korea and former prime minister), Matsui Iwane
(former commander in chief of Japanese military forces in China), and Lieutenant Gen
eral Yanakawa Heisuke (head of the Board for the Development of Asia). I followed Wu
in his travels to the eastern and northern regions of Japan, including places like Hokkaido
and Sakhalin.
During his stay in Japan, Wu always emphasized the need for Mongolian inde
pendence to every Japanese leader that he met. He also established contact with other
Mongol leaders and students in Japan. At that time, over one hundred Mongols were liv
ing in Japan, most of them from territories included in Manchukuo; the rest were dis
patched by the Allied League Government. The eldest of the Mongols in Tokyo was Oljei
(Shi Yunqing), a professor of Mongolian at the Tokyo Academy of Foreign Languages
(the present Tokyo University for Foreign Studies) from Kharachin. Though uninterested
in politics, he made great efforts to help his fellow countrymen in Japan. Oyundalai, a
counselor at the Manchukuo Embassy in Tokyo, was assigned to supervise the Mongol
students from Manchukuo. Ashkan, a young Mongol officer in the Manchukuo Army
who was studying at the Japanese Army War College, greatly influenced his fellow Mon
gols. Prince Yondansangbu,_/a5ag of the Turned Left Banner, was also a student at Waseda University.

Prince De’s Election to the Chairmanship and the Reorganization
of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
The Third Mongolian Congress was held at the Hohhot city hall at the beginning
of July 1938. On July 1, Prince De was unanimously elected to the chairmanship of the
Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government. With Prince De’s support, Li Shouxin was elected as vice chairman. Both were immediately inaugurated, and an official
inaugural declaration was then issued by Prince De, as follows:
I, [Demchugdongrob], the vice chairman, am both honored and glorified by the congress in
their support of my election to the chairmanship of the Mongolian Allied League Autono
mous Government. I consider myself both less prestigious and less capable [than my late
predecessor], and am afraid that I may be unable to accomplish this heavy assignment.
Nevertheless, I will follow the fearless example of our great ancestor, Chinggis Khan, and
the [exemplary] will of our predecessor. Prince Yondonwangchug. Remaining true to this
mission that you, the congress, have given me—and adhering to the basic principles of anti
communism, unification, and cooperation of nationalities, as well as the six guiding princi
ples of livelihood, unification, education, development, nourishment, and defense—I will
not shirk from these difficulties; neither will I complain in this task. 1 shall rather rush to
ward these goals. [I] sineerely hope that all the honorable guests from friendly countries
will, in the spirit of mutual assistance and peaceful coexistence, faithfully deliver their in
struction and help us. Also, 1 look forward to the entire nation striving together in this great
enterprise of national construction and the realization of peace in East Asia. Seas may dry
and stone erode, but my determination will never change or weaken. This should be real
ized and accepted by both heaven and earth, and by gods and men.
This statement emphasizes how fully Prince De realized the many obstacles in
the way of Mongolian nationhood. His emphasis on the great enterprise of national con-
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struction bespeaks his unbending will. He spoke sternly on the subject because there was
simply nothing else left for him to do.
After his inauguration as Chairman, Prince De announced that in order to deal
with some personnel problems that had hindered the new regime, he would personally
lead the Political Affairs Department, and that Vice-Chairman Li Shouxin would be
Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian Army. Prince De then examined the function and
organization of the government, spending one month reflecting on the changes needed.
He placed the Political Affairs Department under the direction of the Chairman, then
added four ministries to the General Affairs Board: Civilian Administration, Finance,
Animal Husbandry, and Peace Preservation. Should the head of the Political Affairs De
partment be unable to function, then control of the department was to shift to the head of
the General Affairs Board. Should the head of the General Affairs Board be unable to
function, then the chairman was to appoint one of his ministers to rule in his stead. Five
bureaus were attached to the General Affairs Board: Personnel, Accounting, General Af
fairs, Planning, and Foreign Affairs. Three bureaus were added to the Civilian Adminis
tration Ministry: Internal Affairs, Education, and Construction. Two bureaus were added
to the Ministry of Finance: Financial Affairs and Taxation. The bureaus of Husbandry
and Grazing Management were added to the Ministry of Animal Husbandry. Likewise,
the bureaus of Police Administration and Jurisdiction were established in the Ministry of
Peace Preservation.
This reorganization limited the function of the General Affairs Board to purely
internal matters of the Political Affairs Department, with the nominal exception of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau. The three internal affairs bureaus were moved from the General
Affairs Board to the newly created Ministry of Civilian Administration. The Ministry of
Animal Husbandry was established to enrich the various leagues and banners and to im
prove the pastoral zones. It also attempted to safeguard against Chinese extortion in the
animal economy and to raise the standard of living of the herding population. The Japan
ese supported the formation of this ministry because it would increase their control over
the domesticated animals of Mongolia and the local supplies of hides, horses, and wool
for military use. The Accounting Bureau of the former Ministry of Finance was placed
under the control of the General Affairs Board. The overall function of the Peace Preser
vation Ministry remained unchanged. Togtakhu remained head of the General Affairs
Bureau, and Tegshibuyan (formerly head of the Ministry of Peace Preservation) was ap
pointed Minister of Civilian Administration. Jirgalang remained as Minister of Finance.
Khorjurjab took control of the Ministry of Animal Husbandry, whereas Shonnudongrob,
jasag of Right Abaga Banner of the Shilingol League, became Minister of Peace Preser
vation.
Beside these boards and ministries, some other organizations were also placed
under the Political Affairs Department. Some had been established early in the era of the
Military Government; some were established only after Prince De’s inauguration as
Chairman. Minister of Finance Jirgalang also served as director of the Bureau of Taxa
tion, in charge of enforcing the prohibition against the opium trade and regulating the
administration of salt taxes and customs fees. Prince De himself headed the Planning
Committee of the Political Affairs Department; Li Shouxin chaired the Committee of
Land Administration. The leaders of the General Wireless Bureau and Bureau of Domesicated Animal Veterinarians were also appointed. Altanochir, because of his ties to the
Joint Committee, did not receive a new appointment; and Enkeburin, sent as the Mongol
ian representative to Manchukuo, was stationed in the Manchukuo capital of Xinjing
(Changchun).
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Changes were made in the league offices as well. League heads were to follow
the direction of the head of the Political Affairs Department in enforcing law and order in
their various leagues. League offices were to house the league head, league vice head,
and bureau chiefs. League heads were to direct and supervise bothyasags and ambans, as
well as magistrates in the xians. Also, league heads were empowered to overrule orders
of the magistrates, ambans, and jasags in time of crisis. League heads also had the right
to request dispatch of peacekeeping troops from either the local military commander or,
in less serious cases, the Political Affairs Department. The vice head was to help his su
perior in the routine administration of the league, and was to assume the head’s position
if necessary. Each league office consisted of a secretariat and three bureaus: Civilian
Administration, Animal Husbandry, and Peace Preservation. Some leagues, under the
direct supervision of the Political Affairs Department, were prohibited from having Ci
vilian Affairs Bureaus. Their affairs were directly managed by the league secretariats.
Political power in Mongolia emanated from the various leagues and banners,
and the chief goal of the Mongolian independence movement was to protect the basic
rights of the leagues and banners. In 1931, the Nanjing government, after consultation
with some Mongol leaders, had promulgated the Organizational Law of Mongolian
Leagues, Tribes, and Banners. Deemed inappropriate by Prince De and the majority of
the conservative Mongol elements, this law never took effect. The Mongolian Political
Council at Beile-yin sume, on the other hand, sought to protect the power and rights of
the leagues and banners. After the Prince Shi Incident, the Mongolians were locked on a
collision course with Fu Zuoyi. Later, when Chahar was upgraded from a tribe to a
league, its Chinese xians were placed under the direct control of the league office. How
ever, throughout the Military Government era, no organizational laws were issued, nor
were any new governmental institutions organized.
The Mongols were reluctant to create new organizations that could be used
against them by the manipulative Japanese. After the formation of the Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Government, the organizational laws of the two cities of Baotou and
Hohhot were promulgated within a month, whereas the organizational laws of the leagues
and banners were issued a full ten months later. This delay occurred because the newly
established Bayantala and Chahar Leagues needed organizational laws, whereas the
older, more established leagues such as Shilingol and Ulanchab were better able to gov
ern themselves during the interim. Yekejuu was also more self-sufficient, mainly because
most of its territory was outside of the regime’s boundaries. It was the three completely
Mongolian leagues—Yekejuu, Ulanchab and Shilingol—that were without Civilian Ad
ministration Bureaus. This was done in order to preserve the cultural integrity of these
largely traditional leagues. Peacekeeping forces under the various league bureaus of
peace preservation were managed under the traditional militaryyfriag system carried over
from the Manchu period, as well as the officer-commandant system established by the
Nanjing regime.

Problems with the Japanese Advisors
As mentioned, Japanese advisors were unavoidable for both the Political Affairs
Department and the various league offices. While Prince De was able to avoid including
in the articles of government specification of which advisor should serve where, he was
unable to avoid the provisions that called for advisors. There was really no way for Prince
De, or any other Mongol leader, to do without advisors altogether. In an effort to regulate

X: The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government

197

the roles of the advisor, the government issued an Organizational Law of the Department
of Advisors in the early days of the regime. The following are its terms:
Article I: In the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, the role of top advisor
shall be created for the purpose of assisting the government.
Article II: The department of advisors shall consist of the advisors to the government, the
league advisors, city and xian advisors, as well as assistants and directors [for police ad
ministration and peacekeeping].
Article III: The staff and personnel of the Department of Advisors shall be decided upon by
the top advisor.
Article IV: Personnel above the position of director shall be nominated by commander in
chief Hasunoma [of the Japanese Army in Mongolia], then appointed by the chairman of
the Allied League Government.
Article V: The top advisor shall control the department of advisors and is in charge of per
sonnel arrangements.
Article VI: Advisors to both the Allied League Government and the various leagues shall,
in their specialized fields, have the responsibility to manage and supervise affairs.
Article VII: The chief advisor in each league shall direct all advisors [attached to the
league] and is responsible for assisting and guiding league administration.
Article VIII: The advisors to the cities and xians shall be under the direction of the senior
advisors and shall assist the magistrates in the administration of their municipalities.
Article IX: The assistants are under the direction of the advisors and shall assist them in
their duties.
Article X: The department of advisors may, in times of necessity, establish assistant staff.
Article XI: Any assistant staff shall be decided upon by the top advisor.
Article XII: Further regulations for the department of advisors shall be decided upon sepa
rately.
Article XIII: This organizational law shall be considered effective from the day when it was
issued.
This organizational law is in accord with Article VII of the Outline of the Or
ganization of the Mongolian Military Government, which states that “an advisory office
shall be established, with one head advisor and eight to sixteen special advisors. These
advisors shall be carefully selected by the general director and appointed by the chair
man. Assistants and interpreters shall be appointed by the general director. The adminis
trative regulations of the advisory office shall be decided by separate law.”
Obviously, the power of the Japanese advisors had greatly increased compared
to what it had been during the Mongolian Military Government era. During the Military
Government period, these advisors were chosen by the general director (Prince De), at
least nominally, and were appointed by the chairman; they were still formally considered
foreign guest employees, working in Mongolia on an ad hoc basis. Under the new regu
lations, however, even the lowest advisor was recommended by the commander in chief
of the Japanese Army in Mongolia and appointed by the chairman. They were no longer
considered ad hoc foreign guest employees. Logically, the articles should have been con
sidered null and void with the departure of Hasunoma. Hence it is easy to see the growing
arrogance and pride of the Japanese advisors.
Article II mentions the various categories of advisors, though not the advisors to
the banners. This was a result of stem resistance by Prince De and the other Mongol
leaders. Superficially, they argued against the inclusion of the banner advisors because
the ongoing reorganization of the banners was not yet complete, and there was no need to
appoint advisors. The Mongol leaders conceded to the Japanese demands regarding the
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attaching of advisors to the xians but would not compromise on the issue of advisors for
the banners. The issue of league and banner advisors will be discussed later.
Article II made it appear that the advisors were to be outside of the superstruc
ture of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government. After all, advisors by
definition are outside the structure of government. Logically, their duties were confined
to helping or assisting the existing government; they were not to take a direct role in ad
ministrative matters. Prince De was adamant that Japanese not be appointed as officials
of the new government, but merely as advisors outside the government superstructure.
Japanese assistants and directors therefore remained under the control of the Department
of Advisors and were not considered staff of the Allied League Government. This regu
lation was maintained throughout the duration of the Allied League Government. In the
Organizational Law, the duty of the advisors was limited to providing guidance, with the
exception of the advisors attached to the cities and xians, who also had administrative
responsibilities. Although the real difference between providing guidance and direction is
slight, it nonetheless was a small victory for the Mongols to limit the legal tole of the
advisors to providing guidance.
Soon afterward, the Japanese rearranged their advisory personnel in Mongolia.
Uyama Heishi and Nakajima Manzo remained as chief advisor and advisor to the General
Affairs Board respectively. A new advisor, Araikawa Kanetasuku, was appointed to the
Civilian Affairs Ministry, and Itsuna Ei, a retired Major General of the Japanese Army,
was appointed advisor to the Ministry of Animal Husbandry. This high-level appointment
indicated the importance the Japanese placed on the Mongolian livestock industry. Kushibe Masateru remained in his role as advisor to the Ministry of Finance; Omada Hisayoshi remained advisor to the Ministry of Peace Preservation.
The Mongol leaders were reluctant to reorganize the various league organiza
tions, though this was very much needed because it would give the Japanese new oppor
tunities to increase their control over the league governments. The danger of expanding
Japanese influence was especially serious in the Bayantala and Chahar Leagues, where
there were many Chinese xians, each with an influential Japanese advisor. Prince De and
his Mongolian advisors had permitted the Chinese to deal with the Japanese separately,
without the participation of the Mongols. Because relations between Mongols and Chin
ese in the region had been strained for years. Prince De was eager to reduce the likeli
hood of fijrther conflict. Unfortunately, the Mongols could not reject the introduction of
Japanese advisors. For many Mongols, this situation brought to mind the ironical condi
tions of the Mongols’ Yuan Dynasty, in which the Mongols used Khitans, Uighurs, and
other Central Asians in their administration of China.
Japanese advisors had already been active in Chahar trom the time the league
was organized in 1935. The chief advisor to the Chahar League was Anzai Kinji, who has
been mentioned several times before. While serving as advisor to Chahar, Anzai was as
signed to head the Occupational Administration of the Japanese Army in North China.
After appointing magistrates for the conquered xians, he felt out with Prince De and, dis
enchanted, resigned. Kangyu Kosaburo then became advisor to the Chahar League and
served in that capacity until the end of World War II.
The chief advisor of the Bayantala League was Sawai Tetsuba, a member of the
Kokuryukai and a disciple of both the well-known right-wing philosopher Kasame Yoshiaki, and the godfather of the Kokuryukai, Toyama Mitsuru. Despite his ties to the
Japanese equivalent to the Mafia, Sawai was a moderate man of integrity who sought to
deal justly with the Mongols and Chinese in the league. He kept his post as advisor to the
Bayantala League until the winter of 1941.
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Bordering on Outer Mongolia, Shilingol, Prince De’s home league, was consid
ered strategically important, and thus drew attention from both the Guandong Army and
the Japanese army in Mongolia. In a move to strengthen the Special Service Office at
Pandita-Gegeen-Keid (Beizimiao, present-day Shilinhot), the Japanese appointed retired
army colonel Nakamura Asakichi to head the office and serve as chief advisor to the
league. Nakamura was a political moderate who sought to interfere as little as possible in
league administration, avoiding conflict with the league head, Rinchinwangdud, and vice
head, Sungjingwangchug.
Two of the earliest Japanese agents to arrive in Mongolia were Nakajima Manzo
and Yamamoto Nobunaga. Nakajima was a skilled but over zealous politician who, be
cause he was able to win support from the military, was appointed to the prestigious post
of advisor to the General Affairs Board. Yamamoto, who was chief advisor to the Ulanchab League, was a zealous, hot-tempered advocate of Mongolian independence, a selfstyled romanticist and Moko ronin (Mongolian ronin). He insisted on gathering around
him only Japanese who held similar views. Because Yamamoto and his associates spoke
some Mongolian, they tended to view themselves as being more integrated than they
really were! This caused some conflict with local Mongol leaders.
The Yekejuu League was in unusual circumstances. During Japan’s westward
advance, it occupied some of the territory of the Ordos Left Banner along the Yellow
River, commonly known as Jungar, and some of the territory of the Ordos Right Rear
Banner, commonly called Dalad. After the advance halted, and during the Second Mon
golian Congress, Prince De had sent his airplane to bring the league head, Shagdurjab, to
Hohhot; the old league head sent his son, Ochirkhuyagtu, and other delegates, in his
stead. The Japanese had stopped their advances with the return of Ochirkhuyagtu and the
other delegates, allowing Fu Zuoyi to establish a stronghold at Shanba, a well-known
breadbasket at the bend of the Yellow River.
The unsettled situation at Yekejuu had been eased by the reestablishment of the
Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council at Ejen-khoroo, the shrine of Chinggis Khan. West
of Baotou, the Japanese forces soon bordered on the Ordos Right Rear Banner, com
monly known as Khanggin, the homeland of Prince Altanochir, vice-head of the Yekejuu
League. Altanochir then sent a message to Prince De asking for troops to help him break
away from Fu Zuoyi’s control and join the Mongol autonomy movement. Prince De re
sponded favorably, overlooking Altanochir’s previous disloyalty to the Mongol cause and
former friendship with Fu Zuoyi. In the spring of 1938, they dispatched a cavalry brigade
under Chief Tumenbayar, which entered the Khanggin Banner and brought Altanochir to
Baotou, where Prince De conferred on him the posts of vice-head of the Yekejuu League
and charge d’affaires under the league head. Soon after, because Prince Shagdurjab was
failing in his responsibilities, Altanochir was appointed League Head. At this point, Ku
rosawa Ryukichi, an expert in land administration, was appointed Advisor to the Yekejuu
League.

Japanese Military Arrangements in Mongolia
and Kanai Shoji’s Political Maneuvers
While Prince De was in conflict with Kanai Shoji over the latter’s Joint Com
mittee of Mongolian Territory, the Japanese military made an important decision that
affected their army in Mongolia: they placed it under the direct control of the Japanese
North China Army. On July 6, 1938, the commander in chief of the North China Army
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sent a proclamation to the commander in chief of Japanese forces in Mongolia, outlining
instructions regarding political affairs in Mongolia. The following are its main points.
1) The Director for Political Affairs in Mongolia should recognize, in a general sense, the
autonomy of that region and should preserve its special characteristics.
2) The present administrative organizations and administrative districts of Mongolia should
be maintained and safeguarded as closely as possible.
3) Fiscal matters in the Mongolian territory should be handled by the Mengjiang Bank. In
the future, when the fiscal structure of China undergoes a major overhaul, the special char
acteristics of Mongolia’s financial system shall be ftilly considered [before any changes are
made].
4) Mongolia’s economic development in areas such as transportation and communication
shall be carried out in association with North China. Nevertheless, the unique condition of
Mongolia shall first be considered.
5) Future political instructions on important matters from the commander in chief of the
North China Army should have authorization from the Ministry of the Army. On matters
concerning Manchukuo, negotiations should be held with the commander in chief of the
Guandong Army.®
The Japanese clearly were much more interested in dealing with their puppet
Mengjiang regime than with the Allied League Government. For convenience in admini
stration, they wanted to maintain a nominally independent Mongolia, except in the realm
of economics, where, despite their stated goals of respecting Mongolia’s “special char
acteristics,” they were committed to joining Mongolia with North China for larger scale
economic development. For this reason, Kaya Okinori, one of the prominent men of Ja
pan’s economy, was appointed head of the North China Development Company (/fa/joAw
Kaihatsu Kabushiki Kaisha), with a particular interest in developing the territories of the
Mengjiang regime. Clearly, the goal of the Japanese was to use economic manipulation to
ensure the success of Kanai’s Joint Committee and the failure of Prince De s autonomous
regime.

In a bid to both influence local politics and to gather intelligence, the Japanese
had, since their arrival in 1933, created Special Service offices (Tokumu Kikari) through
out Inner Mongolia. These offices were placed under the direct control of the Japanese
Army in Mongolia during the reorganization of its general headquarters. The following is
a list of the various Special Service offices in Mongolia:
1. The Ujumuchin Special Service Office, originally founded by the Guandong
Army in 1933, was established near the official residence of Prince So in the Ujumuchin
Right Banner. Later, the Guandong Army established another office at Nunai-yin-sume in
the Left Banner.
2. The Abaga Special Service Office was established by the Guandong Army at
Pandita-Gegeen-Keid. Long established as a center of espionap, this office was headed
by retired Colonel Nakamura Asakichi throughout the duration of the Allied League
Government. Though it remained under the nominal control of the Japanese Army in
Mongolia, the Guandong Army actually supervised this office, which in turn supervised
the two offices in Ujumuchin. In other words, among the ten banners of Shilingol, seven
of them, with the exception of the Abaga Right Banner and the Sunid Right and Left
Banners, were under the control of the Guandong Army.
® Morimatsu Toshio, “Mokyo hachinen no mamori Chumogun no rekishi,” Omoite no Naimoko,
(Tokyo, 1975), pp. 36-7.
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3. The Sunid Right Banner Special Service Office was created in 1935; later it
was put under the control of the Jabsar office.
4. The Doloonnor Special Sevice Office, created in 1934, was disbanded when
the Allied League Government was organized.
5. The Jabsar Special Service Office, etablished in 1935, later became the center
of Japanese intelligence operations in the Chahar and western Shilingol areas. It was
headed by Lieutenant Colonel Shimonaga Kenji, author of the first volume of a major
Mongol-Japanese dictionary.
6. The Kalgan Special Service Office was headed initially by Major General
Matsui Kyutaro and later by Lieutenant General Sakai Takashi.
7. The Special Service Office at Hohhot, along with the Kalgan office, played an
influential role in Mongolian politics. It was first headed by Colonel Kuwabara Araichiro,
then by Colonel Takaba Sonzo, and finally by Colonel Yokoyama Jun.
8. The Baotou Special Service Office was headed sequentially by Captain Noda
Masao, Lieutenant Colonel Kanagawa Kosuka, and Captain Takehara Kiyoshi.
Several other smaller Special Service offices were located throughout the Mon
golian countryside, but each was placed under the administration of one of the larger of
fices. One larger office was located in the city of Datong, but because of its location, it
played a negligible role in Mongolian politics. Its head was Lt. Colonel Haneyama Yoshiro, who had earlier been stationed at Hohhot during the Fu Zuoyi period.
By saturating Mongolia with special service offices, the Japanese were able to
increase their control of the region. Thus Lieutenant Colonel Ohashi Kumao, senior staff
member for politics and intelligence and coordinator of the offices, was a very powerful
individual. Both Ohashi and Kanai viewed the Mongolian autonomy movement with
equal antipathy. Kanai used his friendly relations with Ohashi to boost his own power
base and strengthen his Joint Committee for Mongolian Territory. On August 1, 1938,
Kanai reorganized the committee, creating several new ministries. He made the following
changes.

1. The General Affairs Ministry, with Jodbajab as minister, Noda Kiotake as ad
visor, and Hisamitsu Masao as senior official.
2. The Ministry of Finance, with Ma Yongkui as minister, Terazaki Eyu (advisor
to the Mengjiang Bank) and Kuma Takeshi as advisors, and a Japanese as senior official.
3. The Ministry of Enterprise, with Altanochir as minister, Takatsu Hikoji and
Morita Kiyoshi as advisors, and Takematsu Kiyoshi as senior official.
4. The Ministry of Transportation and Communication, with Du Yunyu as min
ister, Ito Tasuku, Terasaka Ryoichi as advisors, and Sugitani Shunoseke as the senior
official.

5. The Ministry of Civilian Administration, with Du Yunyu as minister, Noda
Kiyotake as advisor, and Chen Yousheng as the senior official.
6. The Ministry of Peace Preservation, with Togtakhu as minister, Ito Tasuku as
advisor, and a Japanese as senior official.
Clearly, the officials of the Joint Committee were dominated by Kanai Shoji and
the other Japanese officials. Each of the so-called ministers was little more than a figure
head. Chen Yousheng, for example, had been brought to Mongolia by Kanai from his
post in the Manchukuo regime. He was the only respected local official with any author
ity on Kanai’s committee; no Mongols were given any positions of real importance. Even
the pro-Mongol Moratani Hikojiro was ousted in the shuffle. Inevitably, the committee
was headed on a collision course with Prince De and his Mongol associates.
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Wu Heling’s Activities in Tokyo
While Wu Heling and 1, exiled in Japan, constantly received a stream of dis
tressing political news from Mongolia, Wu actively collected any information in Tokyo
that might prove useful to the Mongolian cause. Wu hoped that the political situation in
Mongolia would remain stable so that his already risky job in Tokyo would not be jeop
ardized. Wu urged Prince De to follow a moderate course, but the latter, eager to achieve
Mongolian autonomy, was not in the mood for restraint. In August 1938, he sent a large
official delegation from the Allied League Government to Tokyo. Khorjurjab, Minister of
Animal Husbandry, headed the delegation.’
The group’s activities had been planned in advance by a Zenrin Kyokai official,
Oshima Yutaka, who booked the group into the Daiichi Hotel in Tokyo. Before their de
parture, Prince De had asked Khorjurjab, Tegshibuyan, and Chogbagatur to relate to Wu
Heling the mounting conflict with Kanai Shoji’s Joint Committee. Prince De wanted Wu
to take the offensive in Japan, pleading the Allied League Government’s case before offi
cials in Tokyo. Wu was under surveillance from the Japanese military authorities, and he
reported this to Prince De via Khorjurjab. However, the task needed doing, and Wu, de
spite the dangers, agreed to undertake it. While traveling together to Nikko, Wu and
Khorjurjab spoke secretly and decided to use an upcoming official banquet hosted by
Deputy Minister of the Army, Tojo Hideki, to formally and openly plead the case for
Mongolian independence.
Tojo’s banquet was held at Gunjinkaikan, the Japanese Army Officers’ Club;
most of the important officials from the Japanese army were present. Khorjurjab’s dele
gation was accompanied by Oshima Yutaka; Wu Heling and 1 had also been invited. Be
fore leaving for the banquet, Oshima told the guests that this was an unofficial, informal
banquet; no formal speeches would be given.
The dinner was a jovial affair, with much drinking; Tojo had a particularly good
time. Khorjurjab, who had had a bit too much to drink, stood up and toasted Tojo, asking
me to interpret for him. He said, “Our greatest hope in coming here to Tokyo was to see
you. General Tojo, so that we could relate to you the heartfelt feelings of the Mongol
nation. Sadly, though, we have had no chance to do this yet. Now, having drunk several
glasses of wine, 1 must represent our group and speak a few words to Your Excellency,
General Tojo.”
He continued by emphasizing the traditional independence of the Mongol na
tion, how the Mongols belonged to no one but themselves, and then outlined the reasons
why his people were striving for national autonomy and self-rule. “At the beginning of
our association with Japan, it was commonly hoped that we could achieve independence;
this was promised to us by General Itagaki and other senior officials of the Guandong
Army. The Mongolian Army, though small and weak, fought alongside the Japanese Im’ The delegation also consisted of Tegshibuyan, Minister of Civilian Affairs; Prince Altanochir,
Head of the Yekejuu League; as well as Duke Dobdan, Charge d’affaires to \htjasag of the Ujumuchin Left Banner; Chimedrinchinkhorlowa, jasag of the Muuminggan Banner of the Ulanchab
League; Norbujana, amban of Taipus Right Banner; Chogbagatur, Head of the General Affairs
Bureau of the Bayantala League office; Mergen Gegeen, abbot of Mergen-juu of the Urad Front
Banner, Ulanchab League; and Kabji Lama of Lama-yin-sume, Ujumuchin Left Banner, a wellknown pro-Japanese advocate of modernization. The advisor to the group was Kushibe Masateru,
advisor to the Ministry of Finance; Ruiyong, a Waseda University graduate and secretary to Prince
De, served as the delegation’s interpreter.
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perial Armies following the Marco Polo Bridge incident. In reality our victories have
earned us only the Joint Committee of Mongolian Territories, which runs counter to the
interests of the Mongol people.” Khorjurjab also reminded Tojo that he himself had at
tended the Second Mongolian Congress at Hohhot, and had there sworn his support for
Mongolian nationalism. He added that he hoped Tojo had not reneged on his promise.
This sudden, unexpected speech left the company very tense and uncomfortable;
Tojo looked particularily confused and surprised, as did Oshima Yutaka and Kushibe
Masateru, both of whom later received a stem rebuke from the Ministry of the Army.
Tojo looked emotionally troubled during the speech, though he did maintain his compo
sure. Following Khorjurjab’s remarks, Tojo simply said that Mongolia should tmst in the
unity of the Mongolian-Japanese alliance. “Japan will not disappoint Mongolia,” he ex
plained. He asked, however, that Mongolia show some consideration to the Japanese,
who were acting under the burden of war, and to be patient for the time being. After the
banquet, Khorjurjab told Kushibe Masateru that he “had dmnk too much and could not
control [his] emotions.” Perhaps he had said something he ought not to have. Kushibe
answered, “This was what the Mongols should have said.” From this point onward Ku
shibe became an ally to the Mongol cause.
With Khorjurjab’s bold move, the Mongol cause had been presented to one of
Japan’s most influential officials. A counter attack had been laid against the misleading
reports of Kanai Shoji and Ohashi Kumao. Sadly, though, this impassioned speech could
not stop the promulgation of new instructions for political affairs in Mongolia by the
Japanese military authorities, which was already underway when the delegation arrived in
Japan.
Soon after the delegation left Japan to return to Mongolia, an influential power
broker, Matsui Seikun (who has already been referred to) came to visit Wu Heling at his
residence in Tokyo. The two men had not seen each other since a meeting in Beiping in
1935. Matsui openly praised Khorjurjab’s bold performance at the banquet. To succeed
politically in Japan, Matsui said, there must be “someone who accelerates things. You are
now unable to really bring your message to the hearts of the Japanese leadership; you can
only create conflict and friction. So far, you have only achieved negative results, and will
continue to do so until you deliver your message in the right way and to the right ears. If
things continue as they now are, your circumstances will go from bad to worse. You
know of my personal friendship with Itagaki, and of the political influence I have. Tell
me of your troubles. Did I not tell you that I want to help you?” Wu then proceeded to tell
Matsui the sordid tale of Kanai’s manipulations, and of the clash between the Joint
Committee and the Allied League Government; Matsui pledged to relate this to Itagaki
Seishiro and other influential Japanese officials.
Matsui and Wu remained in regular contact, Matsui relating inside news of offi
cial attitudes towards Prince De and the Mongolian autonomy movement. Matsui also
showed his trustworthiness by winning over several key officials to the Mongolian cause.
When it became obvious that Matsui required financial assistance for his activities, Wu
supplied the necessary money. Their valuable, mutually beneficial relationship continued.
Despite Wu’s efforts, Japanese support for Kanai Shoji continued unchanged.
The power of the Joint Committee grew with every passing day. Kanai grew sufficiently
bold as to send out direct orders to the three supposedly co-equal regimes of Southern
Chahar, Northern Shanxi, and the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government.
While Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi yielded to Kanai’s demands, the Allied
League Government remained firm in opposing him, regarding his orders as an intoler
able insult. They began to hate the Joint Committee’s use of the words Mengjiang in Chi-
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nese or Mokyo in Japanese for the Mongolian territory.

8

Prince De’s Visit to Japan
At this point, Ohashi Kumao, senior advisor for politics in Mengjiang, initiated a
plan to bring the heads of Japan’s three Mongolian client regimes to visit Japan. This was
an attempt to convince Prince De of the greatness and power of the Japanese Empire and
to show him that the Joint Committee was a durable institution backed by great resolve
and might. Prince De viewed his visit, along with the two Japanese puppets from North
ern Shanxi and Southern Chahar, Xia Gong and Yu Pinqing, as little more than an effort
to “present the captives to the imperial court.” Nonetheless, he went, fueled by a small
hope that if he were able to go to Japan himself, he might be able to plead his case before
at least a few sympathetic officials. Since Generals Tojo and Itagaki had already pledged
their support for the Mongolian cause, perhaps he could find others sympathetic to the
prince’s quandary.
Prince De decided to go to Japan by himself, to avoid any connection with the
two subservient puppets from Northern Shanxi and Southern Chahar. But Kanai and
Ohashi refused to allow the prince to visit alone and put pressure on the commander in
chief of the Japanese Army in Mongolia to convince the prince that he must travel in the
company of the two pro-Japanese puppets. Any refusal would jeopardize his position
with the Japanese, he was told, and brand him as an anti-Japanese agitator. Disgusted
with Kanai’s blatant manipulation, the prince fled Hohhot for his own Sunid Banner.
Taking advantage of his absence, Togtakhu and a few other treacherous Mongols sought
to betray the prince, in order to boost their own positions. Under heavy pressure from the
Japanese, Prince De agreed to go to Japan, leaving in early October 1938.
While Prince De was in his brief exile at Sunid, he had been beset with serious
anxiety and depression. It was at this point that Sainbayar discussed with Prince De the
possibility of escaping together to the Mongolian Peoples Republic. The prince rejected
this proposal, realizing that he was essential to the Mongolian autonomy movement and
that his defection would have no real positive effect.
Prince De was accompanied on the Japanese visit by a large entourage. One of
the most influential members of the delegation was Jirgalang, who, being fluent in Japan“ According to Prince De, Mengjiang was first used by Zhang Zuolin, Manchuria’s leading warlord,
shortly before he was to attempt the invasion of Mongolia. He called himself Mengjiang Jinglueshi, the Occupier and Administrator of Mongolian Territory. From that point on, use of the word
Mengjiang was considered an insult by the Mongols. The literal translation of Mengjiang into
Mongolian is Monggol Kijigar, or “Mongolian borderlands,” a phrase sometimes used by outsiders
to ridicule and insult the Mongol nation. The Mongols staunchly refused to accept the continued
use of this word. However, I have personally conducted some research on the traditional use of the
word Mengjiang, and found it was used even by Prince De himself in a November 1936 commu
nique to Fu Zuoyi: “Since the provinces and xian% were established in Mengjiang [the Mongolian
territory], the political power of the leagues and banners has been damaged.” This indicates that the
term Mengjiang was once considered more acceptable but that its use had become a source of con
flict between Kanai and Prince De. Wu Heling also used the term on occasion. Kanai defended his
use of the Japanese translation of Mengjiang, Mokyo, on the grounds that it simply meant Mongolia
and the territories bordering it, such as Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi, and that it was used
without negative connotations. Despite these explanations, Kanai’s continued use of Mokyo or
Mengjiang was a constant source of conflict in already strained relations.
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ese, was able to serve as the prince’s interpreter instead of the manipulative Togtakhu. Li
Shouxin also accompanied the prince, as did the Japanese advisors, Muratani Hikojiro
and Nakajima Manzo. Kanai Shoji’s obedient puppets, Xia Gong and Yu Pinqing also
came along, as did Kanai himself, to be the guide for the delegation. Kanai brought some
of his staff along as well. Including Ito Tasuku, Kimura Yujiro, Chen Yuming, his inter
preter, Chen Yousheng, and his ally Colonel Ohashi Kumao.
Tensions between Prince De and the Japanese militarists peaked shortly before
the entourage was to depart for Japan. In order to see Commander in Chief Li Shouxin
before his departure for Japan, Chief of Staff Wu Guting came to Beiping by train. Dur
ing the trip he was by coincidence seated with Ohashi Kumao, chief political advisor of
the Japanese forces. They frankly discussed the political ramifications of the prince’s
forthcoming visit to Japan; Ohashi said that if the prince did not give up his intransi
gence, it would be better to “eliminate him, and get somebody else to take his place.” No
doubt, Ohashi was purposely rude and forward in an effort to threaten the Mongolian
side. Wu later, on different occasions, related this conversation to both Prince De and me;
the former, on being told of these Japanese threats to eliminate him, was not frightened,
but rather more determined to carry forth his plans.
The Japanese government attached great importance to Prince De’s visit, view
ing it as a major event. The chiefs of the two puppet regimes of Northern Shanxi and
Southern Chahar were not taken seriously; the main attention focused on Prince De and
his Mongol entourage. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, wanting badly to establish
friendly relations with Mongolia, appointed Nakane Naosuke, a former consul at UlanKhada, to coordinate the visit. The Ministry of the Army appointed Major Miyamoto to
accompany the entourage as well. The plans for the visit were excellently laid, and full
diplomatic protocol was observed. However, Kanai and Ohashi helped with the prepara
tions and ensured that the prince was given no free time with which to establish political
contacts.

On November 21, Wu Heling and 1 left Tokyo for Shimonoseki, where we
greeted the prince on his arrival from Pusan. At the Hotel Sanyo, where the entourage
was staying, Wu Heling and I met privately with Prince De and exchanged a few words.
The prince appeared to be very unhappy and dejected. When addressing a large number
of journalists, he always used the term Mongolia in lieu of Mokyo or Mengjiang, and this
was faithfully translated by his interpreter, Jirgalang. After the press conference, Kanai
met with the journalists and told them to translate Mongolia as Mokyo', this infuriated
Prince De.
Prince De and his entourage arrived in the capital on their second afternoon in
the country and were welcomed by many important dignitaries and journalists. The next
day, his arrival made headlines in all the papers. In the ensuing meetings, I met the infa
mous Kanai Shoji for the first time, and found him as belligerent and manipulative as had
been rumored. His assistant, Ito Tasuku, was equally repugnant; it was widely believed
that many of Kanai’s ideas had originated with Ito. The moderate Muratani Hikojiro
found himself uncomfortably sandwiched between Kanai and Prince De, and was embar
rassed by this difficult role of middleman. Chen Yuming, in a pathetic attempt to win
Kanai’s support, declared himself an enemy of the Mongol nation; Chen Yousheng
played the buffoon.
Kanai had structured the prince’s schedule in Tokyo so tightly that he literally
had no opportunity to bring up issues of interest to Mongols. On October 26, in the name
of the Minister of the Army, Itagaki Seishiro, a large banquet was given to honor the
Mongolian entourage, Tojo Hideki, along with many other important guests, attended.
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Halfway through the dinner, a special report came to Itagaki announcing that Hankou, a
strategic stronghold of Chiang Kai-shek in Central China, had just fallen to the Japanese
army. A wave of great Joy swept the Japanese military authorities assembled, and the rest
of the evening was spent celebrating and toasting the Emperor. Prince De, having no op
portunity to discuss the subject of Mongolian autonomy with Itagaki, left the banquet
dejected, as I personally observed.
After returning to his suite at the Imperial Hotel, Prince De talked with Wu
Heling in an attempt to arrange a private meeting with either Itagaki or Tojo to discuss
the issue of Mongolia’s political difficulties. Deciding it would be most effective to work
through Matsui Seikun, Wu phoned him that evening to arrange a secret meeting the next
day. When Wu told Matsui of the Mongol disgust with Kanai’s high-pressure tactics,
Matsui promised to arrange a private meeting between Prince De and Itagaki. When in
formed of Kanai’s heavyhanded approach, Itagaki quickly saw the need for private con
tact with the prince, and expressed a sense of dissatisfaction with their previous meeting.
At this time, I became ill and was hospitalized and therefore was unable to personally
witness further developments. The following account is thus based on Wu Heling’s in
formation, later relayed by him to me.
Shortly after Itagaki’s banquet. Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro held a similar
reception. As dinner was being served, Prince De, who was seated next to the Prime
Minister, explained to him why all Mongols hated the use of the terms Mokyo and Mengjiang. Only at this point did the surprised Konoye realize there was a real difference be
tween the term Moko (Mongolia) and Mokyo. Soon it was time for Konoye to deliver a
welcoming speech and, using a prepared text, repeatedly used the word Mokyo, as it was
originally included in the text. Prince De was both angered and insulted.
In preparation for his meeting with Itagaki, Prince De, working with Wu Heling,
devised two plans for Mongolian independence, and had each translated into Japanese by
Jirgalang. One called for the political separation of Mongolia from China, as well as from
Northern Shanxi and Southern Chahar; and for Mongolia to be ruled by the Mongolian
Allied League Autonomous Government, which was committed to the principle of devel
oping full national sovereignty. The other plan called for the Mongolian Allied League
Autonomous Government to control Mongolia along with Northern Shanxi and Southern
Chahar, and by gradually increasing its political power, it should eventually develop full
political autonomy.
Wu Heling and Jirgalang accompanied Prince De during this initial secret
meeting with General Itagaki. Itagaki expressed sympathy for the Mongol cause, and
when presented with the two plans stated that he would read both carefully before com
menting on them and stating which one would have his support. At their second meeting,
Itagaki told the Mongols that “the goal of Mongol nationhood is a long-range one; the
situation is not yet ripe enough for there to be further developments. We must first wait
for the reunification of Inner and Outer Mongolia, which will occur at some future point.
Japan will help you then.” Prince De, realizing that the goal of an independent Inner
Mongolia was more distant than at any time since the movement began, felt dejected and
disappointed. At least he had received the word directly from a top-ranking and courteous
official of the Japanese Imperial Government, without the interference of the manipulat
ive Kanai Shoji. Kanai soon caught word of the secret meetings, and when he learned that
they had been arranged by Wu Heling, his hatred for Wu increased.
The official highlight of the trip was the visit to Emperor Hirohito at the Imper
ial Palace, a mark of extreme honor at the time. Yu Pinqing, Xia Gong, and Li Shouxin
were allowed to accompany Prince De to the palace, but were denied an audience with
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the Emperor; they were merely permitted to sign the official palace registry. Kanai Shoji
accompanied the prince to see the Emperor, as did the interpreter, Jirgalang. Jirgalang
later related to me what Kanai told him immediately before meeting the Emperor. “At the
audience with the Emperor, there must be absolutely no talk of Mongolian independence
or nationhood,” Kanai had said. You must use Mokyo, not Moko, when speaking of Mon
golia. Should you accurately translate what Prince De says to the Emperor, it will affect
your life!” Prince De, however, understood that the Emperor was too lofty and highranking to intervene in political affairs; it would be both futile and foolhardy to discuss
matters of Mongolian independence with him. Accordingly, their conversation was lim
ited to polite greetings.
Xia Gong and Yu Pinqing were both offended by the exalted attention focused
on Prince De and angry that their regimes were treated as impotent puppets. Not only
were they denied an audience with the Emperor, but they were not presented with official
medals commemorating their visit, as were Prince De and Li Shouxin. The officials of the
Allied League Government were treated with all the respect afforded a visiting head of
state, whereas Xia Gong and Yu Pinqing were treated very disrespectfully. The honor
paid to Prince De was arguably the only success of his visit to Japan. He received exten
sive press coverage during his stay, so much so that his name became practically syn
onymous with Mongolia, and many Japanese people were won over to the side of the
Mongolian autonomy movement. However, Kanai was an active anti-Mongolia, proMengjiang propagandist and was able to destroy at least some of the good produced by
the prince’s visit.
Prince De’s negotiations with Itagaki at least helped the latter realize the dis
agreement between Kanai and the Mongol people. Itagaki was finally able to understand
that the Mongols hated Kanai and that it would be prudent in the future to pay greater
heed to their wishes and less to those of Kanai. This small moral victory came about be
cause of the intercession of Matsui Seikun. Prince De requested the honor of paying Matsui a visit, but Matsui rejected his offer because it would uncover and Jeopardize the
network of secret relations that had been built up at such a cost. Realizing that such a visit
would not be prudent, the prince agreed, thou^ he encouraged Wu Heling to maintain
this useful contact so that the opinions of the Allied League Government would be under
stood in Tokyo.
The prince’s visit was at first entirely consumed by state affairs. Aside from
meeting with those involved in the Mongolia question, he visited Yokosuka, the Japanese
Naval Headquarters, and several other military bases. With the political negotiations be
hind the entourage, things were generally more relaxed; the prince even took a brief holi
day at Hakone. Being outside of the capital also gave Prince De time to continue private
discussions with Wu Heling. Prince De still supported the plan which called for the sepa
ration of Mongolia from the two puppet regimes, but Wu Heling advocated the other
plan, which called for the unification of Mongolia with Southern Chahar and Northern
Shanxi.
The rift that was slowly developing between the two leaders centered on a ques
tion of idealism: Prince De refused to budge on his principles, whereas the more prag
matic Wu was eager to work out a practical solution. Prince De, feeling strongly about
the principles of self-determination and nationalism, was thus reluctant to accept any
conglomeration with the Chinese. Since Prince De did not want his people under Chinese
domination, he thought it only reasonable that the Chinese of Northern Shanxi and
Southern Chahar should want self-rule themselves. Prince De proposed drawing an exact
line between Chinese and Mongol territories, surrendering if needs be some traditional

The Last Mongol Prince

208

Mongol territory that had been irreversibly encroached upon by Chinese settlers.
Sinicized Mongols would be brought back to their native territory. In Prince De’s eyes,
there was simply no other way to resurrect the Mongol nation. Wu disagreed, viewing the
ceding of ancestral lands to aliens as morally unacceptable. Wu scoffed at Prince De’s
strong ideas favoring Mongol separatism, viewing them as anachronistic.
After leaving Tokyo, Prince De and his entourage visited Kyoto, Osaka, and
Nara before continuing to Kyushu. On Kyushu, he spent an evening at the hot springs at
Beppu; from there he went to Hakada, where the Mongolian fleet had been destroyed by
the kamikaze during the period of Khubilai Khan’s invasion. Kanai Shoji had planned
this trip, and by the time Prince De realized the significance of Hakada, it was too late to
back down. When he arrived at the pagoda erected to honor the dead of both nations
(which had disappeared when 1 visited the site in 1989), a group of reporters asked him
about his impressions. “At the present,” he told them, “it is important to emphasize peace
and development in East Asia, and to recall the cooperation and friendship of Mongolia
and Japan. We should not emphasize unfortunate events in the past. A typhoon destroyed
the Mongol fleet, and though this was a great loss at the time, without it, there would
have been still greater destruction on both sides. That would have caused me great em
barrassment here this day.” His answer was diplomatic, neither proud nor subservient in
tone. The reporters were duly impressed, and thought him a master of tact and protocol.
On his way home. Prince De paid a pleasant visit to the Japanese viceroy of Ko
rea, spending a day and a night at Keijo (Seoul), the capital. He also visited some indus
trial sites in the vicinity, evidence of the success of the Japanese occupation of the penin
sula. Prince De left Korea very discouraged at seeing a people without self-rule, in a
homeland overrun by aliens.

Mongol Conflict with Kanai Continues
Conflict with Kanai Shoji increased on Prince De’s return to Mongolia, and the
prince decided a showdown was necessary, no matter the potential cost. The current
situation was simply unacceptable. Kanai invited Prince De to the armiversary celebration
of the founding of the Joint Committee on November 22, 1938, and surprisingly, the
prince attended. He refused, however, to speak one word, and this greatly annoyed all the
other attendees. On December 1, Prince De called a secret meeting of representatives
from the various leagues and banners to commemorate the establishment of the Allied
League Government. He suggested that they submit to him official complaints against the
continued use of the offensive term Mengjiang, and also formal protests against Kanai’s
Joint Committee. The prince planned to deliver these protests to the Japanese officials in
an effort to officially register Mongol dissatisfaction. Each of the league and banner
heads under the Allied League Government, with the exception of the pro-Japanese Jodbajab, duly submitted their official protests. When Jodbajab refused to agree, he was os
tracized by his fellow representatives, and this drove him even further into the arms of
Kanai. Prince De nonetheless remained opposed to the use of the term Mengjiang. Even
Jodbajab was opposed to the use of the term. His opposition in official communiques was
recorded by Kanai’s secretary.’
After having collected all the official protests. Prince De commissioned Tegshibuyan to draft a protest in the name of the Allied League Government against both the

’ Nomura Yasuzo, “Three Memories of the Past,” Kogensenri (Tokyo, 1972), p. 191
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use of the word Mengjiang and against Kanai’s Joint Committee. He presented all the
documents to the commander in chief of the Japanese Army in Mongolia, Lt. General
Hasunoma Shigeru, and he also sent a copy to Wu Heling in Tokyo, to be circulated in
the Japanese capital. Prince De organized this unanimous protest secretly. When the pro
tests arrived en masse, the Japanese officials would more likely be forced to take notice
than if the protests had merely trickled in over the space of weeks or months. Suspicion
of the prince increased, of course, but it subsided after the Japanese were able to study the
documents.
Although Hasunoma and his military colleagues planned to give the protests the
sort of official examination they deserved, unfortunately, they called in Kanai for con
sultation. Somehow, they came to the ludicrous opinion that Prince De was requesting
that Kanai’s Joint Committee be made the central governing body for Mongolia. Hasu
noma and his colleagues decided to appoint Prince De as chairman of the General Affairs
Committee of Kanai’s Joint Committee, thinking that this would solve the problems
mentioned in the many protests. Hasunoma, apparently after consultations with Itagaki,
invited Prince De to Kalgan for official negotiations.
The curious Prince arrived and immediately ran into Colonel Ohashi Kumao,
supporter of Kanai Shoji. Prince De tried to explain to him why the Mongols found use of
the term Mengjiang so offensive. Ohashi brushed aside his complaints, telling him that
the Japanese authorities would like him to accept appointment to the office of Chairman
of the General Affairs Committee, an idea the prince immediately rejected. When Prince
De was presented to Hasunoma, the latter took on a conciliatory tone, exchanging pleas
antries and requesting that Prince De convey his best wishes to the leagues and banners.
He insisted that there was nothing pernicious about the continued Japanese use of the
term Mokyo, and asked the prince to help the Mongol people understand this. The con
versation ended fruitlessly.
Leaving Kalgan, Prince De remained adamant against the use of Mengjiang, and
he redoubled his efforts to strengthen the Allied League Government. However, the
situation in East Asia was rapidly changing to the disadvantage of the Mongolian cause.
Wang Jingwei, second in command ot the KMT, abandoned the regime, heading first to
Kunming and then to Hanoi. During the same period. Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro
proposed his so-called “Three Principles,” which called for an East Asian cease fire and
reconstruction of relations between Japan and China. In an effort to win over the selfexiled Wang to the Japanese side, Konoye pledged that the Japanese would respect
China’s territorial integrity. Prince De’s longstanding requests for Mongol independence
were to be deferred, and the Japanese continued to use the artificial terms Mengjiang and
Mokyo (which were neither Chinese nor Japanese in origin), to describe the territory of
Mongolia.
Prince De had anticipated a dramatic shift in the East Asian situation. After all,
at Itagaki’s banquet in Japan, he had heard of the fall of Hankou, soon after which he had
remarked to Wu Heling, “1 never had an idea that the Nationalist forces were so weak and
susceptible. How could a strategic site like Hankou be overrun so quickly? A force so
proficient and ruthless as the Japanese Empire will likely be at best indifferent to our
pleas.” Prince De refused, however, to be swayed by this discouraging appraisal and con
tinued his anti-Mengjiang protests.
Stepping up the campaign. Prince De requested that Prince Rinchinwangdud,
Head of the Shilingol League, and other Mongol leaders travel to Kalgan to present to
Hasunoma and Tanaka Shinichi, his new chief of staff, the case against the Joint Com
mittee and against the continued use of Mengjiang. The prince, fearing that if Jirgalang
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acted as interpreter his personal security would be in question, requested Togtakhu to
accompany them as interpreter. Prince Rinchinwangdud was a very narrow-minded and
forceful personality who did his best to present the Mongol case thoroughly, even though
Togtakhu greatly changed the meaning of his words. The Japanese misunderstood the
protest because of Togtakhu’s inaccurate translation. Togtakhu gained still more popu
larity with the Japanese after this incident.
In early February 1939, Tanaka Shinichi replaced Ishimoto Torazo as Chief of
Staff of the Japanese Army in Mongolia. Wu Heling visited with him in Tokyo before his
departure for Kalgan, and found him an unprejudiced, fair-minded person, biased neither
for Kanai or Prince De. Tanaka grew increasingly sympathetic to the Mongol cause as
Wu outlined the history of the Mongolian autonomy movement, briefly explaining the
nature of the conflict between Prince De and Kanai’s Joint Committee. Wu Heling did all
he could to brief Tanaka on how the Mongol people felt about the current situation. Al
though the year and a half during which Tanaka was chief of staff was a bad one for
Prince De’s relationship with the Japanese, Tanaka remained a level headed, impartial
individual, much appreciated by the Mongol people. He never accepted any proposals of
Kanai or Ohashi unconditionally.
Wu Heling also communicated to Prince De the news, relayed by Matsui Seikun, that Minister of the Army Itagaki intended to accept the plan outlined by the prince
during his visit to Japan calling for strengthening the position of the Mongolian regime
on the basis of the Joint Committee. Wu had thought that when Hasunoma invited Prince
De to Kalgan, it was related to rumors then circulating about Itagaki’s support for that
plan.
By the end of 1938, the Japanese government had established the cabinet-level
Board for Asian Development (Koayin), with retired Lieutenant General Yanakawa Heisuke as its head. The board had responsibility for issues pertaining to the ongoing China
crisis. The Mongolian problem was loosely lumped together with conditions in China.
Relations with Mongolia thus passed out of the hands of the Foreign Ministry and into
control of the Board. In March 1939, the Japanese army agreed to put its Special Service
Office in Kalgan under the control of the Board, appointing Major General Sakai Takashi, formerly a head of the Special Service Office, as head of the new liason office.
Yanakawa had mentioned Sakai’s appointment to Wu Heling in Tokyo before it
was officially announced, and Wu decided that it would be best to talk directly with the
new appointee. They spent a whole morning together, and Wu found Sakai a hard-headed
individual. Japan’s policy in the area was, he was told, to support Kanai’s Joint Commit
tee. He was also informed that if Prince De continued his stubbornness, Japan would do
well to find a new man to replace him and break the deadlock. Sakai, of course, had said
this because he knew that Wu would communicate it to Prince De immediately. Sakai’s
anti-Mongol position had been well known as early as 1937, when Mongol forces enter
ing Hohhot found him a difficult and narrow personality. Although he despised Ohashi
Kumao, Sakai was a great ally of Kanai Shoji, who held similar views on the Mongolia
question.
In March 1939, Prince De sent his eldest son, Dugursurung, to Tokyo to con
tinue his studies, accompanied by his father’s secretary, Kogjintei, and a Japanese advi
sor, Yamanouchi. Prince De hoped that by going to Japan, his son would broaden his
horizons; but Yamanouchi did everything in his power to isolate the young noble, drasti
cally limiting his contact with teachers, students, and even fellow Mongols. Though it
was technically possible for him to continue his studies there, Dugursurung’s life in Japan
became very uncomfortable, and he angrily left after only two months.
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Jirgalang, in Tokyo for medical treatment, met with Wu Heling and related to
him the unpleasant conflict between Prince De and the Japanese authorities, particularly
with Kanai Shoji. Noting Wu’s reaction, Jirgalang realized that he must communicate to
Prince De the need for prudence and moderation with the Japanese. Wu sent me back to
Mongolia to give a personal account of Wu’s anti-Mengjiang activities in Tokyo and to
urge the prince to curtail his political adventurism, for the sake of both his security and
the security of the Mongol nation.
Sakai Takashi had already taken up his position as Head of the Kalgan Liaison
Office of the Board for Asian Development by the time 1 returned to Hohhot. Mongols
widely viewed Sakai’s appointment as a boon for the power of the pro-Mengjiang forces.
When I reported Wu’s and Jirgalang’s admonitions, Prince De sat silently, shaking his
head dispassionately. He had been under persistent pressure from Kanai and Ohashi to
accept the position of Chairman of the General Affairs Committee. After considering
Wu’s warnings, the prince flatly rejected the notion of being appointed to the chairman
ship, but conceded he would accept the post if and only if duly elected to it by the leagues
and banners of the Mongol nation. Prince De related this message to Togtakhu, who in
turn relayed it to the Japanese authorities at Kalgan. The Japanese then employed Li
Shouxin and Togtakhu to relay a curious message to the prince: Kanai would quietly re
sign the chairmanship of the General Affairs Committee, and it would be wise for Prince
De to use this opportunity for change by accepting that chairmanship. Nevertheless,
Prince De insisted on the formality of an election. Togtakhu and Li Shouxin returned to
Kalgan with the prince’s message, which they soon put aside to negotiate in its place a
plot with Ohashi Kumao that would force Prince De into accepting the chairmanship.
On April 29, 1939, Hasunoma Shigeru, Commander in Chief of the Japanese
Army in Mongolia, invited Prince De to his headquarters for a very important discussion.
Prince De came, accompanied by his new secretary, Chogbadarakhu, a recent graduate of
Chuo University in Tokyo. Colonel Ohashi Kumao welcomed the prince with the words
“We welcome you upon your arrival at your inauguration ceremony.” Upon Prince De’s
arrival in the main hall of the headquarters, Hasunoma, Kanai, Tanaka, and many other
“dignitaries” there present all stood up ceremoniously. Before the prince had a chance to
speak, Ohashi announced the commencement of the ceremony. Kanai announced his
resignation from the chairmanship of the General Affairs Committee; Hasunoma then
announced that Prince De had been appointed to fill his position as Chairman of the Gen
eral Affairs Committee of the Joint Committee of Mongolian Territories, whereupon
Ohashi announced the end of the ceremony, without allowing Prince De to utter even a
single word. The prince viewed the whole sham ceremony as a degrading insult; burning
with fury, he left for Hohhot.
At home, he drank several glasses of liquor and broke into tears, lamenting to
Chogbadarakhu, “This is the result of my cooperation with Japan!” Just then, Togtakhu
entered to console the prince. He was shocked by the frightful scolding he received from
him. Lunging toward the traitorous Togtakhu, the prince chastened him for being a
wicked and deceitful man, slapping him twice on the face. Togtakhu fell to his knees,
begging forgiveness; Chogbadarakhu, embarrassed and unable to intervene, left the room.
Just then, a messenger arrived. Taking advantage of the distraction, Togtakhu also fled.
Word of the conflict spread among the officials of the Allied League Government, caus
ing much amusement. Though the prince had vented his anger, he had not slowed Togtakhu’s rise as an important pro-Japanese figurehead on Kanai’s Joint Committee.
Appointment to the chairmanship of the General Affairs Committee was a great
political blow to Prince De. Still, he refused to surrender. He ordered me to return to To-
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kyo, to report news of recent events to Wu Heling and encourage him to keep up his antiKanai activities. Wu was also ordered to inform Itagaki Seishiro of recent developments
in an attempt to influence him against the Joint Committee. I was also ordered to seek out
Kanai Shoji on my way back to Tokyo.
Because Prince De had ordered it, I had no choice but to return to Kalgan to see
the great enemy of the Mongolian people, Kanai Shoji. At the time, the Joint Committee
was headquartered in the old Chahar Grand Hotel, built during the governorship of Song
Zheyuan. Because I had met with Kanai’s secretary, Kimura Yujiro, during Kanai’s ear
lier visit to Tokyo, 1 went to Kimura first, and with his assistance was soon able to meet
with Kanai Shoji in his office. Kanai, who was reading at his desk, never once lifted his
head to look at his visitor. With a furious face, he asked me, “When did you come back
from Tokyo? Why didn’t you come to see me immediately upon arrival? Why are you
here today?” I answered, “I am an officer of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous
Government. Upon my return to Mongolia, I had to return to Hohhot to present my report
to my superiors, as my duty to them requires. Now, I am here upon the request of Prince
De to see if Your Excellency has any messages to convey to Wu Heling in Tokyo.”
Head still bowed, Kanai said, “Go to Tokyo and tell Wu that he should concern
himself with studying the soul and character of Japan, not with unsavory political mat
ters.” Kanai’s antagonism toward Wu was evident. This was the first time that I was able
to speak with Kanai Shoji, and I received an extremely negative impression of him. Later,
however, when I returned to Mongolia, I had countless opportunities to meet with Kanai,
and each time was received very politely, though it was impossible for me to forget our
initial meeting. Kanai skillfully wore many political masks, depending on the role he was
playing.

, •
. •
After receiving my reports, Wu Heling contacted Matsui Seikun, asking him to
relate the recent developments to Itagaki Seishiro, Minister of the Army. Itagaki sent a
message of comfort to Prince De through Matsui, saying that Prince De should be in
charge of the Joint Committee, and he disapproved of forcing people to do things against
their will. Itagaki also argued for elections among the leagues and banners as opposed to
appointment. Heartened, Prince De again sought to conduct negotiations with Japanese
officials in Mongolia, but he got nowhere; Ohashi Kumao was leading a campaign to
embarrass Prince De wherever possible. This greatly embarrassed the prince; discour
aged, he determined to pull away even farther from the Japanese.
Though Prince De was chairman of what had once been the most important
committee of the Joint Committee, power remained in the hands of Kanai Shoj i, the Chief
Advisor. Much to his chagrin, the prince found himself a mere figurehead, an involuntary
puppet. This demoralized Prince De both psychologically and physically.
Although some individual Japanese officers showed varying degrees of sympa
thy for the Mongolian cause, official Japanese policy toward Mongolia was that Prince
De should be an impotent figurehead within the Joint Committee superstructure. Also, the
Japanese were committed to the unification of the three client regimes of Northern
Shanxi, Southern Chahar, and Mongolia. Spearheaded by Kanai Shoji, Ohashi Kumao,
and Sakai Takashi, the Japanese sought to dismantle the Mongolian Allied League
Autonomous Government, something they finally achieved on September 1, 1939, the
first day of war in Europe. As Kanai’s Joint Committee filled the power vacuum, an even
darker era began for the Mongol nation.
As his struggles with the Japanese heightened. Prince De continued to use the
name Monggol in lieu of the offensive Mokyo or Mengjiang. Though on some issues he
was willing to compromise, he held fast on this, as a point of principle. Finally, the Japa-
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nese gave in, abandoning use of the words Mokyo and Mengjiang for the Allied Autono
mous Government of Mongolian Territories, and using in their place the much more ac
ceptable Moko (Mongolian) Allied Autonomous Government. In an effort to accelerate
things, Matsui Seikun even requested that Ozaki Yukuo, senior member of the Diet, bring
up the Mongolian Question in the legislature. Sadly, though, Ozaki’s pointed criticisms
of government policy did little good, because by then, the Diet was practically impotent,
having been overshadowed by the military clique then ruling Tokyo.

The End of the Mongolian Allied League
Autonomous Government
The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, established by the
Second Mongolian Congress on December 1, 1937, lasted a mere twenty-two months,
during which time Prince De and the other Mongol leaders focused their attention on
national security. There had been practically no time to reconstruct the leagues and ban
ners and work extensively on domestic matters. Yet there had been some advancement
domestically; and though pinioned by outside concerns, the Mongolian leadership had an
acute understanding of what needed to be done domestically.
Prince De believed that the chief cause of Mongolia’s decline was its poor edu
cational system; indeed, ignorance held all other domestic reforms forever in check. In
making these observations. Prince De followed in the footsteps of Prince Gungsangnorbu
of Kharachin, who had started the modernization of Mongolia at the turn of the century.
Early on in the Allied League Government period, the Mongol Academy was established
near Hohhot, with Prince Khorjurjab, a man of great literary abilities, as headmaster.
Sangbu, formerly an experienced teacher at the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing,
was appointed dean of this new institution, whose aim was to provide an ethical reeduca
tion for individuals sent from the various leagues and banners. Prince De, a frequent
guest lecturer, gave the school four words of advice that later became its official motto:
“honor, prudence, loyalty, and sincerity.”
In August 1938, Khorjurjab was assigned to head the Ministry of Animal Hus
bandry, and Altanochir assumed control of the Mongol Academy. Soon the school took
upon itself the education of junior governmental officials. Besides giving a general ethi
cal education, it offered special classes in banner administration, teacher training, tele
communications, and other special subjects. In time, in an effort to provide some basic
education for the Mongol nobility—the young jasags and ambam—a special institution,
the Mongol Banner Academy, was established. Tegshibuyan, Minister of Civilian Ad
ministration, was the school’s headmaster, and Chogmandukhu its dean. Chogmandukhu,
a graduate of the Beijing Mongolian-Tibetan Academy, and member of the Inner Mon
golian Peoples Revolutionary Party, had spent time studying in Ulaanbaatar before
teaching at the Chungcheng School in his native Kharachin established by Prince Gungsungnorbu in 1903. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, he had fallen under Japan
ese suspicion for his communist sympathies and had fled to Hohhot. At the recommenda
tion of Wu Guting, he was able to win appointment from Prince De as headmaster of the
new academy. This is a good example of Prince De’s keen sense of judgment: he
awarded a prestigious post on the basis of ability, not political creed.
Cultural development was also a target of the Allied League Government. Prince
De established the Institute of Mongolian Culture, with Yi Dechin as its head. Yi was a
former member of the Mongolian Political Committee at Beile-yin sume and a teacher of
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Mongolian language and literature at the Army University in Nanjing. The goal of this
new institute was to promote Mongolia’s native culture, along with introducing selective
elements of foreign culture. It consisted of several departments: research, floor displays,
art, athletics, publication, and textbook compilation. The Allied League Government
placed its library, the Peoples’ Education Institute and the Historical Institute, under the
control of this newly created institute. A Japanese historian. Go Minoru, served as advi
sor. A friendly scholar with a deep interest in Mongolian history and literature, he stayed
at the institute through 1945 without the slightest quarrel with local Mongols or Chinese.
The institute gathered many important Mongolian documents, especially on the question
of land tenure; sadly, many of its manuscripts were lost after the war.
In Chahar, a youth school had been established at Zhangbei during the period of
the Military Government. After the establishment of the Allied League Government, a
wide assortment of primary and middle schools was established: the Bayantala League
Normal School was founded in Hohhot, the Baotou Youth School was established in
Baotou, the Ulanchab League Youth School was set up at Beile-yin sume, and the Shilingol League Youth School was founded at Pandita-gegeen-keid. Each school accepted
Mongol children through their teen years, schooling them in basic subjects and in the
foreign culture then sweeping the region. The already established Chinese schools, or
ganized to educate Chinese residents, functioned as they always had. The schools of the
Turned Banner were considered especially Important, and like the other banner schools,
those Turned Schools were financially supported at several levels.
In a bid to better understand Japan, students had been sent to Japan in everincreasing numbers since the Military Government era, when only ten or so had studied
in Japanese universities. During the Allied League era, this number grew to several
dozen, studying in a variety of fields.
Shortly before Prince De’s official visit to Japan, Wu Heling and I toured the
Imperial University in Hokkaido. Wu was particularly impressed with the departments of
animal husbandry and forestry. It became obvious that the Imperial University was where
Mongol students should study in Japan to obtain crucial scientific instruction. Wu negotiationed with the university’s president and a Professor Soga, working out the means
whereby Mongol students could study at the university. The Mongolian government es
tablished a student dormitory in nearby Sapporo, and provided room, board, and school
fees. The prince approved of Wu’s preliminary negotiations when he himself visited Ja
pan; soon, several students came to Sapporo, among them Gombojab (Hangin), who later
became Prince De’s secretary. Also, a Japanese language training center was established
in Hohhot to help Mongol students and officials communicate with their Japanese advi
sors.

The Allied League Government was also active in rejuvenating the domesticated
stock and herds of Mongolia. The Ministry of Animal Husbandry imported rams from
Australia and America and established several breeding paddocks throughout the leagues
and banners. Unfortunately, breeding conditions in America and Australia differed sub
stantially from those in Mongolia, and so the generation of sheep produced by the cross
breeding was inferior in quality to the old Mongol stock. The importation program thus
was a failure. The ministry also actively improved pasturelands, bringing in several Japa
nese technicians, who constructed winter shelters for animals in an attempt to guard
against overgrazing. Unfortunately, the Japanese refused to take the advice of the local
herdsmen; they built the paddocks in the distant wilderness, where they were never used.
The ministry also sought to vaccinate the many herds of Mongolia, initially with no suc
cess. Unschooled herdsmen, having no understanding of the value of vaccination, refused
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ministry officials access to their herds. Following a prolonged campaign of public educa
tion, however, the vaccination program became successful.
The Japanese advisors of the Joint Committee controlled the entire transporta
tion, finance, telecommunications, and industrial networks in the Mongolian region. The
Joint Committee likewise controlled both grain and opium production within the Allied
League region. These elements of the modern world really had no impact on the tradi
tional Mongol pastoralist, whose chief outside interest was the ongoing trade in animal
byproducts, food, and textiles. This trade had traditionally been in the hands of Chinese
merchants, though increasingly they were controlled by the Daimo Gongsi, the Japanesecontrolled Great Mongolian Company. They co-opted the local Chinese merchant class,
eventually monopolizing trade in the traditional Mongolian territories. In areas where the
Chinese were better entrenched, they continued to dominate the local economies. The
Daimo Gongsi had been given the task by the Japanese Army in Mongolia of purchasing
horses, wool, and hides for military use. The Army provided the company with quality
textiles at subsidized prices to exchange for animals and animal by-products with the
local Mongol pastoralists. Mongolia’s large population of herdsmen were thus under a
double yoke of economic oppression, both Chinese and Japanese.
Except for the seven eastern banners of Shilingol, all the Mongol leagues and
banners relied on food produced either within their own banner or on food produced
elsewhere within the boundaries of the Allied League Government. Shilingol, because of
its geographical location, had to rely on food produced in what was then Manchukuo. The
two regimes eventually worked out a trading agreement that allowed for the free sale of
food across the border. Shilingol always found itself at a disadvantage, however, because
the prices of its two main trading commodities—domesticated animals and salt from the
salt lake of Ujumuchin—^were always less than those of the imported foodstuffs. Skirting
the disadvantageous money economy, a barter system soon developed across the border.
When the Japanese tried to regulate this, the trading situation grew very confused, and
many Mongols suffered economically. The Allied League Government was, however,
unable to redress these woes, consumed as it was in the struggle against alien pressures.

XI
THE MONGOLIAN ALLIED AUTONOMOUS
GOVERNMENT
SEPTEMBER 1939 - AUGUST 1941
Formation of the New Mongolian Political Regime
The Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government was established on September
1, 1939. Its name was changed to “Mongolian Autonomous State” on August 1, 1941.
Prince De hoped that changing the name of this organization to the original Mongolian
term would create a foundation for future independence. It was during these two years
that Prince De’s emotional condition was at its worst and that the course of Inner Mon
golian politics reversed.
After his visit in Japan, Prince De spent ten months in Hohhot negotiating the
future of Mongolia with authorities from Hohhot, Kalgan, and Tokyo. Finally, the Mon
golian Allied League Autonomous Government had to be dissolved because of heavy
pressure from the Japanese army stationed in Mongolia. It united with the two puppet
regimes of Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi, having Kalgan as its capital; and was
renamed the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government. Although he accepted most of
the conditions advocated by the Japanese authorities during this time. Prince De also in
sisted on using the word Mongolia instead of Mongolian Territory as the name of this
new regime, and dating the years from Chinggis Khan rather than from the founding of
the Republic of China. Prince De accepted a splendid title but lost the real power of the
old Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government.
On August 29, 1939, Prince De held the fourth session of the Mongolian Con
gress and declared the disbanding of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Gov
ernment and the unification of the three political regimes of Mongolia, Southern Chahar,
and Northern Shanxi. At 9:00 a.m on September 1, as Germany invaded Poland, a
founding ceremony for the newly established Mongolian Allied Autonomous Govern
ment took place in Kalgan in the courtyard of the Joint Committee of Mongolian Terri
tory, under the direction of the Japanese advisor, Kanai Shoji.
At the beginning of the ceremony, Kanai Shoji recommended Prince De as
chairman of the newly founded political organization, with Yu Pinqin and Xia Gong as
deputy chairmen. Following this, Kanai reported on the negotiations among and proce
dures specified by the agreement made by the three political regimes of the Mongolian
territory, including their desire to establish the new Mongolian Allied Autonomous Gov
ernment. Yu Pinqin announced the outline of the organization of this new government
and its political goals. Xia Gong announced the statement of the newly established gov
ernment. Finally, Prince De led the main officials of this new government in their swear
ing in to their new posts. After this ceremony. Lieutenant General Hasunuma Shigeru,
Commander of the Japanese Forces Stationed in Mongolia, and Major General Sakai Takashi. Head of the Liaison Office of the Asian Development Board (Koayin) in Kalgan,
delivered the words of greeting which established the Mongolian Allied Autonomous
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Government.
Following is an outline of the organization, the political goals, the inaugural
statement of the newly established Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government, and the
oath taken by its chairman.
I. Outline of the organization
1) The new regime is established in the territory of Mongolia and organized by all the na
tionalities of East Asia [present in that territory],
2) The title of the new political organization is the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Gov
ernment.
3) The head of this new political organization is titled Chairman.
4) The new political organization is established on the basis of East Asian uprightness.
The policy of the government should be carried out according to the general will of the
people.
5) The location of the capital is Kalgan.
II. Political goals
1) To uphold and promote the moral spirit of East Asia.
2) To achieve the grand harmony of all the nationalities and to go forth toward the great
goal of peace.
3) To improve the livelihood of the people, to establish stability and order, and to guaran
tee the benefit of the people.
4) To bring forth the liberation of all the nationalities from the oppression of communism
and to reinforce the common world anti-communist front.
5) To ally sincerely with the friendly nation [Japan] and to lay the foundation for the es
tablishment of the new order of East Asia.
III. The Declaration
On September 1, of the 734th year of Chinggis Khan’s chronology, the three gov
ernments of Mongolia, Southern Chahar, and Northern Shanxi unite to establish the Mon
golian Allied Autonomous Government. Because of the difficult present conditions, [we]
must open the way for great harmony and peace [and] build the foundation for everlasting
peace and good rule. This must be announced to all the people of every banner [and local
administration unit] and be declared to all the nations of the world as follows;
The territory of Mongolia is well known in history. Its resources are splendid. The
people are simple, honest, strong, and brave and are accustomed to leading peaceful lives
herding and farming. The landscape is continental, with many mountain ranges. It extends
from the Great Wall on the south to the North Sea [Lake Baikal], However, from the
founding of the Republic of China, it was occupied by the war lords. For twenty years they
tyrannically oppressed the people at will and treated them as nothing but food for tigers and
wolves. The man Chiang [Kai-shek], although setting up the national order for a temporary
period with his capital in Nanjing, “allied with the Soviets and tolerated the Communists,”
exhorted the Mongols and resisted the Japanese as his main project. Consequently, relations
with the friendly nation [Japan] worsened and war broke out. [Chiang] was defeated again
and again and was able to maintain his existence only in the area of Sichuan. Nevertheless,
such a beast-like person still aimed at a chance to swallow up the banners on the Gobi
Steppes, encroaching on Mongolian borders and heartland. Judging from the approaching
danger of communism and on the basis of the common will and desire for anti-communism
to bring peace to the people, the three governments of Mongolia, Southern Chahar, and
North Shanxi must have a basic policy: to cooperate; to found the Mongolian Allied
Autonomous Government; to defend against communism; to carry out harmony of the na
tionalities; to accept the assistance of Japan and sincerely unify Japanese, Mongols, Manchus, and Chinese into a solid body to march toward the establishment of the new East
Asian order; to enlighten the upright spirit of East Asia; to glorify the world; to inerease the
welfare of human beings; and to establish everlasting merit in history.
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IV. The Oath of the Chairmen
Before Buddha and the gods I swear that I will follow the constructive spirit to obey
the organization of law and other ordinances, to strive for victory in the great enterprise
against the communists, to unite harmoniously with all the nationalities in order to enrich
the livelihood of the people, to march forward toward the establishment of an East Asian
new order, and to strengthen the foundation of national establishment forever and ever.
This 1 swear. (Go Minoru, “Mokyo,” Omoiie no naimoko, pp. 63-66).
According to the specified general procedures, the Declaration and the Outline
of Policy had to be declared by the supreme leader of the regime unless he was not able
to perform this task. These important documents were not to be read aloud by other peo
ple. On this occasion Prince De read only a few lines of the oath; the other important
documents were proclaimed by Yu Pinqin and Xia Gong. Although the three heads of the
unified governments had equal political positions, his behavior suggests that Prince De
did not wish to read documents that were not agreeable to him. This declaration, com
pared with the declaration of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement of 1933, had
no meaningful content. It did not express the emotions or desire of the Mongol people
who were fighting for liberation and sheer existence. Evidently, this new declaration did
not represent the will of Prince De either.
After Wu Heling was exiled to Japan, all the important documents and regula
tions were composed by Tegshibuyan, who was also expert in Chinese literature; conse
quently, he was one of the men nominated to compose this declaration. Later, in the fall
of 1949, when the last Mongolian Autonomy movement was proclaimed at Alashan,
Prince De personally told me about this matter: “When the three governments decided to
unify, they brought me the finished manuscript of the Declaration. I was very dissatisfied
with it, especially the words against Chiang Kai-shek. I recommended a change, but it
had already been printed, and there was no way to retrieve it. Later, I rebuked Tegshi
buyan, saying that the struggle for existence and independence of the Mongol people put
us up against China, but not against any individual who was part of the Chinese state. We
should speak, but there is no need to use such ugly words against someone, especially
since the man Chiang did not do any bad things to Mongolia. Why should we attack spe
cific individuals without cause? He is the leader of China, and if later we are really able
to establish our independence, we will have to solicit the cooperation of such a leader of
the Chinese government. Since then I have read all declarations under my name very
carefully, and nothing like this has happened again.”
Prince De mentioned this matter to me because I was then writing the Declara
tion of Autonomy. All this suggests that the Declaration of the Mongolian Allied Auto
nomous Government was not authorized by Prince De; it was a document that he hated.
It is impossible to find in the organization of the government and its political
outline any words that reveal the desire of the Mongol people for independence. More
over, this new political outline erased the words “livelihood, unification, education, de
velopment, nourishment, and defense” (see p. 179) as the goals of the government. These
words clearly announced the founding of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous
Government by the Second Mongolian Congress. Their deletion here perhaps shows how
thoroughly the old goals were dismissed.
Although Prince De used the chronology of Chinggis Khan in his oath, the flag
that hung in the courtyard was different. The new flag had the same colors, but the design
was different, in order to show that this was the flag of a combination of the Mongolian
government and the governments of Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi.
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After Kanai Shoji conducted the ceremony, Prince De, Yu Pinqin, and Xia Gong
went to the Japanese Military Headquarters in Mongolia and the Liaison Office of the
Asian Development Board to visit with Commander Hasunuma Shigeru and the Office
Head Sakai Takashi and to express gratitude for their “support.” After they returned from
this visit, they held a public conference as a formality to pass the organizational laws and
regulations for the Political Affairs Department, the Councilors Department, the minis
tries and bureaus of the Political Affairs Department, and the Offices of the Leagues, and
to appoint important personnel to fill the positions. At the same time, Kanai Shoji was
“welcomed” as Supreme Advisor.'
The combination of the three political regimes—Mongolia, Southern Chahar,
and Northern Shanxi—destroyed the Mongolian government and the leagues under the
jurisdiction of the newly organized Political Affairs Department of the Mongolian Allied
Autonomous Government. The two regimes of Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi
were demoted to political bureaus under the direct administration of the new Political
Affairs Department. Their original territories and administrations remained unchanged.
The new flag of this new regime was greatly disappointing to Prince De and
other Mongol leaders. It had seven horizontal stripes of red, white, blue, and yellow. A
broad red stripe in the middle represented the Japanese, two narrow white stripes adjacent
to the red represented the Moslems, two slightly wider blue stripes represented the Mon
gols, and the yellow stripes—^which formed the upper and lower border—^were equal in
width to the blue and represented the Chinese and other nationalities. This flag symbol
ized Japan as the center country toward which all the nationalities of East Asia should
incline, unifying harmoniously under a new political regime.
The design for this flag was initiated by Kanai Shoji and authorized by the Japa
nese commander, Hasunuma Shigeru. When it was shown to Prince De, he refused it and
insisted on using the old flag of the Mongolian Military Government. The two sides were
deadlocked for a long period. Finally, Sakai Takashi put pressure on Prince De to accept
the new flag. According to the words of Nojiri Tetsuji, a Japanese deputy minister of that
period, “Sakai Takashi admonished Prince De, ‘You will be the representative of this
new political regime. You are the one who is really qualified to be a monarch. However,

' The important appointments were as follows: Jodbajab, Head of the Political Affairs Department;
Wu Heling, a Councilor of the Councilors Department; Muratani Hikojiro, Advisor of the Chair
man’s Office; Sekiguchi Tamotsu, Minister of General Affairs; Sungjingwangchug, Minister of
Civilian Affairs; Oba Tatsunosuke, Deputy Minister of Civilian Affairs; Ding Qichang, Minister of
Peace Preservation Ministry; Nagakawa Kazuo, Deputy Minister of the Peace Preservation Ministry; Togtakhu, Minister of the Judiciary Affairs Ministry; Hatano Yoshikuma, Deputy of the Judici
ary Affairs Ministry; Ma Yongkui, Minister of Finance; Nojiri Tetsuji, Deputy Minister of Finance;
Altanochir, Minister of Communication and Transportation; Ito Tasuku, Deputy Minister of Com
munication and Transportation; Du Yunyu, Minister of Industry (the deputy minister was a Japa
nese); Khorjurjab, Head of The General Bureau of Husbandry Industry; Itsuna Ei, Deputy Minister
of the General Bureau of Husbandry Industry; Shonnudongrob and Tegshibuyan, Councilors of the
Department of Political Affairs; Sekiguchi Tamotsu, President of the Mengjiang Institute; Yi De
chin, Head of the Mongolian Cultural Institute; Jirgalang, Head of the General Bureau of Investi
gation; Takasu Shinichi, Deputy of the General Bureau of Investigation; Bayantai, Head of the
General Bureau of Economic Supervision; Chen Yuming, Head of the Southern Chahar Political
Bureau with Takeuchi Gempei as Deputy; Tian Rubi, Head of the Northern Shanxi Political Bur
eau, with Maejima Noboru as Deputy; Han Guangsen, Mayor of Kalgan, and Yaejima Seiji, the
deputy mayor. The heads of the leagues remained as they were. All these appointments were de
cided prior to the conference, which was just a rubber stamp.
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a monarch should not talk too much on small matters. Under the Manchukuo Regime,
when Puyi was established as leader, his attitude was excellent. He gave thorough trust to
the newly established organization and to the designers creating the flag; he only said,
“Good, good,” and offered no interference. Although the national flag is an important
matter, since it is already designed it would be better not to criticize it too much. I hope
you also will have the attitude of a real monarch and understand.’”
This advice is an example of Sakai’s attitude toward Prince De and frankly as
sumes that this new political regime was to be the political organization serving the Japa
nese. He wanted Prince De to act as a puppet, as Puyi had in the Manchukuo regime. This
basically meant that the important matters were not Prince De’s business, and the small
matters were not worth his interference. Of course, Sakai was able to apply pressure to
cause Prince De to nod his head, but he could not eliminate the opposition of the Mongol
people. Many Mongols ridiculed the flag as '■'solongga-ym toos” meaning, “trim for
women’s costumes.” From the beginning to the end, this flag never captured the hearts of
the Mongols.
As for the personnel appointments, too many Japanese deputy ministers and
heads held the real power. This had been the goal of the Japanese advisory institution
from the time of the founding of the Mongolian Military Government: the Japanese were
not advisors anymore, but officials. Consequently, except for the Mongolian banners (all
of which had strong historical feudalistic traditions), all other new institutions came un
der the control of the Japanese officials. The personnel assignments of the Mongolian
Army did not change because of the unification of the three governments. Nevertheless,
because of the dissolution of the Mongolian Allied League Government, Li Shouxin lost
his nominal position as the vice-chairman of the former government.
Wu Heling, who was in Japan, realized that the Mongolian Allied League
Autonomous Government was being dissolved and that consequently he was becoming a
figure with only nominal power as a mere councilor of the new government. There had
been no decision on the length of his stay in Japan, nor was there a budget for his support
there. Therefore, he decided to take me along and return to Mongolia to observe what the
future held. We left Tokyo around the 10th of September 1939, and arrived in Beiping in
the middle of the same month. There we met with many high and middle-ranking offi
cials of the old Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government. From these conver
sations we realized that this newly organized Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government
was nothing but the old Mengjiang Joint Committee with a new label. There were not
even desks and chairs for the officials of the old Mongolian government in the ministry
offices. They were thus all idle and had come to Beiping merely to look busy.
Wu and I stayed in Beiping for several days, then left for Kalgan. During our
conversation with Prince De, we noticed that while talking he always looked at the ceil
ing. It seemed he was preoccupied. This was later explained by his secretary: In recent
months, the prince has been terribly disturbed by Kanai Shoji, Ohashi Kumao, and Sakai
Takashi. This has caused his current lack of motivation and distress.” This kind of psy
chological depression continued even when circumstances later improved. Of course, he
did not ask to see any psychiatrists.
After arriving in Kalgan, Wu Heling and I went to visit the Supreme Advisor
Kanai Shoji, whose attitude toward Wu was extremely different than when he had re
ceived me six months before. He smiled and said, “1 think it would be better for Mr. Wu

^ Nojiri Tetsuji, “Motyo Kaiso,” Kogen Senri, p. 238.

XI: The Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government

221

to go back to Japan to continue studying one more year. Then your contribution to the
Mongolian government would be much greater.” Since Wu had already personally seen
the situation at Kalgan, he also wished to leave. So he answered, “1 was thinking of ask
ing you to prolong the period of my study in Japan.” This was, of course, immediately
agreed to by Kanai. Prince De also desired Wu to go back to Japan to continue his activi
ties in the Japanese capital against Kanai. Consequently, Wu stayed in Kalgan only a
little over a month, then returned to Tokyo.

Prince Sungjingwangchug and Other High Officials
The newly appointed minister. Prince Sungjingwangchug (1886-1948), a very
good friend of my father, was very happy when he saw me and said sincerely, “You
know I don’t speak Chinese, and I don’t understand Japanese at all. Now that you have
returned from Japan, don’t go again; be my secretary.” Given the good friendship be
tween Prince Sung and my father, it was impossible for me to refuse. Moreover, since
Wu Heling and I disagreed on so many issues, it was difficult for us to work together; it
would be better for us to separate. So 1 accepted the kind offer of my father’s friend and
resigned as Wu Heling’s secretary to become the secretary of the Minister of Civilian
Affairs. The following record is of things 1 experienced personally or heard directly from
the people involved from this time on.
Sungjingwangchug was the josag prince of the Khauchid Left Banner and the
deputy head of the Shilingol League. He was a very intimate friend of the deceased head
of the Shilingol League, Prince Sodnamrabdan, but his relationship with Prince De was
merely cordial. He was well known among the leaders of the eastern Shilingol as a mod
erate and kind elderly person. Prince Sung’s appointment to this new Job was promoted
by the Japanese military authorities, particularly by Kanai, and was agreed to by Prince
De. They intended eventually to make him Prince De’s equal, and, when it became nec
essary, to have him take over Prince De’s position. Kanai’s attitude toward Prince Sung
was thus very “friendly.” This situation greatly “improved” the Japanese advisor’s atti
tude toward me as well. However, Kanai’s plot was in vain. Prince Sung was a very faith
ful, honest person who had no political ambition at all. Because of the loyalty so char
acteristic of Mongols, after his appointment as a minister, he showed absolute support for
and loyalty to Prince De, and throughout their association they never had any conflict. In
fact. Prince De eventually recognized Prince Sung as one of his most faithful friends,
relying on him in all domestic matters involving Mongolia. When he had an idea he
wanted delivered to the Japanese side, he would ask Prince Sung to communicate it in
order to reduce his direct contact with the Japanese. The increasing intimacy between
Prince De and Prince Sung evoked Jealousy in Buyandalai.
In the Ministry of Civilian Affairs, Oba Tatsunosuke, the deputy minister, was
very controlled and polite. Kimura Yujiro, the General Affair’s Section Head, was also a
prudent and careful person and easy to deal with. Prince Sung’s policy was very clear: he
wanted Oba and other Japanese officials to manage the affairs of the Chinese of Southern
Chahar and Northern Shanxi and the Chinese xians inside the borders of Chahar and Bayantala Leagues; however, he wanted to himself supervise the affairs of the Mongolian
banners of the leagues. Because of this policy, Oba and other Japanese officials honored
Prince Sung’s decisions on the Mongolian leagues and banners. This created a division of
power which made both Prince Sung and the Japanese officials feel comfortable and thus
avoid conflict. Prince Sung thereby received honor from both Mongolian and Japanese.
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At this time, many officials from the dissolved Mongolian Allied League Auto
nomous Government were moved into the Civilian Ministry, although at first there was
not even a chair prepared for them. After Prince Sung began to act as minister, they were
able to settle down and start to work. Among them was the head of the Bureau of Educa
tion, Togtakhu (Tao Libin), who, because of Prince Sung’s management, later became
one of the active bureau heads in that ministry.
The beginning of the newly established Mongolian Allied Autonomous Gov
ernment reflected the symbolism of its new flag. The Japanese officials were at the center
of power. Important matters, such as policy decisions, as well as minor matters, such as
management of automobiles, were all in Japanese hands. The “autonomy” of this
“Autonomous Government” was nothing but a mockery.
Prince De’s residence was a nice civilian house in the city of the Lower Castle
in Kalgan. Unless there were ceremonies to attend, he rarely came to these so-called gov
ernmental offices. The Supreme Advisor, Kanai Shoji, who lived in a newly established
residence at the Upper Castle, came to the office every day. So his room became the real
center of power in this regime. The chairman’s room opposite Kanai’s room was nothing
but a room full of furniture. Except for the Department of Councilors, consisting of some
of the Japanese advisors from the dissolved Mongolian Allied League Government, such
as Nakajima Manzo and Yamamoto Nobunaga, only a single Japanese secretary, Wasa
Yoshinosuke, spoke fluent Chinese.
In any event, Kanai, Sekiguchi Tamotsu, the Minister of General Affairs, and his
personal henchman, Akiyama, were the most powerful people of this new regime. Se
kiguchi was originally a Manchukuo official. His personality and attitude were exactly
the same as Kanai’s: they both treated the local leaders as puppets. Sekiguchi was sup
ported by Lieutenent Colonel Ohashi Kumao, the chief of the political staff of the Japan
ese army in Mongolia, and therefore he became the Minister of General Affairs. It is dif
ficult to judge whether personal envy caused the constant power struggle between him
and Kanai. Although Kanai was able to manipulate Prince De, he could not do anything
with Sekiguchi. This conflict continued until the end of 1940, when Sekiguchi was forced
to resign. Thereafter Kanai again grasped absolute authority over all Japanese officials
under him.
The two vice-chairmen, Yu Pinqin and Xia Gong, did not come to the office;
there was nothing for them to do. Among the ministers, the most arrogant and impolite
was the Minister of Industry, Du Yunyu, who had a Japanese wife and was trusted by
Kanai. The local people viewed him as a running dog of the oppressive Japanese. After
Togtakhu, the Minister of Judicial Affairs, had betrayed his superior, Prince De, and the
Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, his value to the Japanese military
authorities and to Kanai Shoji came to an end. However, he was made a minister in name.
Altanochir also accepted his “due” reward and was duly appointed Minister of Commu
nication and Transportation. At this time he had a severe heart attack and, perhaps be
cause of his bad health, became a devout Buddhist. After being healed, he regretted his
former deeds. He also understood that “minister” was only a vain title of no significance.
His attitude toward Prince De reversed fully, and from then on he did no harm to the
reputation and leadership of the prince. His personal relationship with the prince gradu
ally improved.
Engkeamur was appointed as a bureau head of the Ministery of Communication
and Transportation; Urgungbu, the third younger brother of Wu Guting, was appointed as
the secretary of the same ministry. Their relationship with Minister Altanochir was pleas
ant and smooth. Nevertheless, this ministry was dominated by Ito Tasuku. The Minister
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of the Peace Preservation Ministry, Ding Qichang, was a Chinese of Kharachin Right
Banner. As a young man he had joined the troops of Cui Xingwu under Tang Yulin and
become one of Li Shouxin’s group.
It was also at this time that the Mongolian army was reorganized. The original
Chinese troops of the first, second, and third divisions were regrouped into police forces.
Ding, recommended by Li Shouxin and several other Japanese advisors, was appointed
Minister of the Peace Preservation Ministry in charge of police administration and espio
nage. However, he was only able to manage the ordinary police administration, not the
organization of spies and the secret police, which was handled by the Japanese. Sangdugureng was also appointed as a powerless bureau head of this ministry.
Ma Yongkui, Minister of Finance, was welcomed and praised by Japanese offi
cials because he never tried to manage affairs or become involved in the administration.
Because of his placement in the entourage of Prince De during the visit to Japan, Jirgalang was hated by Kanai. He lost to Togtakhu his position as minister of the dissolved
Mongolian Allied League Government, and was made Head of the General Bureau of
Supervision and Investigation. Bayantai, although not favored by Prince De, had been
able to occupy the position of a councilor in the old Hohhot regime. Now he was de
moted to Head of the Economic Supervision Bureau. After Wu Heling’s exile to Japan,
Tegshibuyan became one of Prince De’s planning advisors. Despised by Kanai, he also
lost his original position as minister and became a mere councilor in the Political Affairs
Department. Khorjurjab became the Head of the General Bureau of Husbandry Enterprise
(the new version of the ministry of Husbandry Enterprise of the old Hohhot government).
The Supreme Advisor of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, Itsuna
Ei, became Khorjurjab’s deputy chief These were the personnel arrangements designed
by Kanai.
Although the middle-ranking cadre, the bureau chiefs, were assigned some posts
and no one was dismissed, they now had nowhere to work. Moreover, before the combi
nation of the three regimes, the Southern Chahar and the Northern Shanxi regimes had
given big salary raises to their employees. Only the Mongolian regime reported their
original position salaries; after the unification, their salary and rank fell even farther be
hind those of the others. This caused a collapse of morale.
Of all the Mongol leaders, Jodbajab was the one most greatly favored by Kanai
Shoji. This was for the following reasons. Jodbajab was one of the senior leaders among
the Mongol politicians and also the senior leader of the Chahar tribe. After the assassina
tion of Nimaodzar, he had been greatly threatened by the Japanese and dared not refuse
their demands. He yielded all his power to the Japanese advisors and never questioned
their administrative acts, being content to put his personal seal on each document to sig
nify his approval. For Kanai’s purposes, he was the most suitable person to head the Po
litical Affairs Department. He would provide a check against Prince De by putting his
administrative power in the hands of Japanese officials, or in other words, in the hands of
Kanai. That is why Mr. Jodbajab, well known as a courageous hero during his early days,
now became the person in the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government most wel
comed by the Japanese, but also the most ridiculed by politically active Mongols.
Persuading Prince De to accept the Japanese insistence on dissolving the Mon
golian Allied League Autonomous Government, to join the Mengjiang Joined, Commit
tee, and to establish the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government had not been an easy
project. In order to increase the pressure on Prince De, Marshall Sugiyama Gen, the sen
ior military leader and commander of the Japanese army in North China, personally took
the position as Commander of Japanese Forces in Mongolia. He transferred Lieutenant
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General Hasunuman Shigeru to another military position in Japan.^
The unification of the three regimes and the formation of the Mongolian Allied
Autonomous Government was the “accomplishment” of Sakai Takashi. One day he went
to visit and tour the office of the newly established government. When he entered a broad
hall, he found two or three desks with a dozen or more Mongolian officials standing
around. Seeing this inactivity, he asked Kanai Shoji and Sekiguchi Tamotsu, “What are
these people doing here?” They told him these were the officials of the fomier Mongolian
Allied League Autonomous Government. Although their jobs were defined, space was
limited and there was nowhere for them to work. Sakai told Kanai and Sekiguchi to do
their best to put these people immediately to work and not to neglect them any longer.
After this dramatic intervention, the upper-middle officials of the dissolved Mongolian
Allied League Autonomous Government were given a place to work with chairs and
desks; but it was still the case that no work was assigned to them. To win the goodwill of
the Mongols, Kanai rebuked Akiyama, a loyal follower of Sekiguchi, for his negligence
of the Mongol officials, cleverly turning the blame for not honoring the Mongols toward
Sekiguchi and Akiyama. Later, these Mongol officials were able to again find work to do.

Secret Contact between Prince De and Chiang Kai-shek
Under the oppression of Kanai Shoji, Sakai Takashi, and Ohashi Kumao, every
one from the dissolved Mongolian Allied Leagues Autonomous Government except
Togtakhu and Jodbajab were greatly discouraged. Even Li Shouxin, whose belief in
Mongolia’s national aspirations was very slight, felt disappointed and viewed the Japa
nese oppression as an insult. They alt originally thought that the reason for their coopera
tion with Japan was to gain existence and independence for Mongolia, but this hope was
entirely swept away by the Japanese attitude and policy. The opportunity provided by this
psychological change was not neglected by the KMT’s Chungking agents. Gao Rong, the
special commissioner of Chungking’s Military Intelligence Bureau, had his colleague
Namur (Liu Jianhua, Chief of the Hohhot Police Bureau and a trusted follower of Prince
De), test the prince and Li Shouxin as to their desire to establish a connection with
Chungking and join together to fight the Japanese.
Namur went to Kalgan and reported Gao Rong’s proposal to Prince De, who
accepted it immediately and agreed to go to Hohhot to investigate the administration of
the Bayantala League Office but also to visit secretly with Gao Rong. During this secret
meeting, Prince De revealed that he was willing to leave the area under Japanese occupa
tion and go to Chungking. Gao Rong answered that such a great risk had to be authorized
by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Later, Ma Hansan, a high rank organizer of Chungking intelligence in North
China, arrived in Hohhot. Through Wu Junyu, a Chinese officer in the General Head
quarters of the Mongolian army, he was able to contact Li Shouxin and to observe He
Yunzhang, a Turned Mongol intellectual and the secretary general of the Bayantala

’ However, Sugiyama did not come to Kalgan himself to directly administer the Japanese army in
Mongolia. Until the new commander. Lieutenant General Okabe Naosoburo, was appointed and
arrived in Kalgan in later September, 1939, Japanese military affairs continued to be handled by the
transferred commander, Hasunuman Shigeru. According to the diary of General Okabe, his first
visit with Prince De did not turn out well because of the prince’s anxiety, reflected by his shifty
eyes and dull countenance. See Diary of Okabe Naosoburo (Tokyo 1982), p. 238.
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League Office, and join his organization. Mergen (Liang Chixiang), a section head of the
Bayantala League Office, and Xiao Zhaogeng, a Manchu man, previously Prince De’s
chauffeur and later magistrate of Togtakhu xian, were the liaisons between Ma and the
prince.
The latter part of 1939 was the grimmest period for Prince De. Mergen and Xiao
were eventually able to bring back instructions from the Generalissmo that he wished the
prince to cross the Yellow River in the vicinity of Baotou and go on south to Chungking.
The prince immediately had Mergen bring Ma Hansan to Kalgan to visit with him. He
expressed his desire to enter Outer Mongolia from his own Sunid Banner and to go from
there to Chungking via the Soviet Union. He gave the reason that leaving from Baotou
was too dangerous because of the heavy concentration of Japanese soldiers stationed
there; the northern route was safer. In reality, however, the prince did not want to leave
the area occupied by the Japanese simply to enter another area controlled by Fu Zuoyi,
his personal mortal enemy.
Ma Hansan reported this to the Generalissmo, and the Chinese leader persuaded
Prince De not to risk going through the Soviet Union; it would be better for him to con
tinue to stay in the area occupied by the Japanese and to “tolerate the heavy oppression so
as to carry out his important obligations, and to deceive the enemy.” (I later heard this
from the prince.) This secret contact with Chungking was extremely dangerous. So in
order to be prudent. Prince De appointed only Mergen and his cousin, Wangragjab, as
intermediaries.

The Secret Contact Ends in Failure
Through monitoring of radio frequencies, Japanese military intelligence eventu
ally discovered this secret line of communication. Becoming suspicious, they enlarged
their investigation and discovered the disappearance of some people, among them a man
who had close ties to Namur. The Japanese military police issued an inquiry to Namur,
asking him to answer immediately. Namur was very intelligent, and in answering their
questions, emphasized the seriousness of the problem. He wanted to go arrest the escap
ees himself First, he went westward to Baotou, convincing the Japanese that the man was
perhaps hiding in Beiping. Then, accompanied by Japanese military police, Namur went
to Beiping. There he falsely told the Japanese police that the escapee had just left Beijing
for Baotou. While the police were going to Baotou to search for the man, Namur himself
escaped. (Mr. Namur told me this in the winter of 1982 in Taibei.) The defection of Na
mur increased the seriousness of the situation.
The Japanese military police, after investigating those who had intimate rela
tions with Namur, arrested Wu Junyu, He Yunzhang, Mergen, Xiao Zhaogeng, and oth
ers. After examination and torture, the captives confessed that Prince De and Li Shouxin
were involved in the conspiracy. Since Li Shouxin was the first to receive news of the
confession, he came to discuss the matter with the prince. At the same time, he purposely
disclosed the secret intelligence to a limited group, who alerted Ma Hansan and other
agents of Chungking, enabling them to hide or escape.
After consultation, both Prince De and Li Shouxin realized that their involve
ment was undeniable. They thought it would be better to confess and try an alternative
plan. On April 11, Li went to the headquarters of the Japanese army to visit with Com
mander Okabe Naosaburo. Soon after, Prince De also visited with Okabe and Major Gen
eral Tanaka Shinichi, chief of staff of the Japanese army. He openly confessed that those
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arrested had merely been following his orders. He wanted to take full responsibility for
their activities and asked pardon for the innocent persons. At the same time, he revealed
his reasons for running this risk: the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
had been dissolved under pressure; the Mongols had been thoroughly neglected by the
Japanese side, and the hope for building a Mongolian nation had become slim.
Tanaka Shinichi expressed his sympathy and asked, “If Chiang Kai-shek al
lowed Mongolian independence, what would you do then?” This sudden question
prompted Prince De to consult with his interpreter, Chogbadarakhu. He answered, “Even
if Chiang Kai-shek promised Mongolian independence, 1 would have to see whether it
was realistic or not before taking action because none of his promises have materialized. I
cannot trust vain words.” This kind of response did not offend the Japanese military, and
the prince maintained his image of humility. Agreeing with the comment, Tanaka said, “1
understand the course of this entire event. Chiang Kai-shek asked you to go, but you
didn’t go. That’s all right; 1 understand your motives and sympathize. Please don’t
worry.”
Since Prince De felt absolved of responsibility, he added, “It was I who ordered
He Yunzhang, Mergen, Xiao Zhaogeng, and Wu Junyu to be the intermediaries. I should
take the whole responsibility, yet you pardon me. I wish you could pardon them also.”
The result of Prince De’s conspiracy with Chungking was that Tanaka agreed to consider
the prince’s desire. However, by then, Wu Yunyu and others had been executed (at the
beginning of their trial). He Yunzhang had died as a result of torture during his impris
onment, and Mergen and Xiao had been sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Three
years later, when Prince De again asked for their pardon from the Japanese military
authorities, Mergen and Xiao were finally released.
According to Okabe’s diary:
1) Prince De and Li Shouxin’s contact with the agents of Chiang Kai-shek
started in the summer of 1940.
2) Prince De was greatly disappointed with the unification of the three regimes
and the newly established government, which did not benefit the Mongols. He refused to
remain in a nominal position, one leaving him no power to manage either big or small
matters. He had confidence in Japan and considered Japan a model. However, when his
expectations were not realized, he became distressed and rebelled.
3) Prince De absolutely opposed the Soviet domination of Mongolia and worried
that the Japanese would one day withdraw from Mongolia. It would be better for the
Mongols to struggle for existence alone than to suffer under the power of the Soviet Un
ion. Therefore, he disregarded the danger to his life, and worried instead about the exis
tence of the Mongol people as a whole. It was rumored in 1940 that the Japanese army
was only temporarily stationed in China and might eventually withdraw. Prince De had to
consider what the situation might be after Japanese withdrawal. He had the feeling that
Japanese expansion had already reached its limits.
4) Because of his fear that Mongolia might come under the influence of Soviet
communism. Prince De indicated he would establish contact with Chungking, but did not
receive a concrete answer from the Chinese side.
5) From this time on, he awakened from his dream of trusting Japan. He appre
ciated the pardon from the Japanese commander in chief, but hoped the commander
would take responsibility for dealing with those treacherous people.'*

“* Okabe, p 326.
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Okabe’s diary may provide a good supplement to the account I have given. It
describes Prince De’s feelings and his willingness to accept responsibility. The words “he
did not receive a concrete answer from the other side” show that in order to maintain
some chance for future negotiations, Prince De did not reveal the whole picture to his
opponent.
Perhaps a brief biographical sketch of the interpreter Chogbadarakhu would be
appropriate at this point. He was a Kharachin Right Banner man who graduated from the
Chongzheng school of that banner. Later, he went to Beiping to study at the MongolianTibetan Academy. He later transferred to the Political Academy of the Kuomintang in
Nanjing. During Prince De’s visit to Nanjing, Chogbadarakhu, greatly influenced by the
nationalistic attitude of the prince, left Nanjing to return to Mongolia and join the
prince’s Students’ Brigade. During the period of the Mongolian Autonomy Movement at
Bat-khaalag in 1933, he was one of the most radical of the youths. When the prince real
ized Chogbadarakhu’s potential, he sent him to Japan for further study under the tutelage
of Sasame Tsuneo, the early Japanese agent in Inner Mongolia. He studied in the Political
Science Department of Chuo University, Tokyo. There he read many Marxist books and
was greatly influenced by socialistic ideas.
During Prince De’s visit to Japan, Chogbadarakhu became one of his intimate
followers and became furious at Kanai’s high-handed policy against the prince. In the
spring of 1939, he graduated from the university and returned to Hohhot. Prince De im
mediately appointed him his secretary and interpreter for important negotiations because
of his facility in the Japanese language. Chogbadarakhu was very faithful to the prince,
and as a result, became a member of the prince’s personal advisory group. Although
Chogbodarakhu was greatly trusted by the prince, the prince did not mention contact with
Chiang Kai-shek to him until the secret became known.^
At the insistence of Tanaka Shinichi, Prince De’s contact with Chungking fin
ally dissolved without greater harm. It was rumored that during a meeting at the head
quarters of the Japanese Army in Mongolia, Tanaka advised that making too much of the
incident might influence many important leaders in Mongolia to turn against Japan and
finally lead to the total failure of Japanese policy in Mongolia. Therefore, it was better to
smooth the tense situation over by having the Mongols ask Japan for help. Commander
Okabe Naosaburo agreed with Prince De, and the decision became final.**

* After the seeret was discovered, Wangragjab, the cousin of Prince De, left Kalgan and hid out to
avoid being arrested. Since Wangragjab was trustworthy enough to keep matters confidential, he
was asked to take part in this top secret matter. In fact, even after the matter became open, he never
discussed it with anyone.
* After the affair was over, Iwai Fumio, advisor to the Mongolian Army, reported the meeting of
the top Japanese military authorities to Sangdugureng, commander of the Mongolian Army’s ninth
division. At first, Ohashi Kumao demanded that the Mongol leaders be subject to severe punish
ment. He feared that Prince De and others might try to contact Outer Mongolia. Perhaps Iwai re
vealed this secret information to threaten Prince De, put a stop to future attempts, and evoke grati
tude toward the Japanese military authorities. Prince De’s reputation and his prestige in Mongolia
were much greater than that of Lingsheng, whom the Japanese executed in 1935. So any damage to
Prince De might cause many Mongols to turn their allegiance away from Japan, even to causing the
Japanese position in Mongolia to collapse. Thus the regime of the Mongolian Territory could suffer
mortal damage and the Japanese endeavor might end in failure. It was better to downplay the im
portance of the situation. This was probably why Tanaka advocated a moderate policy toward the
Mongol leaders. On the other hand, Ohashi Kumao, always antagonistic toward Prince De, natur
ally insisted on a harsher policy. Fortunately, the Board of Asian Development in Tokyo replaced
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Kanai Shoji, a close collaborator with Ohashi Kumao, should not be absolved
from responsibility in such an important political problem. He pretended, however, not to
be involved. Therefore, Prince De humbly discussed this matter with Tanaka, but never
with Kanai. Again, only a limited number of Mongolian and Japanese leaders knew about
this great political crisis. Some leaders did not know of Prince De’s involvement in the
secret attempt; others thought that He Yunzhang, Mergen, and Xiao Zhaogeng were ar
rested because of their contact with Chungking. Three years later, when Mergen and Xiao
Zhaokeng were released, they remained silent, saying nothing in public. After the end of
the Second World War, Chiang Kai-shek did not label Prince De a traitor; he had told the
prince to be patient and remain in Japanese-occupied territory, but to only pretend to
collaborate with the Japanese. That is why none of the Mongol activists who followed the
prince were ever punished by the Chinese government.

The Wang Jingwei Regime and the Qingdao Conference
After establishing his regime in Nanjing, Wang Jingwei, with the assistance of
the Japanese, established a movement to unify China. Liang Hongzhi of the Nanjing Re
newal Government and Wang Kemin of the Beiping Preliminary Government immedi
ately responded to Wang’s initiative. On January 23, 1940, a conference ehaired by Wang
Jingwei in Qingdao discussed the new central government and its relation to the Chinese
regimes in Chungking and Beiping, and the Mongolian government in Kalgan. The
problem of the founding of the “Central Political Committee” was also discussed. This
matter had been studied and discussed for quite a long time. The Japanese authorities in
China supported Wang. This required Prince De to yield to the new Chinese regime. Be
cause Prince De stubbornly rejected this move, a deadlock occurred between the Mongol
leaders and the Japanese military commander in Kalgan. Finally, the Japanese decided
that even if the prince disagreed, they would have the Mongolian Allied Autonomous
Government send a representative to the Qingdao Conference. So Ohashi Kumao and
Kanai Shoji joined forces and put heavy pressure on Prince De.
By this time, those pressing the Mongols to recognize Wang’s regime as their
superior and to see themselves as subordinates to China were not the Chinese but the
Japanese. For a long time, the Japanese had encouraged the Mongols to separate from
China and establish their own independent political regime. Of course, this about face
greatly discouraged Prince De, who realized that the Japanese were not to be relied upon.
This turn of events not only cheated and insulted the prince, but also made it impossible
for him to face his own people. His original aim had been to ally with the Japanese and
cooperate with them. He wanted their assistance in founding an independent Mongolian
nation, while avoiding becoming a puppet of a foreign people. Since Prince De felt he
was being forced to be a puppet by the Japanese as well as a puppet of another puppet
(Wang’s regime), he tried once more to establish contact with Chungking. At the same
time, he decided not to send anybody to Qingdao to the conference.
In order not to disappoint Wang Jingwei, without the permission of Prince De,
the Japanese military authorities sent Li Shouxin to Qingdao, as the delegate from the

Sukai Takashi with Major General Takeshita Yoshiharu as Head of its Liaison Office in Kalgan.
The prudent Takeshita had no personal prejudice in Mongolian matters or against Prince De. This
was possibly another reason for the success of the moderate policy among the Japanese military
leaders.
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Mongolian government. Li Shouxin was accompanied by Sekiguchi Tamutsu, Minister of
General Affkirs; Nakajima Manzo, a secretary of the Councilors Department; and Chen
Yousheng, a counselor of the General Affairs Ministry and interpreter of Japanese and
Chinese languages.
As a matter of fact, Wang Jingwei had already reached an agreement with the
Japanese. He planned to place all the political units in the Japanese-occupied areas under
his control. The Japanese Board of Asian Development had agreed to this proposal in
October 1939. Many decisions were made at that time concerning the Mongolian Allied
Autonomous Government.^
After he arrived in Qingdao, the Japanese had Li Shouxin meet with Zhou Fohai, the representative of the Wang regime. On March 24, Li and Zhou signed an agree
ment containing the following points: 1) the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government
recognized the new central government as the legitimate government of China; 2) the
central government recognized the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government as a re
gional political regime, thereby also postulating the unity of the Mongolian, Chinese,
Manchu, and Japanese peoples as an established fact, but with each party granted a higher
degree of autonomy; 3) the central government allowed the Mongolian Allied Autono
mous Government to use the year date of Chinggis Khan and its original flag.
During the negotiations, both sides had distinctively different opinions, but the
compromise (summarized above) was suggested by General Itagaki Seishiro, chief of
staff of the Japanese Army stationed in China. In order to express the independent char
acter of Mongolia, Li Shouxin did not attend the conference for unification between
Wang Jingwei, Liang Hongzhi, and Wang Kemin. Although Li Shouxin visited with
Wang Jingwei once, they did not discuss politics. After signing the agreement, Li for
mally visited with Itagaki Seishiro. After his return to Kalgan, he reported all these events
to Prince De. He was trusted now by the Japanese because he had agreed to go to Qing
dao. This decision helped the Japanese pacify the deadlocked opponents of Wang Jing
wei. Nevertheless, Li’s image darkened in the hearts of the Mongols.
After Wang established his regime in Nanjing, he set up the Ministry of the
Frontier Administration, and appointed Engkebatu, former member of the National Gov
ernment, and Keshingge, former member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission,
as the Mongolian members of his newly established regime. These decisions symbolized
that Mongolia and other frontier areas were still under the domination of Wang’s socalled Republic of China. During this time, some Mongol students were still studying in
Beiping,**

The Clash at Wuyuan
At about the same time that Prince De was in contact with agents from Chung
king, the Japanese military authorities and the Mongol army under their control were
planning a western campaign into the grain-producing territory inside the Great Bend of
the Yellow River, where Fu Zuoyi had located his headquarters and base. Fu fortified
’ Nakajima Manzo, “The Qingdao Conference and its relationship to the Wang Regime,” Kogensenri, pp. 76-77.
* The Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beiping was not, however, influenced by this changing po
litical situation. At first, the academy was governed by the Beiping Provisional Government, but
later it came under the administration and maintenance of Wang’s National Government. A Man
chu, Guan Zhenduo, was the head of this school and administered it until the end of the Second
World War.
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Wuyuan and Linhe as his special strategic sites. Prior to this period, Fu had sent An
Chunshan to hide inside the city of Baotou; however, An joined Li Shouxin’s old troops,
now reorganized into police brigades, to respond to the attack from Fu’s army. On the
night of December 19, 1939, Fu’s troops were able to enter the city. However, they were
soon driven out by the Japanese and Mongolian forces. This attack from Fu’s side greatly
alarmed the Japanese military authorities stationed in Mongolia, and consequently be
came one of the direct causes of the Japanese invasion of Wuyuan and Linhe.
After a period of preparation, the Japanese army appointed Lieutenant Colonel
Kuwabara Araichiro, head of the Special Service Office in Hohhot, as the commander of
the Japanese forces. The tirmy also appointed Wu Guting, chief of staff of the Mongolian
army, as commander of the Mongolian forces. Both the Mongolian and Chinese forces of
the local Police Brigade also joined the invasion. On February 3, they occupied Wuyuan
and two days later took Linhe.
The war started just like a military review. When the Japanese moved forward,
Fu Zuoyi had his troops retreat. After the Japanese occupied the two cities, the enemy
was so weak that another blow was not necessary. Both the Japanese and Mongolian
forces withdrew to Baotou. The newly occupied territory was protected and administered
by both Japanese and Mongolian police forces. (The old Mongolian army had been reor
ganized into the Police Brigade under their commander, Kuwabara.) Underestimation of
the enemy provided Fu Zuoyi with a good opportunity to carry out a counterattack; on
February 14, Fu’s troops retook Linhe; and on March 20, Fu brought reinforcements to
this battlefield. After two days of fighting, Fu was able to reoccupy the city of Wuyuan.
Kuwabara and most of the Japanese police officers were killed in the battle. To avenge
this defeat, both the Japanese and Mongolian army again attacked Wuyuan, entering the
city on March 26. But Fu carried out a large scale counterattack, finally pushing the
Japanese and Mongol forces out of the areas of Wuyuan and Linhe. This defeat prevented
the Japanese military forces from moving westward or southward from the vicinity of
Baotou until the end of the Second World War.
These battles had a great impact on those Mongols who were hostile to Fu Zuoyi
in the area of the Yekejuu League. Prince Altanochir, who was in Baotou, was especially
anxious for the liberation of his people from domination by Fu. Prince Altanochir wanted
the entire Yekejuu League to be unified under the Mongolian government in Kalgan.
However, Fu Zuoyi was the one who triumphed. This victory elevated his per
sonal reputation and political position; it also brought high honors from the authorities in
Chungking and diminished the people’s fear that the Japanese could take over still more
territory. Consequently, the Mongol banners of the Yekejuu League dealt with Fu pru
dently and dared not plan to break away from China despite the difficulty of their situa
tion. The Mongolian Political Council of the Suiyuan area became Fu’s main instrument
for controlling the Mongols. And the number of Chinese settlers in the Mongolian territo
ries of the Yekejuu League immediately increased. These changes eventually became the
direct cause of the March 26, 1942 incident in the Yekejuu League, when the Mongols of
the Jasag Banner rebelled against Chinese domination, causing Mongol and Chinese
blood to be shed.

® Just before hostilities broke out at Wuyuan, Prince De and the Chungking agents had discussed
the ability of the prince to use the Baotou district as an escape route to enter the territory under
Chinese control.
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Wang Jingwei’s Visit to Kalgan
After the Qingdao Conference, Prince De fell into deep depression. Although it
was impossible for him to abolish the agreements established at Qingdao, he utterly ig
nored their existence, and the Japanese had no way to force him to honor these articles.
By this action, Prince De refused to acknowledge that the Mongolian regime was a part
of China. He would certainly not recognize any subordinate relationship between his
government and Wang’s in Nanjing. On the other hand, Wang Jingwei always felt sure it
was impossible to recognize the “Mongolian Territory” as equal to the local political en
tities of North China under the authority of his regime. Wang even desired that the
“Mongolian Territory” become a part of the “Republic of China,” with himself as the
sovereign.
On April 9, 1940, after his visit to Beijing as the Chairman of the National Gov
ernment of China and before the crisis of Prince De’s contact with Chungking had been
completely resolved, Wang decided to visit Kalgan. This event caused great tension
among the Japanese military authorities in Mongolia, the Liaison Office of the Asian
Development Board, Kanai Shoji, Prince De, and other Mongol leaders. The Japanese
military authorities told Kanai about this event. Then Kanai conveyed the desires of the
Japanese to Prince De: “The commander in chief of the Japanese forces in Mongolia sin
cerely hopes that you will go to the airport tomorrow morning to personally welcome
Wang. This is the sincere hope of the Japanese side. Wang will not be involved in any
political discussions during his visit.” Prince De rejected this demand. He would not ac
cept Wang’s claim and absolutely would not go to the airport to welcome Wang.
This caused a dilemma for Kanai, who asked the prince what it would take to get
him to respond positively to the Japanese authorities’ request. Prince De told Kanai that
his health was bad, and thus he could not receive a visitor. This excuse greatly angered
Kanai’s military superior, Ohashi Kumao, who telephoned Prince De personally. The
prince did not answer the telephone, but had his secretary Chogbadarkhu respond for
him. Ohashi said, “Wang Jingwei is coming. The Japanese army desires that Prince De
treat him politely.” The secretary explained that the prince was sick and not able to re
ceive visitors. Ohashi said, “If Prince De is really sick, then we will send a military doc
tor to heal him.” The secretary rejected this suggestion. Finally, Ohashi insisted that the
prince go to the airport to fetch Wang personally; the result was yet another refusal.
Kanai was helpless; he was not able to make Prince De accept the demands of
the Japanese army authorities in Mongolia, nor was he able to deliver Prince De’s refusal
to them. In the afternoon of the same day, he gathered all the ministerial-rank officials of
the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government and laconically informed them that the
coming of Wang would have no impact on the political position of the Mongolian Allied
Autonomous Government. But for the sake of simplicity and formality he asked JodbaJab, head of the Department of Administration, to go to the airport to welcome Wang.
Other high-ranking officials would await Wang’s arrival in the conference hall of the
government and Join the official luncheon party.
Kanai still had not reported the result of the telephone communication between
Ohashi and Prince De. That evening. Prince Sungjingwangchug and I were discussing the
matter when we suddenly received a telephone call from Kanai, who asked Prince Sung
to be at the airport before 8:00 the next morning to welcome Wang Jingwei as the repre
sentative of Chairman Prince De. Prince Sung answered by saying he had to obtain the
permission of the chairman himself Kanai said, “Because the prince is sick and cannot
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go to the airport personally, he has agreed. Please come to the airport on time.’ Prince
Sung felt this event had great possibilities for political entanglement. We immediately
went to see Prince De and asked how to resolve this problem. Prince De smiled as Prince
Sung told him the whole story: “Since Kanai asked you to go, I agree. You may deliver
word of my ‘sickness’ to Wang. At the time of the autonomy movement at Batu-Khaalag,
Wang showed his sympathy toward us. We have to treat him as a guest and not embarrass
him. However, he comes in the position of chairman of the Chinese government and with
the intention to make us his subordinates. We of course cannot accept this. I am not going
to the airport and will not accept his visit. Please do your best.”
Early the next morning. Prince Sung and I rushed to the airport. There was no
special ceremony of welcome. Kanai Shoji, Tanaka Shinichi, Ohashi Kumao, Jodbajab,
and others were there. The airplane arrived at about 9:00 a.m. Because Prince De was not
there, the welcome was chilly. Jodbajab went forward as the representative of the Mon
golian government to express welcome. Then Prince Sung appeared as the personal rep
resentative of Prince De and said, “Your Excellency, arrived from afar; unfortunately
Prince De is in bad health and unable to come to welcome you personally. He had me
come to express his welcome and apology.” I interpreted this.
In this way. Prince Sung avoided using the formal official titles of the leaders on
both sides and diminished the political significance of Wang’s visit. Wang smiled and
accepted these good wishes courteously, showing his great ability as a talented politician.
But the face of Lin Bosheng, Minister of Propaganda, who was following Wang, was
very cold. After this formality, the Japanese military officers and all the Mongol officials
accompanied Wang to the hall of the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government.
During the subsequent conversation, Wang realized that this was neither the
place to talk about politics nor the time for political bargaining. His questions avoided
important problems and made the atmosphere very comfortable. But outside the room,
the air was very tense. Ohashi Kumao again telephoned Chogbadarakhu and told him that
Wang’s purpose for visiting was to see Prince De face to face; the prince had to accept a
meeting. Chogbadarakhu answered that the prince was sick. Ohashi angrily responded,
“This is a demand of the Japanese army. He should not pretend sickness. I will send a
military doctor to see if he is sick or not.” A military doctor arrived at the residence of
Prince De, but Chogbarkhu refused to give him access to the prince, explaining that
whether the chairman was sick or not, his religious beliefs indicated that this day was
taboo. He could not accept visitors.
While Wang was talking with the Mongolian government authorities, he turned
to Prince Sung and said, “My goal in coming here is to visit my old friend Prince De.
Unfortunately, being sick, he is not able to leave his bed. The only possibility then is for
me to go to his place to comfort him. I don’t know whether I can see him or not. If not,
my visit has been completely in vain.” This time no one was able to answer for Prince
De. Prince Sung had to say, “Prince De is feeling quite poorly, and receiving you from a
bed would be really impolite. But since Your Excellency has this desire, let me convey it
to the prince and bring you his answer.” I translated this entire conversation.
When Prince Sung again took me to visit Prince De, and I reported Wang’s con
versation to him. Prince Sung admonished Prince De not to embarrass Wang. After
hearing these reports. Prince De said, “Ohashi used all his pressure upon me to receive
Wang Jingwei, which I rejected. Even more, he sent a military doctor to check me, which
is very offensive. But these words of Wang make rejection impossible. You go and tell
him he can come, and that it was because of my sickness that I did not go to welcome
him. I ask for his pardon.” Prince Sung returned to the government hall and reported
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Prince De’s reply. Wang gladly accepted this invitation, thus relieving the terrible tension
of the past two days. Kanai’s face showed some wrinkles of a faint smile.
During Wang’s visit to Prince De’s residence he was accompanied by Lin
Bosheng. Prince Sung and I were the only officials from the Mongolian Government.
Kanai did not go, to show that the Japanese were not interfering in every matter; if the
situation became embarrassing, it would be better for him not to be there. Prince De said
he was sick and could not meet the guest at the gate. Moreover, he did not properly wel
come Wang Jingwei as an honored guest in his inner apartment, but rather had him wait
in the guest room.
This was a very tense occasion. Though Prince De’s health was very good, he
pretended to be a sick man. With his sharp eyes, Wang undoubtedly realized Prince De
suffered from a political disease, but he pretended to comfort an old friend and wished
him recovery as soon as possible. Again and again Prince De apologized for not being
able to welcome his guest properly because of ill health. The men chatted for a while, but
touched on nothing political. The interpreter for Prince De was Chogbarkhu; 1 acted as a
temporaiy interpreter for Wang. Because of the need for interpreters, the time taken up by
the meeting was doubled, and there was no time to talk about the real problem. Finally,
Wang smiled politely and concluded, “I really didn’t come at an appropriate time; you
are sick in bed, and we cannot talk more. This is regrettable. Please take care of your
self.” Then he bade Prince De goodbye, and the prince accompanied his honorable guest
to the outside gate of his residence.
At noon, Wang and his entourage were welcomed with a formal luncheon party
at Yuanlai Zhuang in the park at Kalgan. Jodbajab and the ministers of the Mongolian
government acted as hosts. Many other leaders were in attendance: Kanai, Supreme Ad
visor; Okabe Tsunesuburo, Commander of the Japanese army in Mongolia; Tanaka
Shini’chi, Chief of Staff; Ohashi Kumao, of the Political Staff of the same Japanese army;
and Takeshita Yoshiharu, Head of the Asian Development Board Kalgan Office. Al
though this was a very formal luncheon party, none of the attendees discussed politics.
Shortly after the banquet, Wang and his entourage left Kalgan by air, and the political
deadlock between Prince De and the Japanese authorities disintegrated. Afterward, Kanai
repeatedly expressed his gratitude to Prince Sung for helping resolve the deadlock; in the
end, both sides maintained their honor.
After Wang left. Prince Sung and I again visited Prince De to review the matter
to determine who, in this political drama, was the winner and who the loser. Although
Wang had come as the Chairman of the National Government of China, the Mongolian
government had treated him only as an honored guest, not as a superior. Prince De had
even tried to reject his visit altogether. However, since Wang came to the personal resi
dence of Prince De, the prince could not refuse to see him. Thus, Wang was able to visit
with Prince De in person. In this way both sides were satisfied. Wang did not lose face
and Prince De did not give in. During Wang’s visit, no political subject was discussed, a
win for the Mongols. Prince De’s pretense of bad health, and his not appearing in the
office of the Mongolian government, officially suggested to Wang that something was
not good. Consequently, Wang did not attempt to discuss any political issues, evidence of
his political brilliance.
These things I experienced personally. My account is quite different from what
Lu Minghui said in his book. Of course, Lu used the material of other writers who pur
posely distorted the facts. For example, he says that Prince De’s acceptance of Wang’s
visit was the result of Japanese pressure. I do not agree with such a false account.

234

The Last Mongol Prince

Political Unrest in Ujumuchin
While this political storm was brewing in Kalgan, a serious political problem
arose in Ujumuchin Left Banner, located in the northeast comer of Shilingol League.
After the former jasag prince’s death, his son Dorji, while still only a boy, succeeded him
in rank and position. The administration of the banner was carried out by Duke Dobdan,
as jasag in charge. By the time the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
was established, Dorji had reached the age of eighteen. According to tradition, it was
time for the young jasag to assume responsibility for the administration of his banner.
Dobdan resigned from the post of jasag in charge and from the position of tusalagchi—high-ranking assistant to the jasag.
Since Dorji was young and not well educated, men of ill intent manipulated him,
increasing taxes and mistreating the people. There arose great dissatisfaction among the
residents of the banner. However, even though they were angry, there was nowhere to
complain. Dobdan, avoiding involvement, kept his mouth shut. During this time, the
Japanese Guandong Army established a “Special Service Office” at the temple of Nunai
sume, located on the southeastern side of the banner, where people came to vent their
discontent to the Japanese. Because the Japanese Special Service Office could not openly
interfere, it tried to become involved in this matter secretly. Lubsang, known by the title
of Kabji Lama, was the abbot of Kabji Lama-yin sume, located to the south of Prince
Dorji’s residence. With Japanese encouragement, this young and ambitious lama openly
opposed Dorji, the jasag of the banner, and created a great split in the Ujumuchin Left
Banner.
Early in the summer of 1938, when the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous
Government dispatched a group of Mongol leaders to visit Japan, this Kabji Lama was
among them. During his stay in Tokyo, Kabji Lama told Wu Heling and me about the
problem and stated his intention to solve it.'° However, because we were abroad, we
could only show him sympathy, but could take no action to help him, especially during
the visit of this group of Mongol leaders. The head of the group, Prince KJiorjurjab, was
planning to see Tojo Hideki, the Japanese Deputy Army Minister, and demand Japan’s
help for achieving independence for Mongolia. Thus the lama’s opinion was not sincerely
considered and not even reported to Prince De.
Eventually, after hearing of Dorji’s misdeeds. Prince De ordered him to come to
Hohhot and join the Mongolian Banners Academy for training, and assigned Dobdan to
once more act as the jasag in charge. Later, at the time of the unification of the three re
gimes, the Academy was moved to Kalgan. Of course, this kind of education did not
change Dorji’s thinking or behavior at all. Soon after, seeing Prince De’s preoccupation
with Japanese negotiations, under the pretense of bad health, he returned to his own ban
ner, where he soon created the problem anew.
In a movement against Dorji, the people under the Kabji Lama's leadership re
fused to pay taxes, did not take on any duties for the banner, and did not respond to the
orders of the banner office. The Kabji Lama organized the lay people and moved them to
Since the Kabji Lama saw so many new things in Japan that broadened his views, he realized a
great change was necessary in Mongolia or the nation would be destroyed. Although he mentioned
that a possible answer was available, the Chief Councilor of the Mongolian Government, Wu
Heling, did not respond. Perhaps, he surmised, it would be better for him to create an opposition
movement ranged against Dorji’s maladministration and himself promote a policy of change for
traditional Mongolia's pastoral livelihood.
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the vicinity of his monastery to practice a pastoral lifestyle. This made it possible for the
children to attend a school that he established inside the monastery. He also established a
workshop in the monastery to teach handicraft skills and demanded that the young lamas
study in the school. All these reforms came from a lama who was not supposed to inter
fere in politics. If the government ignored them, other lamas might imitate the Kabji
Lama and get involved in politics, creating still greater confusion.
On the matter of involvement with foreigners, the Kabji Lama, who was proJapanese, was supported by the Japanese Special Service Office. Later on, Dorji’s fol
lowers tried to get assistance from Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, but the Japa
nese Special Service Office discovered their attempt.
The Kabji Lama caused worry for Prince De, Prince Sung, and other Mongol
leaders, and also attracted the attention of the Japanese military headquarters in Kalgan.
At this time, Prince Sung and I were vacationing in his native home, Khorchid Left Ban
ner. Because the Japanese military headquarters was concerned, it discussed the matter
with Kanai, the Japanese Supreme Advisor, and Prince De. Prince De decided to send
Prince Sung to deal with the problems that related to diplomacy, civilian administration,
and religion.
The Mongolian Government also appointed Japanese advisors Muratani Hikojiro, Kimura Yujiro, and Nakamura Asakiji (the Councilor of the Shilingol League Of
fice) to join with Prince Sung in settling the problem in Ujumuchin Banner. When this
group of Mongol and Japanese authorities first arrived in the banner, Prince Sung visited
Dorji’s mother. Although Dorji was there, he did not realize the significance of this visit
and did not explain his situation. Soon after this visit. Prince Sung arrived at the banner
office. The two conflicting groups sent all their delegates to confront each other and to
petition Prince Sung to settle the problem. After hearing both sides, Prince Sung sent the
leaders of the two groups to the monastery of Gakhail Sume, located between the Kabji
monastery and the residence of Prince Dorji, to wait for his final decision.
The banner officials now began to realize the seriousness of the situation. They
also asked the retired leader Dobdan to act as mediator for both sides. After his arrival at
Kabji Monastery, Prince Sung carefully listened to the Kabji Lama's defense of his ac
tivities. After Prince Sung observed the Kabji Lama's work, he felt that this young monk
was a man of great talent. However, traditionally, a lama was not allowed to interfere in
banner administration. There were also people from among the lama’s shabinar (under
lings) who petitioned Prince Sung with pro and con opinions. Whether the Kabji Lama's
deeds were appropriate or not, and no matter to what degree, he had received the assis
tance of the Japanese Special Service Office. This gave grounds for Prince Sung to insist
that a monk should not interfere in politics. Any activities that went beyond the principle
of religious discipline should not be allowed, and to have women stay in the temple was
forbidden, by regulations of the monasteries.
All the lama’s projects were prohibited; Prince Sung also strictly ordered that,
except for the traditional obligations of its people, no additional burdens should be as
signed by the monastery and the lifestyle of the monks should not be interfered with. This
decision halted most of the Kabji Lama's reform activities. Although the lama did not
resist, he was greatly disappointed by Prince Sung’s conservative solution.
After Prince Sung issued this decision at Kabji Monastery, he went to Gakhail
Monastery, where he gathered the leaders of the second group to inform them that the
government would not retroactively punish their unlawful activities, but from this time
on, they should not continue these unlawful activities, such as their reftisal to pay taxes
and duties, or they would be severely punished. This was a partial solution to the prob-
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Prince Sung took further action when he returned to the office of the banner.
Here he officially announced the removal of Dorji from his rank and post and installed
Dorji’s son (who was under the age of eighteen) to succeed him. Dobdan was to once
more carry out the functions of the banner’s jasag. Though Dobdan tried hard not to be
involved, at the insistence of Prince Sung he finally accepted the assignment. Muratani
and Nakamura did not interfere because they had asked Prince Sung to manage this po
litical problem completely according to his own judgment. This political problem was
thus solved without complications.
Though the problem of UJumuchin Left Banner appeared outwardly to have
been solved peacefully, it arose again in 1945. After the defeat of the Japanese and intru
sion of the Soviet-Mongol Allied forces, Kabji Lama and Dobdan were accused of having
been collaborators of Japan, arrested, and brought to Outer Mongolia. Dorji and his fol
lowers, because of their former contact with the Outer Mongolian agents, moved to the
territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Although it was later rumored that the
MPR Government gave Dorji and his group a splendid welcoming ceremony, he was
soon after killed as a feudalistic remnant.

The Mongolian Conference
In the first half of 1940, Prince De’s spirits were low. This emotional depression
greatly influenced the leaders of the leagues and banners, who usually followed him un
conditionally. Since the Japanese could not neglect this situation, they persuaded Prince
De to call a meeting of the jasags and ambans, as well as of the high-ranking officials of
the leagues and the banners. The Japanese wanted to inform these officials of the sincere
concern of the authorities in Kalgan and to revive their morale. Except for this desire,
there was no other political goal. Prince De agreed only to a Mongolian conference, not
to a formal meeting of “the Mongolian Congress.”
From August 29 to 31, a three-day conference was held in the auditorium of the
Mongolian Development Academy outside the Dajing Gate of Kalgan. Many leaders
attended the conference: the Chairman, Prince De; Minister of Civilian Administration,
Prince Sung; high and middle-ranking Mongolian officials of the government; the Com
mander in Chief of the Mongolian Army, Li Shouxin; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Mon
gol Army, Buyandelger; the heads and deputy heads of all the leagues, yasags, and ambans of the banners, and some high-ranking local Mongol officials. Jodbajab, head of the
Administration Department, did not attend because of ill health. The guests of honor in
cluded the head of the Liaison Office of the Asian Development Board in Kalgan, Takeshita Yoshiharu, and the consultant of the Japanese Army in Mongolia, Morishima Kadofiisa. However, the Minister of General Affairs, Sekiguchi Tamotsu, and the advisor of
the Chairman’s office, Muratani Hikojiro, also attended as guests of honor. The staff
members of the Japanese Army in Kalgan, together with Kanai Shoji, purposely stayed
away to signify that there was no Japanese involvement. The Japanese “guests” only at
tended the ceremony of the opening session and were not involved in the conference it
self.

The ceremony of the opening and closing sessions occupied one of the three
days of the conference. However, the most important item was to proclaim the Mongol
ian Allied Autonomous Government’s basic policy toward the Mongolian leagues and
banners. They made the following resolutions: (1) the institution of the leagues and ban-
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ners embodied the social system of the Mongols, and hence the historical tradition of the
ethnic Mongol districts should be honored; (2) the present social institutions must be
maintained; (3) the teachings of Buddha should be honored; (4) the present jasag institu
tion should continue as it is presently constituted.
The goal of these four points evidently was aimed at appeasing the emotions of
the conservatives, by promising no new basic reforms for Mongolia. Although Prince De
issued this declaration, it was basically a token gesture.

Prince De’s Redirection of Effort
Though the Mongolian Conference was formally opened and closed, the Mon
golian Allied Autonomous Government continued to be tightly controlled by Kanai Shoji
and Sekiguchi Tamotsu, with no change. Prince De rarely had the opportunity to admin
ister the affairs of the so-called Mongolian government. His depression made it impossi
ble for him to avoid self-evaluation. Sometimes he pondered to the point of preoccupa
tion, not responding to people who addressed him. In this depression, he asked how much
the autonomy movement of 1933 had benefited the Mongolian people. The Mongol lead
ers had occupied themselves in the struggle outwardly and inwardly. Yet in reality, what
had they done for their own people?
During this time, he pondered the wasted time and energy of those years that
failed to achieve independence and self-government. How could the Mongol people in
such a decline continue to exist overshadowed as they were by the great powers, if they
were unable to see some immediate results. Perhaps there would be no chance for an in
dependent Mongolia to exist in the future. Would it be better to pay full attention to our
own people, and go along with securing their basic requirements rather than concentrate
completely on the struggle against outside oppression? Perhaps this would contribute
something to the Mongols. This was what the prince personally told me about his
thoughts. He repeatedly suffered mental breakdowns during this period. At such times he
liked to be alone and avoided communication with other people. If someone inquired
about his whereabouts, the prince usually had someone respond that he was napping. All
these matters happened during this period of self-evaluation.
Prince De felt that since he was unable to interfere with the affairs of the Mon
golian Allied Autonomous Government and the Mongol Army, it would be better to con
centrate his energy on his own Sunid Right Banner, using it as a testing ground to deter
mine if a similar plan could be promoted in other banners. Prince De appointed his young
and shrewd nephew, Altanochir, a second-ranking Duke, as the first tusalagchi to the
jasag. In this capacity, Altanochir would assist the prince’s son, Dugursurung, then the
jasag of the banner, in carrying out the new policy.
Although there were many new tasks. Prince De especially emphasized educa
tional matters: school facilities, textbooks, nourishment of the students, dormitory prob
lems, encouraging the pastoral people to bring their children to the school, and elevating
the standard of knowledge among the people. He also emphasized the importance of
girls’ education. On this matter, his viewpoint was exactly the same as that of Gungsangnorbu, the enlightened prince of Kharachin.
After Prince De’s plan was perfected, he immediately established a girls’ school
about forty kilometers southeast of his princely residence. He had all school-age girls
attending the school stay in a dormitory. In addition to ordinary classes, special attention
was given to domestic skills. He hoped that education would help them become good
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wives and dedicated mothers of the future. This school was the first purely Mongolianstyle girls’ school. Since the teachings could not go against the traditional forms of daily
life, the classrooms and dormitories were yurts, not houses. The prince continued to ex
pand and reform this girls’ school. A few intellectuals trained in Japan were appointed as
teachers at the school. At the same time, the school was promoted to the standard of a
middle school. The teachers included the late Gombojab Hangin of Indiana University in
the USA, and Urgungge Onon, who later taught at the University of Leeds in England.
In addition to this girls’ school, the Mongolian Army Young Cadets’ School
greatly attracted Prince De’s attention. It was established in the summer of the same year,
west of the princely residence. He visited it often, personally encouraging students to
become great men and heroes who would struggle for the Mongol people. He also en
couraged boys of the Turned Banner, already sinicized, to receive a pure Mongolian edu
cation as well as to carry out the rehabilitation of the Mongolian language and writing
system.

Prince Sung’s Activities in Japan
On November 10, 1940, Japan celebrated what its mythic ancient histories sug
gested was its 2,600th anniversary as a nation. At the same time, a conference was held in
Tokyo to establish the New Asian Order. The Mongolian government dispatched Prince
Sungjingwangchug, the Minister of Civilian Administration, and Ding Qichang, Minister
of Peace Preservation, as the chief and deputy chief of the Mongolian delegation. Also
sent to Tokyo to celebrate and join the conference were Erkejibu, the son-in-law of
Prince Sung, several Japanese advisors, and I, who went as the secretary and interpreter
of the group. Before leaving. Prince Sung foresaw that conflict would inevitably break
out between his group and the delegates of Wang Jingwei from Nanjing. Prince De in
structed him to deal with the matter as he saw fit.
Hisamitsu Masao, the head of the Office of the Mongolian Government in To
kyo, had been serving in Tokyo since the period of the Mengjiang Joint Committee. Al
though a very capable person, he did not understand the Mongolian situation. When
Prince Sung arrived, he had already prepared a very detailed itinerary, including every
thing from a visit to the Imperial Palace to sightseeing. But he failed to realize that a con
frontation between the Mongol and Chinese groups would take place at the meeting.
When Prince Sung and his group arrived at Hibiya Hall and registered with the confer
ence secretariat, they discovered that there were three national flags: those of Japan,
Manchukuo, and the Wang Regime in Nanjing (the original flag of China, with a yellow
strip added above it). There was no flag for the Mongolian regime. Prince Sung expressed
his dissatisfaction and ordered Hisamitsu to negotiate: “For this conference, the Mongo
lian flag has to be hung, or the flags of the Manchus and Nanjing must be pulled down.
Just hang the flag of the host country, Japan, or 1 and my delegates will return to Kalgan
immediately and will not attend even a celebration of J^jpan’s 2,600th anniversary.”
Hisamitsu tried to explain to Prince Sung Japan’s stand, hoping he would sym
pathize with Japan’s difficulties. The prince’s response, however, was completely oppo
site from what Hisamitsu hoped for. Prince Sung would not discuss Japan’s predicament.
Instead, he asked Hisamitsu, “Are you talking to me as a representative of the Japanese
government or as an official of the Mongolian government stationed in Japan? If you are
still an official of the Mongolian government, there is no need for you to debate with me.
Just go and negotiate what I have told you, or I will not attend the meeting tomorrow.
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There is no need for you to explain the matter on behalf of the Japanese government; that
is not your duty. You cannot be their representative.” Since Hisamitsu had never met
such a decisive Mongol leader, these words shocked him into compliance. He said, “All
right, since that is what you request, I will go negotiate. If I fail, I will resign from this
post.”
Three or four hours later, Hisamitsu returned in high spirits and reported to
Prince Sung: “Although I was not able to convince them to hang the Mongolian flag, they
agreed to hang the flag of Japan only; the others will be pulled down. The mission that
you gave me has been accomplished.” Because of this dramatic incident, Prince Sung and
Hisamitsu established a very close relationship. But at other conferences that involved
Japan, Manchukuo, Nanjing, and the Mongol Government, the hanging of flags remained
a problem. Nevertheless, to hang only the flag of the host country became a precedent.
At the departure of Prince Sung from Kalgan, he gave a formal address without
any specific content. Because of the problem of the flags, a confrontation with the Nan
jing side was inevitable. Prince Sung ordered me to write a speech that explained to the
delegates of the Asian countries the reason for the Mongolian struggle for liberty and
self-determination. The speech was also to emphasize the irony implied by the Nanjing
regime’s attempts to put Mongolia under Nanjing’s control. This official address of
Prince Sung, although intensely provoking to the delegation from Nanjing, won great
applause from the other delegates from all over Asia.
Emperor Hirohito presided over the celebration of the 2,600th anniversary. All
the countries that had relations with Japan had their representatives attend the ceremony.
The senior diplomat in attendance was the ambassador of the United States. After the
ceremony. Prince Sung had a series of official visits with Japanese leaders. Of all these
meetings, the most significant was the one with Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke. Af
ter exchanging greetings, both sides emphasized the importance of the MongolianJapanese relationship. Prince Sung stressed the faith of the Mongols in their ability to
handle independence and subsequent nation-building. Hoping that an agreement would
soon materialize, Matsuoka responded that Prince Sung’s idea was congruent with the
policy of Japan in dealing with the changing situation in East Asia. Prince Sung also re
ceived an invitation from Waseda University to lecture at Okuma Hall on “The Present
Situation of Mongolia.”

The Founding of the Mongolian Cooperatives (Khorshiya)
In the fall of 1939, Wu Heling and I (acting as his secretary) visited Hokkaido
and met with Ishikuro, the governor of the island. With Ishikuro’s assistance, Wu was
able to contact the authorities of the Imperial Hokkaido University and develop a pro
gram of education and living arrangements for Mongol students. During his island trav
els, Wu had a very successful interview with Kurosawa Torizo, an outstanding leader of
the Japanese milk products industry and the founder of the cooperative of the Hokkaido
dairy farms. Kurosawa explained the reasons for his success and described the difficulties
he confronted in the founding and establishment of the great cooperative. Kurosawa’s
experience greatly impressed Wu Heling, who realized that the economic development of
the Mongolian herdsmen depended on learning from Kurosawa’s example. A cooperative
movement for production and consumption was necessary in Mongolia. At the time of the
winter disaster of Inner Mongolia in 1936, the Mongolian Livelihood Association
(Shengjihui) was established, but because Wu Heling went to Japan, the association re-
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mained inactive. However, it did pave the way for the foundation of future cooperatives.
In the fall of 1940, Wu Heling returned from Toyko to Kalgan. He reported his
activities in Tokyo to Prince De and also tried to discover the attitude of the Japanese
Army Headquarters in Mongolia toward him. Because of Kanai Shoji’s objections, Wu
had no choice but to go back to Japan to “finish his studies.” While in Kalgan, besides
holding secret talks with Prince De on the matter of Kanai, Wu again earnestly encour
aged Prince De to establish cooperatives that would manage the production, transporta
tion, and consumption of commodities in every banner. Of course, Kurosawa Torizo’s
experience was one of the important topics of discussion.
Prince De, agreeing with Wu’s opinion, called a meeting of all the top officials
of the leagues and banners in his residence at Kalgan November 21 to 28. Prince De, who
personally presided at the meeting, explained that a cooperative would be established to
manage the problems of production, consumption, and transportation for the Mongol
people. Wu Heling detailed the plan. Because the Mongols had no commercial experi
ence, they worried about the success of this new attempt. But because it was advocated
by Prince De and was necessary, they agreed unanimously to establish the khorshiya, a
new Mongolian commercial organization.
In those days, the economic life of the western Inner Mongolian herders was
entirely controlled by the Chinese merchants. In addition, because of the involvement of
the Japanese Daimo gongsi (Great Mongolian Company), all the trade in wool, hides, and
domestic animal products was manipulated by foreigners. Since the Japanese military
controlled the economy, the prices of imported goods increased, but the price of domestic
goods was controlled. Moreover, the main commercial activity in Mongolia employed a
barter system. The herders suffered great losses. The prices of sheep wool, camel wool,
and animal hides, all essential for Japanese military use, were worst affected. The Japa
nese army headquarters in Mongolia had Daimo gongsi gather these essentials for them.
These conditions forced the Mongols to run the risk of establishing their own
economic enterprise. The Mongolian word for cooperative is khorshiya, a term also used
in Outer Mongolia under that socialistic regime. Instead of using the Chinese word hezuoshe, which has a socialistic flavor, the conference stuck to the word khorshiya, and
abandoned the Chinese word in order to avoid problems with the Japanese military
authorities. Each family had to buy at least one share so that the cooperative could as
semble its capital, but no one could have over 300 shares. Each share was priced at ten
yuan of the Mengjiang currency. Domestic animals could be exchanged for a family's
first share. If there was some yearly profit, a part of it had to be divided among the share
holders to establish confidence in the hearts of the people. The khorshiyas were encour
aged to engage in the export of domestic animals to Beijing and Tianjin directly, without
Chinese and Japanese intermediation. The khorshiyas also had to gather all the wool and
hides from their members but were obliged to exchange them with the Japanese Military
Headquarters for the necessary imported goods at controlled prices. The Mongolian

' ‘ The Daimo gongsi ran this selfishly manipulated enterprise of gathering the hides and wools
from among the Chinese merchants. The Daimo gongsi greatly benefited, because they could get
cloth and tea from the Japanese army headquarters at a low, controlled price. After these materials
were delivered to the Chinese, the Chinese increased their implicit prices when trading them to the
Mongols. They could do this because they were linked to a monopoly supplier. This changed the
barter system into a kind of theft, causing the Mongol people to suffer greatly. The economic situa
tion became even worse than before the war.
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Livelihood Association was designated as the central organization of all khorshiyas}^
Besides establishing the khorshiyas, Wu Heling also initiated the establishment
of the Association for Assisting Mongol Students in Japan. All Mongol students who
returned from Japan were designated as members of this association. Wu himself, offi
cially sent to Japan to “study,” was nominated as chief of this organization. The goal of
the association was to support the government by gathering money to send one hundred
students to Japan each year to study. One thousand intellectuals were to be educated in
Japan over a period of ten years and on their return would serve as cadres for Mongolian
reconstruction. The establishment of this association received enthusiastic support from
all sides, and the plan was carried out beginning the next year (1941). Although the num
ber did not reach one hundred in the first year, preparation was made for one thousand to
study in Japan during a ten-year period.

The Resignation of Prince Sung and the Response
The 1941 solar new year day, though supposed to be formally observed in the
government office, was celebrated only by the Japanese. It was traditionally neglected by
the Mongols and the Chinese, whose New Year followed the lunar system. Prince De,
Prince Sung, and the Shilingol League leaders planned to return to their home banners
and celebrate the lunar new year with their families and officials on January 27, 1941.
Following the government ceremony, Prince De left Kalgan and returned to Sunid. Prince
Sung was to leave a little later. One night, Prince Sung was invited to dinner by his Japa
nese friends Muratani Hikojiro and Kimura Yujiro. Prince Sung and I went together and
enjoyed a very relaxing supper—talking, laughing, and drinking. Later Kanai Shoji came,
because he had heard that Prince Sung was there. Initially, they talked in a relaxed at
mosphere, but the tone of the conversation gradually changed.
Kanai started to talk about his accomplishments^—how he had created so many
profitable policies for the people and how he had improved their livelihood. Perhaps he
thought Prince Sung would give him great praise. However, Prince Sung, in somewhat
high spirits from the liquor, deliberately acted drunk and began to criticize him:
1 don’t want to recognize what you said. These words could not fool anyone. I do not know
the Japanese and Chinese languages, but I am still able to observe the heart of the people. I,
as the Minister of Civilian Affairs, usually visit and observe the local administration.
Where 1 went 1 had to deliver addresses [in reality, all the addresses Prince Sung made in
After these principles were accepted, the old Mongolian Livelihood Association was reorganized,
with Wu Heling again as its appointed head. Prince Sung and Jirgalang were the deputies. In real
ity, however, this association had been directed by Wu Heling himself since its establishment in
1936. Although the khorshiyas were now very important to the livelihood of the entire Mongolian
people, the reorganization of the Mongolian Livelihood Association did not change its traditional
management simply because of a decision by its director. Wu's unyielding character was one of the
many reasons for its slowness to chemge. Most of the Mongol leaders hesitated to offend Wu be
cause to do so might harm the khorshiyas. This association was originally organized to carry out a
service for the Mongolian herders and to raise their standard of living. Unfortunately, two covetous
people, Chidaltu (Dai Zhongyuan in Chinese) and the Chinese Luo Lipu, were mistakenly ap
pointed by Wu to manage the association. Later, some suggestions for different leaders were given
to Wu, but all were rejected. Following the expansion of both the association and the khorshiyas,
the wrongdoings of Chidaltu and Luo Lipu became more evident. Eventually their conspiracy and
greed damaged the reputation of Wu Heling. This could have been avoided.
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Chinese territory were drafted by Kimura] in which I explained the political outlines of the
government, just as you said a moment ago. These are all lies. These are words to cheat
people. Now I feel that to go out and speak these words to the people is really an unre■ warding business. I never lied during my entire life, but after being appointed minister, the
words I have said have been mostly untrue. 1 feel disturbed from the bottom of my heart.
You are the Supreme Advisor of the government. I would like to ask you which department
of this government is really planning for the welfare of the people? All the officials and
clerks of this government, besides wasting paper to write the documents to cheat the peo
ple, what have they done? What useful thing have they accomplished? As head of such an
office, I feel very ashamed. I don’t know how you feel. Now 1 tell you, I am returning and
will be no more the Minister of the Civilian AtTairs. Everything is up to you.
I inteipreted these words honestly, giving them no polish, and Kanai was terribly
embarrassed. He laughed bitterly. He could neither debate nor leave. Muratani and Ki
mura, also embarrassed, tried to smooth thing over by urging everyone to drink more and
end the unhappy gathering as soon as they could. As a result. Prince Sung and Muratani
both got drunk. Kanai pretended to be drunk. 1 did not drink. Kimura could drink much
without being affected. At noon on the next day. Prince Sung awakened and asked me to
fill him in on what happened the previous night. 1 related it in detail. Prince Sung
laughed: “These are the words I should have spoken earlier. It is good I spoke out. Since
these words came from my mouth, 1 must resign, and 1 won t regret it.
After returning to his home in the Khauchid Banner, Prince Sung sent two
documents of resignation to Kalgan. He demanded that I personally deliver them to
Prince De, the chairman, and Kanai, the supreme advisor. These two documents referred
to Sung’s bad health as the only reason for his resignation. But I knew Prince Sung’s per
sonality. He really meant to resign over matters of principle.
So I showed these two documents to Kimura and had him translate one into
Japanese and presented both of them to Prince De and Kanai following the governmental
procedures. Although Kimura was astonished, it was too late for him to reverse the situa
tion. Kimura and I went to the vice-minister of the Civilian Administration Department,
Fujii Gochiro, who had a high reputation in Japanese law enforcement circles and was the
judge in the case of the notorious May 15 Incident, and we discussed the situation. Fujii s
and Prince Sung’s personal relationship was quite strong because Prince Sung felt that
Fujii was a fair person. Fujii had always advocated that the affairs of the Mongol banners
be decided by Prince Sung. To deal with the unexpected news, Fujii sent a telegram to
Prince Sung, asking him not to resign. In addition, he discussed the matter with Kanai.
Nevertheless, Fujii, not knowing the reason for Prince Sung’s resignation, was disap
pointed that he had not been consulted about the problem beforehand.
Prince Sung’s resignation gave rise to many rumors. The Japanese military
authorities recognized Prince Sung as a very important figure. They knew of the good
relationship between Prince Sung and Prince De. However, unlike Buyandalai, Prince
Sung was not a confidant of Prince De. Nevertheless, a figure like Prince Sung had to
remain in the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government.
After Prince De returned to Kalgan from Sunid, Kanai immediately explained
the desire of the Japanese military authorities to return Prince Sung to a government po
sition. Prince De also felt that Prince Sung had already achieved his purpose in resigning.
It would be better not to prolong a rigidly maintained confrontation; Prince Sung might
best return. After consultations, Kanai obtained permission from Prince De and sent Fujii
Goichiro to Khauchid, returning the document of resignation to Prince Sung and asking
to escort him back to Kalgan. For his convenience, Fujii asked me to accompany him.
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Before leaving Kalgan, 1 went to see Prince De to receive his instructions about whether
Prince Sung should accept Fujii’s request. Prince De instructed me that it was very im
portant that Prince Sung come back to Kalgan.
Fuji! was an honest person. After his arrival in Korchin, Fujii explained the de
sires of Prince De and Kanai and returned the documents of resignation to Prince Sung.
After a few minutes of rejecting the papers, Prince Sung eventually accepted Fujii’s per
suasion because I had already informed him of Prince De’s instructions. Then Fujii began
to relax and said formally, “Your Excellency the Minister, if you have any instructions,
please tell us without hesitation, but please don’t mention resigning again.’’ After return
ing to his office in Kalgan, Prince Sung was sincerely welcomed by Kanai. He held the
prince’s hands in his own and laughed. Prince Sung also laughed, thus ending the politi
cal tension. From this time on, the high ranking officials of the Mongolian Allied
Autonomous Government realized that this polite and gentle prince, Sungjingwangchug,
could not be influenced by power or political position; he had an independent will.
Prince De had not been in Kalgan when Prince Sung decided to resign,. His sec
retary was unable to report this significant event to the chairman immediately. Kanai was
the man who really knew the reason for Prince Sung’s resignation, but it was difficult for
him to explain matters to the Japanese authorities without criticizing himself. So when
this news reached the Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Mongolia, it drew great at
tention and created suspicion. The Japanese misunderstood the situation and thought that
the reason for the resignation was Prince Sung’s disappointment with Prince De.
In the lunar calendar’s new year’s day of the white snake year (January 27,
1941), the commander of the Mongolian Army, Li Shouxin, also left Hohhot and came to
Kalgan for the celebration. On the night of the last day of the white dragon year (January
26, 1941), Wang Zhenhua, the former commander of the third division under Li, also
arrived at Li's residence. After retirement, Wang had no income. That is why he decided
to visit his superior and old friend, who might help him with money or position. Li’s aide
de camp, knowing that it was the new year’s eve, asked Wang to stay in a room for one
night. He would have him visit with Commander Li after the celebration of the new year
ended the next day. Wang received this as an insult, and felt that Li was being unfaithful
toward his old follower and friend. So at midnight, when everyone was awaiting the arri
val of the New Year, Wang committed suicide with a pistol.
After this news became public, many of Li Shoushan’s followers became disil
lusioned. At the same time, a group of old Chinese soldiers in the Mongolian Army who
had been reorganized into the police forces ran off with their equipment. Some of them
even surrendered to Fu Zuoyi. Though these activities all happened among the Chinese
soldiers, they influenced the entire Mongol Army.
After these unsettling events, the authorities of the Japanese Army in Mongolia
and those of the Asian Development Board Liaison Office in Kalgan seriously analyzed
the causes of the trouble. They began to connect the dissolution of the Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Government and its impact on the Mongolian Army with the
changed civilian feeling toward Japan and Prince De’s contacts with Chungking. They
concluded that these events were the result of their oppression of Prince De and other
Mongol leaders. It would be better to alter this high-handed policy and to relax their op
pression to some extent in order to win back the hearts of the Mongols. This was a great
change in Japanese policy, and of course a great blow to Kanai Shoji. This change of
policy probably stemmed from the transfer of Colonel Ohashi Kumao, who was unusu
ally hostile toward Prince De.
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Prince De’s Determination to Modernize
After the lunar new year (1941) celebration, Prince De went to Janglung Pandita
Gegeen Keid (present Shilinhot), the location of the Shilingol League Office. Before his
arrival, he ordered the jasags of the ten banners of the Shilingol League to gather at the
great monastery for important discussions. Although the office of the Shilingol League
was originally located at Tara-eke-yin sume of the Sunid Left Banner, during the summer
of 1940, it had been moved east to Pandita Gegeen Keid in Abkhanar Left Banner. Be
fore the league office moved, a primary school and a clinic had been established by the
Japanese Zenrin Kyokai, and these were later transferred to join with the league office.
However, the conference authorized by Prince De was held in the monastery, not in the
league office.
Since the conference was not official, the Japanese in the Kalgan government
and the office of the Shilingol League were not informed. The leaders were gathered for
five days and nights, but not one Japanese was invited. Not even Lieutenant Colonel Makino Masaomi, head of the Japanese Special Service Office of the Guandong Army, was
notified, despite his reputuation as one of the Japanese officers most capable of penetrat
ing Mongol secrecy. All the attendees, including Prince Sung, maintained silence about
the meeting; no one said a word to the Japanese. This secrecy was not motivated by antiJapanese sentiment. It was Prince De’s idea to transfer his own experience, which he had
gained in his own Sunid Right Banner, to the jasags of the Shilingol League, demanding
they carry it out in their own banners as he had in his.
The demands from Prince De were many; 1) all the feudal lords, theyosags, had
to practice fiscal self-restraint; 2) each banner had to establish a definite budget system;
3) the expenditures of the jasag, including his own and his residents’, should not surpass
five percent of the budget; 4) twenty-five percent of the whole income of the banner
should be devoted to education; 5) the existing primary schools should be strengthened,
while the primary schools for girls should be established immediately; 6) each school
should supply the students with books, accommodations, and food; 7) because of the
pastoral-nomadic lifestyle and the difficulty of accommodating students under twelve
years of age (eleven in the Western way of counting), compulsory education therefore
should only apply to children twelve and over. It would be more efficient if the well-todo people sent their girls first, followed by everyone else; 8) for the maintenance of
Mongolia’s population, the numbers of lamas—celibate males—should be limited. An
only son of a family was forbidden to become a lama. Only one in three or two in five
would be allowed to become lamas; 9) each monastery or temple would have to
strengthen its ecclesiastical orders; 10) the education of the young lamas would have to
honor equally the teachings of Mongolian and Tibetan literature; 11) the lamas under
forty years of age would have to pass an examination demonstrating their understanding
the scriptures; 12) those males in a templb who were unqualified according to provisions
8, 9, and 11, would be sent back home and stripped of their ecclesiastical positions.
Because such changes in had never before been proposed in Inner Mongolia,
especially in the western part. Prince De’s proposals must be recognized as bold and in
novative. Although the minds of the attendees were extremely conservative, they finally
accepted the prince’s orders without open opposition. This was a very difficult task to
accomplish during the early 1940s in Inner Mongolia. It perhaps confirms the thesis that
the reputation of Prince De had already reached its peak, at least in the ten banners of the
Shilingol League. The nature of his prestige as a leader had become very different from
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what it had been at the time of the 1933 autonomous movement.
Because no conference decisions were referred to them for their approval, great
suspicion arose among the Japanese. The military authorities asked Kanai about Prince
De’s activity at Pandita Gegeen Keid, but Kanai knew nothing of what had occurred
there. Kanai questioned Muratani Hikojiro, the advisor to Prince De who had accompa
nied the prince to the conference. However, Muratani was not invited to the actual con
ference proceedings, and because of his great confidence in the prince, he did not suspect
that the conference was anti-Japanese. He also said the Mongols needed to have their
own conference; it was not necessary that any Japanese attend. Muratani’s attitude was
welcomed by the Mongols. He did not ask about the conference until he talked to Prince
De’s secretary, and only then got the information that he reported in its entirety to the
Japanese military authorities. Naturally, his report was accepted with suspicion.

The Japanese Change Their Attitude
In the latter half of 1940, important personnel changes were made in the Japan
ese military headquarters in Mongolia. The commander. Lieutenant General Okabe Naosaburo, was transferred to another position; Lieutenant General Yamawaki Masataka
was placed in Okabe’s post. However, Yamawaki left Kalgan in January 1941 because of
bad health, and his post was filled by Lieutenant General Amakasu Jutaro, who was sta
tioned in Kalgan until March of 1942. In general, the commander in chief of the Japanese
army in Mongolia usually refrained from open and direct involvement in politics; how
ever, that did not mean that he would never interfere. Amakasu, at least ostensibly, had
no personal prejudice against Prince De or against solving Mongolia’s problems, and
consequently, the prince’s impression of this Japanese commander was not a bad one.
The chief of staff of the Japanese Army, Tanaka Shinichi, whom I mentioned
earlier, was also transferred to another place in July 1940. The new chief of staff was
Major General Takahashi Shigekazu, a straightforward person who had a great interest in
the Mongolian situation. While I was still acting as the secretary of Mr. Wu Heling, I had
seen him several times together with my boss. I still remember the discussion between
this Japanese general and Wu on Mongolian problems and on the confrontation between
Prince De and Kanai. Later, Mr. Wu told me that he had established good personal con
tact with Takahashi. Wu was able to win Takahashi’s understanding and sympathy on
Mongolian matters and on Prince De’s situation. Of course, during this period, no one
could imagine that this person would become the chief of staff of the Japanese Army in
Mongolia. His appointment to the new post and the transfer of the political attache. Colo
nel Ohashi Kumao, undoubtedly had an important impact on the alteration of Japanese
policy toward the Mongols.

Prince De’s Second Visit to Japan
The change in Japanese policy toward Mongolia was evident during Prince De’s
second visit to Japan. The results of this visit were entirely different from the first visit.
Although the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government was the result of the unifica
tion of the three political regimes of Mongolia, Southern Chahar, and Northern Shanxi,
no delegate from any of the other areas joined the expedition. Prince De was accompa
nied by Li Shouxin, the commander of the Mongolian Army; Buyandalai, head of the
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Bayantala League; and Jirgalang, head of the Investigation and Transportation Bureau.
Others present were Muratani Hikojiro, the advisor of the Office of the Chairman; Sec
retaries Ruiyong and Chogbadarakhu; and Kimura Yujiro, the head of the General Affairs
Section of the Civilian Administration Ministry. Moreover, Kanai Shoji, supreme advisor
to the Mongolian Government, and Major General Takeshita Yoshiharu, head of the
Asian Development Board Liaison Office in Kalgan, went to Tokyo before Prince De to
prepare the agenda for his visit.
This visit of Prince De to Japan resulted from the conflict of opinions created by
the Japanese-Chinese Basic Treaty, which the Japanese and Wang Jingwei’s regime
agreed to in Nanjing oh November 30, 1940. The visit was initiated by Prince De himself,
not arranged by Kanai Shoji. By this time, those who had been deeply involved with the
Mongolian independence problem had been reassigned to various positions. For example,
Tojo Hideki became minister of the army in Prince Konoye’s Cabinet, Tanaka Ryokichi
became head of the Soldiers’ Affairs Bureau, and Moto Akira became head of the Mili
tary Affairs Bureau. Prince De thought it would be a good time to discuss the Mongolian
problem with them, and reverse the unfavorable political situation that had been created
by the Qingdao Conference.
Prince De and his delegation arrived in Tokyo Station from Shimonoseki on the
afternoon of February. 15, 1941. Ohashi Chiuchi, Deputy Foreign Minister, as the formal
representative of the Japanese Government, welcomed the guests at the station. Others
included Chu Minyi, ambassador of the Republic of China that was under Wang’s leader
ship; Lieutenant General Sakai Takashi; Major General Tanaka Ryukichi, head of the
Soldiers Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry; Oshima Yutaka, head of the Zenrin Kyokai; Lieutenant General Takeshita Yoshiharu, head of the Asian Development Board Li
aison Office in Kalgan; Kanai Shoji, the Mongolian Government supreme advisor; Wu
Heling, councilor of the Mongolian government; and many members of the Mongol elite.
In addition, more than one hundred Mongol students from Tokyo, carrying the flag of
Mongolia, welcomed Prince De. The prince and his delegation, after greeting those who
came to welcome him at the station, left for the courtyard of the Imperial Palace to pay
the customary respects to the Japanese Emperor. Then Prince De went to the Imperial
Hotel for a press conference. He said the goal of his visit was to increase the friendship
between Mongolia and Japan and deliver congratulations on the 2,600th anniversary of
the founding of Japan as a nation.
Although Prince De was still accompanied by Kanai during this visit, the prob
lem of the wording of “Mongolia” and “Mengjiang” did not occur as it had during the
first visit. The reason was that the title of the newly formed political regime then was
“Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government”; because the word Mongolia was author
ized in the title, there was no need for further struggle between Prince De and Kanai.
One of the important activities of Prince De in Tokyo was to pay his respects to
the Emperor of Japan. During this visit. Prince De expressed his appreciation and thanks
to the emperor for his support of Mongolia. In return, the emperor expressed his appre
ciation for Prince De’s efforts to establish peace in East Asia. Overall, the emperor’s
statement treated Prince De as leader of a nation or at least an independent political re
gime, not the head of a regime inside another country. The exchange was merely a ritu
alistic formality, but this change in tone was significant as compared with the tone of the
prince’s first visit to the same country.
The visit with Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro was also but a ceremonial
courtesy. However, the visit with Army Minister Tojo, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and
Head of the Asian Development Board Yanakawa Heisuke was political. The political
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concern was how to carry out a plan for the founding of the nation of Mongolia. This, of
course, was one of the topics Kanai Shoji had stubbornly opposed during the first visit.
During this second visit. Prince De brought forward his “Proposal for Mongolian Na
tional Founding,” which he personally gave to Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro and
those others mentioned above. This was Prince De’s blueprint for negotiations with the
top Japanese authorities.
Among all the talks, the one with Foreign Minister Matsuoka was the most suc
cessful. At the formal banquet, the Japanese foreign minister toasted Prince De by saying,
“Long live Mongolia!” Thus, Prince De was very satisfied with the new attitude of the
Japanese Government. Of course, this change in attitude was influenced by Matsuoka’s
vice-minister, Ohashi Chuichi, a long-time personal friend of Prince De. Ohashi was also
well known for being bold and ambitious as a professional diplomat.
During his visit with Army Minister Tojo Hideki, Prince De avoided Kanai
Shoji’s company, keeping Wu Heling as consultant and Jirgalang as the interpreter. Dur
ing their talk. Prince De gave this high Japanese military authority a lengthy, detailed
explanation of his project. Although Tojo did not give a definite answer to the proposal,
his response was nonetheless friendly and positive. During this talk, Moto Akira and Ta
naka Ryukichi, two important bureau heads of the Japanese Army Ministry, were in at
tendance. Also during this talk. Prince De frankly expressed his wish that Kanai Shoji be
dismissed as superior advisor of the Mongolian Government. At the same time, he said,
referring to the Autonomy Movement of 1933, that the goal of the Mongols was to strug
gle for their independence; they did not want to be dominated by others and had no desire
to put the Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi Provinces under their control.
Besides this official talk with Tojo, Prince De and his group carried out a per
sonal visit with Tanaka Ryukichi, who recommended that Prince De appoint Wu Heling
as the head of the Political Affairs Department of the Mongolian Government. For years,
Tanaka had held strong feelings against Wu, but now he changed his attitude from hostil
ity to support. This alteration, of course, was deeply welcomed by the prince, who imme
diately asked Tanaka to deliver his suggestion to the Japanese military authorities in Kalgan.

During this negotiation, the changes in Japanese policy toward Mongolia and the
increased support of Tojo, Matsuoka, Ohashi, Moto, and Tanaka eventually helped Prince
De reorganize his Mongolian Government, build a semi-independent regime the Mon
golian Autonomous State”—and successfully remove Kanai from the post of the supreme
advisor. All these were the result of this second visit to Japan.
Following is the Prince's proposal for the founding of the new Mongolian Na
tion;
Proposal for Mongolian National Founding
The people of Mongolia have suffered decline for hundreds of years. Fortunately,
now supported by the Japanese Empire, it is able to march toward a national foundation.
For five years we, the Mongol people, have dared to adventure without regret for any sacri
fice and move forward to the realization of this goal. Unfortunately, the establishment of
the Japanese-Chinese Treaty placed Mongolia {Mengjiang) and North China on the same
level; the already-established Mongolian independent regime reappeared as part of China.
Hearing this, the Mongolian officials and civilians were greatly surprised and disappointed,
and the Chinese in the Mongolian territory consequently began to waver. This was not only
a severe blow to the rise of Mongolia, but also set a bad example for all nationalities who,
in the new Asian order under Japanese leadership, would be greatly disappointed and turn
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away. This situation was desired by most of the Japanese elite.
Earlier, after the success of the Autonomous Movement of 1933, many people from
Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Kokonor, Kham (Xikang), and Tibet, including the Moslems,
came to us for consultation. These [results] are a clear witness that if Mongolia were able to
achieve the status of an independent nation, this would have a great impact on all the peo
ple and the future development of East Asia. The Japanese Empire should not be unduly
concerned with the problems of the Chinese people, but should instead concentrate on
Mongolia and its needs. Here, for the sake ot Japan, we propose a secondary request that
will establish the Mongolian Autonomous State under the suzerainty of China, [and will
also serve as] the foundation of a future independent Mongolian state. 1 he request is based
on one principle found in Sun Yat-sen’s Outline for National Building, honored by the
Chinese Government as its basic principle: “The government should foster the weak and
the minority nationalities inside the country and enable them to carry out self-determination
and self rule.” If the Chinese term for autonomous state, zizhiguo, could not be recognized,
then the Chinese term zizhibang should be used instead.'’ All in all, with the establishment
of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, some new measure needs to be carried out to satisfy and pac
ify the hearts of [both] the Mongolian and Chinese people. Thus, we propose a draft for a
triple agreement between Japan, China, and Mongolia as follows. We sincerely hope that
the Japanese Empire wilt give us great support.
The following is the draft for a Japanese-Chinese-Mongolian agreement:
1) The Japanese Empire and the Republic of China recognize Mongolia as an autonomous
state. The territory under its control should include the land north of the Great Wall line. It
should enjoy a broad and high degree of autonomous power, and all the administration
should be handled according to its own will and determination.
2) The Empire of Japan recognizes the suzerainty of the Republic of China over the Mon
golian Autonomous State.
3) If any difference of opinion occurs between the Republic of China and the Mongolian
Autonomous State, it should be managed through negotiation.
4) The Mongolian Autonomous State should enjoy the right to negotiate with Japan, Manchukuo, and other related countries by exchanging diplomats and becoming with them
members of the international organizations for Asian development.
5) The Mongolian Autonomous State should continue to use the chronology of Chinggis
Khan as the basis for its calendar.
6) The Mongolian Autonomous State should use its own national flag and national symbol.
Before Prince De departed for Tokyo, the Japanese Consulate-General in Kalgan
delivered a secret report to Matsuoka, the Japanese foreign minister, about the possibility
of a proposal by Prince De to the Japanese Government, together with his personal analy
sis of the situation. He concluded that without success in Japan, it would be very difficult
for the prince to satisfy the hearts of the Mongol people. This report seemingly facilitated
the negotiations of Prince De in Japan’s capital.
Before returning to Mongolia, Prince De visited Kimura Yujiro’s hometown of
Morioka in northeastern Japan, where Japanese ranches are located. He did this to reward
Kimura’s faithfulness and obedience. This of course was a great and glorious matter for
Prince De’s Japanese followers.
During the prince’s visit in Japan, no open hostility arose between him and Kanai. However, when the prince was discussing political matters with the Japanese

” The Chinese terms guo or bang would be translated in Mongolian as ulus, which means a nation,
state or country.
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authorities separately, he frankly and seriously expressed to the Japanese government his
desire to replace the supreme advisor in Mongolia. Although Kanai of course heard about
this movement against him, he pretended everything was in harmony, hoping that his
superiors in Japan would sympathize with him.

Tojo’s Arrival in Kalgan
Soon after Prince De’s return to Mongolia, General Tojo Hideki visited North
China and Kalgan to observe the Japanese military situation in these areas. He met with
Prince De to communicate his personal concern and sympathy to the prince. He also
urged him not to be disappointed and to devote himself to the struggle for JapaneseMongolian friendship and the future of East Asia, implying the possibility that the Japa
nese Government might alter its policy towards Mongolia. Tojo also presented 500 rifles
to the prince as armament for a personal bodyguard. Tojo’s arrival significantly encour
aged Prince De, who realized that Mongolia’s independence and the beginning of its na
tion-building might not materialize immediately, but that the situation would surely pro
ceed toward that goal. At the same time, the prince and most of the Mongolian leaders
discovered that Kanai no longer dominated the situation.
Prince De started to organize his bodyguard, naming it shitar chehg {}\\.. “chess
soldiers; i.e. “pawns”). He appointed as its commander, Khatanbagatur, who he had sent
to the Japanese Imperial Military Academy for training during the period of the auton
omy movement in the early 1930s. By this time, Khatanbagatur was already a colonel in
the Mongolian Army. A very serious person, he recognized that the shitar cherig was the
bodyguard of the Chairman of the Mongolian Government. He selected the finest young
soldiers from the seventh and eighth divisions which solely Included Mongol troops and
had them begin serious modern training. Theoretically, the bodyguard should have had
the exact same nature as the imperial bodyguard of Japan, and should not mix with the
private troops of Prince De from the Sunid Right Banner. Consequently, when Prince De
was traveling, to maintain the dignity of the Chairman, Khatanbagatur refused to seat the
personal entourage of the prince on the trucks of the shitar cherig. This did not make the
prince happy, because he felt that the institution and dignity of the government had been
compromised by the stem demand of his own bodyguard commander, who absolutely
refused to compromise.

Reorganization of the Government and its Personnel
From the latter part of March on, Prince De’s main activity was negotiating with
Takahashi Shigekazu, the chief of staff of the Japanese Army in Mongolia, and Takeshita
Yoshiharu, head of the Asian Development Board Liaison Office in Kalgan, to build on
the results of his talks with the Japanese authorities in Tokyo. The first item on his
agenda was to bring Wu Heling back from Tokyo to Mongolia to take over Jodbajab’s
post as head of the Political Affairs Department. Of course, this was the matter that Kanai
most opposed. However, Prince De again and again negotiated with Takahashi, empha
sizing that unless Wu Heling accepted this important position, the needed construction
for the future of Mongolia would not materialize. He also demanded to talk with Tanaka
Ryukichi, who advocated the same course as Prince De. Since the spring of 1936, when
Jodbajab’s trusted friend Nimaodzar was assassinated by Japanese agents, Jodbajab felt
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greatly threatened and had dared not express his opposition to the demands of the Japan
ese advisor. In fact, he never said a single no to Kanai. Consequently, he was strongly
supported by Kanai. But since Kanai was unable to stop this threat to go over his head,
Jodbajab had no other choice but to resign from his post.
After everything was settled. Prince De immediately summoned Wu Heling to
return from Japan. Before leaving Tokyo, Wu visited Moto Akira and Tanaka Ryukichi,
influential leaders of the Japanese Army Ministry to confirm and emphasize the under
standings that had already been discussed between Prince De and Japanese authorities.
Prince De’s second step was to reorganize the Mongolian Allied Autonomous
Government and appoint new personnel. Prince De and Wu Heling, the new head of the
Department of Political Affairs, decided to win the agreement of the Japanese authorities
in Kalgan, such as Kanai, Takahashi, and Takeshita. On April 8, these decisions were
formally issued as a resolution from a meeting of the Political Affairs Department. The
following are the important points of that meeting:
The top leader of the government will be the Chairman, with the Deputy Chairman under
him. The position of the Supreme Advisor should be equal to that of the Chairman. The or
ganizations directly under the Chairman are the Political Affairs Department, the Depart
ment of Councilors, the General Headquarters of the Mongol Army, the Supreme Court,
and the Attorney General’s Office. All the ministries, except for the Civilian Ministry, are
combined and reorganized. The new ministries of the Political Affairs Department are the
Board of General Affairs, the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee, the Ministry of Interior
Administration (originally the Ministry of Civilian Administration), the Ministry of Econ
omy, the General Bureau of Communications, the Judiciary Committee, the Audit Bureau,
the General Mobilization Committee, the Bureau of Information, the Moslem Affairs
Committee, the delegations stationed in the areas of other regimes, the Central Academy,
and the offices of the regions and leagues.
The main goal of the reorganization was to form the Mongolian Rehabilitation
Committee, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Ministry of Economy. These estab
lished administrations for the Mongols separate from those of the Chinese. All the ad
ministrative bodies dealing with Mongols were put under the Mongolian Rehabilitation
Committee, while those concerning the Chinese, in the Chinese territories, would be ad
ministered by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, The administration of finance and econ
omy was put under the control of the Ministry of Economy.
These main principles were important, and fortunately, their acceptance did not
cause more tension. However, the selection of new appointees for the reorganized gov
ernment was a difficult task. Prince De originally desired, through the reorganization of
the government, to pick individuals perfectly attuned to their positions and therebjy
maximize the ability of the government to function. This goal was difficult to reach.
''' On June 1, the Chairman announced a new unit, the Political Affairs Department. The list of
appointees to that and the other institutions was as follows: Li Shouxin, Vice Chairman; Wu
Heling, Head of the Political Affairs Department; Jodbajab, Chief of the Department of Councilors,
with Togtakhu, Khorjorjab, Jirgalang, and Jiang Huiruo as Councilors; Sungjingwangchug, Chair
man of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; Ding Qichang, Minister of Interior Administra
tion; Jirgalang (from Dahur), Minister of Economy and Deputy Chairman of the Mongolian Reha
bilitation Committee; Altanochir, Head of the General Bureau of Communications; Du Yunyu,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee; Maejima Noboru, Vice-Head of the General Affairs Board;
Muratani Hikojiro, Main Advisor of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; Hayasaka Fuyo,
Vice-Minister of Interior Affairs; Hibino Jo, Charg6 d’Affaires of the Vice-Minister of the Depart-
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Balanced appointment of personnel was very difficult to achieve. However, the above list
of appointments was a masterpiece of political maneuvering given the conditions of that
period. These arrangements had to balance out confrontations between the Mongols and
Japanese, Mongols and Mongols, Mongols and Chinese, and Japanese and Japanese.
Details of the personal relationship of Wu Heling and Jodbajab, already dis
cussed, will not be repeated here. However, the personal relationship of Wu Heling and
Buyandalai remained bad. Buyandalai always had a strong desire to take over the leader
ship of the Department of Political Affairs. Seeing the post come into the hands of Wu
Heling disappointed him and increased his antagonism toward Wu; this became one of
the factors in a later power struggle in 1944 leading to Wu Heling’s removal from this
important political position. Wu Heling was brilliant, zealous, and talented in political
manuvering, but also overconfident and proud. At the beginning of his tenure, his ambi
tion was not a hindrance to his acceptance by most of the Mongolian cadres in the gov
ernment, but because of his opinionated attitude, his popularity among the other Mongol
leaders gradually crumbled.
Prince Sungjingwangchug enjoyed a good reputation among both the Mongols
and the Japanese, so there was no challenge to his appointment to the Mongolian Reha
bilitation Committee. Togtakhu lost his position as a minister and was transferred to the
position of councilor without power. Of course, this increased his hatred of Wu Heling.
Prince Khorjurjab lost his position as head of the Husbandry Enterprise Bureau and also
was transferred to the position of a councilor. Yet he was tolerant and remained faithful;
he had no personal desire for power and reputation, only a desire to do something for the
Mongols. These events were insignificant to him. Jirgalang (from Dahur) had always
been kept from employment congruent with his abilities by Kanai Shoji and Togtakhu.
His appointment as a councilor was a favor from Prince De to reward his loyalty during
the prince’s troubles with Kanai. At the same time, he was appointed vice-chairman of
the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee to support Prince Sungjingwangchug in carry
ing out the task of building a new Mongolia.
Jiang Huiruo, a Moslem leader with some military experience, had had no con
tact with Prince De or other Mongol leaders before his appointment as a councilor. He

ment of the Economy; Fujii Goichiro, Deputy Chairman of the Judiciary Committee; Jirgalang
(from Jerim), Vice-Head of the General Affairs Bureau; Chen Yousheng, Charge d’Affaires of the
Deputy Head of the General Affairs Board; Jirgalang (from Dahur), councilor and Deputy Chair
man of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; Mogdengbu, the Deputy Chairman of the Mon
golian Rehabitation Committee; Kashiwa Goro, Advisor to the Mongolian Rehabilitation Commit
tee; Sekiguchi Tamotsu, Advisor of the General Affairs Board; and Moto Kohei, Advisor of the
General Affairs Bureau.
For instance, the promotion of Li Shouxin to the position of vice chairman would not only in
crease the Mongolian influence in the government, it would also satisfy the hearts of the Mongol
Army under Li’s command. As for Li himself, he always refused to criticize the politicians openly.
Therefore, Li’s promotion would appease the Japanese and not hurt Xia Gong, one of the vicechairmen of the Mongolian Government, who basically had no ambition for or interest in politics.
So it was easy to persuade Xia Gong to retire from the vice-chairmanship under the pretense of old
age. However, in order to make him feel good, he was appointed as nominal director of the Board
of Trustees of the Datong Coal Mine. This position carried a high salary, and to appease the feel
ings of the people in Northern Shanxi, he continued to be treated as vice-chairman. With the per
suasion of Prince De, Xia Gong and Yu Pinqin, another Chinese vice-chairman, who still remained
in this post, returned the favor by recommending that Li Shouxin also be appointed as a vicechairman.
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had been discovered and recruited by the Japanese Special Service Office to organize a
strategic Moslem force and became commander of the Northwestern Trade Protection
Brigade with the rank of Lieutenant General. In order to win over the Moslems in north
west China, the Japanese advocated creating a Committee for Islamic Affairs and gave
Jiang the title of councilor. Jiang Huiruo was talented in winning the trust of the Japan
ese. Also, because of his personal relationship with the Moslem leaders of the Ma family,
both in Qinghai and Ningxia, he could openly smuggle opium via Inner Mongolia to
North China. He also bribed the authorities by smuggling cloth and daily necessities into
Qinghai and Ningxia. Even weapons were included in his smuggling operations. Ot
course, these activities enabled the Japanese to collect intelligence from the other side
and establish secret contacts with their counterparts.
Ding Qichang, a Chinese settler in Kharachin Right Banner and an old follower
of Li Shouxin, respected Prince De and other Mongol leaders. When he accompanied
Prince Sung during the latter’s visit to Japan, he clearly showed his attitude that all politi
cal problems should be resolved by Prince Sung. Of course his yielding to the Mongolian
leadership was reported to Prince De by Prince Sung. Establishment of the Interior Min
istry combined the Civilian Ministry and the Peace Preservation Ministry. The target of
this new ministry was the Chinese administration in the Chinese settlers’ territory. Prince
De decided to appoint Ding as the head of this new ministry. Of course, Ding’s coopera
tion with the Japanese created support from the Japanese side. Vice-Minister Hayasaka
Fuyo was transferred from the Vice-Minister’s position to the Peace Preservation Minis
try where he took charge of the police administration.
Since the Ministry of Economy was an important department, Kanai Shoji and
the Japanese side were reluctant to have Jirgalang as the minister. They insisted that Ma
Yongkui, the former Minister of Finance, originally a shopkeeper in Shanxi province, be
given that appointment so they could manipulate him as a puppet minister. They also
wanted Hibino Jo as Vice-Minister, to actually run the ministry.
Mugdenbuu had lost all his political power because of the defeat at Bat-kliaalag
and Shiramoron in the winter of 1936. However, because of his personal relationship
with Wu Heling and as a result of Wu’s strong recommendation, he was promoted from
head of the Industrial Bureau of the Chahar League to the position of vice-chairman of
the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee.

Quarrels Among the Japanese
There were also confrontations/and clashes among the Japanese, most evidently
between the Supreme Advisor, Kanai Snoji, and the Minister of General Affairs, Sekiguchi Tamotsu. Sekiguchi’s strategy was^to strengthen his own position within the Ministry
of General Affairs by taking over one after the other each of Kanai’s responsibilities until
the latter no longer had any real power. Kanai, on the other hand, used this opportunity to
reorganize the government institutions. He was able to demote the General Affairs Min
istry to a General Affairs Board. Kanai was also able to obtain approval from the Japan
ese Army Headquarters in Mongolia and the Japanese Liaison Office of the Asian Devel
opment Board in Kalgan to move Sekiguchi from the position of a minister to that of an
advisor. This caused Sekiguchi to resign and leave Kalgan. During this phase of the
struggle Kanai was the winner.
To stop this conflict from happening again, Kanai advocated that no board head
should be appointed in Sekiguchi’s place; the deputy board head alone should carry out
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the board’s business. Kanai was able to appoint Maejima Noboru, who was his capable
confidant, as deputy head. By so doing, Kanai completely controlled the government in
stitutions without interference from other Japanese officials. In order to win the friend
ship of both Mongols and Chinese, he also formally advocated the establishment of two
vice bureau heads, one each for the Mongols and the Chinese. The Mongolian vice
bureau head position was assigned to Jirgalang (from Jerim), a very faithful follower of
Prince De and a trusted friend of Wu Heling. The Chinese vice bureau head position was
assigned to Chen Yousheng, the interpreter and confidant who had followed Kanai to
Kalgan in 1937.
Because of Prince De’s visit to Japan, the Japanese elevated the Office of Mon
golian Government in Japan to that of Delegation. Originally, the head of the old office,
Hisamitsu Masao, had quite a serious political debate with Prince Sung, which increased
their mutual understanding. Because Hisamitsu had a long period of contact with Wu
Heling, this also gradually altered Hisamitsu’s view of the Mongolian problem. During
Prince De’s visit, Hisamitsu had gained personal contact with the prince thanks to his
record of good service. Kanai, taking advantage of the change in the Tokyo office, dis
patched his confidant, Ito Tasuku, as the delegate of the Mongolian Government sta
tioned in Japan. Kanai had Hisamitsu return to Kalgan to fill the functionless post of chief
secretary of the Department of Councilors. This brought Hisamitsu into Wu Heling’s
circle. Since Hisamitsu had a personal relationship with Major General Takahashi Shigekazu, chief of staff of the Japanese Army in Mongolia, he became the bridge between
Wu Heling and Takahashi. This contact made it possible for Takahashi to carry out the
secret move to oust Kanai from Kalgan.
Muratani Hikojiro was a Japanese acceptable to most of the Mongols. His as
signment as chief advisor to the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee was proposed by
Prince De and Prince Sung. During his service on this committee, Muratani maintained
his traditional policy and manner. Anything the Mongols were able to manage, he usually
heeded with silence. If the committee had something to negotiate with the Japanese side,
he usually acted as a mediator—really as a spokesman for the Mongolians. Muratani’s
policy also created a good model for the rest of the Japanese assigned to the same com
mittee.
At the same time, the General Bureau of Husbandry Industry was dissolved and
Kashiwa Goro was assigned as advisor to the Bureau of Enterprise of the Committee.
Kashiwa, a retired Lieutenant General of Veterinary Medicine in the Japanese Army,
used his knowledge and experience to negotiate between this committee and the Japanese
military headquarters. Kashiwa’s interest was concentrated entirely on the management
and development of Mongolia's husbandry enterprise; he had no intention of interfering
in Mongolian politics. Even though he held a high military rank, he was satisfied to be an
advisor to a bureau of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee. He continued in this job
until the Japanese were defeated at the end of the Second World War.

The Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee
Establishment of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee was one of the cen
tral topics in discussions of the reorganization of the Mongolian government. At least in
the hearts of the Mongols, this committee was the only real institution to work for to
achieve the reconstruction of Mongolia. There were five bureaus under this committee:
General Affairs, Civilian Administration, Education, Industry, and Peace Preservation. In
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addition, there were the Institute for Mongolian Cultural Research, the testing ground for
husbandry enterprise, the Office of Animal Vaccination, and the Center for Breeding
Facilities.
The recruitment of personnel for this newly established committee was very
complex. Oljeitu, a well-known, respected person from the early period of the Batkhaalag Autonomy Movement in 1933, was assigned to be the head of the General Af
fairs Bureau. Jirgalang (from Jerim), already assigned as vice minister of the General
Affairs Bureau, was the head of the Bureau of Civilian Administration; Ruiyong, a sec
retary to Prince De for years, was made head of the Bureau of Industry. Togtakhu, origi
nally the head of the Section on Education within the dissolved Ministry of Civilian Ad
ministration, was now the head of the Bureau of Education; and Khorongga, a Mongolian
army colonel, was appointed as head of the Peace Preservation Bureau. Makhashiri and
Jalgamji, formerly of the Mongolian Political Affairs Commission at Bat-khaalag, were
assigned to supervise the compilation of Mongolian textbooks for schools; I was assigned
to be secretary to Prince Sung.
The higher ranking Japanese officials assigned to this committee were relabeled
as advisors, while the lower ranking Japanese officials were relabeled as assistants. These
title changes seemed to be a throwback to the institutions of the old Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Government—previously known as the Mongolian Military Gov
ernment. Although this was only a superficial change, it restrained the Japanese in the
Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee and made them better behaved than the Japanese in
other branches of the government. The Mongol members of the Mongolian Rehabilitation
Committee were the heads and vice heads of the leagues, and some were highly reputed
jasags and ambans of the banners. The committee held two meetings each year, one in
the spring and one in the fall. All the jasags and the ambans attended the conference;
although they could express their opinions, they had no voice in the final decisions.
The leaders of all the leagues were influenced by the establishment of the Mon
golian Rehabilitation Committee. The most important event was the change of the head
of the Shilingol League. Rinchinwangdud was the original head of this league, ihtjasag
of Sunid Left Banner, and was very loyal to Prince De. However, his personality was
very conservative and he did not support the new policy for the league administration.
After the league government moved from Sunid to Pandita-Gegeen-Keid, he never visited
the office again. His negligence rendered the administration of the league inactive. To
improve the situation, Prince De appointed Bodibala (the son of Yangsang—a former
league head and the eldest prince of Shilingol) to be the head of the Bureau of General
Affairs of the League Office. Accompanying him was Makhashiri, Prince De’s old intel
lectual follower, as the head of the Bureau of Industry.
In part because of Makhashiri’s strong antagonism to the Japanese and his quar
relling with them, he was unable to reform any of the work of the league office. Because
Prince De always considered Shilingol as his power base, he could not tolerate the con
tinuation of this miserable situation in the league office. He appointed Chogbagatur, a
capable bureaucrat and head of the Bureau of General Affairs of the Bayantala League
Office, to replace Makhashiri. However, Chogbagatur also failed to accomplish the tasks
that Prince De wanted. Because of this disappointment. Prince De decided to make a
complete change in the bureaucracy of the league. He “persuaded” Prince Rinchinwang
dud to resign because of his “bad health” and assigned Prince Sung to be the head and
Bodibala to be the vice-head to manage the administration while Prince Sung was in Kalgan. Also, in order to encourage the administration of the league office, both Prince De
and Prince Sung agreed to have Mandaltu (a founder of the Inner Mongolian People’s
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Revolutionary Pary in the 1920s and by now a senior politician in Mongolian official
dom) become the head of the General Affairs Bureau. Nevertheless, this man also failed
to accomplish the goals of his superior.
The main task assigned to the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee was to carry
out the renewal of the league and banner administration that Prince De had decided upon
with the jasags of the Shilingol league during the early spring in Pandita-Gegeen-Keid.
Another important task for this newly established committee was to strengthen and pro
mote the facilities of the khorshiyas in order to stabilize the economy of the banners.
The important assignment in the territories of the leagues and banners was to
figure out how to obtain the needed horses, hide, and wool within the territory for the
Japanese army; and how to exchange these materials for a sufficient quantity of the
commodities essential for the herding people who sent their husbandry products to the
Japanese side. For the territories in the hinterland of the Kalgan regime, the important
economic questions were (1) how to establish smooth and rational control over the ex
portation of domestic animal products to North China and gain profitable commodities in
exchange, and (2) how to improve the trade through improving land transportation facili
ties leading to Manchukuo.'*
The Peace Preservation Bureau separated the police administration from in
volvement with the Chinese police in Chinese territory. Since the areas had both Mongol
and Chinese populations, the drawing of definite boundary lines for this mixed admin
istration was a very difficult problem and one never really solved right up to the end of
the Mongolian regime in Kalgan.
The Civilian Administration was assigned a most important and difficult prob
lem—to draft institutional regulations for the leagues and banners. Modernization was
necessary and earnestly demanded by all the antifeudalistic intellectuals, who wanted to
abolish the hereditary institution of the jasags and princes. Although these proposals
were necessary for Mongolian modernization, they could be realized only with great dif
ficulty. Opposition from the feudalistic privileged class and conservatives was inevitable.
The good side of the survival of the feudal classes was that the old feudalistic system left
no basis for the Japanese to legally become involved in local government. Paradoxically,
excessive or too rapid modernization might enable the Japanese to penetrate down into
the “grass roots” of the Mongolian local administration. The movement toward moderni
zation had to keep this risk in mind.
Finally, the Mongol leaders decided institutional modernization should be car
ried out, but not immediately. They agreed that only one Japanese advisor should be al
lowed to stay in a banner office, thereby using backward feudalistic institutions as shields
to stop the penetration of Japanese influence into the banners. Still, discussions prior to
drafting of the plan for modernization had to be handled prudently.
While Prince De and his group were busy reorganizing the Mongolian Govem-

For instance, the domestic animals and “blue salt” produced from the Dabusun-nor (salt lake),
inside the territories of Ujumuchin and Khauchid banners, were necessary items for Manchukuo.
Originally, the export of these products from these two banners was very profitable. However, after
the establishment of Manchukuo, its authorities abolished free trade in cereal and food stuffs. This
eliminated the profit from this trade for the people of eastern Shilingol. The Mongolian traders
were also unable to keep up with the complex regulations issued by Manchukuo because of lan
guage difficulties. In addition, the Manchukuo bureaucrats used price controls to unreasonably
depress the price of Mongolian domestic animals and salt, making the exchange very unfair. How
to balance the trade became one of the main problems this committee had to solve immediately.
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ment, an extraordinary change occurred in world politics; Japanese Foreign Minister
Matsuoka Yosuke visited Germany and Italy. Through the intervention of Hitler, the
Japanese Foreign Minister was also encouraged to go to Moscow to visit with Stalin. And
on April 13, 1941, Matsuoka signed the five-year Russo-Japanese Treaty of Friendship
and Nonaggression with Foreign Minister Molotov of the Soviet Union. The treaty re
lieved Japanese military activities in China from the threat of being outflanked by the
Soviet Union. The military confrontation along the border between the Mongolian Peo
ple’s Republic and Manchukuo also ceased, and at the same time, the Soviet threat on the
northern border of Inner Mongolia ended. In Inner Mongolia (at least to a limited extent),
this great change was welcomed; the leaders hoped the treaty between Russia and Japan
would last long and produce positive effects.

Prince Sung’s Activities
In the summer of 1941, following the establishment of the Mongolian Rehabili
tation Committee, Prince Sung and the heads of the bureaus took a tour of the banners of
Chahar and Shilingol League. They observed the progress of the new policy and were
able to help the officials of the committee understand the real situation of the banners in
order to facilitate plans for the reconstruction of the local administrations. In fact, it was
proving very difficult for so conservative a society to apply the new policy. Although the
majority of the people were concerned about the individual khorshiyas, which had great
impact on their daily life, they had no real concern for the policy of modernization in the
abstract. Requiring examinations of lamas contradicted their faith and traditions; they
dared not touch it. Among the conservative leaders. Prince Rinchinwangdud, the former
head of Shilingol League, was most opposed to the reforms. For a man like Prince
Rinchinwangdud, it was difficult to change his opinions, but Prince Sung had tried his
best to persuade him not to hinder progress.
At this time, the Police Affairs Bureau of the Shilingol League was still included
within the police system of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. During the official tour of
Prince Sung, the chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee and the head of
the league, all the Mongolian and Japanese officials and clerks stood up to show their
respect for the prince. However, when he entered the Bureau of Police Affairs, the Mon
gol members all stood up, but the Japanese ignored his presence. Prince Sung then turned
to the Japanese councilor of the League Office, Nakamura Asakichi (a retired colonel),
and asked him, “Do you know in what position I came here? In this league office,
whether Mongol or Japanese, all servicemen are under my leadership. Why didn’t these
people stand up to show their respect for me? I have visited Japan, noting the politeness
of you Japanese people and observing the regulations of your government and offices. So
why are these Japanese servicemen, under your control, so impolite as not to honor the
institutions of the government? How did you guide them?”
This question embarrassed Nakamura. In a loud voice he rebuked the Japanese
police officers. He then had each of them come to the front, stand before the league head
and bow and report their names. After this clash, the Bureau of Police Affairs of the
Shilingol League was at least formally put under the Jurisdiction of the League Office.
This paralleled the relationship between the bureaus of police affairs of the other leagues
and the heads of the league office.
The Shilingol League Middle School was originally a primary school founded
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by the Zenrin Kyokai;” its business was now being conducted by a Japanese schoolmas
ter by the name of Yoshimura. Although he was cordial toward the students, he also very
zealously carried out Japanese policy. So from the early days of the primary school, Yo
shimura taught Japanese literature but omitted the Mongolian curriculum. Every day be
fore class, the students had to gather in the courtyard to raise the Japanese flag and bow
toward the east—^the direction of the Japanese Imperial Palace. I suggested to Prince
Sung: “Education in a foreign language should follow the general rule and only begin
with the first year of middle school. Education in primary school should be limited to the
native language. Although it is difficult under the current situation to stop bowing toward
the east, we can demand that after bowing to the east the students also bow toward the
west—the direction of the Shrine of Chinggis Khan. By so doing, we can balance east
and west and prevent the Japanese from indoctrinating the youngsters.”
Prince Sung, agreeing with my opinion, immediately summoned Yoshimura and
advised him of these suggestions. Yoshimura could not reject the order of Prince Sung,
but after expressing his acceptance of the instructions, he asked to resign under the pre
text of old age. Prince Sung comforted him and asked him to stay temporarily until the
arrival of the new schoolmaster. This example became a policy for all middle schools in
the leagues and the Mongolian youth were thereby released from the pressure of Japanization.

After returning to Kalgan, Prince Sung reported about all his activities while
touring the Chahar and Shilingol Leagues. By then. Prince De already knew what had
happened at the Shilingol League Middle School: the head of the Japanese Abaga (Pandita-Gegeen-Keid) Special Service Office, Lieutenant Colonel Magino Masao, had al
ready reported the event to the Japanese military headquarters in Kalgan, accusing antiJapanese activists of hiding behind Prince Sung. When Japanese military headquarters
asked Prince De why this change had been made, Prince De answered very simply, “I
agree with this change.” In this way he defused the accusations of an “anti-Japanese con
spiracy,” of which nothing further was heard. Also, soon thereafter, the Mongolian Reha
bilitation Committee issued an instruction to all the schools demanding that all students
bow toward the west during every ceremony to pay their respects to Chinggis Khan and
that the foreign language course (meaning Japanese) should only begin in middle school.
While Prince Sung and his group were in Shilingol, on June 22, 1941, Hitler
invaded the Soviet Union. The existence of the Axis alliance, which linked Japan to
Germany, and Italy created a tense situation. However, at the beginning of July, the Japa
nese cabinet announced that it would not interfere with Russia s military actions; this
announcement brought relief along the border between Inner and Outer Mongolia.
In June, during the period of the reorganization of the Mongolian government.
The Zenrin Kyokai was originally a Japanese military organization to foster Japanese/Mongolian
relationships. Before the breakout of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, this organization helped a
number of Mongolian students study in Japan and established schools and clinics in several areas of
Mongolia. However, after the Japanese occupation of Mongolia, the Zenrin Kyokai had to retreat
from the front to the second line. Most of their schools and clinics were gradually relinquished to
the control of the Mongolian government. Of course, the remaining Zenrin Kyokai branches in
Mongolian territory continued their intelligence work for the military. The Zenrin Kyokai gradually
developed an internal split, creating a division between the home headquarters in Tokyo and the
headquarters in Hohhot. Following the death of the head of the board. Lieutenant General Inoue,
the confrontation became more visible. Eventually, the original organization split into two inde
pendent Zenrin Kyokais—the one in Tokyo, headed by Oshima Yutaka, and the one in Hohhot,
headed by Maekawa Hirokichi. The political importance of this institution declined thereafter.
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the Japanese proposed to establish a General Mobilization Committee. The purpose of
this organization would be to reinforce the power of the Japanese to expand. The chair
man of this committee was also assigned to be head of the General Affairs Board of the
Mongolian government. All the committee members were Japanese vice ministers. By
then, Maejima Noboru was the charge d’affaires of the General Affairs Board, and so he
became the head of this committee. The task of this committee was planning, not practi
cal administration. Almost no Mongols paid attention to this purely Japanese organiza
tion, and its existence was thoroughly ignored by the Chinese as well. Yet in order to
strengthen Japanese political propaganda, the newly established Bureau of Information
(propaganda) was put under this committee.
The most important changes in the Japanese policy toward Mongolia happened
in the late summer of 1941. In reality, the attitude of Japan toward Mongolia, or probably
toward Prince De, began to change from the beginning of this year. This was a real turn
ing point, and was the result of Prince De’s second visit to Japan.

XII
THE MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS STATE
AUGUST 1941 - AUGUST 1945
The Formation of the Mongolian Autonomous State
If the 1933 Autonomy Movement was Prince De’s first golden era, then the per
iod between August 1941 and August 1945 was his second. But his shining light came
too late, too near the sunset.
Following Prince De’s second visit to Japan—after years of struggle, endeavor,
argument, and compromise—a breakthrough eventually occurred in the relationship be
tween Prince De and the Japanese authorities: the two sides reached an agreement to es
tablish the Mongolian Autonomous State. The inaugural ceremony was carried out on the
morning of August 4, 1941 in the courtyard of the Mongolian government offices in Kalgan. The Mongols in attendance were greatly encouraged, and their cool feelings toward
Japan during the administration of the Mengjiang Allied Committee under Kanai Shoji’s
leadership began to dissolve. The ceremony was carried out quickly, without adequate
preparation; Prince De and his fellow planners of the event worried that the Japanese
might change their minds if too much time elapsed. So they decided to act immediately.
Of course. Prince De and the great majority of Mongol leaders had always
wanted to establish an independent Mongol state. Because this goal could not be reached,
they compromised by establishing an autonomous state. To deal conveniently with Wang
Jingwei, the Japanese authorities had not wanted to use a word for this government offen
sive to the Chinese, such as guo. Nevertheless, no matter whether they used country (gud)
or state (bang) the Mongolian translation of both terms is ulus. The formal title of this
new regime became Monggol-un Obesuben Jasakhu Ulus, a title satisfactory to Mongol
patriotic feelings.'
The changing of the personnel in the Political Affairs Department and the for
mation of the Autonomous State greatly encouraged the Mongols and improved Mongolian-Japanese relations. However, any real progress for the Mongols was limited to the
affairs of their own leagues and banners. Those administrative posts held by the Japanese
(finance, economy, transportation, and the police administration in the Chinese territor
ies) that had been under their control from the time of the Mengjiang Allied Committee,
were not all influenced by the changes. Of course these administrative units were not the
' From the time of the autonomy movement in 1933 until the end of the Second World War, Prince
De kept looking for a satisfactory title for his Mongolian regime. He got the idea for autonomy
from the self-ruling domains of the British Empire. He thought that if Mongolian independence
could not be realized, either in fact or at least in name, it would be better to follow the pattern of the
self-ruling domains of the British Empire. After the Second World War, the British Empire was
transformed into the British Commonwealth, a move that also attracted Prince De’s attention. After
the war, he recommended this new political form to Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the Chinese
government, but failed to get a positive answer. This problem is discussed in later chapters.
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ones Mongol leaders earnestly desired to take over. What mattered most to the Mongol
leaders was the power they obtained to allocate and increase some budgets for the con
struction of local Mongolian administration, thus making the plans of the Mongolian Re
habilitation Committee easier to push forward. To enhance the efficiency of banner ad
ministration, they created a training center for Mongol banner officials in the fall of this
same year. All middle-ranking officials, such as meiren-janggis and formal bichechi
(clerks) under the age of forty, were summoned to this center on a rotating basis for three
months of training. The purpose of this training was to explain the new policies decided
upon by the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee and the methods used to carry out
these policies.
On September 18, the top leader of North China under Japanese occupation,
Wang Yitang, chairman of the North China Political Affairs Committee, arrived in Kalgan for a formal visit. Although Wang and Prince De had been introduced earlier and met
several times, they were not personal friends. This visit was of course only a formality,
but it had political significance in that it recognized Prince De as the leader of an
autonomous state.

The Removal of Kanai Shoji
In mid-October 1941, Takahashi Shigekasu, the chief of staff of the Japanese
army in Mongolia, who had supported Wu Heling, was transferred and left Kalgan. Major
General Imamura Toyojiro replaced Takahashi. During his stay in Kalgan, Imamura
maintained a prudent and friendly attitude toward Prince De and other leaders. Most im
portant, Imamura helped remove Kanai Shoji, with whom the Mongols were disgusted.
In the middle of November of that same year, it began to be rumored among
high-ranking Mongol leaders that the Japanese authorities had already urged Kanai Shoji
to resign “on his own.” This rumor, which delighted the Mongols, soon proved true. Of
course. Prince De and Wu Heling were the two leaders offically informed by the Japa
nese authorities. Prince Sung was informed by Muratani Hikojiro and Kimura Yujiro,
they only delivered the news, hesitating to analyze it. Since it was inconvenient for Prince
Sung to visit Kanai, he went to see Prince De, who told him, “Now Kanai has to go. No
matter what he has done before, he is leaving now. If he can be transferred, our purposes
are achieved. It is not necessary for us to embarrass him while he is stepping down. Wu
and I have already sent someone to ask Kanai how he would like to be rewarded for his
accomplishments. His hope is to get half a million dollars for his retirement. Both Wu
and I feel that amount is too much. Nevertheless, we have decided to give him what he
desires, without hesitation.”
Kanai had controlled the budget and expenditures of the Mongolian government
for years. But now, after his formal request for retirement, he was unable to allocate the
money for his own retirement. This decision had to be made officially by Wu Heling,
head of the Political Affairs Department. Hence the transfer of this large amount of
money could not be hidden. Everyone who heard the news recognized Kanai s desire as
improper. Even the Japanese Army in Mongolia criticized Kanai. Because of this pres
sure, Kanai was forced to hand back to the Japanese Liaison Office of Asian Develop
ment Board $350,000 of the total. This amount was already in his pocket. Now it became
his personal contribution to the Japanese Government. This act eased the resentment of
the Japanese Army against him. Nevertheless this last defeat during his last act in Mon-
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golia was all the more humbling for having become public knowledge.^ In addition to
half a million dollars of pension money, Prince De gave him a scroll bearing the Chinese
saying Gong zai Meng-bang, which means “Your merit is everlasting to the Mongolian
State.” Perhaps Kanai read between the lines and felt the stinging irony intended.
In 1948, seven years after his separation from Mongolia, Kanai published an
article “To Establish a Country in the Desert.”^ It is easy to see that he was mocking
Mongolia’s ambitions to establish a nation. He says, “Prince De is ... a zealous fellow
with a burning desire for the reconstruction of his people. The Mongols seemingly are
always dreaming of the return of their great ancestor Chinggis Khan.” He concludes,
“Because of the necessities of the situation during the beginning of the Japanese occupa
tion, Southern Chahar, Northern Shanxi, and Mongolian governments had to be dissolved
and reconstituted in the form of the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government. By so
doing, the formation of a new state of our dreams was able to show its fhiits.” These
words clearly express Kanai’s attitude toward Mongolian nationalism. It is also evident
why the Mongols opposed him.
Kanai went on to recall the situation when he left Manchuria to come to Mon
golia. He had asked for advice from Katukura, a staff member of the Japanese Guandong
Army, the man who had supported the young activists who started the Mongolian inde
pendence movement in eastern Inner Mongolia in 1931. Soon after, though, he changed
his attitude and pressed these young Mongols to cease their activities and disband their
organization. Katukura continually warned them not to carry out any movement to sepa
rate from the newly established Manchukuo. During his service in the Guandong Army,
Katukura was one of the opponents of Mongolian independence. He also advocated that
Mongolia remain a part of China. Of course, Katukura instructed Kanai to hinder the
Mongolian movement.
In this article, Kanai mentions that Prince De visited Japan three times; that the
population of western Inner Mongolia was less than one hundred forty thousand; and that
after the Mongol Army entered the city of Hohhot, more than thirty Mongol princes gath
ered to ask if Puyi really had ascended to the throne as emperor, the most influential
among them being Prince Yon. The truth, however, was that Prince De visited Japan only
twice; though the western Inner Mongolia population was quite thinly distributed, even
so, Kanai’s figure was only half the actual number; and last. Prince Yon did not come to
Hohhot on this occasion and never visited with Kanai. All these errors appeared in an
article composed by a man who had offlcally acted as the supreme advisor for several
years. These errors show that while Kanai was in Mongolia, he overemphasized control
ling the economy and administering the Chinese territories nominally placed under the
Mongolian government. He was not concerned with the Mongolian national problem or
the Mongol people. Otherwise, how could such errors appear in so short an article he
himself had composed?
Following the removal of Kanai Shoji, the Japanese government decided to dis
patch Prince De’s friend, Ohashi Chuichi, as the new supreme advisor to the Mongolian
government. Ohashi was a faithful supporter of the Mongolian independence movement.
He had been deputy minister of the Japanese Foreign Ministry when Matsuoka Yotsuke
was minister, during Prince De’s second visit to Japan. While serving in the Japanese
^ See Oya Giichi’s ""Kanai Daisensef' (Great Mr. Kanai) in his Omoitei no Naimoko (Inner Mon
golia in My Memory), pp. 386-7.
’in Bongei Junshu, v. 32, no. 13.
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Foreign Ministry, Ohashi had persuaded Matsuoka to support Mongolian independence.
So even before his arrival in Mongolia, the name of Ohashi was quite popular among the
Mongol leaders.
At the end of November, Kanai left Kalgan; and Prince De and most of the
Mongol leaders were happy to see him off at the Kalgan station. Kanai decided to go first
to the capital of Manchukuo and then return to Tokyo. To maintain a better relationship
with Kanai, Prince De had Prince Sung, who had a somewhat personal friendship with
Kanai, accompany Kanai to Beiping and from there escort Ohashi to Kalgan. I was as
signed to go with Prince Sung as his interpreter. On the way out from Kalgan, Kanai told
humorous stories without mentioning political problems. He put up a good front pre
tending to be happy about his removal from the heavy burdens of leadership. When
Ohashi Chuichi received Prince Sung, his first question was about the health of Prince
De. Then he said, “My obligation is to help Prince De reach his long-range goal of Mon
golian independence and nation building. The immediate problem right now is how to
stimulate the Mongols into assuming their responsibilities and doing their own work. The
Japanese do not need to interfere in everything.” This straightforward attitude, very dif
ferent from that of Kanai Shoji, was greeted enthusiastically by the Mongols.

Outbreak of the “Great East Asian War”
Prince Sung saw Kanai off and left Beiping on December 8 to escort Ohashi to
Kalgan. This was the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and started the Pacific War,
known in Asia as the “Great East Asian War.” Prince Sung and most of the Mongols in
the city of Beiping recognized this action as a great mistake made by Tojo Hideki (or by
the Japanese government as a whole), because the Chinese problem was not yet resolved.
This thoughtless adventure might rebound and bring great disaster to Japan. Of course,
these analyses were influenced by the assumption that Great Britain and America would
always remain great powers. Nevertheless, the future of Inner Mongolia merited concern
in this new context.
When Prince Sung returned to Kalgan, he discussed the outbreak of the larger
war with Prince De and discovered that Wu Heling and others held similar views. Al
though they thought Britain and America might suffer a period of setback, in the long
run, the final victory would not belong to Japan. Consequently, the idealistic hopes for
the future evoked by the changing of the supreme advisor was immediately overshad
owed by the coming of a world war. They recognized that if the Japanese moved toward
the south and east, this would ease the threat on the Soviet Union of an attack from the
east, and the Soviet threat from the north on Inner Mongolia would gradually intensify.
Of course, the outbreak of the Pacific War not only influenced the future of
Prince De, but also greatly affected both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Even during the
worst days of the East Asian War, the Mongolian leaders retained their idealistic nation
building goals, but their power to control an increasingly unfavorable situation steadily
diminished. Even though Prince De had to express an optimistic view publicly, he real
ized that disaster was unavoidable. From the beginning of this war. Prince De remained
aware of the changing world situation. Since he had a radio station and very loyal sup
porters, he gathered news from all sides for analysis and reference. But this increased
knowledge of the war and the problems it caused only brought him more worry.
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Arrival of Ohashi, the New Supreme Advisor
After his arrival in Kalgan, Ohashi Chuichi went directly to the residence of the
chairman and formally reported his arrival to Prince De, saying that he had come to
Mongolia as the advisor to the chairman and would not follow in the footsteps of his
predecessor. He would rather live near Prince De than move into the residence of the
former advisor, Kanai Shoji. Although Ohashi tried to change the attitude of the Japanese
toward occupation administration, most of the Japanese officials were accustomed to
their own system. They preferred to grasp almost all economic and financial power. Even
though the supreme advisor was their leader, it proved impossible for Ohashi to initiate
change. In addition, the Japanese Army Headquarters in Mongolia and the Liaison Office
of the Asian Development Board were traditionally two offices with power over the
Mongolian government. Their heads had the power to make final decisions. The supreme
advisor, although recommended by the Japanese government to the chairman of the
Mongolian government, still had to follow the instructions of the Japanese military
authorities. Ohashi, determined to change this unreasonable situation, presented a strong
challenge to the Japanese military authorities and as a consequence eventually would be
forced to resign.
The removal of the previous supreme advisor caused a rearrangement of Japan
ese personnel in the government offices. In order to avoid conflict between the supreme
advisor and the head of the General Affairs Bureau, Ohashi also made himself head of the
General Affairs Bureau. At the same time, Ohashi appointed Sawai Tetsuba, then coun
cilor of the Bayantala League Office, to be the vice-head of the bureau. Sawai was an
upright person who had few conflicts with the local Mongols and Chinese. He was, how
ever, a member of the Kokuryukai and a disciple of Kasame Yoshiaki, a well-known ex
tremist, right-wing scholar. The former vice head of the same bureau, Maejima Noboru,
had been a close friend of Kanai and hence had to resign and leave Mongolia. Many of
Kanai’s clique who had accompanied him to Kalgan from Manchuria also resigned.
Ohashi appointed Nishijima Shozo, who was working in the Japanese-dominated North
China Transportation Company, to be his secretary. Nishijima was young, well-educated
and had a sharp eye, but his narrow-mindedness created many problems for his boss,
Ohashi.

Ohashi’s Conflict with the Japanese Military
Sawai Tetsuba was a straightforward and good-hearted person. However, be
cause of the influence of the kokuryukai and his ronin personality, he was very emotional
and disorganized. The routine work under his control fell into disorder, especially the
administration of personnel. Although he honored the opinions of the local leaders, he
was headstrong and dominating towards the Japanese. His first target was Kimura Yujiro,
who had been a follower of Kanai from the begirming of the creation of the Mengjiang.
Sawai thought that Kimura therefore had to leave. Prince De, Prince Sung, and other
Mongol leaders recognized Kimura as a good man; Prince Sung had confidence in him
and turned down Sawai’s demand. The two sides finally reached a compromise. Kimura
was moved from the position of advisor to the General Affairs Bureau to an advisorship
without a definite assignment.
Nishijima Shozo tried hard to establish a good relationship with the more intel
lectual Mongol officials, such as Chogbagatur, secretary of Prince De; Ruiyong, head of
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the Bureau of Industry of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; and me, secretary of
the committee. He usually invited us to his place for long talks. He was open-minded
about the Mongolian problem. He also had some good ideas for rehabilitating the Mongol
people. Nishijima was even sympathetic toward the khorshiya (cooperatives) of the ban
ners, which were designed to promote the economic rehabilitation of the Mongol people
in socialist terms. Although his thinking was precise, his opinions were very narrow, and
he was hostile to other Japanese. Because Ohashi ranked high in the Japanese political
world, his attitude toward the military authorities was quite different from that of his
predecessors. However, because of stubbornness among the other Japanese advisors, little
change was effected.
Ohashi arrived a little before New Year’s Day 1942. At that time. Prince De was
back home in Sunid. In order to express his personal courtesy to the prince, Ohashi de
cided to go to Sunid to deliver New Year congratulations to Prince De as part of his fa
miliarization tour of the leagues and the Chinese territories. Prince Sung, as chairman of
the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee, was to officially accompany Ohashi, together
with two secretaries, Nishijima Shozo and me. On the last day of December 1941, this
group left Kalgan and arrived in Zhangbei, where the Chahar League Office was located.
By that late date, the league head, Jodbajab, was at his home in the Minggan Banner;
therefore, Ohashi and his group were welcomed and briefed by two bureau heads of the
League Office, Serengnamjil and Norbujana. Ohashi told them to do their best to improve
the livelihood of the common Mongol people.
In the afternoon, Ohashi and his group left Zhangbei for Dehua (Jabsar). Colonel
Matsuo Yutaro, head of the Japanese Special Service Office in Dehua, welcomed him.
Ohashi not only refused to visit the Special Service Office, but when Matsuo came to his
hotel, Ohashi did not invite him to his room but had the colonel stand in front of the door
to ofW his greetings. A Japanese colonel was quite important, but at this time and in
front of many Mongols, he was not even given a seat. It might have seemed that this high
officer of the Imperial Army was being insulted by a civilian, but Matsuo did not act in
sulted. He merely exchanged a few Joking words with Prince Sung and left calmly. How
ever, the atmosphere was charged.
Prince Sung, a straightforward person, admonished Ohashi by saying, “Your
Excellency’s attitude toward Colonel Matsuo seems a little difficult for him to bear. You
should know that the head of the Special Service Office is quite a moderate, good-natured
person.” Ohashi then answered, “I have been vice minister in the foreign ministry. As for
official rank, a colonel means nothing to me. This is due treatment for him. We shouldn’t
provide any special treatment Just because he is a military man.” Prince Sung did not
continue, but he realized problems would be in store for this new supreme advisor.
On the morning of the second day, January 1, Ohashi reached Sunid. He insisted
that the host. Prince De, not come to see him as was customary, but that he go as the su
preme advisor to visit the chairman first, to deliver best wishes for the New Year. This
ceremony was quite formal. It took place in the Yeke ordo, a yurt big enough to seat one
hundred people. Such a structure has four red columns carved with golden dragons. All
the officials of the Sunid Right Banner were gathered there. First, Ohashi delivered his
formal greetings to the chairman, wishing him good health and a brilliant and successful
future for Mongolian nation building. Prince De responded by wishing the supreme advi
sor good health, a smooth administration and victory in the Great East Asian War. That
night, Prince De laid out a Mongolian-style banquet in this yurt for Ohashi, with music
by a Mongolian band. The atmosphere was very friendly. It showed the harmony that
existed not only between Prince De and Ohashi, but also between the Mongols and the
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Japanese. From beginning to end, no one talked about politics; I acted as the interpreter.
On January 2, Ohashi’s group left Sunid and traveled west, arriving in Beile-yin
sume (Bat-khaalag) in the evening and stayed in the Ulanchab League Office. The league
head, Babudorji, had never been to the league office. All the administrative work was
handled by the vice head, Shirabdorji. The atmosphere in the league office was not har
monious. The Japanese chief councilor, Yamamoto Nobunaga, was quite sympathetic to
and enthusiastic concerning the Mongolian independence movement, but his personal
relationship with Mergenbagatur, head of the Civilian Administration Bureau of the
League Office, was tense. According to Mergenbagatur, Yamamoto interfered too much
and paid no attention to the desires of his Mongolian colleagues. On the other hand, Ya
mamoto and the other Japanese considered Mergenbagatur to be a man without enthusi
asm who delayed all the work of the League Office. To complicate things, in the banners
under the League Office, the relationships between the local banner officials and the
Japanese advisors evoked conflicts quite similar to the conflicts within the League Office.
Consequently, all the new policies decided on and sent from Kalgan were delayed in thenimplementation.
During the night, Shirabdorji reported these difficulties to Prince Sung and
asked for instructions on how to report his problems to the supreme advisor. Prince Sung
told him he had to report the situation to the supreme advisor factually and ask him for
solutions. The next day, in the hall of the league office, Shirabdorji reported all these
unhappy events in the league to Ohashi, as instructed by Prince Sung, except for naming
the people involved. Ohashi did not give any immediate answer to Shirabdorji. Perhaps
Yamamoto had already submitted his report and criticism to Ohashi the night before.
From Beilin-sume, Ohashi’s group went to Hohhot, where they were warmly
received by the Mongolian military and Bayantala League officers. In the evening, they
held a big welcome banquet at the well-known restaurant Fenglin-ge to which they in
vited many of the high-ranking military officers of the Japanese army.
By this time, the Japanese forces were winning great victories in the Pacific.
Therefore, the spirits of these officers were high. In his speech Ohashi said, “Now,
blessed by heaven, the Imperial Army is winning incomparable victories everywhere.”
Although these words were positive, the countenances of the Japanese officers became
very solemn. Then an officer stood up and asked, “Your Excellency, the supreme advisor,
are you implying that the victory of Japan was caused by the blessings of heaven and not
caused by the effort of the Imperial Army?” Ohashi stood up, and in a condescending
manner said, “1 am not saying that the Imperial Army did not struggle vigorously, but the
blessing of heaven should not be ignored.” After saying that, he sat down. Unexpectedly
these words, tenyu mondai (the problem of the blessing of heaven), became the spark that
lit an open confrontation between Ohashi and the Japanese Army. I translated these
words from Japanese to Mongolian and Chinese at the banquet, and I can still feel the
changing atmosphere of that moment.
From Hohhot, Ohashi returned to Kalgan. Although the train passed Datong, he
did not stop to visit the office of the Northern Shanxi district. His pretext was that these
Chinese districts were secondary in importance to the Mongolian government, and there
was no need to visit them right away. After returning to Kalgan, Prince Sung went to see
Prince De and gave his report on Ohashi’s situation. By then. Prince De had already re
ceived reports that the Japanese military authorities were greatly disappointed with
Ohashi. First, they were aware of Ohashi’s impoliteness toward Colonel Matsuo, head of
the Dehua Special Service Office, when he purposely showed his condescending attitude
toward the Imperial Army. Second, they said the “heavenly blessing” remark was taken
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as an insult against the entire Imperial Army and demanded that Ohashi submit a formal
apology. Prince De thought this was a very bad beginning for Ohashi and that his con
frontation with the military authorities might hinder the progress of all the proposals
promoting Mongolian rehabilitation.
When Ohashi Chuichi arrived in Mongolia as supreme advisor, Major General
Takeshita Yoshiharu, head of the Liaison Office of Asian Development Board in Kalgan,
was removed and Major General Iwasaki Tamio was appointed in his place. After Iwasaki took office, he had to deal with the confrontational relationship between Ohashi and
the Japanese Army.

The Mongolian Delegation in Tokyo
and the Mengjiang Bank in Kalgan
When the Mongolian Delegation in Japan was established in June 1940, it was
controlled by Kanai Shoji, who appointed his confidant Ito Tasuku as delegate. By so
doing, Kanai was able to expand his activities in Tokyo freely. After Ohashi’s arrival.
Prince De convinced Ohashi that the Mongolian Government Delegation in Japan needed
Japanese official associates because of the language and communication barriers. Never
theless, the post of delegate had to be filled by a Mongolian; otherwise, how could it rep
resent Mongolia? Ohashi agreed to have Prince De appoint Tegshibuyan, the head of the
Mongolian Rehabilitation Academy, as the delegate. He was a trusted follower of Prince
De but had no path to promotion after the dissolution of the Mongolian Allied League
Government. At the same time, Prince De appointed his secretary, Chogtumanglai, as
secretary of the delegation and dispatched Hisamitsu Masao, who was originally sup
posed to be head of the delegation, to be councilor to the delegation. By so doing. Prince
De was able to make it at least outwardly a delegation of the Mongolian political regime.
Tegshibuyan stayed in Tokyo until the end of the Second World War.
At the beginning of 1942, to express support for Japan in the Pacific War, Prince
De issued a statement in the name of the chairman of the Mongolian government. In it he
emphasized that the mission of the Mongolian government was to strengthen the defense
of the special anti-Communist zone located in the northern borderlands of East Asia. On
one hand, he recalled the great enterprise of Chinggis Khan in the past and demanded that
the Mongols look to their future. On the other hand, he emphasized that the flourishing of
Japan encouraged that of Mongolia and that the flourishing of Mongolia contributed to
the victory of Japan. These words were ostensibly diplomatic flattery of Japan, but in
reality reflected the true feelings of Prince De at that time.
Soon after the Lunar New Year of the White Horse, on February 26, 1942,
Prince De again visited the Pandita-Gegeen Keid, the place to which he had summoned
the jasags of the Shilingol League the year before to promote the new policy. On this
occasion he gathered the Jasags to deliver their own reports. A conference was held to
discuss how to balance the burden of people’s taxation, to establish a budget system, to
guide the lamas in their return to lay life, and how to manage the khorshiya. Because
Prince De personally scrutinized their activities, the officials had to produce results, and a
good administrative atmosphere was renewed.
In the middle of March, the Mengjiang Bank, the central bank that controlled the
economy of the Mongolian territories (Mengjiang), had to be reorganized. Bazargurda, a
notorious pro-Japanese figure, had to retire because his term was up. Bazargurda whole
heartedly desired to be appointed as a councilor of the Mongolian government and was
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recommended by the Japanese military authorities, but because of his unconditional proJapanese attitude, Prince De rejected him. This rejection, however, enabled the Japanese
side to recommend an expert Japanese banker, Munekata Kyukei, to be the director of the
bank, and Prince De could not reject two of their recommendations in a row and so he
accepted Munekata. Prince De then appointed Temurbolod, vice head of Chahar League
and the amban of Shangdu Banner, to be the nominal deputy director of the bank. The
reason for the compromise was a practical one—there were no Mongolian experts to run
the bank. However, the change in office by the aged Temurbolod made it possible to
promote Serengnamjil, the amban of the Taipus Left Banner, to the post of vice head of
the Chahar League so as to encourage adoption of the new policies in that area.

Christian Missionaries During the Pacific War
From the latter half of the nineteenth century on, both Catholics and Protestants
continued to send missionaries to Mongolia. After the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, these
churches were able to accelerate their work through diplomatic pressure. The Catholics
moved beyond the Great Wall to Kalgan and Hohhot. However, because there were too
few Mongols converted, they had to also make the Chinese their objects of proselytization. Only in the southern part of the Yeke-juu League were they able to convert some
Mongols to Catholicism. As for the Protestant missionaries, though they penetrated sev
eral areas, only in Chahar were they able to have a little success. After the outbreak of the
Pacific War, all the missionaries from England and America were sent to the concentra
tion camp at Qifu (Yantai), Shandong. After the defeat of Germany and Italy, almost all
missionaries, no matter from what country, were removed from Mongolia.
During the time they were in Mongolia, the Catholics and Protestants received
instructions from the Japanese military authorities demanding that they reorganize and
make a formal statement in support of the military actions of Japan. To increase Japan’s
control over these missions, a special group of police of the Interior Ministry of the Mon
golian government established the Mengjiang Information Office {Mokyo Annaijo) as a
special intelligence office to deal with all the foreigners in Mongolia. Consequently, all
the foreign missionaries and the local people who had contact with the missionaries were
usually “invited” to this “Information Office” to be “interviewed.” If there was any kind
of suspicion, deportation was inevitable.
Among the Mongols, Gombojab, a Chahar who spoke and read English and
translated Marco Polo into Mongolian and who had regular contact with the missionaries,
was “invited” to this office and tortured terribly. Although he was released after this tor
ture, his health was very poor, and he died soon after. Among the foreigners, George Soderbom received the most severe torture. Soderbom was bom in Mongolia to Swedish
missionary parents and spoke fluent Mongolian. He was once the guide of Dr. Sven Hedin, the famous adventurer of Central Asia, in Chinese Turkistan. He was also known as a
good friend of the Mongols. Although he was tortured, he was strong, and the torture did
not really damage his health. Although Sweden had not declared war against Japan, Sodorbom was also sent to the concentration camp in Yantai. After the Second World War,
he served in the UNRRA, the relief organization of the United Nations, and brought tre
mendous relief supplies to the Mongols, especially to the poor.
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Prince De’s Visit to Manchukuo

March 1, 1942 was the tenth anniversary of the establishment of Manchukuo.
Prince De, as chairman of the Mongolian Autonomous State, delivered a congratulatory
telegram to Puyi, the puppet emperor of Manchukuo. On the same day, the prince at
tended the official celebration banquet given by Li Yishun, the delegate of Manchukuo
stationed in Mongolia. Later on. Prince De invited various leaders to go with him to Xinjing, the capital city of Manchukuo, to express good will and celebrate their ten-year anniversary.**
The day after the prince’s arrival, Puyi held a national banquet at his palace for
Prince De. This was the third visit of Prince De to Manchuria, and the first time that he
was treated as a national guest. In his speech, Puyi addresed Prince De as “Your Honor
able Chairman.” Prince De expressed his good will and congratulations on the tenth anni
versary of Manchukuo and recognized its help to Mongolia. These ceremonial changes
were of course the result of the establishment of the Mongolian Autonomous State.
Prince De did not bow to Puyi, the abdicated emperor of the former Manchu Dynasty.’
Li Shouxin also had a conversation with Puyi, but they said nothing involving
politics. Although Puyi had political interest in Prince De’s visit, he was unable to ex
press it because of the supervision of the Japanese Major General Kataoka. Soon after,
Puyi dispatched Jingjia, a Manchu intellectual who was a member of his personal staff, to
express Puyi’s personal concern to Prince De and Puyi’s decisive will to rehabilitate the
Manchu people. Because Prince De realized that Puyi was a bird in a cage and could not
do anything according to his own will, he knew that nothing would be accomplished ex
cept some pointless conversation. Although he received Jingjia and his message, there
was no serious discussion of the future of the Mongols and Manchus.
Prince De’s main activity in Xinjing was to visit the headquarters of the Japan
ese Guandong Army. The same night as the banquet, a welcome party was organized by
General Umezu Yoshijiro, commander of the Japanese force in Manchuria. At the table.
Prince De expressed his thanks for the support of the Guandong Army, emphasizing
Japanese-Mongolian friendship and Mongol support of the East Asian War. In this
speech. Prince De emphasized his intention to establish Mongolian independence and
build a nation. But the response of Lfmezu (who had been commander of the Japanese
Army in North China and therefore disagreed with separation of Mongolia from China) is
unknown to me. Nevertheless, since he was the head of the Guandong Army, which or
ganization had been involved with the Mongolian independence movement from the
early 1930s, he could not officially express his pro-Chinese opinion.
Almost all Prince De’s activities in Manchuria were ritualistic—matters of form,
not substance. No real problems were discussed. During his stay in Xinjing, beside the
formal visit to Jagar, head of the General Bureau of Kinggan, Prince De also met with
These leaders included Li Shouxin, Vice Chairman of the government; Ding Qichang, Minister of
the Interior; Jirgalang, councilor of the government; Muratani Hikojiro, advisor of the Secretariat of
the Chairman; Chogbadarakhu, head of the same secretariat; Nakajima Manzo, councilor of the
General Affairs Bureau; and others. Prince De arrived at Xinjing on April 21, and was welcomed
by Zhang Jinghui, premier of Manchukuo; Yu Shenzheng, minister of Military Affairs; Jagar,
Prince of Baarin Banner and then head of Kinggan General Bureau; the chief of staff of the Guang
dong Army; and other Japanese authorities.
’ This was told to me by Mr. Jirgalang, and is different from the inaccurate record in Lu Minghui’s
book, p. 253.
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other officials: Badmarabdan, commander of the Kinggan Army (Mongolian troops of
Manchukuo); Manibadara, director of the Mongolian Livelihood Improvement Associa
tion {Mengmin Huoshenghui); Buyanmandukhu, governor of Southern Kinggan Prov
ince; Namkhaijab and Oyundalai, councilors of the Kinggan General Bureau; and Askhan, the leader of the young Mongol military officers. Although they had sincere talks
privately, no conclusions were reached.

The Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee
and Japanese Horse Purchasing
Following the establishment of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee, the
spring and fall sessions of the Members’ Conference convened to discuss how to imple
ment the new policies and how to provide the banners with a chance to communicate
their difficulties to the central authorities. If there were problems related to the Japanese
side, the conference would also have the opportunity to ask the central government for a
solution. This official conference was two or three days long. However, after the closing
of these official meetings, an unofficial conference was usually held at the residence of
Prince De, with him presiding as the authoritative figure. The members of the committee
and its high-ranking officials, the leaders from the leagues and banners, and the highranking officials of the government all had to attend. The session was conducted infor
mally from the afternoon well into the night. The Japanese were not invited. Although
this conference had no legal basis, it became the catalyst for the new policies. Because
none of the attendees would discuss the information they had received with outsiders, the
Japanese were suspicious of the meeting.
As mentioned earlier, the Mongol leaders worked to protect the growth of their
pastoral economy and the privileges of the herders by establishing the khorshiya (coop
eratives). After a testing period, the cooperatives became part of the plan. That is why the
khorshiyo question was one of the main topics at these conferences. The attendees had to
provide detailed price lists for commodities to be imported and exported. This report pro
vided the base for a new yearly plan. The formation of the khorshiya did not allow the
Chinese merchants to export at will the products of the Mongolian herders. It also created
great losses both for the Daimogunsu (the Great Mongolian Company) established by
Japanese in Manchuria and the Mongolian territories and the Mokyogunsu (the Mengjiang Company established by Japanese in the Mengjiang areas). To recover the losses
and diminish competition, the Mokyogunsu accepted the recomendation of the Daimo
gunsu and let itself be absorbed by the latter. Because the supply of wool and hide in ex
change for consumer goods thereafter became a licensed monopoly under the manage
ment of the khorshiya, it was impossible for any Japanese firm or Chinese merchants to
take over this trade again.
The Japanese had burdened the people of all the banners by demanding that they
provide horses for the military. The go-between in this trade was the Daimogunsu. Be
cause of extortion by this go-between, the people who submitted horses were unable to
obtain appropriate amounts of commodities in exchange. The Mongolian Restoration
Committee, however, negotiated with the Japanese army stationed in Mongolia the ex
change ratios of the horses to cloth, brick tea, and tobacco leaves. The Mongolian Restor
ation Committee insisted that the horse prices determined by the Japanese military and
the Mongolian government be set according to the quality of the horses. This insistence
eliminated extortion by the Japanese go-between merchants. The Chinese agents also had
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to give the Mongols a fair commodity exchange for their horses. Although the Daimogunsu represented the Japanese military in delivering the exchange commodities, the ex
amination and appraisal of the horses were now carried out directly by the Japanese
militEuy. This arrangement made the management of military horses an easier task for the
Japanese military and eliminated most of the disagreements between the Japanese mili
tary and the banner offices.

Japanese Schemes Concerning the Mongolian Religion
Their martial spirit is a unique historical characteristic of the Mongol people.
But after the national conversion to Buddhism during the middle of the sixteenth century,
this religion became the well-spring of almost all Mongol spirituality. Whether one views
this reduction of the martial spirit as good or bad, it is an important political development
in the history of the Mongols. The Japanese occupiers, of course, paid much attention to
the role of the Buddhist religion. Many Mongol intellectuals had long engaged in antire
ligious activities, taking special note of the negative effects created by the Chinese gov
ernment’s religious policy toward the Mongols. Thus the Japanese had to be careful in
their formulation of a religious policy. In the realm of Manchukuo, the Japanese pleased
the intellectuals by forcing many able-bodied lamas to enter military service; after lamas
had served in the military, they seldom returned to religious life. But in western Inner
Mongolia, circumstances led the Japanese to implement different policies. The Japanese
recognized that anti-religious activity in western Inner Mongolia might drive the Mon
gols into Outer Mongolia. Consequently, the Japanese Special Service Office imple
mented friendly policies toward the lamas and the monasteries in order to win over the
hearts of the conservatives. Of course, this policy in western Inner Mongolia was not
bom of benevolent concerns for religious freedom, but of consideration for political re
alities.
By 1941, the young incarnation of the Panchen Lama [Pandita-Gegeen], who
had not adhered to his religious vows, was forcibly removed by the officials of the Abkhanar Left Banner. The orders of the banner’s jasag compelled him to leave his temple
and go immediately to Tibet to study the scriptures. This was a terrifying piece of news to
many conservative Mongols. Balgunsurung, the jasag of this banner and other banner
officials had been making secret plans for this expulsion for quite some time. This event
caused great concern to Lieutenant Colonel Makino Masaomi, the head of the Abkhanar
Special Service Office. He feared that the conservative Mongols might suspect the Japa
nese of complicity in this plot, and anti-Japanese sentiment might arise. Since the expul
sion was already a fait accompli by the time Makino received news of it, there was noth
ing he could do. Interestingly, Prince De and Prince Sung applauded the actions of the
Abkhanar Left Banner authorities.
The Japanese realized that the policies of Prince De and other Mongolian leaders
toward the lamas were excessively harsh, and that if these policies were implemented,
general dissatisfaction would develop among the devout Mongol Buddhists, damaging
the Japanese propaganda effort against Outer Mongolia. But the Japanese knew that the
enormous proportion of males entering the celibate life of the monasteries contributed
directly to a decline in the Mongol population. Therefore, they could not oppose Prince
De’s policies. On the other hand, they also understood the political influence wielded by
the monasteries. In view of these parallel considerations, the Japanese decided on a pol
icy of “Japanification” of Mongolian Buddhism—a policy they hoped to carry out in an
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unobtrusive manner, without antagonizing the monks or defiling the temples.
This Japanification policy was run by the Koyazan sect, with its roots in the
Japanese Shinganshu sect. Koyazan was a tantric Buddhist sect that had many similarities
to the esoteric Buddhism of Tibet; it dispatched many monks to visit Mongolian monas
teries and conduct research into Mongolian religious beliefs and practices. These monks
also recruited young Mongol lamas and brought them back to Japan for education and
training. The Japanese wanted these young lamas to be successfully indoctrinated and
returned to Mongolia to reform Mongolian Buddhism along Japanese lines.
Although Prince De and other Mongol leaders realized that the number of young
men who became lamas had to be reduced to protect the national existence of the Mongol
people, they did not harbor any reservations or resentment toward the Buddhist faith it
self. It was a faith they and their ancestors had embraced for generations. They could not,
therefore, accept Japanese demands for basic changes in the doctrines and teachings of
Mongolian Buddhism. The leaders of the monasteries were also unable to accept these
demands. So it was decided that although young Mongolian lamas would be allowed to
go to Japan for religious study and training, they should not accept any tenet opposed to
their own orthodox teachings. Most of the lamas who went to Japan did not in fact
change their religious beliefs. Some maintained a low profile after returning Irom Japan,
while others became interpreters, refusing to go back to the temples. Overall, the Japan
ese policy toward Inner Mongolian Buddhism was a failure, producing opposition groups
among the lamas and leading indirectly to the formation of Lama tamag (lama admini
stration).
To strengthen their propaganda directed toward Outer Mongolia, the Japanese
promoted a “reincarnation” of an Outer Mongolian religious leader, the Noyan Khutugtu,
in the vicinity of Jara-yin sume of the Abaga Right Banner. In the summer of 1942, they
enthroned him at Chagan Obootu sume, the largest temple on the northern edge of the
Sunid Left Banner, located on the border with the Mongolian People’s Republic. Prince
De was very dissatisfied because he recognized that the Japanese policy of using religion
for political purposes could create many problems. He was only too aware that in Tibetan
and Mongolian Buddhisim it was illegal to enthrone an incarnation.
An event even more ominous than the one described above was the Japanese
attempt to locate and enthrone the Ninth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu. After the death of the
Eighth Jebtsundamba in 1924, the Communist authorities of the newly proclaimed Mon
golian People’s Republic announced that no further incarnation of the Jebtsundamba was
to be established. The Guandong Army and the Japanese Army in Mongolia agreed that
finding the ninth reincarnation would give the Japanese enormous political influence over
the Mongols north of the Gobi. After hearing that the ninth incarnation had probably been
located in Tibet just before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese sent to Tibet the
Dilowa Khutugtu, a high Outer Mongolian lama who had defected to Inner Mongolia, to
bring the incarnation of the Ninth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu to Inner Mongolia.
Because of his religious beliefs and hatred of the communist regime in Outer
Mongolia, the Dilowa Khutugtu accepted this secret mission. He told Prince De about it
and asked for his opinion. Prince De’s opinion was that the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu line
had reached its conclusion with the Eighth Jebtsundamba; no further reincarnation was
possible. He also argued that no matter what amount of religious significance the discov
ery of the Ninth Jebtsundamba might have, there was no need politically to claim such a
discovery. Prince De also objected to finding the Ninth Jebtsundamba because to do so
would entail resurrecting elements of the now defunct Manchu dynasty’s policy of estab
lishing religious constraints for the Mongols. Since the Mongol people now had new
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knowledge and a new nationalistic consciousness, any attempt to propagandize them
would have to be made in terms of the unification of the several Mongol nationalities in
establishing a free and independent country. He hoped that the Dilowa Khutugtu would
not accept this mission. The words above were related to me personally by Prince De.
But the Dilowa Khutugtu did not heed Prince De’s admonitions. The Japanese
arranged for his departure from Kalgan to Beiping, and thence to Tianjin and Shanghai,
and finally by sea to Hong Kong. At Hong Kong, he bought a ticket to Calcutta, India.
But his presence there was discovered by the British intelligence community; and the
British and Chinese intelligence services, taking advantage of his complete lack of
knowledge of English, Chinese, or Cantonese, put him on a plane bound for Chungking.
He discovered his actual destination only when the plane landed.***
1 include this story here in order to describe the Japanese attempts to restrain the
Mongols through their own religious beliefs, and also to present Prince De’s opinions on
reincarnated living Buddhas. Prince De was opposed to searching out the reincarnations
of the Jebtsundamba Khutugtu and the Noyan Khutugtu', later, he even encouraged the
Chinese government not to enthrone the Tenth Panchen Lama. These facts show that
while Prince De was a religious person, he had independent ideas about using religion for
political purposes. He was absolutely opposed to an alien people’s alteration and use of
Mongol religion to achieve political imperatives.

The Fall of Ohashi Chuichi
In June of 1942, the Manchukuo authorities dispatched Yu Shenzheng, Minister
of Peace Preservation, and Buyanmandukhu, governor of the Kinggan Southern Province,
to Kalgan. These two men were sent to express the appreciation of the Manchukuo
authorities for Prince De’s visit to the Manchukuo capital. The visit of these two men was
only a ritualistic formality; no substantive talks took place, but Buyanmandukhu did
manage to speak privately with Prince De, Wu Heling, and Prince Sung. These private
talks led to somewhat closer relations between eastern and western Inner Mongolia.
The most important event of this summer was the downfall of the supreme advi
sor, Ohashi Chuichi. As mentioned earlier, the arrival of this man had raised the hopes of
Prince De and other Mongol leaders that he might exert some positive influence on the
Mongolian policy of the Japanese. This hope, however, was entirely dashed when Ohashi
developed personal conflicts with the Japanese army and other Japanese officials in the
Mongolian government. After these conflicts broke out, the Japanese military immedi
ately began an agitation to have Ohashi removed. Apparently Ohashi did not realize the
* The Diluwa was very clever, however, and he did not make his displeasure known. In fact, he
even pretended to be overjoyed at having arrived in Chungking and acted as though he had been
demanding to go there for years. In Chungking, he met with his old friend, Owen Lattimore, who at
that time was working as an advisor of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Because the Dilowa Khu
tugtu had been appointed a member of the Legislative Yuan, his arrival in Chungking did not go
unwelcomed by the Chinese government. The Chinese government made him a Member of the
National Political Council (Can-cheng hui) in Chungking, expressing goodwill toward him. After
the war, Diluwa resigned from his post and expressed his wish to go to Tibet to visit with the Ninth
Jebtsundamba Khutugtu, and his request was approved by the Chinese government. Although he
made it to Tibet and accomplished his religious goals, it proved impossible to achieve the political
goal of taking the Jebtsundamba to Inner Mongolia.
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seriousness of this movement when it first began. Perhaps he believed that his backers in
Tokyo—powerful Japanese militarists such as Itagaki, Tojo, Matsuoka, and others—
would keep him safe from low-level military conspiracies against him. At any rate,
Ohashi continued to use his abrasive style and refused to bow down to the Japanese army
leaders in Mongolia.
In the summer of this year, Prince Sung, Nishijima Shozo, and I accompanied
Ohashi on a trip to the Shilingol banners for the purpose of observing the implementation
of the new policies. In Shilingol, Ohashi first visited the Sunid Right Banner, where he
was warmly welcomed by Prince De and his son, Dugursurung, the jasag of the banner.
Here he visited the girls’ middle school, an institution of which Prince De was immensely
proud. The school was traditionally Mongolian in every way. Since Prince De was con
vinced that the girls would eventually become housewives, their lifestyle as students was
not different from the nomadic lifestyle. Ohashi was also very satisfied with the founding
and management of this middle school.
From Sunid, Ohashi and his group went eastward to Pandita Gegeen Keid,
where the league office, the Japanese Guandong Army’s Special Service Office and the
great monastery were located. Because Prince Sung was chairman of the Mongolian Re
habilitation Committee and head of the Shilingol League, a briefing was arranged for
Ohashi by the vice-head of the league, Bodibala, the jasag of the Abaga Left Banner.
While there, Ohashi instructed the Japanese officials that they should not always do
things the Japanese way. He informed them that they must regard themselves as guests,
honor the opinions of the local people, and act prudently. This action won the respect and
admiration of the Mongol people. I do not know what the Japanese thought of him.
From the Shilingol League Office, he went to Prince Sung’s banner, the Khauchid Left Banner, and was wined and dined at Prince Sung’s modest princely residence.
Ohashi greatly praised Prince Sung’s modest lifestyle. After visiting Prince Sung’s ban
ner, he went eastward to the princely residence of the Ujumuchin Right Banner. At that
time, Ujumuchin was considered the most conservative, wealthy, and pastoral of any re
gion in all of Inner Mongolia. The Jasag of this banner, Mijidjangchubniyambu, was then
only a child of eight or nine years. Although he was not in actual charge of his banner, he
still performed the ceremonies at the banquets in a very solemn and dignified manner.
Because all of his actions were ritualistic, this child Jasag was capable of a deportment
that was neither submissive nor arrogant.’ Ohashi was very impressed with the ability of
these strict feudalistic ceremonies to preserve an image of Mongol dignity and national
self-respect in the face of such difficult circumstances.
From Ujumuchin, we left for Linxi, located in the Kinggan West Province of
Manchukuo, and secured arrangements for the import of foodstuffs from Manchukuo to
Ujumuchin. Because Ohashi was originally the consul of the Manchukuo government and
was now the supreme advisor to the Mongolian government, he was able to engage in
detailed discussions with the Japanese officials of Linxi x/an. In Manchukuo, all the x/an
heads were puppets. Their presence was, therefore, not required in discussions of this
type.
From Linxi, we went to the Ongniud Right Banner Office, located in Chifeng
(Ulaankhada). After the founding of Manchukuo, the Guandong Army’s policy was to
keep the original Mongolian leagues and banners intact. They placed the banners in the
Juu-uda League, where there were fewer Chinese. They also renamed the league “King' At this point, I recalled the story of the former prince of this banner, Sodnamrabdan, and his
treatment of Itagaki Seishiro, the deputy head of staff of the Guandong Army.
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gan Western Province,” to show that it was a region of Mongolian “self-rule.” The ban
ners of the Josotu League, along with the Ongniud Right Banner mentioned above (areas
that were heavily populated with Han Chinese and had had Chinese-style xian govern
ments established for years), were placed under different local administrations. That is,
these banners were placed under Rehe and Jinzhou Provinces and maintained as Mongolian-style banner governments. The Chinese xiam were abolished, and the banner offices
ruled over both Chinese and Mongols. Chifeng xian, which was designated as the Ulaankhada ting during the Manchu period, was accordingly abolished; the banner office of the
Ongniud Right Banner was moved to Chifeng, and all the jasags were designated as ban
ner heads. By this time, the head of this banner was Sechinchogtu. He carried out the
ritual formalities of reception and entertainment, but did not participate in discussions on
the Manchu-Mongolian overland trade.
From Ulaankhada, we went westward to the old princely residence of the
Kharachin Right Banner. The former prince of this banner, Gungsangnorbu, had started
the modernization movement in Mongolia at the beginning of the century. Prince Gung,
as he was popularly known, founded an ordinary girls’ school and a military academy.
Because of his modernization endeavors in this area, many of the political and educa
tional leaders of Inner Mongolia were from Kharachin. Ohashi was especially glad to
visit this region because of its importance in modem Mongolian history. Prince Sung was
also very glad to travel to this area because he wanted to proceed to Kharachin and meet
with his old friend, Lobsangchoijur, my father.
By this time, Tudub, the son of Prince Gung, had already been assigned as coun
selor of the Provincial Office of Rehe. The banner head, Uribatu, had been a follower of
Sun Yat-sen in his activities against the warlord governments of northern China, and he
had participated in the “protect-the-constitution” movement in Guangdong led by Sun.
Uribatu gave a briefing on the modem history of Kharachin to Ohashi and Prince Sung,
then guided his guests on a tour of the most luxurious and sumptuously appointed Beijing-style princely palace in all of Inner Mongolia—the residence of the prince of Khara
chin. Uribatu also gave them a tour of the Chongzheng Normal School founded by Prince
Gung.
Both Ohashi and Prince Sung delivered speeches to the students of this school.
In his speech. Prince Sung emphasized the future of the Mongolian nation and the fact
that its destiny depended on the diligence of the students in the audience. He became so
excited that he neglected to mention the existence of Manchukuo! After this speech, he
and Ohashi were guests at a luncheon party at my father’s house. Because of my father’s
advanced age and his excitement at seeing Prince Sung, he asked Xing Chixiang, former
principal of the Chongzheng School, to talk to Ohashi. My father wanted to spend the
entire time talking with Prince Sung alone.
After leaving Kharachin, we returned to Chifeng, where we turned west and had
a short visit at the princely residence of the Ongniud Right Banner. We then proceeded to
Weichang, the muran or hunting ground of the Manchu emperors, and from there entered
Doloonor, in the territory of the Mongolian government. The next day we visited the
great Doloonor monastery, built where the Khalkha (Outer) Mongols had formally sub
mitted to the Manchus in 1691. From there we travelled to the Juu-nainan sume and the
mins of Shangdu (one of Khubilai Khan’s capitals). We then arrived at the banner office
of the Taipus Left Banner, where the amban, Serengnamjil, delivered a report on his ban
ner and the work of the khorshiya (cooperatives).
Just then, the deputy minister of the General Affairs Ministry of the Mongolian
government, Sawai Tetsuba, mshed up in a small car. He immediately talked to Ohashi in
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a very furtive and secretive manner. Prince Sung and the rest of us realized that some
thing extraordinary was going on. Soon after this conversation with Sawai, Ohashi in
vited Prince Sung into his yurt. He said to Prince Sung, “My endeavor for the Mongolian
nation ends here. I have been forced to submit my resignation to the Japanese govern
ment. I hope that you will not be disappointed and that you will continue to press for
ward. I regret that I have been unable to reach my ambitions.”
Prince Sung was the first Mongol to hear the rumors of Ohashi’s departure offi
cially confirmed. Prince Sung could do nothing but express his regret to Ohashi. Ohashi’s
removal had been engineered by the Japanese militarists in Mongolia, and nothing could
be done to reverse it. Because of this sudden development, Ohashi cancelled his visits to
the Chahar League and rushed back to Kalgan before sunset. He then went directly to the
residence of the chairman and delivered his notice of resignation to Prince De. Prince De
did not want to accept the resignation, but since it had been forced by the Japanese occu
piers, there was no way out. Prince De quickly summoned Wu Heling and conferred with
him on the matter. They decided that regardless of the Japanese complicity in Ohashi’s
departure, they would go to the Japanese military headquarters and express their deep
regrets at his resignation. They also decided that if the Japanese rejected these expres
sions of regret, the issue of abolishing the post of the supreme advisor should be taken up
at a later date.

Abolition of the Supreme Advisorship
As Prince De expected, the Japanese rejected his expression of regret at the re
signation of Ohashi. They did, however, agree to discuss the issue of the supreme advi
sorship. In the wake of this conspiracy against him, Ohashi had decided to return to Japan
within a week. Prince De appointed Prince Sung as the official departure escort of the
Mongolian government and directed him to accompany Ohashi to Beiping and there see
him off to Japan. Sawai Tetsuba, vice-minister of the General Affairs Ministry, and Nishijima Shozo, Ohashi’s secretary, tendered their resignations together with Ohashi.
As mentioned, Ohashi had a low opinion of the Imperial Japanese Army in
Mongolia, and this eventually had led to a direct clash between him and the army. One
specific incident, however, which occurred at the Special Service Office of Beile-yin
sume, greatly contributed to Ohashi’s ouster. Chimedrinchinkhorlowa, thQ jasag of the
Muuminggan Banner, Ulanchab League, became acquainted with an Outer Mongolian
agent. This jasag was later “invited” to the Special Service Office for a “talk” with Asaka
Shiro, an assistant of the Office, during which he died. The Japanese claimed that during
the talks, Asaka withdrew from the room for a moment just before Chimedrinchinkhor
lowa took out a loaded pistol from Asaka’s bureau drawer and killed himself.
This incident created anti-Japanese sentiment among the Mongols. Ohashi real
ized that this was a homicide, not a suicide, and openly urged the Japanese military to
investigate it thoroughly. The Japanese military, angry at these statements, suspected that
Ohashi was seeking to gamer favor with the Mongols by pressing this matter. The Japan
ese military had launched its own “investigation,” which “proved” that the jasag of the
Minggan Banner had “committed suicide.” In the minds of the Japanese militarists in
Mongolia, Ohashi’s contentions to the contrary clearly proved that he “despised the Japa
nese Imperial Army.” The Japanese military then openly and formally began its cam
paign against Ohashi.
Since Kanai Shoji had first assumed the position of supreme advisor, this posi-

276

The Last Mongol Prince

tion had been the center of the “Mengjiang” regime. After the unification of the three
governments, Kanai had explained that he was in a position equal to that of the chairman,
Prince De, and that he was not just a guest but a real official. Kanai was the representa
tive of the Mengjiang regime to the Japanese military authorities. As the supreme advi
sor, the commander of the Japanese Army stationed in Mongolia, and the chief of the
Kalgan Branch of tlie Asian Development Board, Kanai held all three top government
posts in Mongolia during the Japanese occupation. When Ohashi arrived, however, he
claimed that he was merely a “guest advisor” to the Mongol chairman; but in reality, he
was the top figure in the government of Mongolia. As supreme advisor, Ohashi's relation
ship with the Japanese Army in Mongolia and the Asian Development Board remained
the same as it had been during Kanai Shoji’s period as supreme advisor.
Prince De and the Mongolian leaders and the Japanese military authorities all
felt that the existence of a supreme advisor was awkward and inconvenient. After the
departure of Ohashi, the two sides agreed to abolish the position of supreme advisor. The
Mongols did not want any man in the government to occupy a position equal to that held
by Prince De. The Japanese militarists in Mongolia, for their part, did not want to see any
man occupy a position equal to that of their commander-in-chief It was therefore easy
for the Japanese militarists and the Mongols to work out a common program for elimi
nating this position.
While Kanai Shoji had occupied the post of supreme advisor, he had come into
conflict with Sekikuchi Tomatsu, Minister of General Affairs. Since Ohashi was aware of
this past conflict, he himself had assumed the position of Minister of General Affairs and
gave the real power of this position to his trusted friend, Sawai Tetsuba. After Ohashi’s
resignation, Prince De and the Japanese army agreed that there should no longer be a
supreme advisor position, that the Minister of General Affairs should be the highest Japa
nese official in the government; and that he should be under the supervision of the chair
man and the Political Affairs Department. This change preserved the power and position
of the General Affairs Minister while ostensibly keeping his power less than that of the
now abolished position of supreme advisor. The beneficiary of this change, Takeuchi
Tetsuo, was promoted from Vice-minister of Interior Affairs to the position of Minister of
General Affairs. Takeuchi was a very prudent and moderate person who tried his best not
to come into conflict with the Mongolian leaders. It was widely believed that the aboli
tion of the office of supreme advisor would make it possible for Prince De and other
Mongolian leaders to recover many powers that had previously been taken away by the
supreme advisor. This considerably increased the morale of the Mongols.

The Plans of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee
By this time, the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee had been functioning for
more than a year. The main task of this committee was the organization of the Mongolian
banner construction brigades. After the celebration of its one-year anniversary, the com
mittee developed the following plan of action:
1) The period of construction shall be divided into three stages: the first stage shall be
four years, and the second and third stages shall be three years each, for a total of ten years.
2) During the first period, the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee, together with the
league and banner offices, shall organize the Mongolian banner construction brigades to di
rect and supervise the progress of the new policies in the leagues and banners.
3) In each banner, model central villages shall gradually be established. These model

XII: The Mongolian Autonomous State

277

villages shall be placed in the vicinity of the banner offices. Central model villages shall be
established at other key locations. [The goal of these measures was to build stationary
domiciles for administrative, educational, and medical uses. They were, in fact, to be the
first steps in establishing a settled pastoral lifestyle.]
4) These measures shall first be carried out in three locations: the Sunid Right Banner
of the Shilingol League, the Dorben Keuked Banner of the Ulanchab League, and the Bor
dered Yellow Banner of the Chahar League. Suitable locations in other banners shall then
be gradually selected for continuation of these measures.
5) A solid financial system shall be established to augment the effectiveness of the
banner administrations.
6) Educational endeavors in the banners shall be closely supervised.
7) The temples and monasteries shall be refurbished, and they shall faithfully adhere
to their original religious regulations.
8) The khorshiyas of the banners shall be strengthened, and their function of import
ing foodstuffs and exporting domestic animal products shall be improved.
9) Health care facilities shall be widely established, medical checkups of the people
in the banners shall be conducted, and modem medical techniques shall be introduced and
strengthened.
10) The vaccination of domestic animals shall be actively promoted. After central
villages have been established, [plans for] introducing wintering areas [for the animals]
should be taken up.

These ten items were the goals for banner construction. Earlier, during the per
iod of the Mongolian Political Council at Beile-yin sume, Wu Heling had already sub
mitted similar objectives, but because of the council’s dissolution, there was no possibil
ity to implement Wu’s proposals. Later, with the political problems that occurred in the
Ujumuchin Left Banner of the Shilingol League, the Kabji Lama had also tried to have
his temple underlings convert over to stationary pastoralism. But his bold endeavors were
in vain because of the prohibition against lamas participating in political matters. These
and other such attempts at reform of the nomadic lifestyle were preludes to the establish
ment of the construction brigades in the Mongolian banners.
To implement the new policies of stationary pastoralism. Prince Sung desig
nated himself as general superintendent and had Jirgalang and Mugdenbuu assigned as
deputy superintendents of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee. He also employed
Jodbajab, head of the Chahar League, and Shirabdorji, head of the Ulanchab League, as
his assistants. Seven groups were organized, one under each of these people: general af
fairs, investigation, engineering, civilian affairs, education, industry, and peace preserva
tion. The heads of these groups were also designated as bureau heads in the Mongolian
Rehabilitation Committee. Wu Heling, head of the Political Affairs Department, took
upon himself the duties of supervisor general. He then appointed Kimura Yujiro, NakaJima Manzo, three league councilors of the Shilingol, Ulanchab, Chahar Leagues, and
other Japanese advisors to positions. The headquarters of this brigade were established at
Dehua. Because of the special circumstances prevailing in the Yekejuu League, plans to
convert this area to stationary pastoralism were temporarily set aside.

The Fifth Mongolian Congress
As explained above, the Mongolian Autonomous State had been founded in
haste on August 4, 1941, and this haste prevented the Mongolian Congress from being
held. After a year, on August 4, 1942, a conference was needed, for the following rea-
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sons: (1) a formal, solemn announcement of the founding of the Autonomous State was
necessary; (2) the unification of the three political regimes on September 1, 1939 had not
been decided upon by the Mongolian congress, but was implemented arbitrarily by the
Japanese militarists; and (3) the terms of Chairman Prince De and Vice Chairmen YU
Pinqing and Li Shouxin had all reached their end and arrangements for their subsequent
terms needed to be made.
For these reasons. Prince De convened the Fifth Mongolian Congress at the
Kalgan City Hall, celebrating the anniversary of the founding of the Autonomous State.
The dissolution of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government had been de
clared at the end of August 1939. This was regarded by many Mongols as a tragic ending
to all their efforts for political unity. The unification of the three political regimes and
Prince De’s assignment as chairman of the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government
had not been supported by the Mongolian leagues and banners. It was unilaterally put
into effect by the Japanese militarists. Prince De always recognized this as a grievous,
shameful insult to himself. He knew it was unseemly to be appointed to a post by aliens,
even though he was struggling for the good of his own people. With this knowledge in
mind, he convened the Fifth Mongolian Congress, at which he formally and publicly an
nounced the formation of the Autonomous State, aand expressed his desire that those in
attendance support him as chairman of the state.
This was an attempt to link this Autonomous State, the Mongolian Autonomy
Movement of the early 1930s, and the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Govern
ment into one legitimate system. Acceptance of this union by its component regional and
local governments would make him the legitimate leader of the new regime. Persons in
attendance at the congress included Prince De, chairman of the Government; Yu Pinqing
and Li Shouxin, the two vice chairmen; Wu Heling, head of the Political Affairs Depart
ment; Chief Councilor Jodbajab; Ministers and Councilors Prince Sung, Prince Khorjorjab, Du Yunyu, and Ding Qichang; other high-ranking Mongolian and Chinese govern
ment officials; the heads and vice-heads of the leagues; Tian Rubi and Chen Yuming, the
heads of the two Chinese political bureaus of Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi; the
jasags and ambans of the Mongolian banners; the magistrates of the Chinese cities and
xians\ Wu Guting, chief of staff of the Mongolian Army; Buyandelger and Golminse, the
vice-chiefs of staff; the division commanders; and the bureau heads of the Mongolian
Army headquarters.
The Japanese in attendance were Takeuchi Tetsuo, his advisors and vice minis
ters; the councilors of the leagues; and the vice-heads of the two Chinese political bur
eaus. Other important Japanese in attendance included Shichida Ichiro, the commander of
the Japanese army in Mongolia; Imamura Toyojiro, chief of staff; Iwasaki Tamio, chief
of the Kalgan branch of the Asian Development Board; Watanabe, the consul-general in
Kalgan; Li Yishun, the delegate from Manchukuo; and special guest Badmarabdan, the
general director of the Kinggan Bureau of the Manchukuo government.
The main purpose of this congress was to formally announce the formation of
the Mongolian Autonomous State and the election of Prince De to the chairmanship and
Yu Pinqin and Li Shouxin to the vice-chairmenships. What distinguished this congress
from the four that had preceded it was the presence of many Chinese officials, who sym
bolized the new unification of the three political regimes of Mongolia, Southern Chahar,
and Northern Shanxi.
Both high- and low-ranking Japanese officials were involved in the administra
tive organization of this congress, but they attended only as guests and were present only
at the opening and closing ceremonies. One of the goals of the congress was to create the
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appearance that the local Mongols could decide on the policies they would follow, that
they were not always under the thumbs of the Japanese. The congress was organized with
this in mind, and it was hoped that this would create goodwill among the Mongol people.
It was not desirable for either side to create the appearance of Japanese manipulation at
this congress.
Prince De delivered the opening address, announced the founding of the Mon
golian Autonomous State, and expressed his appreciation for Japanese assistance. After
his speech, several other speeches were given by the guests of honor. The people attend
ing the congress were greatly interested in Badmarabdan, the envoy from Manchukuo,
because of his special position. His speech, however, was nothing but jargon and cliches;
it gave no hint of the eastern Inner Mongolian people’s view of the foundation of the
Mongolian Autonomous State. Wu Heling then delivered his report on administration.
The selection of the chairman and the two vice-chairmen occurred in the afternoon. As
was fully expected. Prince De, Yu Pinqin, and Li Shouxin were elected.
The Mongolian congress ended smoothly, having accomplished its objectives. It
was politically significant to Prince De because it was a symbolic vindication of all his
years of political struggle. Despite Badmarabdan’s inconsequential speech, his very pres
ence was highly encouraging for the political leaders of western Inner Mongolia. His
presence indicated that eastern and western Inner Mongolia were struggling in the same
direction, toward a common goal.
I was appointed by the Mongolian government to accompany the delegates from
Manchukuo during the conference, and therefore had a great deal of contact with them.
During our talks, it appeared that Badmarabdan had a great appreciation for the accom
plishments of the western Inner Mongolian leaders. He thought that the future of the
Mongolian people was linked with Japan. Without Japanese support, this new govern
ment might not have materialized. Consequently, he advocated in his speech that it might
be better to adopt the Japanese opinion on some difficult problems. He believed that by
so doing, it would be possible to mobilize more of Japan’s strength behind a realistic pro
gram of nation building. However, because he overstated the need to adopt a proJapanese policy, response to him was divided.
On September 1, at the City Hall of Kalgan, a ceremony to celebrate the third
anniversary of the Mongolian government took place. At the same time. Prince De, Yu
Pinqing, and Li Shouxin officially took their new positions, and Prince De issued the
following statement:
At this moment, through the support of the Mongolian Congress, 1 am selected to be the
chairman of the Mongolian Autonomous State. 1 deeply and sincerely feel that the duties of
this post are as delicate as walking on thin ice. The only possibility is not to consider the
gains and losses, but rather to exhaust myself in struggling forward; to accomplish the mis
sion of the sessions of the Mongolian Congress, and to satisfy the support and hope of the
officials and people. The Great Asian War is a struggle for the liberation of Eastern Asia.
Our state has an intimate, inseparable relationship with the Japanese and the Manchu Em
pires—like the combination of the wheels and the body of a car. And therefore we have to
cooperate to accomplish the great enterprise of Asian development, and this will be the ob
ligation of all our officials and people to fulfill. We must strengthen our solid faith and
wholeheartedly unify in order to do our best in marching forward to struggle for the stabil
ity of the foundation of our state.

Following this, Wu Heling, head of the Political Affairs Department, representing all the
officials of the Mongolian government, swore his fealty to the newly elected chairman.
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Prince Sung’s Visit to Manchukuo

Following these political ceremonies, Kalgan was promoted to the status of a
special city, to emphasize the importance of this city as the capital of the Mongolian
Autonomous State. At the same time, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the es
tablishment of Manchukuo, the Mongolian government appointed Prince Sungjingwangchug, chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee, as the head of the delegation
to be sent to Manchukuo. This delegation consisted of Jiang Huiruo, councilor of the
government; Golminse, vice-chief of staff of the Mongolian Army; Aminboke, chief of
staff of the Seventh Division of the Mongolian Army; myself as Secretary of the Mongol
ian Rehabilitation Committee; and approximately twenty others. We all went to Xinjing
(Changchun), the capital of Manchukuo, to attend the ceremony.
The reason that Prince Sung was assigned this mission was to reciprocate Badmarabdan’s visit to the Fifth Mongolian Congress. Also, both Prince De and Prince Sung
desired to take advantage of this opportunity to contact the eastern Inner Mongolian lead
ers. They wanted to reach a common understanding and establish a personal relationship
in preparation for any unexpected change. As for Jiang Huiruo, as mentioned earlier, his
attendance was recommended by the Japanese military authorities. The Japanese military
hoped that through Jiang, they could make contact with the Muslim leaders in Manchu
kuo, learn about the situation of the Muslim people in Northwest China, and gain support
for Japan’s military activities in the Muslim zone.
Prince Sung and his group attended the formal ceremony of the celebration, the
military review, and the cocktail party at the Manchu Imperial Palace on September 15
and 16. Afterward, we visited Zhang Jinghui, premier of the Manchukuo government; Yu
Shenzheng, minister of Military Affairs (who earlier had represented Manchukuo in a
visit to Mongolia); and General Umezu Yoshijiro, commander in chief of the Japanese
Guandong Army. All these were ceremonial visits without substance.
Prince Sung’s group, with the exception of Jiang Huiruo and some Japanese
members, all earnestly desired to visit the Kinggan General Bureau of the Mongolian
administration. We wanted to converse further with its chief, Badmarabdan, and other
high-ranking Mongolian officials about the future of the Mongolian people. However,
after our arrival, we were received only by Badmarabdan; Namkhaijab, a graduate of
Beiping Normal University, who was a counselor of the bureau at the time; and Oyundalai, who was assigned by the Manchukuo government to accompany Prince Sung and his
group. All of them tried to avoid any discussion on the future of the Mongolian people.
Of course they had their own troubles, but it greatly disappointed Prince Sung and his
group, who felt that the Mongolian leaders in Manchukuo had become demoralized and
no longer had the courage to press forward. Our group openly displayed its disappoint
ment on this matter to Oyundalai.
From Xinjing, Prince Sung and his group went northward to the center of east
ern Inner Mongolia, Wangin-sume (Wangyemiao, present day Ulanhot), the capital of the
Kinggan General Province (including the three branch provinces of Kinggan, the East,
South, and West). The Kinggan Northern Province, because of its importance in the de
fense against the Soviet Union and in the Lingsheng Incident in the past, had become a
separate unit outside the administration of the General Province. The name Wangin-sume
means “the temple of the prince,” because it was the location of the temple of the
princely family of the Khorchin Right Front Banner. At the beginning of the century,
after the Boxer Rebellion, Udai, the prince of this banner, had borrowed money from
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Tsarist Russia and was punished by the Manchu court for this. He also confronted the
Manchu officials about the Han Chinese immigration problem. In 1911, when Outer
Mongolia declared its independence from China, Prince Udai quickly responded by
leaving his native land for Urga (now Ulaanbaatar).
Because of this historical background, Wangin-sume became a city with special
significance, becoming a center of strong Mongolian national spirit. This city contained
the office of the Kinggan General Bureau, headed by Buyanmandukhu; the Mongolian
Association of Livelihood Improvement, headed by Manibadara; the General Headquar
ters of the Kinggan (Mongolian) Army; the Kinggan Teacher’s College; and the Kinggan
Agricultural College. Also located there was the Japanese Special Service Office, headed
by Colonel Kanagawa Kosaku, whose nickname was “The Father of Kinggan.” Under
him was Asao Tatsuo, who had the Mongolian name Maidarjab. He was a civilian official
attached to the Japanese Army and a man capable of great eloquence in the Mongolian
language. Also in this city were the headquarters of the Japanese Military Police, the core
of Japanese control of the area.
Oyundalai was assigned by the Kinggan General Bureau to accompany Prince
Sung and his entourage to Wangin-sume. Through him. Prince Sung was able to meet
many important eastern Inner Mongolian political, educational, and military leaders,
among them Colonel Askhan, considered the model for all young military officers; and
Lieutenant Colonel Medeltu, an extreme Mongolian nationalist. Buyanmandukhu had a
position second only to that of Badmarabdan. In his early days, he had joined the Inner
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party headed by Bai Yunti. After the Manchurian
incident, Buyanmandukhu started his political life and became a well-known politician,
supported by both Mongols and Japanese. However, he mostly engaged in activities or
ganized by Manibadara.
Manibadara, Khafengga (the leader of the young nationalists), and Buyanman
dukhu were all from the Khorchin Left Front Banner, commonly known as the Bingtu
Banner. Thus they were called the “Three Talented Ones of Bingtu.” Manibadara, also
known by his Chinese name, Ma Mingzhou, had been assigned the posts of section head,
department head, and bureau head of both the Kinggan southern provincial office and the
Kinggan General Bureau. Later, after the establishment of the Mongolian Livelihood
Improvement Association, he resigned from his governmental position and became
chairman of the board of the association. Khafengga was then the cultural attach^ of the
Manchu embassy in Tokyo, and therefore we were unable to meet with him. Askhan (also
known by his Chinese name, Li Youtong) was from Khorchin Left Central Banner
(commonly known as Darkhan Banner).
At the end of the 1920s, Askhan was studying at Beiping’s Mongolian-Tibetan
Academy. Later, because of his activities in the students’ movement, Askhan was ex
pelled. Just then, Sasame Tsuneo arrived in Beiping, took Askhan to Tokyo, and helped
him become a cadet at the Japanese Young Officers Academy. After the Manchurian
Incident, Askhan, along with Jirgalang and other nationalistic youths, organized a mili
tary force to start the movement for Mongolian independence. After Manchukuo was
founded and the policy of the Guandong Army was fixed, this group of young Mongol
ians was dispersed. However, the organizers of the military forces, including Askhan,
became the backbone of the Kinggan Army. Later, Askhan was sent to Tokyo for military
training. Because of this background, and because he was a relative and close friend of
Khafengga, he established a good reputation among the Mongolian military forces.
Through Khafengga, Askhan established ties with the People’s Revolutionary Party of
Outer Mongolia and the Communist International (Comintern). During the period of our
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visit, Askhan was known as one of the most influential men in eastern Inner Mongolia.
Perhaps some explanation of the Mongolian Livelihood Improvement Associa
tion is necessary. Some of the leaders mentioned earlier seemingly had had the same ex
perience as Prince De. After suffering several setbacks, they realized that the rehabilita
tion of the Mongol nation had to start with the economy, education, and culture, rather
than with politics. The eastern Inner Mongolian leaders realized they could not achieve a
political breakthrough in Manchukuo. To assure the very existence and future develop
ment of the Mongol people, they had to turn their attention to the economy and educa
tion. The most important economic problem was how to regulate or change unfavorable
conditions caused by the farms of the Chinese immigrants so as to create a reasonable
and profitable situation for pastoralists. In other words, they had to carry out land reform
to protect the land rights and benefits of the Mongol people. Yet they also had to recog
nize the status quo, which did not allow them to return the land cultivated by the Chinese
farmers to the Mongolian herdsmen. Moreover, the lifestyle of the great majority of the
Mongol people in this region had already changed from pastoral to agricultural.
During the survey they took, the Mongol leaders divided the cultivated land of
the Chinese into two categories. The first was called “red land,” meaning lands formally
bought by the Chinese settlers and registered by them in documents issued by the Mon
golian Banner Offices, bearing the official red stamp. Land brought into cultivation ille
gally or without any documentary evidence was categorized as “white land,” meaning the
land unaccompanied by documents bearing the official red stamp. The policy was to re
cognize the right of possession or the right of eternal leasing of “red land.” Those who
had red lands were to pay fees to obtain a new document of ownership. Lands being
leased would have rents assessed at rates deemed reasonable for comparable lands. Ten
ants on “white land” were charged a reasonable rent payable at set times over a term of
twenty-five years. Then the land would revert to the local Mongol banner, or to Mongol
people who had evidence to prove their rights to possession of that land. Any land not
owned by landlords possessing adequate documentation would be returned to the banners
as public land.
These were the principles for the regulation of land problems in eastern Inner
Mongolia. However, in the event that the rent money was directly and immediately re
turned to the original landlords, they might not choose to use it for recapitalization of the
land. This would diminish the political significance of the land reform. Consequently, the
authorities decided that this money, originally belonging to the Mongol people, had to be
used more efficiently. The highest priority was to establish schools and to send students
to Japan. These were the factors behind the establishment of the Mongolian Livelihood
Improvement Association of the Kinggan Mongol Area and the Mongolian Association
for Wealthier Livelihood of the Mongol area outside the Kinggan area.
Just after the founding of Manchukuo, the eight banners of both the Josoto and
Juu-uda Leagues had desired to be placed within the Kinggan Mongolian district. But this
desire could not be met, since their demands were not fully supported by the banners al
ready part of the district. The district was then placed under the administration of the two
provinces of Rehe and Jinzhou. By this time, however, the results of the land regulations
in the eight banners outside of the Kinggan district had proved to be economically more
beneficial than results in the Kinggan area. As a consequence, the leaders of the eight
banners recalled their previous inability to get support from the district and said they
were unwilling to let the banners of the Kinggan district draw on their abundant re
sources. They decided to establish a Mongolian Association for Wealthier Livelihood to
manage their income and develop cultural and educational enterprises independently. The
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operator of this association was Wu Chunling, a younger brother of Wu Heling. No mat
ter what ill-feelings had arisen between the leaders of the two associations, their goals
were identical, and their accomplishments in Mongolian education should not be over
looked. Today, many activists in Inner Mongolia are the beneficiaries of the good works
fostered by these two associations.
Prince Sung and his group visited several schools in this area. We witnessed
both teachers and students display high morale, and demonstrate their readiness to strug
gle for the existence of the Mongol people. Greatly moved by this display of loyalty.
Prince Sung and his group expressed their belief that the future of the Mongol nation de
pended on the outcome of these reforms in eastern Inner Mongolia. Prince Sung himself,
in order to understand the lifestyle of the common people, visited a family in the vicinity
of Wangin-sume and chatted with the family members. He realized that their lifestyle was
still quite backward and had not yet really improved, despite the reforms.
At Wangin-sume, Prince Sung and his group were warmly welcomed by the
locals. Of course the billboard of the Mongolian Autonomous State and Prince Sung’s
title of chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee had attracted large audi
ences. During the banquets and lectures. Prince Sung was very excited and emphasized
the direction the Mongol people should take. However, he mostly neglected to talk about
the relationship with Japan, except for political formalities. This, of course, caused some
of the Japanese to feel somewhat disillusioned. At the banquet put on by Colonel Kanagawa, the commander of the Japanese Military Police told me, just as I finished the
translation of Prince Sung’s response to the host’s speech, “You Mongols who are able to
enjoy today’s lifestyle should be grateful for Japanese assistance.” Before he had finished
these words, however, Major Colonel Medeltu stood up and said, “What is Japanese as
sistance? The Japanese have done many evil things here. I ask you to point out what you
Japanese have done here?”
The Japanese military police chief, very indignant, scolded him with a few in
sulting words. Upon hearing this, Medeltu jumped up and knocked the military police
chief to the floor. Witnessing this embarassing situation, Askhan leaped upon the table
and began to sing and dance in an effort to show that everybody was in a state of drunk
enness. Thus the banquet ended in laughter, song, and cursing. Although this was a small
matter, it demonstrated the Mongols’ strong-willed nationalistic views toward the Japan
ese occupation; more specifically, it underscored Mongol hatred for the Japanese military
police. Later, the rumor was spread that this melee was the result of drunkenness; the
Japanese authorities chose not to interpret the episode as anti-Japanese.
Before Prince Sung left Wangin-sume, he reached an agreement with Manibadara, stipulating that during the reconstruction of western Inner Mongolia, selected
experts from eastern Inner Mongolia would be sent to aid in the effort.

Upheaval in the Government and Prince De’s Recovery of Power
The year 1943 was Prince De’s year to promote his new policy in Mongolia and
regain his power through various changes in the government. Kanai Shoji had earlier
expanded his power to control the regime by suppressing the positions of the original
Mongolian organization through the unification of three regimes: Mongolia, Southern
Chahar, and Northern Shanxi. Prince De recognized this event as a great humiliation per
petrated by Japan. By 1943, the era of Kanai had already passed. The Pacific War, the
world situation, and the changing of Japanese strategy all favored the elevation of Prince
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De’s position and fulfilling the wilt of the Mongols. Under so auspicious a set of political
circumstances, Prince De insisted that the two political bureaus of Southern Chahar and
Northern Shanxi be reclassified as provinces, reducing their political status to the level of
the leagues. As a result of this struggle. Southern Chahar was changed to Xuanhua Pro
vince, moving its offices from Kalgan to Xuanhua; and Chen Yuming, who was then the
head of the Southern Chahar Political Bureau, was appointed provincial governor.
Meanwhile, Northern Shanxi was renamed Datong Province without moving its offices;
while Tian Rubi, the original head of the political bureau, was appointed provincial gov
ernor.

Although Kalgan had previously been promoted to the status of a special city, its
political organization only began at this time. Li Shusheng was named mayor. The office
and the residence of the chairman, originally in the lower castle of Kalgan, moved to the
site of the Southern Chahar Political Bureau. This site had served as the office of the
Chahar governor general in the early Republican period as well as the office of the Cha
har provincial government since 1928. This drastic government reorganization not only
elevated the prestige of the Mongolian regime, but also enhanced Prince De’s personal
impact upon the people.
Following the above changes, all Police Affairs Bureaus of the leagues were
renamed Peace Preservation Bureaus, under the pretext that the people disliked trouble
some interference by the police. By changing its title, the police administration could
also, theoretically, be put under the supervision of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Com
mittee.
To push forward the new policies. Prince De appointed members of his trusted
young cadre to serve as the heads of the League General Affairs Bureaus: Urgungbu was
sent to Ulanchab, Kogjintei to Bayantala, Unentei to Chahar, and 1 to Shilingol. Only in
the Yekejuu League, because of its special circumstances, did the new official appoint
ments lack any special political significance.
The Shilingol League was Prince De’s power base. The Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Government was established there in 1937. To strengthen the ad
ministrative efficiency of the league office and to deal with Japanese advisors. Prince De
appointed one after the other of his prot6g6s to high office. First his trusted young secre
tary, Makhashiri, was made head of the Civilian Affairs Bureau. Then he made his most
trusted personal advisor, Chogbagatur, and later Mandaltu (Li Danshan), a senior Mon
golian politician (a member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission in Nanjing
and head of its Beiping branch) as successive heads of the Civilian Affairs Bureau. Flowever, none of them were able to cooperate sincerely with the leaders of the banners to
promote the policies and to reach the goals that Prince De had hoped for. As a result, with
the reorganization of the government, I was appointed to that post.
Almost simultaneously, all the leading Japanese consultants to the league offices
were replaced. Flisamitsu Masao, who had been the head of the Mongolian Government
Office in Tokyo, was assigned to Shilingol; Kimura Yujiro, a trusted Japanese official of
Prince Sung, was assigned to Ulanchab; Mori Ichiro was moved from Shilingol to Cha
har; and Kangyu Kozaburo was moved from Chahar to Bayantala. Due to the special cir
cumstances of the Yekejuu League, Kurosawa Ryukichi was not replaced. Hisamitsu’s
and Kimura’s exile fi"om the central government to frontier areas severed their contract
with the Japanese military authorities in Kalgan.
Prince De had special concern for the Peace Preservation Bureaus of the
leagues. He appointed Shonnudongrob, the jasag of Abaga Right Banner, who had been
his faithful, long-time follower, as the head of the Peace Preservation Bureau of Shilingol
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League; Dewagenden, the tusalagchi and the most influential person of the Dorben Keid
Bureau, as head of the Peace Preservation Bureau of Ulanchab; Buyan, the amban of
Pure White Banner, as head of the Peace Preservation Bureau of Chahar League; and
Nomundalai, a major general in the Mongolian Army, as head of the Peace Preservation
Board of Bayantala. Prince De thought this might shift the power of the police admini
stration away from the hands of the Japanese police officers and return it to the Mongols.
Even if they were unable to exercise complete control, they could at least limit the Japan
ese from acting arbitrarily
But the Japanese police officers in the Police Affairs Bureaus of the leagues had
already become comfortable with their old, bad habits, and were, therefore, difficult to
change. Although Prince De and his appointees worked hard, it was still very difficult to
reach the new goals. The new appointees to the bureaus were unable to keep abreast of
what their Japanese subordinates were doing. One year later, at Prince De’s insistence,
the Peace Preservation Bureaus (the former Police Affairs Bureaus) were themselves dis
solved in a final attempt at their reformation. But this move came too late. The end of
Prince De’s control in Inner Mongolia was approaching.
Though the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee was said to be the most im
portant organization in the Mongolian government, its budget was too limited. For in
stance, the total expenditure of the Mongolian Autonomous State Government was
82,841,121 togrig (one togrig approximately equaled one Japanese yen), of which the
budget for the committee was a mere 6,271,433 togrig^ or no more than 7.5% of the total
budget. In terms of the size of its budget, this committee was ranked fifth out of six min
istries and committees. These numbers showed that although the Mongolian Rehabilition
Committee was the most important organization of the so-called Mongolian Autonomous
State Government, its administration could not afford to concentrate on the rehabilitation
or reconstruction of the ethnic Mongol lands.
This, of course, was the greatest cause of disappointment among the Mongol
leaders at that time. They had always hoped that the original territories of the former
Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government would be the core of the Autono
mous State. However, this desire had already been disappointed during the unification of
the three regimes in 1939. Even with the establishment of the Mongolian Rehabilitation
Committee, its authority could only reach the banners. It was unable to administer the
xians of either the Chahar or Bayantala Leagues. Since the leagues that had the xians had
to be administered by both the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee and the Internal Af
fairs Ministry, it was very difficult to decide which main points of their administration to
enhance.
Soon, Prince De and Wu Heling contacted the Japanese authorities. After a long
period of discussion, a reformation of the central organizations of the Mongolian
Autonomous State Government and personnel appointments became possible. The Bur
eau of General Affairs (originally a ministry), the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee
and the Internal Affairs Ministry remained unchanged. The Ministry of Economics, the
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Enterprise were established. Selected to serve as
the heads of these ministries were respectively Jirgalang, Tian Rubi, and Du Yunyu, with
Burinbiligtu and Temurbagatur as the deputy-ministers under the two Chinese heads.
Wen Huajun was appointed head of the Judiciary Committee; Mugdengbo as head of the
Transportation General Bureau, with Chen Yousheng as vice-head; Chogbagatur as viceSee Moko, v. 128 (Feb. 1943).
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chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; Saijirakhu as deputy minister of
Internal Affairs; Buyandalai, head of Bayantal League, as head of the Supreme Court;
Altanochir, as supreme superintendant of investigation; Liu Jiguang, as governor of
Xuanhua Province; Li Shusheng, as governor of Datong Province; and Cui Qinglan, as
mayor of Kalgan Special City.
The appointee as Minister of Economics, Jirgalang, was a faithful supporter of
Prince De. His appointment did, at least, return a part of the administrative power over
the economy to the Mongols. Although he was appointed to this new position, he was not
allowed to resign from the post of vice chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Com
mittee. Tian Rubi, who headed the Northern Shanxi Political Bureau succeeding Xia
Gong, had always expressed his sincere support for Prince De. His new appointment
showed Prince De’s good will and served as a reward for his loyalty. Burinbiligtu had
once been deputy mayor of Dehua, in the era of the Mongolian military government, and
was a good friend of Li Shouxin. Du Yunyu was, from the beginning, hostile toward
Prince De and Wu Heling, never becoming intimate with any of the Mongol leaders.
Nevertheless, because he had a Japanese wife, Du was always strongly trusted by the
Japanese military authorities. His appointment as minister occurred at the insistence of
the Japanese military.
Chen Yuming, Kanai Shoji’s Chinese confidant, was greatly disappointed with
his new appointment as provincial governor of Xuanhua, and he refused to accept it. He
submitted his resignation and asked to return to Manchuria. Prince De, of course, made
no effort to stop him. Because the province of Xuanhua was important, he appointed Liu
Jiguang (then Supreme Superintendant of Investigation and old friend of Li Shouxin) to
the post that Chen Yuming had vacated. Through Liu’s appointment, the power of the
Mongolian government was restored to the Japanese in the area known as “Southern
Chahar.” Also due to this arrangement. Prince De appointed Altanochir (Jin Yongzhang)
to the post of Supreme Superintendent of Investigation. Originally, Altanochir had been a
wholehearted supporter of the Japanese. Later, however, after the unification of the three
regimes and the decline in his health, he lost interest in politics and turned his attention to
Buddhist teachings and Mongolian literature. He tried to reconstruct the original Mongol
ian language version of The Secret History of the Mongols. Because of this change in
personality, his relationship with Prince De greatly improved, while his disagreements
with Wu Heling also diminished. And that was why he got the chance to occupy this high
position.
Buyandalai, a very old intimate of Prince De, was able to get away with making
all sorts of unreasonable requests. He always complained about his position as a mere
head of a league and requested a much higher position. Prince De had no choice but to
propose that he be appointed head of the Supreme Court. However, he was not to resign
as head of Bayantala League. This decision—^that a high official in administration also
become a high judge—made the government a laughing stock. Nevertheless, to satisfy
the desire of an old and faithful ally. Prince De chose to ignore his obligation to respect
institutional integrity. Although this was a symbol of his faithfulness to his followers, it
was bad from the legal standpoint. And of course this aspect of his loyalty to his friends
must be recognized as one of Prince De’s shortcomings.

The Awakening and Some Real Problems
All in all, the reorganization of the government and the new appointments were
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symbols of a gradual recovery of power by Prince De. This inspired the Mongolian lead
ers; it sparked their desire to do something for the future. However, the world situation
was constantly changing. The Japanese expansion had reached its apogee, and the future
downward turn was already foreseeable. Under such circumstances, the struggle for the
existence of the Mongol people caused Prince De and the leaders to think deeply. But it
was such a difficult matter that they could not reach a solution. Another problem was
how to guide the people under the adminstration’s jurisdiction without allowing the war
to affect their livelihood. Many other questions remained unanswered: how to avoid seri
ous casualties; how to maintain the most basic needs of the people; how to satisfy the
Japanese military demands, without damaging the Mongolian pastoral economy; and
most of all, how to bring modernization to the Mongol people.
As for the local problems of the leagues, I will use as an example Shilingol,
where I myself was an official of the league office. First of all, we had to promote the
new policies while dealing with conservative majorities. We had to win people over.
Confrontation might boomerang and damage the progress of the new policies. Second,
we had to maintain the dignity of the Mongol people as well as the authority of the league
office. Another question was how to maintain a balanced attitude in dealing with the
Japanese special service office, along with the Japanese officials in the league office.
The head of the special service office in this area, Lieutenant Colonel Makino
Masaomi, was a very sharp man dealing with whom was difficult. Even so, he was a ra
tional man who never made outrageous demands. I recall that he once captured a dozen
or more people from both the Left and Right Banners of Ujumuchin, who had made con
tact with Outer Mongolian spies. How to handle these suspects troubled Makino very
much. If the punishments were not severe enough, it would not deter people from con
tinuing to make such contacts. However, if the punishments were viewed as Draconian,
this could create a lasting antagonism against Japan.
To address this dilemma, Makino invited help from Prince Sung, who was at his
league office, for a discussion; 1 was the interpreter. After explaining the seriousness of
the circumstances, Makino said, “These are people under your [the league head’s] con
trol. The disposal of this case is up to you. I submit these people along with the evidence
of their spying activities to you.” Prince Sung then asked, “Are you really submitting
them to me to make the decision?” Makino replied, “Yes,” to which Prince Sung said,
“Since you have me make the decision, I will give these ignorant people a good lesson
and then release them. Let them understand the mercy of rebirth and not continue to do
evil. Otherwise, you may revoke your words.” Since the offer had already been made,
Makino was moved by Prince Sung’s courageous attitude and said, “It is all up to you.”
After returning to the league office. Prince Sung ordered the Bureau of Peace
Preservation to receive the suspects. The next day, Prince Sung had me ask the suspects
about their deeds and announce Prince Sung’s display of good will in releasing them. The
relief, emotions, and sincere and heartfelt gratitude expressed by the suspects is some
thing that remains with me even today.
Because of Prince Sung’s insistence on cooperation between the bureau heads
and other Mongol officials of the league office, the Japanese Special Service was unable
to control the league administration at will. If they had any opinions, they had to pass
them on to the Japanese officials in the league office in order to influence the leaders of
Shilingol. Consequently, during my three years of service in this league, 1 was not trou
bled by the Japanese military intelligence agency. However, the Mongol officials of the
league office had to be wary of this organization and tried to keep their distance from it.
This of course is not to say that the special service office did not pressure the Shilingol
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league office. It put especially heavy pressure on the Japanese league officials. There was
also a power struggle between the Mongolian and the Japanese officers. Nevertheless,
both sides were still able to maintain a degree of courtesy. The chief counselor, Hisamitsu
Masao, arrived at the league office at the same time I did. Hisamitsu, though brilliant,
was power-hungry by nature.
In Ulanchab League, the situation was similar when Kimura Yujiro was sent
there as the top counselor. Despite having a good relationship with the local Mongol
leaders, he was forced to resign and returned to Japan as a result of heavy special service
office pressure. During this period, the Japanese special service office at Beile-yin sume
was headed by Major Yukei Kogan, a Japanese monk, quite moderate by nature. Even so,
during this time, as related earlier, the jasag of Muuminggan Banner “commited suicide”
during his interrogation at the spying center. This event created great instability and
sparked anti-Japanese sentiment among the Mongol people.
On the first day that Hisamitsu and I took up our positions, the Japanese clerk
purposely listed the top counselor above the vice head of the league and all the Japanese
vice bureau heads in front of the bureau heads on all the documents. Of course this was
not agreeable to the laws and regulations issued by the Kalgan government. This “error”
led to a heated debate between Hisamitsu and me. Eventually, Hisamitsu had to concede
the truth of my argument, which was backed by the laws. Although this personal debate
harmed our relationship, it did not create further conflict.’ A half-year later, Hisamitsu
resigned, returned to Japan and was replaced by Ekuchi Yoshinao. This argument of mine
also influenced the relations between the banner officials and their Japanese advisors.
Similar clashes also occurred in the Ulanchab League.
The Mongolian pastoral economy had become extremely depressed. Establish
ment of khorshiyas in the banners did not much improve the livelihood of the people,
especially the herders. Although the workers of the cooperatives were diligent, they had
no control over the exchange prices for commodities. Prices were negotiable for the cat
tle, sheep, and goats exported to northern China, but prices for the cattle, horses, and salt
from Dabsun (salt lake) exported to Manchuria were not negotiable.
The prices of these commodities from Mongolia were set by the Manchukuo
side at prices much lower than the official prices of their own commodities. Having to
buy grain and foodstuffs with these poor terms of trade resulted in great losses to the
Mongol people, I personally had been assigned several times as a delegate to the Manchu-Mongolian Land Trade Conference, where I always raised this as the main issue and
demanded a change. Although the conference was unable to reach any conclusions, it
reduced the quantity of domestic animals demanded by the Manchukuo side and raised
the salt price a little to ease the unfair terms of trade. Tlie Manchukuo delegation always
maintained, falsely, that these exchanges were the results of generosity on their part to
ward Mongolia. In reality, they were acts of extortion against the Mongol herders. Be
cause I persistently pointed this out, some Japanese officials, both in the Mongolian gov
ernment and the Manchukuo government, said this was not only a trade problem, but also
implied lack of Mongol support for the “Great Asian War” because of the Mongols’ in
sistent haggling. All in all, Shilingol was always in a non-competitive position, and the
handling of the exported animals always a problem.
’ The early bureau heads dispatched by Prince De, including Makhashiri, Chogbagatur, and Mandultu. all failed to carry out their assignments. They even allowed the management of the routine
league office work to fall into the hands of their Japanese colleagues.
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Soon the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee decided to separate the adminis
tration of husbandry enterprise from the management of the Civilian Affairs Bureau of
the league offices of Shilingol, Chahar, and Ulanchab. These three leagues established a
Bureau of Industrial Enterprises. In addition to heading the General Affairs Bureau, I also
had to head the new bureau. 1 had my colleagues survey the domestic animals of the
leagues, estimated the expected annual increase in their number, the number of animals
devoted to consumption, and the quantity lost to illness and misadventure each year.
These statistics helped us estimate the quantity we might prudently set aside for the sup
port of Japanese military needs and Manchu-Mongol trade. Once we could estimate the
number of animals available for exchange, then, on the basis of the figures for the circu
lating capital of the khorshiya and the estimated demand by the Chinese merchants, the
distribution of the remaining animals to be used for exchange could take place.
The khorshiyas’ share of the banner’s resources was fifty percent, while the
other half belonged to the people of the banner. This was clear from the documents. The
Chinese merchants usually issued false reports of the amount of their capital in order to
avoid paying more taxes. Because of this, they were now rationed to fewer domestic ani
mals to match their underestimated capital stock. This became a serious problem for the
Japanese Daimo Company. It had great amounts of capital yet was unable to compete
with the Mongolian khorshiyas because the Japanese merchants depended on the Chinese
to handle their trade. With fewer animals at their disposal, the Chinese merchants lost
interest in dealing with the Japanese company. This forced the Daimo Company to fore
sake this profitable business. Both the Chinese merchants and the Daimo Company were
the chief losers. This especially embarrassed those Japanese officials who had been ex
pensively entertained by the company. Both the head and the vice-head of the league
backed the proposal of the Bureau of Industrial Enterprises of the Shilingol League of
fice, and so the khorshiyas and the herdsmen were protected.
The Chinese merchants at Pandita-Gegeen keid (Beizimiao), along with all the
Chinese merchants in western Inner Mongolia, were in the same situation as those in
Ulaanbaatar. They were divided into two groups: Beiping and Shanxi. The Beiping group
mainly exchanged silk, satin, and other luxury commodities for animals, wool, leather,
and fur. The Beiping style of doing business involved establishing intimate contact with
the banner princes and officials by being active in relations with Mongol officialdom.
Nevertheless, their capital was limited. Their counterparts, the Shanxi group, developed
their business more slowly but steadily. Unlike the Beiping group, they had great
amounts of capital. The commodities they imported were mainly grain and foodstuffs,
brick-tea, tobacco leaves, and other relatively cheap everyday necessities to exchange for
Mongolian products. The Beiping group gathered about a mile southwest of the keid
(monastary) and was known collectively as the Western Shops. The Shanxi group, cen
tered three miles southeast of the monastery, was known as the Southern Shops.
Before the founding of Manchukuo, these shops were the centers for supple
menting the food supplies of eastern Shilingol and provided good service. However, after
Manchukuo placed strict controls on exports of grain and foodstuffs, these merchants
were unable to ship them, and therefore exchange declined greatly, and the import of
food into the banners became a political problem. This was the reason why the ManchuMongol land trade had to be carried out under such unfavorable conditions; the khorshi
yas were obligated to engage in trade with Manchukuo in order to import foodstuffs. The
Daimo Company was able to manage this difficult trade with the Manchukuo authorities
more easily than the Shanxi merchants could. Nevertheless, complete dependence on the
Daimo Company would eventually allow this Japanese firm to take control over the
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economy of eastern Shilingol. Because of these political factors, even though the task
was difficult, the khorshiya had to take the responsibility for importing foodstuffs. The
promotion and supervision of their work became one of the important businesses of the
league office. The banners of western Shilingol and Ulanchab League had no such prob
lems, since they could obtain necessary food supplies from territory under the Mongol
government.
The development of education was one of Prince De’s main goals. Thus he de
cided to earmark twenty-five percent of the banner income for this purpose. All children
of both sexes, unless handicapped, were obligated to attend school. The banners had to
supply dormitories, food, textbooks, and other necessities. If the budget proved insuffi
cient, it was to be supplemented by the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee. Although
money was a problem, a teacher shortage and a lack of initiative on the part of the banner
officials, especially the extreme conservatives, were greater problems. Consequently, the
league office had to monitor the program and push it forward.
Examination of the lamas was also a difficult task to accomplish. Although the
original monastic regulations were perfectly just, they had not been ftilly carried out for
many years, and they were quite difficult to enforce all at once. In particular, to send back
to lay life the monks who failed their examinations was considered a sin against ancient
traditions. So it was difficult to have the officials of the leagues and banners fulfill their
obligations. Nevertheless, this reform had to be carried out, and the ones who were as
signed the task had to perform it rigorously. On the other hand, it also had to be carried
out tactfully, without embarrassing the leaders and the high authorities of the monaster
ies, for this might cause dissatisfaction among the common people.
Another main project for Prince De was to reinforce the Mongolian Army, and
make it the force behind national rehabilitation. However, to reach this goal, conscription
had to be carried out in the ethnic Mongol territories. This not only contradicted the pol
icy of increasing the population, but it might also have created a labor shortage that could
have set back the increase the number of and degree of development of husbandry enter
prises. From the middle period of Manchu rule, because of the influence of Buddhism
and the neglect of military duties, the conscription system had become defunct. Having
able-bodied men serve in the military of one’s own banner was agreeable to the people,
but stationing them afar was another matter. It was difficult to convince the people to
accept this new policy.
Moreover, from the time of the founding of the Mongolian military government,
many confrontations had occurred over conscription. In 1936, an anti-conscription riot
broke out in Ujumuchin Right Banner. The Mongolian leaders had to strengthen their
national military forces without placing the youths of the leagues and banners in Chinese
districts, in areas where Mongols and Chinese were mixed together, or in areas where
skirmishes between Mongols and Chinese tended to easily break out. They did not want
to have these youths sacrificed for nothing. They wanted to train them as able warriors
but keep them within the ethnic Mongol zones in anticipation of future needs. These con
siderations finally became important factors in the formation of the Guard Divisions of
the leagues.
The duties of the league office now included how to carry out conscription rea
sonably, fairly, and comfortably. For instance, these conscripted soldiers from the ethnic
Mongol pastoral zones were accustomed to eating mostly meat and milk, but the ordinary
food of the Mongolian Army primarily consisted of cereals and vegetables. To maintain
their health and strength, each meal should have included meat. But budget limitations
imposed on the General Headquarters of the Mongolian Army made this impossible. The
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military authorities demanded that the leagues supply beef and mutton at the official price
which was below market price. But the league offices refused to do so because this would
have decreased the income of the herding people. This sort of deadlock led Budabala,
vice-head of Shilingol League, and me to negotiate with the Mongolian Army authorities
on many occasions, mostly without a satisfactory conclusion.

Confrontations between Mongol Leaders and Japanese Advisors
Carrying out new policies usually met with difficulties. For instance. Prince
Rinchinwangdud, the former head of Shilingol League and the jasag of Sunid Left Ban
ner, was one of the conservative princes of that time who were always trying to hinder
the progress of the new policies. To give him a warning, during a tour of inspection 1
fired Neren, the tusalagchi of his banner, because of the failure of the banners to imple
ment the new policies. Of course, in the feudalistic tradition, this was a very extraordi
nary punishment for a high ranking official of a banner. Even though it hurt Prince Rin’s
dignity, 1 had no choice but to promote the new policies.
Among the Japanese advisors, many were university graduates with good train
ing and fine personalities. Others acted as if they were the overlords of the territories un
der Japanese military influence. Some were unable to control their emotions and often
acted violently because of their isolation and loneliness. For instance, the Japanese advi
sor of Prince Rin’s banner was notorious. He was known by his nickname, Ulan-galju,
meaning “Red Lunatic.” Even today, 1 do not recall his real name. He did not think an
advisor should confine himself to giving advice, but rather did whatever pleased him
whenever he wanted to do it. That was how he earned his nickname.
Seeing his high ranking official discharged. Prince Rin angrily told me, “You
are a high ranking official of the League Office. Now you have discharged my tusalag
chi. 1 think you have heard of the activities of our advisor, but 1 don’t know whether you
can move him or not.” This provoked me to say, “Yes, I will try my best.” Later, I re
ported this problem to Prince De. Fortunately, he realized the seriousness of this problem
and ordered the government officials to remove this unreasonable Japanese advisor to
some other position. Prince De’s decision not only saved the reputation of the League
Office but it also removed a major hindrance to introduction of new policies.'**

The New Banner Institution
In 1943, the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee decided to carry out con
struction work in the central villages and model villages. Besides the work done by the
Mongolian Construction Brigade, as in the Khauchid Left Banner and the Abkhanar Left
Banner, work was also done in the Darkhan Banner of the Ulanchab League and the
Shangdu Banner of Chahar League. The heads and vice heads of the leagues, the heads of

In the Chahar League, because of Jodbajab’s neglect and failure to maintain the authority of the
league head, the Japanese advisors of the banners possessed more power than in the ethnically
Mongol districts, Shilinghol and Ulanchab. Nevertheless, there had been considerable progress in
the promotion of the new policies. Although the four Chahar Right Flank Banners in Bayantala
League were similar to the banners of Chahar League, only the Turned Banner, due to its sinicization, was different from all the other league banners. Because Yekejuu’s jurisdiction did not reach
the whole area, the situation there was entirely different from those mentioned above.
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the General Affairs Bureaus, and the Japanese counselors of the league offices were all
assigned to service as brigade members to manage the construction at these localities.
The Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee also passed preliminary banner tax
regulations." These tax rates were quite low, not even approaching one percent of value.
In the purely pastoral areas the herders valued only silver dollars and disdained paper
currency as chaas, or “paper.” To have the people submit the tax in paper money would
not only increase trust in this currency, but also reduce the people’s complaints over their
tax burdens. Whether these low tax revenues would be sufficient to meet the budget was
another question. The leaders needed to reduce the tax burden and increase the wealth of
the herders, so they had to get further revenue from the central government’s budget to
meet the needs of the banners. Of course, this was a measure to use the wealth of the nonMongolian districts to meet the needs of the Mongolian territory.
It was also in 1943 that the Mongolian government finally promulgated the offi
cial form of banner organization that had been delayed for years. The following were the
main points:
1) The banners should be divided into two categories—yasag and amban, as under the ex
isting system.
2) In banners with Jasags, the position of the jasag should be decided by law. Tusalagchi,
jakirugchi, and meren janggi are third-ranking officials; while clerks, supervisor of educa
tion, and technicians are fourth rank officials.
3) In banners with ambans, the third rank amban includes jalan jangi, \icc-Jalan, and
Janggi", clerks, supervisors of education, and technicians arc fourth rank officials.
4) The Jasag or amban, under the direction and supervision of the head of the league,
should enforce the laws and ordinances as well as administer the banner.
5) The Jasag or amban should direct and supervise their subordinate officials by promo
tion and demotion, and by reporting to the head of the league.
6) A third-rank advisor should be designated for each banner to give advice on important
banner affairs.
7) If the Jasag or amban is unable to perform his duties, the tusulagchi and the Jalan
Janggi shall take up the responsibility for doing so.
8) Sections should be established in the banner office. The regulation of the sections
should be authorized by the chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee and be
decided by the head of the league.

These regulations were promulgated on July 1, 1943. The reason for the long
delay in their promulgation was quite complicated. On the one hand, Mongolia had to
carry out reform for it to survive. How could it maintain the feudalistic institutions cre
ated by the Manchu rulers, which split up Mongolia and hindered the progress of the
Mongols? On the other hand, the conservatives of the banners were still in power. They
believed that an autonomous or independent Mongolia should strive to protect the old
Mongolian tradition. How then could they support independence if that would destroy
their tradition? The conflicts between the two positions were very difficult to resolve.
After eastern Inner Mongolia fell under Japanese occupation, a new banner sys
tem was immediately promulgated. The old feudalistic institutions were abolished. In
" The tax on domestic animals three years or older was as follows: horse—maximum of two tugrigs", cattle—maximum of two tugrigs", camel—maximum of three tugrigs", and sheep and goat-1/4 lughg. If someone had only two horses, three cattle, twenty sheep and goats, the tax was re
duced by half (see Moko, 136, Oct. 1943). This rate was a function of the price of livestock at the
time.
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addition to Japanese control of the appointment of the banner heads, Japanese counselors
and other Japanese officials were also appointed and assigned to the banner offices. Con
sequently, the Japanese held the real power of the administration in their hands. In west
ern Inner Mongolia, because the old institutions were maintained, the Japanese could not
establish any legal pretext for penetrating the old feudalistic institutions. The only way
for them to interfere was to go beyond the nominal powers of an advisor. If police forces
were organized in the banners, Japanese directors might be assigned to run them, but the
police were outside the framework of ordinary banner institutions.
To protect their existing power. Prince De, Wu Heling, Prince Sung, and the
great majority of the new cadre had to exercise great prudence when dealing with the
situation. Issuance of banner regulations was repeatedly delayed. Even when finally
promulgated, old feudalistic elements were preserved in order to minimize Japanese in
terference: the position of jasag was not abolished, and it was announced that appoint
ment to that position should be according to law, but no further explanation was pro
vided. This of course satisfied the hopes of the conservatives, but the lack of protection of
the traditional privileges of the ambans also offended a group of the conservatives in
Chahar territory. As for the tusulagchi, the term taiji (nobles)—a title that had been at
tached to this rank—was deleted. This was to show that the position of the tusulagchi was
open to both the Chinggissids and the common people. As for the jasags, though their
position was mentioned without a clear explanation, the old words for the ranks were not
mentioned at all. This obviously was a result of compromise between the old and new
groups.

Problems of the Mongolian Army
To win the goodwill of the Mongolian Army, the Japanese authorities delivered
a first degree Zuiho Medal to Li Shouxin, who had already received the second degree
medal. At the same time, several medals and badges were presented to other high ranking
officers. In reality, most Mongolian Army officers knew that Japan would lose the war;
therefore, presenting medals and badges did not win the goodwill that Japan had hoped
for. Nevertheless, Li Shouxin assumed that the Japanese wanted to maintain his position
as equal to Prince De’s so as to increase the checks and balances between the two. The
Japanese authorities, out of consideration for Prince De’s feelings, presented him a silver
plate from the Japanese Emperor. Because he had already received the first degree Asahi
Medal, no higher medal could be presented.
As discussed in earlier chapters, the original establishment of the Mongol Army
was accompanied by internal contradictions and conflicts. The troops of Li Shouxin were
originally Chinese. Their only interest was personal gain; they had no interest in Mongol
ian independence or nation building. Prince De and other Mongol leaders could not rely
on these forces. They were also under suspicion by the Japanese. Eventually, the Japa
nese reorganized them into police forces and took power from the Chinese division
heads. Although the top ranking members of these units were given high positions (Ding
Qichang was assigned as Minister of the Interior, Liu Jiguang as governor of Xuanhua; Li
Shusheng as governor of Datong; Cui Qinglan as mayor of Kalgan), most were disap
pointed. Those who remained in the headquarters of the Mongolian Army were also dis
illusioned. For instance, Wang Zhenhua, the commander of the original Third Division,
committed suicide, while Yin Baoshan, the commander of the original Second Division,
and Chen Sheng, who later replaced Yin, were arrested and tortured by the Japanese
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Military Police because of rumors that they had contacts with Chinese anti-Japanese
forces. Although Li Shouxin negotiated the release of both Yin and Chen, this could not
ease the dissatisfaction of Li’s former followers. When Yin Baoshan died, this had a fur
ther negative impact on these already dissatisfied people.
In spite of these political hindrances, the Mongolian Army continued to become
ever more nationalistic. Even though their common goal was the liberation of the Mongol
people, the inclinations of the leaders were quite mixed and complicated. The number of
pro-Japanese officers was, in reality, quite limited. As the Pacific War became prolonged,
those leaders who had been trained in Outer Mongolia, such as Oljeiochir, commander of
the ninth division, and others, made a plan to establish contact with Outer Mongolian
agents. The division commanders Sangduureng, Nomundalai, and other middle and upper
ranking officers also held to this view and participated in these activities. However,
Prince De had already discovered what was happening.
Bayar, head of the Bureau of Tax Administration of the Finance Ministry, be
cause of his personal entanglements, suddenly decided to reveal this conspiracy to the
Japanese. When Bayar’s intent was leaked to Prince De, he summoned Bayar to his resi
dence. To prevent the leaking of such a secret. Prince De sent Bayar to Khorgan sume in
the Sunid Right Banner and secretly imprisoned him there, thereby thoroughly covering
up this potential crisis. From that point on, no news of Bayar was ever heard again.
At the same time, something else happened. Delgerchogtu, a young man from
Jerim League sent to Japan to study, failed to graduate and returned to Mongolia. He was
hot-blooded and deeply hated the feudalistic system that had created incurable problems
for the Mongols. Admiring the success of Hitler in Germany, he decided to use Hitler as
his model. He tried to organize a political party, but no one responded. To stimulate a
response, he falsely claimed some prominent people had joined his organization. When
the Mongols heard of this, they merely laughed, but the Japanese responded with anger,
and made a mountain out of a molehill. Even Watanabe, the Japanese consul-general,
sent a report to the Japanese Foreign Ministry that read, “The Mongolian Youth Allied
Party aims for Mongolian Independence.”*^
Delgerchogtu was arrested by the Japanese military police, but they could not
find any reliable evidence to convict him. He was released through the mediation of Matsuzaki Yo, an advisor to the Mongolian Army who was acquainted with Delgerchogtu.
This case seemed to have some connection with the case of Bayar. However, for lack of
evidence, it was difficult to link the two. Fearing that this young man might create further
problems, Prince De sent him off to be a teacher at a primary school in the Sunid Right
Banner, where he worked until the invasion of the Soviet-Mongol forces during the
summer of 1945.

The Mongolian Army Officer Academy
After a long series of debates and consultations, the Mongolian Army Officer
Academy was finally established at Hohhot on June 1, 1943 and Nomundalai was ap
pointed as its head. The cadets of the first class were drawn from the ranks of young army
officers and graduates of the Mongolian Army Youth School in Sunid Right Baimer. BeSee Terajima Eimei, “Kindat Nai-Mongoni okeru fudatsu-no seito: Chukoku kyosanlo to Mokoseinen-ketsumeito.” [Two parties in modem Inner Mongolia—^the Chinese Communist Party and
Mongolian Youth Allied Party] Toyoshirun, 3 (June 1982).
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fore the formation of this academy, the headquarters of the Mongolian Army usually se
lected its candidate officers and sent them to the Kinggan Army Officers Academy in
Manchuria for further training. After this academy was founded, there was no longer any
need to send young officers to Manchuria for training. Instead, a select group was sent to
Japan for further training.
In terms of education and training, the formation of this academy should have
presented no problems. But because of its special political significance, the plan was re
peatedly discussed. Prince De had long since intended to create a military force under his
own direction and management. Nevertheless, right after the Mongolian Army was
formed, it came under the shadow of Li Shouxin and his followers. Therefore, along with
the army, a dual control system was created behind the scenes. The intervention of the
Japanese army made it impossible for Prince De to achieve his goal. At the insistence of
the Japanese Army stationed in Mongolia the power to control the army was taken from
Prince De and put under the nominal control of Li Shouxin, the commander-in-chief Of
course in reality, control of this force was in the hands of the Japanese supreme military
advisor and his group. Though the Mongolian Army was completely severed from Prince
De’s control, the prince never gave up his attempts to intervene in its management, even
when under pressure from the Japanese militarists. Nationalistic Mongol officers always
remained under his influence.
Earlier, Prince De had established the Mongolian Army Youth School in the
vicinity of his own residence. He sincerely desired to educate youths who would serve as
the cadre from which the entire army could eventually grow. He strongly preached Mon
golian nationalism and established deep personal relationships with the students. He vis
ited the school and gave talks to increase their nationalistic aspirations. He believed that
through this youth school, it would be possible to elevate Mongol nationalistic aspira
tions. He even ordered sinicized Turned Banner leaders to send their students to this
school, where they might be re-Mongolianized. As a result of this atmosphere, the youth
educated there became radical Mongol nationalists. To send the graduates of this school
to the newly established military academy would naturally propagate strong nationalism
throughout the army. Although sending young officers to Kinggan Army Officer Acad
emy would also increase their nationalistic aspirations, it would not match the strong po
litical indoctrination at the academy reflecting the direct influence of Prince De himself
This was the main reason Prince De and other Mongol leaders earnestly struggled to cre
ate this academy.
Naturally, the Japanese Army strove to block such intervention by Prince De. It
separated the Mongolian Army’s headquarters from the government even though this
created many unnecessary inconveniences for the Mongolian Army. However, the world
situation was changing rapidly, and the attitude of the Japanese army toward Prince De
eventually had to be reconsidered. After long consideration, the Mongolian Army Liaison
Office was established under the jurisdiction of the General Affairs Bureau of the Politi
cal Affairs Department of the government. At first, Arbijikhu was assigned to head the
office, but Tobgereltu soon replaced him. This made it easier for the Mongolian Army to
contact relevant branches of the government. From the point of view of Prince De and
Wu Heling, this would be the first step in their recovery of military power. In the fol
lowing year, the Military Affairs Ministry was established to further this aim. Neverthe
less, these changes evoked still other political confrontations, which eventually caused
Wu Heling to step down from his post.
Beside open interference in Mongolian military and political affairs, the Japan
ese Army also carried out spying and intelligence activities from within. There were
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probably Japanese agents almost everywhere in Inner Mongolia whose duties were to
gather intelligence on Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Chungking, and the Chinese
Communists, as well as to supervise all members of the Mongolian political and military
establishment. As mentioned earlier, the people despised the police, and the antagonism
of the Mongolian leagues and banners toward the Japanese local intelligence bureaus
grew. The heads of the staffs of the Japanese Army stationed in Mongolia were the back
bone of these intelligence organizations. For the purpose of training hard-core intelli
gence agents, the Japanese established a special station, Jitsugetsu Ryo, Sun Moon Dormitory, just outside the Great Wall in the mountains north of Kalgan. It could be seen
from the road between Kalgan and Shilingol, and hatred filled the hearts of those who
saw it. It was rumored that in this “dormitory,” special training was carried out for those
who might deal with Mongolia (both Inner and Outer), the Islamic region of northwest
China, and the Soviet Union. Beside the knowledge and techniques needed for intelli
gence, the language and customs of targeted peoples were especially emphasized. The
members trained here, of course, were mostly Japanese; very few Mongols and Muslims
participated.

Formation oi the Lama-yin Tamaga
By the turn of the century, the new Mongolian intellectuals had already altered
their attitudes toward religion. They especially opposed the Interference of religious lead
ers in politics. Prince De, Prince Sung, Wu Heling, and others felt that the issue of relig
ious interference had to be addressed without delay or hesitation. As a result of long dis
cussion, they decided to adopt a conservative attitude, reinforcing control without creat
ing any new institutions. This was to avoid Japanese intervention. They also decided to
convene a religious conference. Through a formal agreement with the monasteries and
temples, a lama-yin tamaga (lama office) was established to manage the religious ad
ministration and unify the hitherto separate monasteries and temples under a common
leadership.
The Conference for the Restoration of Mongolian Buddhism took place from
May 11 to 13, 1943 in Kalgan. The main officials who attended the conference were
Prince Sung, chairman of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; Jirgalang, vicechairman of the M.R.C.; Togtokhu, head of the Bureau of Education of the M.R.C.; the
heads of the leagues; and the chief Japanese counselors of the leagues. The religious
leaders included the Chagan Gegeen, of the Obootu Monastery of Sunid Left Banner; the
Kanjurwa Khutugtu, of Doloonor; the Mergen Gegeen, of the Mergen Monastery of Urad
Front Banner; and the Kabji Lama, of the Kabji Monastery of UJumuchin Left Banner. In
addition, the leading lamas of the great monasteries were in attendance, including Badgar, Beile-yin sume, Shiramoron sume, Shireentu-Juu of Hohhot, Pandita-Gegeen Keid,
Lama-Kuriyee of UJumuchin Right Banner, and those of the monasteries and temples of
Doloonor. The Japanese military and other institutions also sent their delegates, including
Lieutenant Colonel Yukei Kogan, to the opening ceremonies. I also attended the confer
ence as the delegate of the Shilingol League Office.
A similar, less formal conference had already convened one year before, in
1942. At this formal second conference in 1943, Prince Sung delivered the opening
speech, in which he asked for the cooperation of the leaders of the monasteries while
explaining the main issues. In reality, the goal of this conference was to formalize a deci
sion already reached: to authorize regulations to establish the Lama-yin tamaga, and to
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decide on the officers of that organization. During the discussion, the lamas from the
monasteries repeatedly emphasized the importance of the traditional religious law and did
not object to the nominations of the top officers of the new organizations. However, they
had very different ideas to whether (1) to use Mongolian scriptures as the main text for
training and Tibetan scripture as a supplement, (2) to establish a lama school in every
monastery to teach the young monks Mongolian literature and other subjects suggested
by common sense, (3) to establish handicraft training centers at every monastery, (4) to
carry out each year an examination on scriptures. Those monks who failed their exams
would be sent back to lay life. The conference delegates sincerely and honestly discussed
the pros and cons of each issue without inhibition. They even jumped up and clapped
their hands, as they would in a temple scripture debate. The discussion became so heated
at times that the faces of some became completely flushed. In any case, the proposal of
the government side was made acceptable to a majority, and the Tamaga was formally
established.
In the office of the Lama-yin Tamaga, a da-lama, two deputy da-lamas, four
demchis, several clerks and scribes, and one (Japanese) advisor were established. As rec
ommended by Prince Sung, Chagaan-gegeen was made the da-lama, Kanjurwa Khutugtu
and Mergen Gegeen were appointed as deputy da-lamas, and Kabji Lama and three oth
ers occupied the positions of demchis. Soon after its establishment, the Lama-yin Tamaga
invited Lieutenant Colonel Yukei Kogan, a Japanese Buddhist monk and head of Jabsar
Special Service Center, to be its advisor.
Lama-yin Tamaga had been created during the period of Manchu rule of Mon
golia in both Beiping and Doloonor. The Beiping Tamaga was located in the Imperial
Lamaist Temple, Yonghe Gong. The Tamaga Da-lama, officially titled Jasag Lama, was
traditionally sent by the Dalai Lama from Tibet to fill the post of abbot of Yonghe Gong.
The head of the Tamaga in Doloonor was usually assigned to be JanggiyaKhutugtu. Be
cause the establishment of this new Lama-yin Tamaga followed in the footsteps of its
predecessors, it naturally diminished the resistence and opposition of the lamas and the
conservatives. Moreover, all the important posts of the Tamaga were assigned to lamas.
This, of course, was done to eliminate most of the Japanese interference. Even so, to re
duce suspicion by the Japanese military, Lieutenant Colonel Yukei Kogan was included.
His invitation owed to his status as a Japanese monk, not to his position as a head of a
Japanese local intelligence bureau.
The Chagaan Gegeen, Jamyanglegshidjamtsu (1886-1957), from the Sunid Left
Banner, was the abbot of the great monastery of Chagan-oboo, located along the furth
ermost border between Inner and Outer Mongolia. He was a person without any political
interests, but was very famous for his profound knowledge of Buddhism and meditation.
Later, after the Chinese Communist regime was established, he was made chairman of
the China Buddhist Association and died just before the Great Leap. The Kanjurwa
Khutugtu was the only high lama who possessed the rank of khutugtu under the jurisdic
tion of the Mongolian Autonomous State. The religious leader, Mergen Gegeen, the ab
bot of Mergen-juu, had enthusiastically supported the Inner Mongolian Autonomy
Movement of 1933, and was a very trusted friend of Prince De. The story of Kabji Lama
has already been mentioned in an earlier chapter. He was an ambitious young religious
leader who tried to carry out reforms in Ujumuchin Left Banner, where his temple was
located. However, at that moment, because both Prince De and Prince Sung strictly en
forced the policy of lama noninterference in politics, his reform activities were put to an
end. Both Prince De and Prince Sung not only recognized his enthusiasm and capabili
ties, but were also willing to give him the opportunity to realize this potential. Of course
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this lama willingly accepted his new assignment in the Tamaga. In doing so, the Mongo
lian leaders solved an age-old problem of religious administration and put it on the right
track.

Japan, the “Allied Nation”
The Mongols under the jurisdiction of Manchukuo decided to recall their glori
ous past and establish a monument to Chingghis Khan, but there were several different
opinions on the appropriate style for the building,. Someone suggested that it had to be
agreeable to the historical tradition of the Naiman chagan ger (eight white yurts). An
other suggested that everything about the monument must be purely Mongolian. Others
insisted that this monument not be built in the style of a Buddhist temple. Of course,
many feared that the Japanese would suggest it be like a Japanese Shintoist shrine. A
group headed by Manibadara was sent to Kalgan to receive the advice of Prince De and
other Mongolian leaders, and to collect some contributions from the Mongolian govern
ment.
Besides the talks on the building of the monument, Manibadara also discussed
with Prince De and other Mongolian leaders Mongolia’s problems in the midst of a
changing world situation. Both sides recognized that Japan’s defeat was merely a matter
of time. As for Mongol preparations to meet this great change, both sides realized that the
Mongolian government had already established a measure of political prestige. However,
the real strength of Inner Mongolia was to be gained in the East. How to come together
and carry out a unified policy would be the most important matter for the future. Under
the leadership of Prince De, the power center would gradually move east, while that of
the Mongol-Kinggan area would move westward. Nevertheless, the challenge remained
in finding a way to break through the barriers separating the two. But these were only
private talks, and there was no way to reach a formal aggreement committing both sides
to act in harmony. Beside Prince De and Manibadara, Prince Sung, Chogbadarakhu
(Prince De’s secretary), and 1 all attended these talks.
From the beginning of the Pacific War, Japan upheld the slogan of “The Estab
lishment of the Greater East Asia Circle for Common Prosperity,” usually less literally
translated as “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” {Daitoa Kyoeikeri) and placed
Japan at the center of this “Great Asian” entity. For this purpose, the Japanese cabinet
changed the Board for Asian Development to the Great East Asian Ministry, assigning
Aoki to be the minister at the end of August of that year. Aoki was sent to Nanjing and
Kalgan, via Beiping, to meet with Prince De. Although their talks did not reach any con
crete conclusion. Prince De told him of the age-old Mongolian hope of independence. It
was also at this moment that the Japanese government, in order to win the good will of
the Chinese people, declared its willingness to abrogate Japan’s special privilege of ex
traterritoriality in China. Although this was not a demand of the Mongol government, the
territory under its Jurisdiction would also be freed of extraterritoriality. Before the arrival
of Aoki, the Japanese Legation in Kalgan issued a statement that the Japanese power of
taxation in this area would also be removed and that the Japanese would submit to taxa
tion by the Mongol government, according to the law issued by the Mongol authorities.
As a response to Japan’s call, Prince De also issued two documents concerning
“Asian development.” The first was issued in January 1942; the second appeared in Janu
ary 1943. Ostensibly, the contents of the documents merely expressed support of Japan’s
activities, and they were thoroughly ignored by the Mongols. However, these documents
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were really quite significant. After Puyi’s second visit to Japan and his return to Manchu
ria, he had issued an “imperial decree” in which he referred to Japan as oya_kuni in Japa
nese and chin-bang in Chinese, both meaning “the father nation.” This implied that Manchukuo was a “son nation” of Japan. The Japanese usually thought that the relation be
tween Japan and Manchukuo was as intimate as oyako, father and son. This was a refer
ence to a most shameful event in Chinese history. In the tenth century, Shi Jingtang, the
founder of the Latter Jin Dynasty (936-944), called himself a “son,” entitling his foreign
supporter and overlord, the Khitan Khan Yelu Deguang, the “father.” The Japanese at
Kalgan repeatedly insisted that Prince De adopt the term oya kuni as the title of Japan in
his documents, but he sternly rejected this idea. In his two documents on “Asian devel
opment,” The prince labeled the Mongols’ relationship with Japan as an alliance. There
fore, Japan would have the Mongolian title anda ulus, and the corresponding Chinese
title meng-bang, which means “a nation in alliance.” This event soured the relationship
between Prince De and the Japanese for quite a long time.

The Yekejuu Incident of March 26,1943
In this year, a brutal incident involving bloodshed occurred between Mongol
nationalists and the Chinese local warlords in Yekejuu League, into which the Japanese
had not intruded. From the beginning of the 1933 Mongolian Autonomy Movement and
the subsequent clash between Prince De and Fu Zuoyi, all the setbacks that Prince De
suffered had become victories for Fu. After the Anti-Japanese War, Fu was made com
mander of the 12th War Zone that defended the northwest region of China. He cleverly
took advantage of the relationship between Yan Xishan’s clique and the central govern
ment of Chiang Kai-shek to establish a very favorable situation for himself Fu Zuoyi’s
situation became still more favorable as Japan’s expansion began to recede from its peak,
allowing him to become a great hero in the struggle against Japan. Consequently, the
Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, operating under Fu’s shadow, dared not resist any
of his proposals, even when that incident involving Mongol-Chinese bloodshed broke out
on March 26, 1943.
This incident was not entirely unexpected. It was created by a series of contra
dictions between the Mongols and Fu Zuoyi, even as early as the establishment of the
Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council. According to a letter from an anonymous youth in
Yekejuu League to me, the situation that led to the incident was as follows:
The Yekejuu incident, which broke out on March 26, 1943, was caused by the New
26th Division and the 7th Calvalry Division, both headed by Chen Changjie, a subordinate
of Fu Zuoyi, who was unwisely stationed in Yekejuu. The men of these two divisions
forcefully occupied and cultivated Mongol land and collected domestic animals and food
stuff The reasons for the clash should be analyzed as follows;
1) Forced Cultivation: The Mongolian lifesyle was traditionally pastoral. The steppes
are their lifeline by which their livelihood is maintained. If the steppes are cultivated, the
Mongols would, of course, fall into poverty, having no way to make a living. Therefore, the
Mongols feel that cultivation is a mortal wound that may take away their lives. It is an ex
tortion of their right to existence endowed by Heaven, and therefore they absolutely oppose
cultivation. As a result of this confrontation, Fu Zuoyi, as always, used violent measures
and a policy of threats to cultivate the pastoral lands to the extent that even Ejen-khoroo,
the location of the shrine of Chingghis Khan, our ancestor, was included. And thus it
stimulated the Mongols to resist, causing this bloodshed.
2) Forceful Animal Collection: Since the Mongols’ lifestyle is pastoralism, taking
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away their livestock is the same as putting an end to their lives. Both Fu Zuoyi and Chen
Changjie, in order to achieve their goal of exterminating the Mongols, purposely planned to
collect by force 7,347 camels with saddles and other equipment, 200 men to look after
these camels, 9,724 horses, 13,560 cattle, and 35,730 sheep. These losses will bring about
economic bankruptcy, making it impossible for the Mongols to maintain even the lowest
standard of living. Because their property would be plundered and their lives disrupted, the
Mongols had to carry out mass resistance. This struggle for their existence led to the blood
shed.
3) Forceful Collection of Foodstuffs: Mongols traditionally follow the lifestyle of
nomadic pastoralism and do not engage in agriculture. Their non-animal foodstuffs are all
received from outside in exchange for animals. Therefore, the forceful collection of
725,835 Suiyan lan (a tan being ten Suiyuan bushels) and 420 tons of hay placed a tremen
dous burden on the backs of the Mongol people. Even should the Mongols sell out their en
tire property, this burden would still be too heavy for them, and they were unable to meet
the demands made on them. Their protest was ignored, and this resulted in bloodshed.

The original purpose of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council was to break
the national unity of the Mongols and to serve as a puppet organization directed by Yan
Xishan and Fu Zuoyi. Of course, Fu was not willing to release the council from his per
sonal control. Moreover, he would haved liked to make it an instrument for his own pur
poses. Nevertheless, the chairman of this council, Prince Shagdurjab, head of Yekejuu
League, was a Mongol. Although he had opinions different from those of Prince De, he
still wished to protect the right of existence of the Mongol people. On this point, his po
sition was no different from that of Prince De and other Mongol leaders in the Autonomy
Movement. Consequently, the conflict between Fu and Prince Sha, although not obvious,
clearly existed.
Fu was very clever and did not always desire to irritate the Mongols personally,
but instead sent his confidant Chen Changjie to Yekejuu League to carry out his instruc
tions. By so doing, he was able to direct the wrath of the Mongols toward Chen, remove
himself from the fray, and then step in as mediator. At the same time, in order to
strengthen his control over the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council from the inside, be
side placing some agents nearby, he also bought off a few Mongols to respond to his call.
Among those he bribed was Bai Yincang, a Han Chinese from Beiping. Because of the
poverty of his family, Bai was sent to Yonghe-Gong to be a lama under the tutorship of
Yeshijalsan. Because Yeshijalsan was also known as Bai Lama, Bai later took the Mon
golian name Bayansang, and acted as a Mongol. Yeshijalsan was a very intimate friend of
Prince Sha. As a result, Bai was introduced by his tutor to Prince Sha and became his
personal interpreter. When the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council was established.
Prince Sha made him a section head. Through his personal relationship with Prince Sha,
chairman of the council, he was able to establish his personal influence in the council.
Thus, Bai became a target of Fu, who made him persuade the Mongols to agree to his
plan for cultivation.
This time, however, the plan was targeted on the territory of Ordos Left Central
Banner, near the location of the Shrine of Chingghis Khan. Another target was Ordos
Right Last Banner, commonly known as Jasag Banner, the banner of Prince Sha himself.
As the head of the league. Prince Sha repeatedly objected, but these protests were bluntly
ignored by Chen Changjie, who carried out the policy of cultivation of pasture lands
through military coercion. These illegal activities greatly irritated the people and officials
of Prince Sha’s banner, who realized that there was no way to tolerate this without giving
up everything. The only way to struggle for life was through death and bloodshed.
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In the summer of 1976, in Taiwan, I met with Mr. Liu Lianke (a Kharachin
Mongol and the minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Committee after the KMT
government moved to Taiwan), who acted as one of the main mediators between the
Mongols and the Chinese authorities. He related the following to me:
At that time, Chen Changjie was commander of the Chinese troops in Yekejuu’s de
fense and was under the command of Fu Zuoyi. Fu’s headquarters were at Shanba, while
Chen’s headquarters were at Torom (Taolimin). Chen, under the pretext that the soldiers
had to have something to do rather than merely sit idly, greatly promoted cultivation of the
land by soldiers. His site for this project was a plain near Prince Sha’s ancestral tombs, and
this became the direct cause of the military clash between the Mongols and the Chinese. At
that moment, the forces under Chen were said to consist of three divisions. At the same
time, the neighboring banner of Ordos Right Front, commonly known as Uusin, had al
ready been penetrated by the Chinese Communists, who then started their activities. Some
subordinates of Prince Sha were somewhat influenced by them.
At the time, Ochirkhuyagtu, the eldest son of Prince Sha, had already been appointed
jasag of the banner. The third son of Prince Sha, a lama known as the Tayin Lama (“the
honorable monk—most Chinese called him the San Lama, which means “the third lama”)
was greatly antagonized by Chen Changjie’s high-handed policy against the Mongols and
became somewhat pro-Communist. Prince Sha himself, beside occupying the positions of
the chairman of the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council and the head of Yekejuu League,
also assumed the post of commander of the Peace Preservation Troops of Yekejuu League.
Under his direct command was a battalion headed by Loroi, a capable young soldier.
In Prince Sha’s banner were two assistants, the younger one of them a brave man. It
seems that the Tayin Lama, Loroi, and this young assistant instigated the violent Mongolian
uprising. On March 26, the people and their followers killed more than one hundred Chi
nese subordinates of Fu Zuoyi and Chen Changjie. At the same time, they killed ten Mon
gols who were recognized as pro-Fu and pro-Chen traitors. They also killed Bai Yincang,
who had just returned from his liaison work with Teng Baoshan, the commander of Chinese
KMT forces stationed at Yulin area in Northern Shansi. He Qishou, a Turned Mongolian
graduate of Beiping Normal University, who was so sinicized that he was unable to speak
Mongolian, was also killed.
The second step of the group was to carry out guerrilla warfare against Chen Chang
jie’s forces. They successfully annihilated the three divisions under Chen in the desert, then
organized all of the Mongols of the banner and carried out a decisive resistance. As a result,
the great winner was the Juun (left-hand side) tusulagchi, an elderly and highly regarded
person of the banner who maintained order among the Mongols, carried out the final en
gagements of this upsrising, and organized the people to quietly continue guerrilla warfare.
After the outbreak of the uprising, Prince Sha and his family took refuge at Arlin
sume, a temple of the neighboring Uusin Banner in the desert, under the shadow of the
Chinese Communists. At that moment, Fu Zuoyi, Teng Baoshan, and Ma Hongkui, gover
nor of Ningxia Province, all lost contact with Prince Sha. Even Bai Haifeng, a Mongolian
commander of the Cavalry Division of the KMT forces and director of the Suiyuan Mon
golian Banner KMT Headquarters, could not locate Prince Sha.
Just then, I arrived at Shanba, where Fu Zuoyi’s headquarters was located, not far
from the great monastery of Labrang, the Tibetan Buddhist center of Gansu and Kokonor
Provinces. I reported all the news I had collected in Shanba to the General Headquarters of
the KMT in Chungking and requested that this be relayed to the party general director,
Chiang Kai-shek. Soon Chiang appointed me to take over Bai Haifeng’s position as the
party director of that area and to escort Prince Sha back. I ventured to Arlin sume and had a
secret talk with Prince Sha, receiving his approval to draft a telegram in his name to send to
Generalissimo Chiang in which he would explain the clash and petition for forgiveness.
Soon the Generalissimo telegraphed Prince Sha to comfort him. Through this response, the
bloody uprising caused by forceful cultivation of Mongol land reached a temporary end.
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Fu Zuoyi, however, desired not to allow the Mongols to “rebel.” He dared not send
his troops to avenge Chen Changjie’s defeat because overplaying the importance of the
event might lead to additional severe nationalistic confrontations as well as provide oppor
tunities for Japanese military intervention. Moreover, the Chinese Communists at this mo
ment had already strengthened their power in northern Shanxi, and the southern part of
Yekejuu League had been already penetrated by communistic influences. If severe oppres
sion was laid upon the anti-Chen Mongols, it might cause them to throw themselves onto
the Communist side and create still larger problems. Thus, Fu had his army well-prepared
but did not move, waiting for the command of the central authority.
Prince Sha also realized that disaster had already begun. It would not end so easily. A
peaceful solution would be better. In order to release himself and the Mongols from further
embarrassment. Prince Sha wanted me, who was sent from the Central Headquarters of the
KMT, to find a solution to this serious crisis.
After receiving very different reports from Fu Zuoyi and Prince Sha, the Chinese
government in Chungking also faced difficulties in resolving the matter. First, this unfortu
nate event could not be allowed to continue and create a greater rift between the Mongols
and the Chinese, which in turn might facilitate intervention from Japan and the Chinese
Communists. Second, a high-handed policy should not be carried out against the Mongols,
for that might create still more anti-Han Chinese sentiment and push them into the camp of
Prince De, Japan, or the Chinese Communists. On the other hand, the Mongolian antago
nism toward Fu Zuoyi should be ended because of the strategic geographical position he
held. Because of these entanglements, the Chinese central government could not make a fi
nal decision until the fall. Finally, Yao Zong, head of the Secretary’s Office of the Gener
alissimo, was dispatched as a special commissioner with complete authority to put an offi
cial end to this revolt.

According to my conversation with Mr. Liu Lianke, Yao Zong declared that
Chen Changjie was to be stripped of all his official posts, never to be reappointed by the
government. On the other hand, Yao also desired to carry out severe measures to discour
age the Mongols from repeating similar uprisings. He wanted to put the leaders, the San
Lama, the Baruun tusalagchi, and Loroi to death. But realizing the seriousness of the
situation and fearing that the crisis would get worse, he decided to execute only Loroi. In
other words, this uprising again ended with the spilling of Mongol blood.
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists also sent an agent by the name of Zhao
Kaixian to visit Prince Sha and exhort him to turn toward Yan’an. Zhao’s persuasion fi
nally failed due to the objections of the elderly Juun Tusalagchi, who was at that time the
actual leader of the resistance behind the scenes.
Transportation and communications in the southwestern part of Yekejuu League
were poor because of its isolation from the rest of the Mongolian areas. Even when a re
volt broke out, the Mongolian government in Kalgan did not receive any information
about it. Eventually, the news arrived through Altanochir, head of Yekejuu League at
Baotou, but by then the time to act had already passed. Moreover, at that moment, Japan
could not carry out any further military expansion. Of course, the Mongolian Army under
the control of its Japanese advisors could not move either. Nevertheless, the existence of
this great military power had checked Fu Zuoyi and rendered him unable to provide
military support to his subordinate, Chen Changjie.

Mongol Youth Activities in Kalgan
In 1944, the balance in the Pacific War seemed to be becoming increasingly
unfavorable for Japan. In particular, the changing situation in Europe clearly had a nega-
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tive impact upon Japan. High-ranking Mongol leaders already felt the coming of the
storm that would accompany Japan’s defeat. The young intellectuals searched actively for
some outlet to assure the future of Inner Mongolia. For instance, a group including
Budabala, vice-head of Shilingol; Ruiyong, head of the Bureau of Industry of the Mon
golian Rehabilitation Committee; Chogbadarakhu, Prince De’s secretary; and I, with a
few others occasionally joining us, gathered many times in the guestroom of Prince De’s
residence to engage in secret discussions. We all recognized that a great change was
coming, and that Ae time allotted to the existing Mongol regime was running out. If the
people were not organized and no political goal proclaimed, it would be Impossible to
confront the coming crises. Consequently, how to organize the existing strengths and
promote an attractive political goal were important topics of discussion. We also dis
cussed financial arrangements, because when the existing regime dissolved, we would
need financial support for any independence movement. We also felt it very important to
strengthen internal unity as well as establish foreign contacts outside of Japan. The more
we talked, the stronger we felt about the need for prompt action.
We also advised Prince De of our ideas and awaited his decision. His attitude
toward us was very serious because of his love for the young. He said, “According to the
most experienced hunters, wounded wolves are the most difficult to handle. The present
situation of Japan is like that of a wounded wolf If the Japanese discover your organiza
tion, they will arrest all of you like birds in a trap. Then Mongolia will suffer an immeas
urable loss. You must be very, very careful, and for the sake of security, you’d better not
organize any visible political body. Economic or financial power should be fostered, but
wealth is also capable of sinking people and creating many problems. You must be very,
very careful.”
At that time, Ruiyong was head of the Bureau of Industry and had authority to
control export of domestic animals to northern China. He was able to gather some money
and accumulate it in Beiping and Tianjin. Significantly, Prince De absolutely refused to
utilize the great income that might be gathered from the opium trade. He feared that the
accumulation of money from more irmocent sources might cause rumors to circulate and
damage the future of his beloved young supporters, so he stopped us. He agreed only to
publicize several political objectives. In the end, he accepted four objectives which I
drafted: 1) to support our brilliant leader to lead the entire nation toward self-government;
2) to unify all our Mongol people so as to seek our common goal; 3) to preserve our
Mongolian traditions but also accept the new currents of the world; 4) to cooperate
wholeheartedly with allied nations.
These slogans could be uttered publicly without evoking Japanese suspicion.
However, reading between the lines would reveal their additional significance. The first
objective pointed to the leader but did not make it clear who that leader should be, though
it undoubtedly designated Prince De. The second objective developed from traditional
Pan-Mongolianism and emphasized the unification of the entire nation. It also meant that
we had not forsaken the Mongolian territory then under the control of Manchukuo. The
third article clearly was an ideological contradiction. It aimed to unify the two conflicting
parties of conservatives and revolutionary reformists in order to struggle for the great
goal. The fourth article merely mentioned the allied nations {anda ulus), but did not ex
plicitly refer to Japan. Ostensibly, it represented support by Prince De for Japan and a
pledge to continue the intimate relationship with Japan, but the actual meaning was that
we Mongols would like to cooperate with any nation that could help us. In Mongolian
grammar, no suffix is needed to make a word plural, so ulus (nation) could very well be
plural. In order to impress these objectives on the minds of the people, they were put into
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a song written by a young nationalistic poet, Saichungga, who was then a secretary to
Prince De.

The Problem of the Queue
In the summer of 1944, Prince De summoned Budabala, vice head of the Shilingol League, and me to his residence in Sunid. Prince De did not have any definite topic to
discuss, but merely intended to chat. While we were there, we accompanied Prince De on
a visit to the girls’ school, the Mongolian Army Youth School, and other new establish
ments. Because there was plenty of time, we were able to tell Prince De that the Mongol
government had to tell the people that additional reforms were needed, because times
were changing and we could not cling to past conservatism.
We advised that the queues Mongolian men were still wearing in the countryside
all be cut off. The people should also be told that the queue was not the hairstyle of
Chinggis Khan’s era, but a much later symbol of subjugation to aliens after the Manchu
takeover. Why, we felt, should this shameful symbol remain on the heads of the Mongols,
who were struggling for liberation and independence? We suggested that the people be
ordered to cut their hair on August 4, the second anniversary of the establishment of the
Mongolian Autonomous State, to make it clear that we were shaking off all bonds and
marching forward for freedom and reform. Prince De hesitated but finally accepted our
proposal conditionally. He said, “In your ten banners of Shilingol League, the head of the
league may issue an order to tell the people to cut the queue on the Fourth of August, but
in Ulanchab, it should be carried out only after I explain it to them personally. As for
myself, I will keep this shameful symbol on my head until the day Mongolia really
achieves independence,”
In reality, in the 1940s, outside of Shilingol, Ulanchab, and a small portion of
Yekejuu, the men in most areas of Inner Mongolia had already cut off their queues. So
this decision would not have had any special influence in places other than these three
leagues. Nevertheless, the act was a symbol of Prince De’s commitment to reform and
was thus politically significant. The order to cut the queues off did meet with some oppo
sition in Shilingol, especially among the elderly, who believed this was a destruction of a
good Mongolian tradition. Nevertheless, the great majority finally began to realize that
times were indeed changing.
In the Ulanchab League, the vice-head, Rinchinsengge, had already tired of the
queue some time earlier. Hearing that both the nobles and the commoners of Shilingol
had removed their braids, he did likewise. At the time of the autumn meeting of the Mon
golian Rehabilitation Committee, he had come to Kalgan and visited Prince De and was
unexpectedly rebuked. Prince De had asked him who authorized him to cut off his queue
and demanded that he make an open apology for his transgression. Thus, Rinchinsengge
had no other choice but to apologize. But this unpleasant event greatly damaged his per
sonal relationship with Prince De. Prince Babudorji, the father of Rinchinsengge and
former head of Ulanchab League, was greatly angered, finding Prince De’s actions to be
a great personal insult, and ordered his son to resign from the post of vice-head of the
league. After Fu Zuoyi heard this news, he immediately sent agents to the residence of
Babudorji in Urad Central Banner to drive a still wider wedge between Babudorji and
Prince De. Finally, as part of this plot. Prince Babudorji and his family deserted his
homeland and took refuge at Fu Zuoyi’s headquarters in Shanba. Thus a split was created
in the unification effort through the cutting off of a queue. The escape of Babudorji and
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his son, Rinchinsengge, was carried out through a disguised attack on their home by Fu
Zuoyi’s troops, who “captured” the entire family.
After this event, the Mongolian Army dispatched a contingent from its seventh
division in order to protect this district. But this time they encountered a real attack from
Chinese guerilla forces under the command of E Yousan, a subordinate of Fu Zuoyi. On
this occasion, the Chinese guerillas successfully captured Aminboke, the chief of staff of
the Mongolian Army seventh division, and a younger brother of Wu Guting who was
chief of staff of the Mongolian Army. Following his usual political strategy, Fu Zuoyi
later released Aminboke. Aminboke’s return aroused deep suspicion among the Japanese
that he might be spying for Fu; he became one of the factors in Wu Guting’s resignation
from his important position in the Mongol Army.

Political Crisis and Disharmony Among Mongol Leaders
As mentioned earlier, both Prince De and Wu Heling desired to wrest control of
the Mongolian Army from the hands of the Japanese. The creation of the Mongolian
Army Liaison Office in the government was a step in that direction. The establishment of
the Liaison Office itself also showed the need to solve an old problem with a new meas
ure. Wu Heling drafted a plan to establish a Military Affairs Ministry in the Political Af
fairs Department to carry out military administration, but he left the direction and control
of the work of the staffs to the General Headquarters. Of course this was not an easy task.
First, these matters had to be approved by Li Shouxin. Second, they had to be authorized
by the Japanese Army stationed in Mongolia and the Japanese advisors of the Mongolian
Army. Prince De repeatedly negotiated with Major General Yano Masao, chief of staff of
the Japanese Army in Mongolia, and Lieutenant Colonel Nakagawa, a staff member of
the Japanese Army, and was finally able to reach an agreement with them. However, as
this Military Affairs Ministry was being established, a political crisis broke out, not be
cause of institutional problems but because of a personality clash among the Mongol
leaders, which was arbitrated by the Japanese military.
Among the important Japanese military and political authorities in Mongolia
were the new legation minister. Lieutenant General Yasato Tomomichi, and Major Gen
eral Yano Masao, chief of staff of the Japanese Army stationed in Mongolia. Both Yasato
and Yano were prudent and careful people, who had no prejudices against Prince De or
the other Mongol leaders, and they desired to avoid confrontations with local people.
However, the senior staff member of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant Colonel Okamura
Seichi (who was soon promoted to full colonel), was a strong-willed, capable, and keen
military analyst, and he created many problems for the Mongolian government.
Wu Heling desired that a lieutenant general of the Mongolian Army fill the post
of Minister of the Military Affairs Ministry. Perhaps he feared that Li Shouxin, a full
general, would become minister without giving up his position as commander in chief
This would mix the military administration with field command of forces and block re
formation of the old situation. This separation of powers was, of course, not welcomed by
Li Shouxin. Li, feeling that Wu Heling was undermining his position, looked for an op
portunity for revenge.
Long before this political struggle started, the Japanese Military Police discov
ered that some officers of the Mongolian Army were involved in opium smuggling. The
claim was that Aminboke, a younger brother of Wu Guting, was the organizer of this
trade. As a matter of fact, during that period, a number of high-ranking officials of the
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Mongolian Army were indeed involved in this illegal trade. In particular, Li Shouxin
himself was a partner of He Bingwen, the head of the tuyao zuhe (opium monopoly),
which was engaged in smuggling great amounts of opium—a matter openly known. Nev
ertheless, Aminboke’s case provided a good pretext for Okamura Seichi to attack Wu
Guting. All these conditions provided Li Shouxin the opportunity to oust Wu Guting
from the Mongolian Army.
The personnel conflict within the Mongolian Army also provided an opportunity
for Okamura Seichi to carry out his plan. He stated publicly that Wu Heling, Wu Guting,
their relatives, and their cliques should no longer be allowed within the Mongolian mili
tary and political circles of power. This demarche from a staff officer of the Japanese
Army aroused the old and new enemies of Wu Heling, including Li Shouxin, Buyandalai,
Togtakhu, and Du Yunyu (a Chinese antagonized by Mongol domination of the old
Mengjiang area) to attack him. They described Wu as a man of ambition who had no loy
alty to Japan. Some of them accused Wu of being corrupt because of the mischief he
made in handling the khorshiyas. This they reported to Yasato Tomomichi, the Japanese
minister in Kalgan, and to Yano Masao, the chief of staff of the Japanese Army in Mon
golia. Of course they also delivered their accusations to Prince De, who ignored them.
The autumn meeting of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee took place
about this time, so the leaders of the leagues and banners were all gathered in Kalgan.
They were disturbed by the ongoing political confrontation and by the interference of the
Japanese Army. They were also disappointed because the above-mentioned opponents of
Wu had agitated for Japanese interference. They displayed their dissatisfaction to Prince
De and were especially disgusted by Buyandalai’s conspiracy to take over Wu Heling’s
post as head of the Political Department.
To show the Japanese military authorities that this confusion was created only
by a small group and was opposed by the vast majority of the leadership. Prince De had
Prince Sun^ingwangchug, Budabala, Shirabdorji, Altanochir, Serengnamjil, and the
heads and vice-heads of Shilingol, Ulanchab, Yekejuu, and Chahar, go to the General
Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Mongolia and to the Japanese Legation to express
their support of Wu Heling. 1 was appointed interpreter of the group. When we arrived at
the Japanese Army Headquarters, Colonel Okamura Seichi came out to receive the visi
tors. Though it was my first visit with this Japanese colonel, he said to me, “I know you
well, and I also know of your eloquence in Japanese, but today I do not want you to in
terpret. I have my own interpreter. I don’t trust you.” However, his interpreter, with only
a limited knowledge of Mongolian, was unable to interpret the conversation. This embar
rassed Okamura, who then turned to me and asked me to translate. Before beginning, I
asked him, “Do you trust my words now?” and then took up my unpleasant task. Prince
Sung started the conversation, and the other delegates reinforced what he said. After
Okamura Seichi sternly expressed the view that he could not support the desires of his
guests, Yano Masao, chief of staff and Okamura’s superior, came out to welcome his
guests and ended the conversation without any actual conclusion having been reached.
Prince Sung and I had just arrived in Kalgan from Shilingol and therefore were
not yet able to understand the situation fully. Only after this conversation and later talks
with other friends were we able to look into the problem more deeply. Okamura not only
wished to push Wu Heling and Wu Guting from the center of military and political
power, but he also planned to move Chogbadarakhu, chief secretary of Prince De; Ruiyong, head of the Bureau of Industry in the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee; Urgungbu, head of Ulanchab League General Affairs Bureau; and me, then head of Shilin
gol League General Affairs Bureau, from our active posts to lesser positions. When
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Okamura came to visit with Prince De, he always rejected Chogbadarakhu as the inter
preter, saying that he did not want his bias in interpreting to influence the prince. But
neither Yano Masao, chief of staff of the Japanese Army, nor Yasato Tomomichi, Japa
nese minister at Kalgan, agreed with Okamura. To ease the tension and to appease us,
they arranged a dinner party at a Japanese restaurant, where they told us, “No matter what
Okamura said, please do not worry. You should continue to work as usual for the friend
ship between Japan and Mongolia, as well as for the future of your people.” This conver
sation persuaded us that the crisis was completely of Okamura’s making.
On the other hand, Buyandalai and Togtakhu Joined in support of Li Shouxin
and sought to have Buyandalai take over for Wu Heling as head of the Political Affairs
Department. Of course their plot failed. Prince De always favored his old friends and
followers, but for such an important post, he had to be very prudent and not give to
Buyandalai the post of head of the Political Affairs Department.
The open attack on Wu Heling occurred because of his unfounded trust in Luo
Lipu and Dai Zhongyuan, both of whom were notorious among both Mongols and Chi
nese in Kalgan for being shrewd and covetous men. Through their handling, the Mongol
ian Livelihood Improvement Association and the banner khorshiyas had become corrupt.
Because of these rumors, the Japanese military authorities demanded a thorough check of
khorshiya management. To wash himself clean, Wu Heling recommended that the Mon
golian Rehabilitation Committee and the delegates of the banners investigate this matter.
Investigations did not uncover any wrongdoing in the books of the Mongolian Livelihood
Association under Wu’s leadership, and he was cleared. Nevertheless, Wu eventually
stepped down from his post as head of the Political Affairs Department under heavy pres
sure from the Japanese Army. Now, Buyandalai and Li Shouxin struggled to obtain Wu’s
former post. In the midst of this delicate situation. Prince De felt that the only way to
solve the problem was to take the post himself. In particular, he worried that since this
post had been recovered only after the downfall of Kanai Shoji, it should not be lost to an
undeserving person. Also, due to the changing war situation, the Japanese military
needed to win Prince De’s good will and so had to defer to him. This move by the prince
finally resolved the crisis. Afterward, some people wrongly criticized this as a deliber
ately planned power struggle orchestrated by Prince De.

Personnel Rearrangements After the Crisis
After Wu Heling’s departure from the post of head of the Political Affairs De
partment, the Mongolian Livelihood Improvement Association, which had dealt with
animal exports and commodities imports, also ceased to function. To solve this problem,
its members and the banner delegates who were summoned to a meeting of the Mongol
ian Rehabilitation Committee decided to establish the headquarters of the Alliance of
Khorshiyas to fill the role of the defunct association. During these talks, Prince De,
Prince Sung, Jirgalang, and others recommended Oljeitu, former head of the Mongolian
Rehabilitation Committee General Affairs Bureau and then deputy minister of the Gen
eral Affairs Bureau, who was widely known as an honest man, to direct this organization.
Their recommendation was unanimously accepted by those in attendance. The Japanese
had requested that one Japanese advisor be invited, and this was a difficult demand to
reject. Consequently, the headquarters of the Alliance of Khorshiyas had to suffer the
intervention of a Japanese advisor, although this position was not officially recognized by
the government and the advisor was not dispatched by the government, but rather was
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invited by the headquarters. The advisor was thus assigned only to serve as a bridge be
tween the headquarters of the Khorshiyas and the Japanese officials in the Mongolian
government and was not expected to interfere with the internal dealings of the headquar
ters.
Because the new organization of the khorshiyas and the new appointment of
Oljeitu, Colonel Okamura Seichi again “advised” the Mongolian government that the
General Affairs Bureau was an important office, and that a capable Mongol, eloquent in
Japanese, be assigned to Oljeitu’s former post. He also recommended Ruiyong, head of
the Bureau of Industry of the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee, as the most qualified
person under consideration. Okamura hinted that it was time that Ruiyong be promoted.
In reality, Okamura wanted to move Ruiyong from a post with real power to a higher post
without power. Nevertheless, Prince De recognized that to have Ruiyong occupy the post
of deputy minister of the General Affairs Bureau would at least facilitate looking into that
office and seeing what the Japanese were doing. Prince De agreed to Ruiyong’s appoint
ment and then appointed Chogtumanglai, then secretary of the Mongolian Delegation to
Japan in Tokyo, to fill the post vacated by Ruiyong. Although Chogbadarakhu, Urgungbu
and I were targeted by Okamura, our positions were not affected, thanks to the influence
and protection of both Prince De and Prince Sung.
While these personnel rearrangements were taking place, something similar was
also happening within the Mongolian Army. Wu Guting resigned from the post of chief
of staff, and a well-known yes-man, Buyandelger, was assigned to the position. By so
doing, Li Shouxin hoped to put an end to opposition from his chief of staff. Prince De
also believed that the new chief of staff would be more obedient to his own instructions.
In fact, they were both mistaken. Because of his superficial obedience, neither Prince De
nor Li Shouxin had yet discovered Buyandelger’s truly obstinate personality. As a result,
by the end of the Second World War, both Prince De and Li were no longer able to move
the Mongolian Army and had lost their basic power base, making it impossible for them
to coordinate another uprising. The promotion of Buyandelger also created dissatisfaction
among the division commanders and officers who had stronger Mongolian nationalistic
aspirations. This would be another factor behind the disintegration of the unity of the
Mongolian Army after the defeat of Japan.

Reorganization of the Mongolian Military Forces
Prince De tried very hard to succeed with the Political Affairs Department, and
both the Mongols and the Chinese under him were greatly inspired by his leadership. But
time was not on his side. The changing world situation worked against him. After these
crises. Prince De had to be very prudent in the establishment of the Military Affairs Min
istry, the ministry which had caused Wu Heling’s downfall. He lifted the limitation that
the position of minister be given only to a person with the rank of lieutenant general and
appointed Li Shouxin as minister.
Li never interfered in small matters, but insisted on handling large and important
matters according to what he took to be the Japanese policy. He believed that if the Japa
nese supported him, no one could do anything to remove him. After he became minister
of Military Affairs in the Political Affairs Department, he still officially remained in resi
dence at the headquarters of the Mongolian Army at Hohhot. Even when he was in Kalgan, he rarely came to the office of the ministry. Yamashita Yoshiji completely con
trolled this newly established ministry. Because Prince De trusted Tobgereltu, he ap-
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pointed Tobgereitu as his military aide. The original commander of the Chairman’s
Guard, Khatanbatur, became chief aide-de-camp of the Mongolian Army’s Headquarters.
Namsereng, a Mongolian Army officer who had attended the Japanese Imperial Military
Academy, was made the new commander of the Guards.
As Japan retreated in the Pacific, the possibility of combat in China now greatly
attracted the attention of Prince De and other Mongol leaders. Especially concerned about
the ethnic Mongol troops in the Mongol Army, they tried to station them in safer loca
tions to avoid meaningless sacrifices. They had begun to implement this plan even before
the downfall of Wu Heling and Wu Guting. The key to the plan was to put the ethnic
Chinese troops in the old Mongolian Army, which had been reorganized into police
forces, back into the regular Mongol Army. These forces were reorganized into four divi
sions. The first division, under the command of Meng Jisan, was stationed in the area of
Wuchuan, the second division, under Guo Guangju, at Baotou, the third division, under
Song Wanli, at Pingdiquan, and the fourth, under Zhu Wenwu, at Xuanhua. The ethnic
Mongol forces were organized into two divisions: the seventh division, under Damrinsurung, and the ninth division, under Jachingjab who, soon after his death, was succeeded
by Oljeiochir. The rest of the Mongol forces were reorganized into defensive divisions
stationed in the leagues, with the heads and vice-heads of the leagues serving as the
commanders and vice-commanders of the divisions, along with professional military of
ficers acting as the chiefs of staff.
This arrangement also aimed at boosting the morale of the Chinese forces of the
old Mongolian Army. They had considered their reorganization into police forces a de
motion, and by regaining military status hoped to increase their morale. Stationing these
Chinese troops on the front lines and in the Chinese districts saved Mongolian manpower
and avoided Mongolian losses. And since these troops were Chinese, they would find it
easier to cooperate with the locals. To move most of the ethnic Mongolian forces to the
leagues was thought to increase the armed strength of the leagues, but the main objective
was to move the Mongol troops to a safer second front. The feeling that they were pro
tecting their homeland would also make them more eager to train and would increase
their strength and their morale.
As for supplying the Chinese troops, there were already set regulations in the
Mongolian Army Headquarters, and no new problems would be created because of the
new arrangements. The army headquarters itself remained responsible for transporting
the food supplies of the troops sent to be stationed in the leagues. Hence the burden on
the local people was not increased. Though the delivery of these supplies was carried out,
the meat supply became a problem. Prince De and other Mongolian leaders wished to
give four ounces of meat to each soldier every day. Though headquarters did not oppose
this, they demanded that the leagues supply the needed beef and mutton at low prices.
The leagues refused to do this, to avoid burdening the people. They hoped the newly es
tablished Military Affairs Ministry would purchase the animals at market prices. This
posed a problem until the last day of the Mongolian government.
Defense of the border areas of Ulanchab League near the Chinese district was
threatened by the increase in Fu Zuoyi’s power. The balance of military power also
gradually changed because of the decaying fortunes of Japan in the Pacific War. E Yousan’s guerilla forces, under Fu’s instructions, unceasingly attacked the district.
By the end of the Manchu dynasty, the Dorben-Keud Banner in Ulanchab
League, following the lead of the Boxers, had joined in activities against foreign mission
aries. Therefore, following the Boxer Protocol of 1901, the banner had to cede the land of
Ulankhua to the Catholic Church as compensation. Because no Mongol believers joined
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the church, it collected poor Chinese settlers to cultivate its land, and a Chinese village
was created under the influence of the church. E Yousan was a man from this district.
During the Japanese occupation, these Chinese Catholics were the victims of discrimina
tion that even surpassed what other Chinese experienced. Using the antagonism this
evoked, E organized Catholics, together with Mongol forces, into a guerilla force against
Japan. While the Ninth Division of the Mongol Army was stationed at Liuheyingzi, a
village between Wuquan and Batukhaalag (Bailingmiao), its headquarters was attacked
by E Yousan’s troops, and the division commander, Jachingjab, was killed. To fill his
post. Prince De, Li Shouxin, and the Japanese authorities all agreed to appoint Oljeiochir,
a Kharachin Mongol trained in Ulaanbaatar. He was able to influence Inner Mongolian
politics through the military power acquired with this appointment.

The Yalta Agreement and its Impact
In the latter part of July, 1944, the Japanese government under Tojo Hideki col
lapsed, and a new cabinet was established under Koiso Kuniaki. By this time, Japan was
no longer capable of mobilizing its full strength to continue the war. At the end of 1944,
Wang Jingwei died in Japan, and Chen Gongbo was made chairman of the Nanjing re
gime. In the early part of February, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin gathered at
Yalta to discuss the conditions under which the Soviets would join the war against Japan.
Stalin agreed to do so under the conditions that North Korea be restored to the Russian
sphere of influence and that Manchuria be returned to its 1904 status, i.e. its status before
the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time, they decided to have Roosevelt persuade the
Chinese government in Chungking to accept Outer Mongolian independence with its cur
rent boundaries.
These decisions all greatly affected Inner Mongolia. Prince De, realizing that
Japan had already lost its ability to deal with the problems of Mongolian independence
and nation building, made no further effort to discuss the problem with Japan. But Japan
did want to ease tensions with Prince De, and the prince, in the twilight of his regime,
was thus able to carry out some reforms on behalf of both the Mongolian and Chinese
people. The most important task that concerned him was the elimination of disturbances
by police and intelligence agents, especially in the Chinese districts. Prince De also
sought to diminish the gap between the Chinese locals and officials of his government,
and to collect the locals’ opinions as the basis for his reforms—a policy that helped re
store the reputation of the government. In the spring of 1945, he summoned a conference
of the heads of the Mongolian leagues and the Chinese provinces under his jurisdiction.
In his speech at the opening session, he openly and sincerely expressed his feelings and
hopes as follows:
The stability of the people’s livelihood and the handling of the people’s hearts are based on
the understanding of their will and dissatisfaction. We must remove the bitterness of the
people and establish better order. Only then will people be able to enjoy their livelihood
and endeavor to carry out their work. Of course, during the war, it has been impossible to
avoid the difficulties around us. We have to make the people realize that great understand
ing and patience are necessary to overcome the difficulties we face. The three main
points—the stability of the people’s livelihood, the handling of people’s hearts, and the en
hancement of the people’s strengths—are the central topics of our administration. No poli
tics can be discussed without [participation by] the masses of the people. A government
separated from the hearts of the people is no different from a building founded in air. As an
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early sage stated, “The people are the foundation of a state.” As for order and stability in
the people’s livelihood, it is important to win the hearts of the people. Only when order is
well-established can the people enjoy a stable life; then the hearts of the people are won.
The police, in the name of order, have galloped into the mountains and the wilderness, ex
posing themselves to wind and rain, and attacked the people’s enemies. Even so, most of
the people still harbor fear and antagonism toward the police because of laxness of disci
pline and consequent mistreatment of the people. Moreover, the wrongdoings of agents, the
establishment of gambling clubs, and the rise of hoodlumism threaten the livelihoods of the
people. These movements have been strictly prohibited, in order to restore public order....
In order to increase military strength, political acumen, and administrative authority,
officials and clerks must enforce the law. In time of war, some officials and clerks may use
the need to establish control as a pretext to satisfy their personal desires. They may neglect
the suffering of the people, delay government processes, or feign obedience [to law]. All
[these malpractices] must be strictly and thoroughly eliminated. Even before any attacks by
the enemy we may crumble all on our own. Therefore, in order to assure the well-being of
the people and our potential to wage war, an investigative institution will be established to
monitor government functions and discipline civil servants. And for us leaders, we must be
lawful and upright. If all officials and clerks can do this, the future and development of our
Mongolian Autonomus State will be limitless. Finally, I hope that all of you attending this
conference will fearlessly and without hesitation resolve to alter and reform local govern
ment so as to strengthen the central state. I hope all of us will openly discuss this matter and
reach a hopeful conclusion to the conference.

Prince De’s Desires for the Future of Mongolia
Before this conference, the Mongolian Rehabilitation Committee had conducted
its spring session as usual. Aside from ordinary discussions, the most important item that
attracted my attention was the coming conference on Manchukuo-Mongolia overland
trade, to be held at the Shilingol League office. This conference would deal with the im
portant challenge of how to meet the material needs of the Shilingol people in times of
scarcity. The excessive demands by Manchukuo for animal products was another impor
tant issue for the conference. Most Japanese officials in the Mongolian Rehabilitation
Committee and the Ministry of Economics of the Mongolian government believed that
meeting the needs of the Japanese Guandong Army would require supplies for Manchu
kuo. Because I was representing the Shilingol League, I insisted that the exchange either
be carried out with equal amounts of commodities in exchange or that Manchukuo buy
the domestic animals it needed at regular market prices. It soon became apparent that
neither side in this conflict would yield; the possibility for compromise virtually van
ished. But the overland trade conference still had to be held on schedule, so I returned to
Shilingol to prepare for the conference.
On April 5, 1945, the day before 1 left Kalgan, Stalin announced the abrogation
of the Russo-Japanese Friendship Pact. On the same day, the Japanese cabinet under
Koiso Kuniyaki collapsed, and that night Japanese army authorities notified Prince De of
this event. Just before this notification, I went to Prince De’s residence and asked whether
he had any instructions. We talked about the Manchukuo-Mongolian conference on
overland trade, and of course he agreed with my views. But after hearing of the political
situation in Japan, he telephoned me at 3:00 the following morning and asked me to come
to his residence. Because martial law was in effect, he sent his own car for me.
When he saw me he said;
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You are going back to the Shilingol League this morning. Yesterday you came and
asked for my instructions. Now the world situation has undergone a serious change. Stalin
has abrogated the Russo-Japanese Friendship Pact. The Soviet Union may carry out mili
tary action at any moment. Since Japan has been defeated, Stalin feels compelled to seize
an opportunity rather than wait and risk losing it.
After you return, report on this situation secretly to Prince Sung, Prince Budabala,
and other trustworthy leaders. Tell them that invasion by Soviet and Outer Mongolian
forces seems inevitable. Since we are unable to resist, we must move our real power to the
desert of Tenggeri-yin elesu to the south of Shilingol in Chahar; then we will see what kind
of contact we can make with the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. We must cooperate to take
advantage of this opportunity to create a breakthrough for the people. Fu Zuoyi’s invasion
from the west is certain. Our military force can stop him. Fie is not as powerful as the So
viet Union. I myself feel that the independence of Mongolia must be recognized by the
Chinese legitimate government that has sovereignty over it. That is to say, Mongolia’s in
dependence and nation-building must be recognized by the Chinese government.
Therefore, I must go to Chungking personally to discuss this problem with Chiang
Kai-shek. Whether Mongolia can achieve independence still depends on his decision. The
Japanese will assume all responsibility for the defeat, and they will probably try to persuade
me to flee to Japan. I am a Mongol; I have struggled for Mongolian self-rule and independ
ence. The Mongol people have recognized me as their leader. How could 1, in this time of
disaster, flee to a foreign country? No matter how the Japanese may attempt to persuade
me, I will not go. 1 would rather they kill me. 1 will not flee with them. This 1 do out of re
spect for the dignity of the Mongol people. If I die, you must know that 1 have been killed
by the Japanese. I will not commit suicide. We did not invite the Japanese here; when they
came, they said they would help the Mongol people achieve independence. But whether
they helped or oppressed us, we were unable to resist them, and so we aeccptcd their as
sistance.” Now they are defeated. We should certainly not take advantage of their current
calamity and attempt to kill them. That would be unbecoming of u.s, the Mongol people.
This I want to emphasize. You must faithfully carry out my will.

I felt as if I was listening to the prince’s last will and testament.
After dawn, several Shilingol League officials and I departed from Kalgan. Be
cause the summer days were tong, we were able to arrive at the Sunid Right Banner be
fore sunset. I was treated well by Dugursurung, the eldest son of Prince De, and of course
I immediately conveyed to him his father’s words. Upon hearing me, he changed his ex
pression; he refused to confront the imminent great change until a measure for dealing
with this change had first been agreed upon. At this time, several Mongol youths edu
cated in Japan had been assigned as teachers in the girls’ middle school and primary
school. Among their number were Urgungge Onon, who later taught at Leeds University
in England, Delgerchogtu, and Burinsain; all felt it necessary to do something before it
was too late. But we did not come up with any solutions in our talks. It was perhaps be
cause of this failure to settle on a plan that soon after the Soviet-Mongolian forces in
vaded his banner Dugursurung went to Ulaanbaatar, where he eventually died.

The Failure to Achieve Common Measures
Soon after 1 returned to the Shilingol League Office, both the Mongol delegates
and the Manchukuo delegates arrived for the conference on overland trade. Because
Manchukuo recognized this conference as significant, it dispatched a large number of
delegates, including the vice governor of Kinggan General Province, Shirahama Yoshiharu, and the counselor of the provincial government, Khafengga, as the chief and deputy
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delegates. On the first day of the conference, the Manchukuo delegation submitted its
demands for our goods to the Mongolian representatives. The demands turned out to be
several times larger than the demands of previous years. In addition, the quantity of food
stuffs offered us in exchange did not increase at all. Endless argument resulted. By this
time, even the Japanese officials of the Mongolian government who in the past had ap
proved Manchukuo demands now realized that the Manchukuo demands were clearly
unreasonable and unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the next day, Shirahama demanded that Shilingol submit to Manchukuo’s demands, and as justification he spoke of the need to support the Great East
Asian War. However, Budabala, the vice-league head, and I, head of the Bureau of In
dustry of the League Office, insisted that trade was trade and that the topic of the confer
ence was trade. There was no need to touch on political or military matters. The chief
delegate and deputy delegate from the Shilingol League agreed with my contention. We
told them that in supporting Japan, Mongolia would contribute directly to the Japanese
army and would not go through Manchukuo as an intermediary. We rejected their unrea
sonable and excessive demands, and the conference ended in failure.
Because of this failure, Lt. Col. Takehara Kiyoshi, head of the Japanese local
intelligence bureau in Shilingol, acted as a mediator and had the two sides agree that be
fore a new agreement could be reached, the amount of exchange should be fixed accord
ing to former arrangements. Shirahama assumed that his position in the Mongolian ad
ministration in Manchukuo would enable him to overshadow the Japanese officials of the
Mongolian government. He did not realize that his demands would be completely re
jected, not by the Japanese officials, but by the Mongols. This made him very angry and
embarrassed; he even refused to attend the welcoming party hosted for him by the Shilin
gol League office.
During this conference, Khafengga spoke not one word except for his translation
of Shirahama’s speech into Mongolian. He nevertheless accepted my invitation to lecture
at the Shilingol Middle School. He also spoke secretly with me, warning me that I would
have to be very careful not to make speeches or engage in activities that might embarrass
the Japanese. He also said that all the Japanese in the Manchukuo Delegation had placed
on me the blame for the failure of this conference.
The main topic of our talk was the changing world situation. We all agreed that
the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan was inevitable. Japan had no power to
resist the Soviets; its defeat was sealed. What should the Mongols do in the face of such a
situation? Khafengga said that his visit to Shilingol was not for the purpose of participat
ing in the conferences, but for discussing these matters. He said, “Your Mongolian gov
ernment has the name ‘The Mongolian Government.’ Politically, you have more prestige
than we eastern Inner Mongols. But the actual power of Mongolia is on our side. In light
of future world changes, both our sides should combine our strength; your designation as
'The Mongolian Government’ and our strength can combine to engage in a great en
deavor for our nation. If Outer Mongolia joins the war effort, then the unification of Inner
Mongolia, which is the general hope of all the Mongol peoples, can perhaps be accom
plished. If Outer Mongolia remains neutral in the war effort, then the external power will
come from the south. In this case, your side will have to assume heavier responsibilities.”
Because he sounded so sincere, I told him that Prince De intended to concentrate
forces under his leadership in the desert areas between Chahar and Shilingol. Khafengga
was quite pleased with this idea, saying, “When you do so, please do not allow your
strength to diminish. We will try to join up with you; then we can act together.” We
agreed that our two sides would use wireless telegraphs in Shilingol and eastern Inner
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Mongolia to communicate with each other.
At that moment, the leaders of eastern Inner Mongolia, Prince De, and the lead
ers of western Inner Mongolia clearly all shared the same ideas and recognized that some
measures must be taken. Regrettably, however, they did not realize that a great change
would occur so suddenly with the surrender of Japan in August. Other factors also
worked against the two sides’ combining their efforts into one coherent program of ac
tion. Each side eventually and unfortunately pursued its own separate goal.

The End of the War
Following the collapse of the Koiso cabinet in Japan, Suzuki Kantaro organized
another cabinet. Many people thought this would be the cabinet that would deal with Ja
pan’s problems after its defeat. Prince De recognized that times were tense and that
something had to be done. He discussed this problem with Jirgalang and Ruiyong, who
decided that they would contact the leaders of the leagues and banners and transfer hu
man, financial, material, and domestic animal resources to areas difficult to reach by
automobile, and also to areas far from important military routes. Such places included the
southern desert areas of southern Shilingol and northern Chahar. Prince De decided that
after this was done, he would leave Kalgan and join them.
It was important to join with eastern Inner Mongolian leaders to face the great
change looming on the horizon. Jirgalang, with this purpose in mind, stayed at the home
of Mukdenbo, the amban of the Bordered Yellow Banner of Chahar, on the pretext of
taking a vacation. Ruiyong went to the Minggan Banner of the Chahar League on the
pretext of supervising the Mongolian construction brigades and their activities. Prince De
soon dispatched Tegshibuyan, the Mongolian delegate to Japan who had just arrived from
Tokyo, to Sunid to get Prince De’s wife and children and to contact Prince Sung and in
form him that there would be a gathering in Kalgan. But all of these plans were one step
too late. The Soviet-Mongolian Allied Forces had already begun military action.
On July 26, 1945, Truman, Churchill, and Stalin joined at Potsdam and demand
ed that Japan surrender unconditionally. On August 6, the Americans dropped the first
atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The Soviet Union took immediate advantage of the ensuing
atmosphere of imminent Japanese defeat and declared war on Japan on August 8, osten
sibly to fulfill promises it had made in Yalta. This cynical and opportunistic move by the
Soviets evidently stemmed from Stalin’s concern that if Japan surrendered to the United
States and Great Britain alone, the Soviet Union would lose its share of war booty.
After the war, it was learned that, since the middle of July, Japan had been
making secret contacts with the Soviet Union and was asking that it act as a mediator to
end the war and achieve peace. The Soviets kept these communications a well-guarded
secret, disregarding them completely after August 6, when it became apparent that they
would be able to get something for nothing. On August 9, the second atomic bomb was
dropped on Nagasaki, and on August 14, the Japanese government announced its accep
tance of the Potsdam declaration and offered to surrender unconditionally. The next day,
the Emperor of Japan issued his decree to end the war. Thus it was that on August 15, the
Pacific War, the Second World War, and the Second Sino-Japanese War all came to a
close. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Japan had been constantly making every
attempt to exploit Mongolia and Manchuria and interfere in Manchu-Mongolian affairs.
This exploitation and interference ceased with the end of the war.
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Conflicting Paths for the Future of Post-War Mongolia
To deal with this momentous change, Prince De and the Mongol leaders made
plans to establish a general command headquarters of the leagues and banners and to
unify the leagues and banners as a base for further activities. But these plans were not
implemented because of the Soviet army’s southward advance. When the Japanese sur
rendered, Li Shouxin was in Kalgan. Wu Heling and Wu Guting came to Kalgan imme
diately from Beiping. Prince Sung, Buyandalai, and Jodbajab were all in their homes in
Shilingol and Chahar at this time and were unable to come.
After the Japanese Emperor surrendered, Neimoto Hiroshi, commander of the
Japanese Army in Mongolia, personally called on Prince De and officially informed him
that the war was over. From that hour on, all the affairs of the government were to be
decided upon by Prince De himself It was also at about this time that Anan Tadaki, the
Japanese minister of the army, telegraphed Prince De that an airplane had been sent to
Kalgan to bring him to Japan, and that arrangements were being made for his exile there.
Prince De politely declined these Japanese offers. He was resolved to remain in Kalgan
and work for a breakthrough for his Mongol people.
Because a general command headquarters could not be established. Prince De
established a defense headquarters at Kalgan in order to deal with the remaining forces.
He made himself the commander in chief of this organization, with Li Shouxin as vice
commander. Ding Qichang as chief of staff, and Aminboke as the vice-chief of staff
They planned to concentrate the Mongolian and Chinese forces to maintain order in the
local districts and to protect Kalgan. At the same time, they appointed Kangi Masaichi,
the minister of the former Mongolian Government General Affairs Bureau, as an advisor
and employed him as their contact with Japanese military headquarters. Prince De, as
always, was occupying himself with attempts to achieve a breakthrough for his own peo
ple.
It was at this time that Prince De’s camp split into two factions. One camp advo
cated contacting the Soviet Union and trying to unify with Outer Mongolia. This group
wanted to struggle for the unification and independence of all of Mongolia; its members
did not occupy themselves with personal concerns. With its emphasis on nationalism, this
group was easily the more popular of the two groups, and it enjoyed the support of almost
all the intellectuals. But it was unaware of the secret Yalta agreement, which stated that
Outer and Inner Mongolia would not be reunited. The other camp argued that, before the
withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the arrival of the Chinese Communists, it was nec
essary to contact the Chinese government in Chungking in order to restore the prewar
relationship between Inner Mongolia and the central government. This group, headed by
Wu Heling, Chogbagatur, and others, advocated the implementation of “realistic” poli
cies. These two camps argued continually with one another and could not agree on a
common course of action.

Disintegration of the Mongol Army
For Fu Zuoyi, the declaration of Japan’s unconditional surrender presented an
extremely good opportunity to move eastward. But the Chinese Communist forces took
the first step and drew close to Hohhot. Both sides had dispatched their agents to deal
with the Mongolian Army Headquarters. As mentioned earlier. Prince De and Li Shouxin
had both telegraphed orders to Buyandelger, chief of staff of the Mongol Army, to con-
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centrate all his divisions and proceed to Kalgan. But Buyandelger, who had always pre
viously been obedient to his superiors, this time chose not to follow their orders. He
thought he could use these troops as bargaining chips in negotiating with Fu Zuoyi for a
military post. He secured Hohhot before Fu’s arrival so that this “merit” might give him
honor in Fu’s eyes. Although Buyandelger ordered all military units to concentrate in
Hohhot, many of the more nationalistic generals and officers in the army did not approve
of his orders and motives. Rather than carry out the orders, many of them surrendered
directly to the Soviet-Mongolian Allied Forces.
When the Communist forces arrived outside the city of Hohhot, Buyandelger
refused them entrance into the city. When the Chinese First Division of the Mongol
Army, under the command of Meng Jisan, arrived in the vicinity of Wuchuan, pressed the
Chinese Communist forces into retreat, and lifted the siege of the city, Fu was able to
enter the city and announce a “glorious reconquest.” But the rewards for Buyandelger
were insignificant. While the city was under siege by the Communists, Buyandelger had
ordered the cadets of the Mongolian Military Academy to join the war against the Com
munists. But Sangduureng, president of the academy, viewed the struggle with the Com
munists as an internal Han Chinese civil war that did not require the participation of the
Mongol nationality. He therefore disregarded Buyandelger’s orders. After Fu’s army en
tered the city, the Chinese authorities condemned Sangduureng’s collaboration with the
Communists and attempted to arrest or capture him. This angered the cadets, who re
solved to use their weapons if necessary to protect themselves. Fu’s army mobilized one
brigade against the academy but could not take it over. In the ensuing struggle, there were
deaths among the cadets, but Fu’s forces suffered more casualties. Negotiations were
quickly carried out, and Fu’s army lifted its siege. The cadets, under the leadership of
Sangduureng, marched northward and joined with the Outer Mongolian forces.
The newly established defense forces of the leagues proved useless because they
did not accept any instructions from their superiors and also because the Soviet mechan
ized forces passed them by, not regarding them as viable military units. As a result, most
of the league forces disbanded and returned to their home areas. Only the forces of the
Chahar League stayed together; under the leadership of the extreme Mongol nationalist
Golminse, they joined up with the Outer Mongolian forces. Damrinsurung, the com
mander of the seventh division, who had always favored the unification of Inner and
Outer Mongolia, disarmed himself and surrendered to the Soviet forces. He also encour
aged his troops to go over to the Outer Mongolian side and cooperate with that group.
Oljeiochir, commander of the ninth division, crossed over to the Chinese Communist side
and became a liaison officer of the Chinese Communist forces. Oljeiochir had always
believed that all Communist parties were members of one great family and that no sig
nificant difference existed between Chinese Communists and Mongolian Communists.
He also supported the concept of cooperation with Outer Mongolia so as to liberate Inner
Mongolia and speed the progress of the social revolution. Consequently, his division did
not disband, and it soon became a military contingent of the Chinese Communist forces
in Inner Mongolia. Most of the Mongolian divisions chose not to defer to Chinese Com
munist forces. Rather, they chose their courses of action because of nationalistic aspira
tions and because they were heartened by the appearance of Outer Mongolian forces in
their homeland.
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The Last Hours of the Mongolian Government in Kalgan
By this time, the only military forces still obedient to the commands of Prince
De and Li Shouxin were portions of Prince De’s bodyguard and some of Li Shouxin’s old
Chinese forces stationed in the vicinity of Kalgan. Of course, so minor a core of loyal
troops could not resist the onslaughts of Fu Zuoyi and the Chinese Communist forces.
The Japanese forces had originally planned to resist the advance of the Soviet Red Army
along the mountain ranges outside of Kalgan, but because of Japan’s unconditional sur
render, they were unable to do so.
External pressure and internal disintegration led the followers of Prince De to
discuss the situation, as a consequence of which they decided to dispatch liaison officers
to Outer Mongolia and see what resulted from that before making any further plans. At
this time, Jirgalang (who had been dispatched to Shilingol), Tegshibuyan, and Ruiyong
had all been cut off from communication with Prince De. Even wireless telegraph ma
chines proved useless in trying to establish contact with them. For this reason, other dele
gates were dispatched northward to contact the Soviet-Mongolian forces. After assessing
the will of those present at this discussion, Mergenbagatur, an old follower of Prince De
from the days of the 1933 Autonomy Movement and later a bureau head of the Ulanchab
League; Chogbadarakhu, Prince De’s chief secretary; and Temurdoshi, a clerk of Prince
De’s library and a Christian, who since his early years had been able to speak some Eng
lish, volunteered to proceed north as delegates. Accepting their offer. Prince De furnished
them with his own automobile. But when this contingent of delegates passed the moun
tains north of Kalgan near the city of Zhangbei, they were stopped by Soviet-Mongolian
forces, who not only refused to recognize them as delegates, but even arrested them. The
Soviet-Mongolian forces eventually released Mergenbagatur and sent him back to Kal
gan. Chogbadarakhu and Temurdushi were sent to Ulaanbaatar.
Chochbadarakhu, one of the intellectuals most trusted by Prince De, was ideo
logically disposed toward socialism. He recognized, however, that the road to Moscow
was a dead end for the future of Mongolia. Perhaps the exigencies of the moment and the
desperate atmosphere permeating the discussion with Prince De had compelled him to
disregard his misgivings about Soviet-style socialism and undertake the difficult task of
proceeding north for negotiations with the People’s Republic of Mongolia and the Soviet
Union. He never returned from Ulaanbaatar.
After Chogbadarakhu failed to return. Prince De attempted to dispatch another
of his old followers, his secretary Chogbagatur, to proceed to Chungking. Chogbagatur
had always considered himself an agent of the KMT and was opposed in principle to
contacting the Mongolian People’s Republic. He had urged Prince De to drop this plan
and to contact Chungking immediately. Acting on Chogbagatur’s suggestion. Prince De
sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking on August 18. In this telegram. Prince
De congratulated Chiang Kai-shek for his victory over Japan and inquired whether
Chungking could possbily settle the Mongols’ problems and give them a higher degree of
autonomy.
By this time, Kalgan had fallen into confusion. The Japanese military asked
Prince De to send some cars to the warehouse of the Opium Monopoly {Tuyao zuhe), take
possession of the opium stored there, and use it as capital for dealing with the changing
situation. Prince De realized that this opium represented a great amount of wealth, but he
also knew that it was public property and that no one person was qualified to take posses
sion of it. Although he was informed that two government officials had already appropri-
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ated a portion of the opium, he decided it would be best not to touch it. Opium was a poi
son that could create many problems. Prince De decided to send it back and not become
implicated in this shady affair. This decision is, of course, a tribute to Prince De’s integ
rity. While the opium was being returned, a portion of it was taken by several officials.
Marshal Choibalsan, the MPR strongman and commander of the Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary Army, followed the Soviet Red Army and entered Inner Mongo
lia. The Soviet-Mongolian forces occupied Zhangbei and pressed onward toward the
mountains near Kalgan, where they stopped. But they did have several airplanes circle
above Kalgan. When Prince De’s envoys to the north were captured, fear began to enter
the hearts of the people, and Soviet planes began to appear above Kalgan, dropping a few
small bombs but inflicting no major damage. Along with these bombs they dropped a
large number of propaganda leaflets, which condemned Prince De as a “thief’ who had
“swindled the Mongol people and sold them out to Japan, the tail of the fascists.” These
leaflets were a great disappointment to Prince De and those who wished to establish con
tacts with the north. They also had the effect of shifting support to the realists under the
leadership of Wu Heling, who advocated closer ties with Chungking.
Prince De, soon realized that he had no way to contact the banners and leagues,
and so had no choice but to restore ties with Chungking. With the support of the Japanese
military, Li Shouxin, and others, he reluctantly boarded the last train from Kalgan to
Beiping at dusk on August 20, 1945. This marked the complete collapse of the Mongol
ian Autonomous State, which had existed for four years. The Mongolian Defense Head
quarters, of course, also collapsed at this time.
Inner Mongolia had been occupied by the Japanese military and administered by
Prince De for almost ten years.

XIII
INNER MONGOLIA AFTER THE JAPANESE DEFEAT
AUGUST 1945 - JANUARY 1946
Prince De Moves from Kalgan to Beiping and Chungking
On the night of August 20, 1945, Prince De left Kalgan for Beiping. When his
train arrived at the Xuanhua station, it was learned that the railroad tracks ahead had been
destroyed. Just then, Liu Jiguang, governor of Xuanhua Province, who was suspected to
be Chungking’s liaison, arrived with a document for the Prince. The document was from
Chiang Kai-shek, Chainnan of the Military Committee of the Chinese government, and it
appointed Prince De as commander of the Advance Mongolian Forces. Li Shouxin was
named commander of the Jehol and Chahar Forces. Since the document said nothing
about the future of Mongolia, Prince De made no definite reply concerning the appoint
ments. Instead, he sent Beiping a request to carry out further negotiations upon his arri
val. Because they had lost control over the Mongol Army, it was difficult for Prince De
and Li to give a definite answer to the Chungking side.
When Prince De arrived in Beiping, he stayed at the residence of Ajia Khutugtu
in the great monastery of Yonghegong, while Li Shouxin stayed in his own house. The
followers of Prince De were accommodated at both Yonghegong and another Buddhist
monastery, Songzhusi. In an atmosphere of uncertainty and distress, the Mongols in
Beiping discovered in the newspaper that on August 24, Chiang Kai-shek, in response to
his acceptance of the Yalta Agreement and the independence of Outer Mongolia, had
lectured on “The Fulfillment of Nationalism and Maintenance of World Peace.” This
news greatly elevated Mongol spirits. Mongols could now believe that the Chinese gov
ernment, following the victory over Japan, would faithfully implement the teachings of
Sun Yat-sen as follows: “The government should help weaker and smaller nationalities
inside the country carry out self-determination and self-rule.” The Mongols hoped that
since the independence of Outer Mongolia was now recognized, the problems of Inner
Mongolia would also be solved. Even Prince De, as he read this important news, was
overcome by optimism, but even he failed to analyze the situation objectively.
The Mongols did not know the Chinese leaders’ attitude toward the Yalta
Agreement. Full of optimism. Prince De was anxious to go to Chungking and resolve
Inner Mongolia’s problems in direct negotiations with the authorities of the KMT gov
ernment. In fact, however, Chiang’s important lecture clearly pointed out the contradic
tory nature of the government’s policies toward Inner Mongolia. The original text reads:
Today 1 represent all the comrades of the Party, which is based on the teachings of
the National Father, and I will explain the policy as it now exists for the fulfillment of na
tionalism and the maintenance of world peace. This policy favors our nation very much. I
should first explain that the national problems of Outer Mongolia and Tibet are the result of
their own long histories. When our Chinese Kuomintang reorganized in the 13th year of the
Republic [1924], Outer Mongolia immediately dispatched its delegates to celebrate. On that
occasion, our National Father recognized them as a fraternal state and treated the delegates
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as honored guests. All these principles were recorded in [his] remaining teachings and were
recognized by the world. All my fellow countrymen must know that if we neglect the desire
for national equality and freedom and suppress the development of independence and selfrule, it would contradict the spirit of our National Revolution. It would also increase the
conflict between the nationalities in our country and damage the hundred year grand plan
for building our nation. Finally, the stability of world peace would be affected.
From the eleventh year of the Republic [1922] in the Beijing government period.
Outer Mongolia competed for its right to independence. Now, 25 [sic] years since the re
sumption of world conflict, it is proper that we once again cultivate our old, good friend
ship. We must follow the principles of our National Revolution in order to act consistently
with this priority. We must make our decisions decisively and legally, recognizing the in
dependence of Outer Mongolia, so that we may establish a strong friendship and bring
about a satisfactory solution to our problems. An absence of friendship between China and
Outer Mongolia would greatly affect our inner stability and world peace.
The nationalities not under the administration of the provinces and who are not capa
ble of self-rule, who yet wish for independence, may in time reach a point at which they are
able to achieve political and economic independence. We hope that our country, in the
spirit of love and friendliness, can foster such independence and freedom while treating
them as equal fraternal nations and not create ill feeling or prejudice against them because
of their separation from the mother country. And all nationalities should hold a friendly and
fraternal attitude toward their mother eountry as they pursue their legal goals; they should
not carry out any kind of revolutionary activities against the mother country. Large and
small nationalities within the territories of the provinces should be treated equally—politi
cally and legally. Their freedom of belief and economy should be respected in order for us
all to accomplish the goal of sincere unification and cultivate mutual love and respect
among all subnationalities.

On August 25, the government ratified the Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact and
designated Outer Mongolia as an independent nation. On August 28, through the media
tion of Ambassador Hurley, Mao Zedong was brought from Yan’an to Chungking to
meet with Chiang Kai-shek and start the “Political Consultation Conference,” which was
to focus on creating another period of cooperation between the KMT and the Chinese
Communists.
In Japan, after the suicide of Anan Tadaki, minister of the army, the commander
of Japanese Forces in North China was appointed to replace him in his post; the com
mander of Japanese forces in Mongolia, Nemoto Hiroshi, was made commander of Japa
nese forces in North China. Earlier, at the time of the Japanese surrender, Nemoto had
expressed his regret that Japan was not able to provide full support for Mongolian inde
pendence. Now, after Prince De’s arrival in Beiping, Nemoto sent Nakajima Manzo, the
former general affairs section head of the General Affairs Ministry in the Mongolian
government, to the Prince. Nakajima brought the Prince thirty thousand silver dollars and
three hundred million dollars of paper money issued by the Mengjiang Bank. The Prince
accepted the silver dollars and handed over the three hundred million dollars in Meng
jiang Bank notes to Oljeitu, a man of known integrity among the Mongols, to distribute
fairly among all those followers who came to Beiping with him to help settle their fami
lies. Soon after, Nemoto invited Prince De, Li Shouxin, Wu Heling, and Kanki Masaichi
and other Japanese officials above the rank of deputy minister to a meeting. Both sides
delivered speeches on past cooperation and expressed their distress over the goals they
were unable to accomplish. The Japanese regretted their negligence in support of the
Mongols, but it was now too late. From this point on, Prince De held no further talks with
Japanese authorities.
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During his stay in Beiping, Prince De tried to contact Chungking so as to rees
tablish the former relationship and to talk with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek about the
future of Mongolia face to face in Chungking. However, the prince’s agents in Beiping,
perhaps because of their low rank, were unable to contact the top KMT leaders, and
Prince De received no clear response to his initiative. Even He Qigong, Mayor of Beiping
at that time, who had been head of Chungking’s secret agents in areas under Japanese
occupation, expressed a sincere hope that the visit could be carried out, but there was no
airplane under his control that could be dispatched. During this deadlock, Aminboke was
in Beiping, and through his personal contacts, he introduced his older brothers Wu
Guting and Wu Heling to agents of General Hu Zongnan, commander of the First War
Zone, who was assigned to block the movements of Chinese Communists in Northern
Shaanxi. Aminboke and his friends were able to convey the wishes of Prince De to Gen
eral Hu. Hu immediately responded, expressing his welcome to the Prince, and inviting
him to visit Xi’an and then Chungking. Soon after, Hu Zongnan asked Xiao Zhengyi, a
professor at Yenching University, and Sun Jian to deliver personal letters to Prince De, Li
Shouxin, Wu Heling and Wu Guting, inviting each of them to Xi’an. Hu and Xiao visited
Prince De and arranged for the Prince, Li Shouxin, Wu Heling, Wu Guting, and their
secretaries, Chogbaatar, Urgungbu, and Gombojab to go to Xi’an on an American mili
tary plane.
Before Prince De left Beiping, a conflict arose among his followers. First,
Chogbagatur and Togtakhu persuaded the Prince not to have Wu Heling accompany him.
Their excuse was that “Wu is a practical man. He might sell out the future of Mongolia
for a low price. Since we demand a higher degree of autonomy, it would be better not to
allow him to go.” Prince De also intended to leave Wu in Beiping so he could tie up any
loose ends there. But Wu Heling insisted on going, saying, “Mongolia is the Mongolia of
all of us. It is not just your Mongolia. Everybody has his own obligation to assure the
future of Mongolia. Moreover, there is the personal invitation from Hu Zongnan. In Jan
uary 1936, when I returned from Nanjing to Mongolia, I was dispatched by Generalis
simo Chiang. Why shouldn’t 1 go?!” After this speech. Prince De did not insist on stop
ping him.
The next conflict broke out between Chogbaatar and Togtakhu, who also strug
gled to accompany the Prince to Chungking. Although Chogbaatar was an old follower of
the Prince, his behavior and support in the period of the Mongolian government had been
weak, and he fell out of favor. Still, he knew better than the others the political tactics of
the KMT and therefore was much more qualified than Togtakhu, who had always been a
“running dog” of the Japanese militarists. After consideration, the prince decided that
Chogbagatur should also accompany him.
Upon his arrival in Xi’an, Prince De accepted a friendly welcome from General
Hu. After a two-day stay, the Prince and his entourage were sent southward to Baoji on a
military plane, and from Baoji to Chungking by the China Air Navigation Company.
Prince De and his men were welcomed by Ma Hansan, the head of intelligence work for
North China, and other high ranking military intelligence people. Because Ma had had
very intimate secret contact with Prince De and Li Shouxin during the period of Japanese
occupation, he came to meet them at the airport. Ma and his organization provided Shulu
as a temporary guest house for the Prince and his group.
As Urgungbu told me, Shulu was not normally used as a guest house, but a place
for high ranking “criminals” to be held hostage. Of course, this was not known by Prince
De and his entourage at the time; because of the bad reputation of the place, no Mongol
in Chungking came for a visit. Every day. Prince De stared sadly from the upper story
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upon the courtyard and watched the flag-raising ceremony. Perhaps he recalled past
ceremonies carried out in Kalgan. Of course, no one asked him what he was thinking,
fearing to increase his unhappy state of mind. Later, Shang Zhen, chief of the military
unit guarding the chairman, was heard to say, “Earlier, when Japan’s defeat was certain, a
high-ranking conference discussed the future of those local leaders involved with the
Japanese in Nanjing, North China, and Mongolia. The Generalissimo said. When the
time comes. Prince De will come to see me. I know him very well.’ Now that the Prince
and you gentlemen have come, the Generalissimo is very pleased. Hearing that Prince De
was accommodated at the Shulu, the Generalissimo added. How could you have him
stay there? Tell the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission to arrange immediately a
proper place and treat him hospitably.’” The head of the commission, Luo Liangjian,
invited the Mongols to stay at the guest house of the commission; only then did the Mon
gols in Chungking dare visit the prince.
During this period. Prince De met with many important military and political
figures.' They discussed the situation in general: the future of the Mongolian problem,
the hopes of the Mongols, and the activities of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Com
munists in both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Responses from the Chinese side were both
positive and negative, but these talks were merely private conversations, leading to no
conclusions for policy.

Mongols in Chungking
Among the Mongols in Chungking who came to discuss the future of Mongolia
with Prince De were Bai Yunti, a senior member of the KMT who had visited Sunid and
then returned to Chungking; Wu Yunpeng, who became head of the Nanjing Office of the
Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners Delegates; Bai Rui, a member of the Control
Yuan; Li Yongxin, head of the Border Areas Party Affairs Bureau of the KMT central
headquarters; Rong Zhao, Chin Zhichao, and Rashidondug, the Mongol members of the
People’s Political Council; and Dugur (Li Shoushan), head of the Nanjing office of the
Janggiya Khutugtu. Many of these visitors criticized the Prince’s political tone as too
idealistic and impractical.
By this time, the Mongols in Chungking were mainly divided into two fac
tions—one headed by Bai Yunti and Wu Yunpeng, the other by Li Yongxin. In the first
group, Bai, its nominal leader, was manipulated by Wu Yunpeng, who enjoyed the sup
port of the Mongolian delegates in Nanjing. Wu was a member of the political clique of
Zhu Jiahua, the current minister of education, but he had been squeezed out of real power
in the party by the clique of Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu (then known as the C.C. Clique).
The other group, led by Li Yongxin, was supported by the Border Area Party Affairs Bu
reau and other Mongol members who were working in party headquarters. And of course
he was a member of the C.C. Clique. Wu Yunpeng, an Aukhan man, had been sent as a
' Dai Li, head of military intelligence; Shang Zhen, chief of the military entourage of the chairman
of the Chinese government; He Guoguang, secretary-general of the military committee; He
Yingqin, commander in chief of the army; Chen Cheng, the minister of military affairs; Lo Liang
jian, chairman of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission; Yu Youren, head of the Control
Yuan; Wu Tiecheng, secretary general of the Kuomintang Central Committee; Chen Lifu, head of
the Organization Department of the KMT; and Li Zongren, who was assigned to be head of the
Military Committee, Beiping branch.
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delegate of Juu-uda League to Nanjing in 1929, and he worked under Wu Heling in the
Nanjing Office of the Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners Delegates. He therefore
was very close to Wu Heling.
Li Yongxin, a man from Kharachin Left Banner of Josutu League, had gradu
ated from the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy. In his early years, he was a member of the
Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, under the leadership of Bai Yunti. During
China’s civil war of 1925, Li and a group of party members retreated to the northwest
comer of Inner Mongolia, and later, most of the members formally Joined the KMT.
From then on, Li became a devoted member of the party. In 1928, Wu Heling and his
Mongolian delegation arrived in Nanjing and formed the Nanjing Office of Mongolian
Leagues, Tribes, and Banners Delegates. Li always contrasted his own revolutionary at
titude with the position of Wu Heling, whom he condemned as a counterrevolutionary.
In the group of Li Yongxin, the most capable member was Liu Lianke, who had
helped the government resolve the March 26 Incident at Yekejuu League. Second in abil
ity to Liu was Pai Haifeng, who at the time was commander of the Independent Cavalry
Brigade. He had deserted Prince De in 1936 from Beile-yin Sume. In addition, He Zhaolin was known as Li’s personal advisor. Because both Li and He were thoroughly
sinicized and unable to speak Mongolian, this group was conspicuously less Mongolian
in cultural style. Moreover, because the main cadres in this group were all from Khara
chin Left Banner, they were boycotted by the clique of Western Inner Mongolians,
headed by the leaders of both the Chahar and Turned areas.
Li Yongxin set out to strengthen the KMT in Mongolia, using as a pretext the
need to struggle against the expansion of Chinese Communists. He was supported by the
powerful C.C. Clique. To reinforce party power, Li Yongxin organized several party
branches within the border provinces. He appointed Zhao Chengbi (Oyundalai from Cha
har) as the head of the KMT headquarters of the Mongol Banners in Suiyuan, Yu Dechun
in Chahar, Xue Xingm in Rehe, Jin Chongwei in Liaobei, and Xu Zhankui in Heilong
jiang. Then he appointed He Zhaolin to be the special director of party affairs in Inner
Mongolia to supervise the entire organization.
Li Yongxin aimed to establish the Mongolian KMT headquarters in the province
at the same level as the Chinese KMT party headquarters in the provinces, a move which
he hoped would help rehabilitate the Mongolian banners. From Prince De’s viewpoint, all
these activities concerned only the KMT. He had no interest in them. Moreover, these
party headquarters were named after the border provinces, which ran the risk of creating
the impression that the Mongolian administrations would be placed under the control of
Chinese provincial governments. Prince De cautioned Li Yongxin against adopting these
names.

Prince De’s Visit with Chiang Kai-shek
During the eight years of the anti-Japanese war, the connection between the
central government and most of Inner Mongolia had been broken, with the exception of
the areas of the Yekejuu League and Alashan and EJine Banners. The Kokonor Mongol
Banners were under the domination of the Islamic warlords; the Mongolian territory in
Xinjiang was governed under special political rules. The Chinese government was not
permitted by the KMT to intervene. Despite the fact that some government resolutions
were being made on behalf of the Mongols, the resolutions were ineffectual and were
neglected by powerful Chinese officials at the regional level. As for education in these
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ethnic Mongol territories, only one middle school was established in Yekejuu League,
and some funding was given to several primary sehools.
Although the central government appointed several Mongols to the People’s
Political Council, most were simply political tokens and without influence. This should
not be attributed to incapability of the Mongols in Chungking, but rather to political inter
ference by the Mongolian Affairs Bureau and the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Committee.
All the objectives of the Mongols, even including some policies of the central govern
ment, were usually blocked by these organizations after “careful study.” Chu Mingshan,
then head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau, was the man who procrastinated in these
matters. His method was to make light of serious issues. He usually said, “Let’s give
them some money to play with for a while, and the issue will pass.” This was also the
attitude of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. The chairman of the commission,
Luo Liangjian, having no political influence, dared not go to his superiors. His policy was
to avoid mistakes by refusing to act. Prince De did not accept him as a leader capable of
discussing Mongolian matters, choosing instead to negotiate directly with Chiang Kaishek, chairman of the Chinese government.
The Communists opposed Prince De strongly, no matter what proposals he of
fered. They made a severe attack on him in the New China Daily (Xinhua ribao), and also
mobilized several members of the People’s Political Council to call for Prince De’s pun
ishment as a collaborator with the Japanese. Although this was not a serious threat, it did
hinder the government in discussion of the Mongolian problem with the prince.
Prince De stayed in Chungking for almost two more months, during which he
made two visits to Chiang Kai-shek. The first visit was at the end of September, the sec
ond at the end of November. In his first visit, Prince De was accompanied by Li Shouxin
and had supper with the Generalissimo. Prince De reported on the situation in Mongolia
and praised the principle enunciated in Chiang’s lecture in which Chiang had recognized
the independence of Outer Mongolia. Concerning Inner Mongolia, the Prince called for a
higher degree of autonomy, offering the relationship between England and members of
the British Commonwealth as a model.
Chiang did not directly reject this idea, but he politely shifted the discussion to
personal matters and then asked De to work with him to gain power for the Mongols. “Do
not allow them to get any advantage,” Chiang said. This was said during the third round
of talks on KMT-Communist cooperation, so Chiang avoided using “Chinese Commun
ist,” referring to them only as “them.” As for the Inner Mongolian problem, Chiang em
phasized that once the overall situation was normalized, a reasonable solution could be
achieved. Then he urged Prince De to wait patiently for the right moment. The visit con
cluded with a friendly and warm personal talk between Chiang Kai-shek and Prince De.
Though the prince had longed for this meeting for many years, nevertheless, this talk did
not offer any solutions to the Inner Mongolian problem. After discussing his visit with
the Mongol elite in Chungking, Prince De affirmed and clarified their discussion by pre
senting a written document to Chiang Kai-shek through Xiong Bin. The main points are
as follows:
The viewpoint that I carefully and secretly advocate is as follows: Currently, 80-90%
of the land in Inner Mongolia is occupied by the Soviet-Outer Mongolian forces. If they
withdraw their troops immediately, this would suffice. But if Outer Mongolian troops . . .
stay there, refusing to withdraw, or if they retreat from the agricultural areas and do not
move northward from the pastoral areas, the greater part of Inner Mongolia will still be oc
cupied by Outer Mongolia. This is the first wony.
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Migration ... in the pastoral zones is very convenient. There are many records his
torically of the migrations of the masses. Now,. . . they might seize all the population and
domestic animals, the yurts and other properties, and move them during their retreat. . . .
This is the second worry.
Even if the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia do not cany out these measures but
during . .. their . .. occupation . . . will. . . spread their communistic activities ... or col
laborate with the Eighth Route Army and create some kind of unreasonable de facto insti
tutions. [fhey] may be impossible to deal with in the future. This is the third worry.
All in all, the present situation in Inner Mongolia is extremely dangerous, and I there
fore dare to ask your permission to carry out the following three proposals to relieve the
tense situation and to diminish the danger.
1. The central government should urge the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia to quickly
withdraw. . . . This will prevent the traditionally anti-Communist Inner Mongolia from be
ing turned into a communist state.
2. The central government should dispatch important members to organize a Mongolian
Guidance Committee, ... to negotiate with the Soviets and rehabilitate the leagues and
banners, and to raise the morale of the Mongolian armies, officials, and people. This or
ganization should enter Mongolia immediately to carry out its work.. ..
3. The central government should again proclaim its goodwill, allowing Inner Mongolia to
establish a high degree of autonomy. [The central government should] dispatch a special
envoy to establish a preliminary committee to achieve a higher degree of Mongolian auton
omy. This must be carried out positively so as to soothe Inner Mongolian anxiety and to
block the temptations and propaganda introduced by Outer Mongolia.
4. 1 sincerely await your instructions as to whether these items can or cannot be carried
out.
P.S. As for the higher degree of autonomy, it has no definite precedent; yet in order
to act against the conspiracy of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia and to reinforce the
present Inner Mongolian situation, it seems better to follow the model of Canada and Aus
tralia under British sovereignty. Unless the name of Mongolia is made noble, we will not be
able to win the hearts of the people. It is not necessary to be autonomous in national de
fense, foreign affairs, and other important matters; these can be aligned with [the policies
of] and supervised by the central government. The people generally both support the unifi
cation of Inner Mongolia and hope for guidance from the central government. The reason
we wish to achieve autonomous dominion is to prevent Inner Mongolia from being ab
sorbed. If this recommendation receives your sympathy, I hope that when the higher degree
of autonomy is declared, that Inner Mongolia would clearly become a separate domain of
China. Then your excellency’s great desire to foster nationalities in this country would be
greatly admired by the world. Of course, it will also immeasurably stabilize Inner Mongol-

After Chiang Kai-shek read this document, he ordered the Ministry of the Inter
ior, the Ministry of Military Affairs, together with the Mongolian-Tibetan Commission,
to find successful resolutions of the issues it raised. The following are their responses:
1. The first concern was to hasten Soviet and Outer Mongolian withdrawal from Inner
Mongolia. . . . This was carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the
Japanese surrender, by the establishment of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact.
2. The second demand was that the central government dispatch an important member to
organize a Mongolian Guidance Committee to pacify the Mongol people and to win their
hearts. This . .. concern ... has already been addressed by the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission ... [with its proposal] to organize the “Mongolian Consolidating and Guiding
Mission.” . . . Now that this mission is in the planning stage, there seems to be no need to
appoint a second important minister to handle the matter.
3. As for the suggestion that the central government should promise Inner Mongolia a
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higher degree of autonomy and organize a preliminary committee for Inner Mongolian
autonomy, the sixth congress of the [KMT] has established the party political outline, and
that policy calls for a higher degree of autonomy for the Mongols, Tibetans, and other na
tionalities.^ An earlier Mongolian-Tibetan Committee drafted a plan for local autonomy of
the border areas and the Mongol banners. This plan has been studied by the Interior Minis
try and other related institutions and has been presented to the Executive Yuan for ratifica
tion. This plan contains a systematic policy for achieving Inner Mongolian autonomy for
which Prince De and the other Mongols in Chungking have all expressed their appreeiation.
Therefore, it seems unnecessary to organize a preliminary committee to work toward a
higher-degree of Inner Mongolian autonomy as requested.

Judging from the second point, it is clear that all the hopes of Prince De were
thoroughly negated. Later, it was heard that this document was originally drafted by Chu
Mingshan, head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commission. The result was similar to what was done with those Mongol proposals that
had historically been presented to the Manchu court. For instance, by the end of the Qing
Dynasty, Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin had submitted two important memos to the
Imperial Court. These were all blocked by the court officials after “sincere study.” This
approach to Mongolian politics on the part of KMT officials continued, not only in the
period of the Beijing government, but also by the KMT authorities in the 1940s. As for
the plan of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission to grant local autonomy to the
Mongol Banners, it was nothing but a lie. Prince De had never agreed to such a proposal.
Interestingly, in this conspiracy by the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, nobody
tried to discover the truth. The commission only approved Prince De’s proposal to create
a Mongolian Consolidating and Guidance Mission—and that only for superficial pur
poses.

In addition to Prince De and Li Shouxin, both Wu Heling and Wu Guting were
summoned by the generalissimo. In his report, Wu Heling emphasized that his return to
Mongolia was specifically authorized by the Generalissimo. Wu had realized that Prince
De’s demand for a higher degree of autonomy would not be accepted. He explained that,
during the struggle between the KMT and the Chinese Communists, Mongolian banners
should be rehabilitated as soon as possible to accelerate the expansion of the influence of
the Chinese government in Mongolian lands. Subsequently, Wu’s proposal was accepted
by Chiang Kai-shek, and at the same time, the Generalissimo spoke approvingly of Wu’s
actions during the Japanese occupation. Chiang ordered Wu Guting to return to Inner
Mongolia to reunify the Mongolian military forces. Soon after, Li Shouxin was appointed
commander of the Tenth Route Army. Chogbagatur also took advantage of his visit to
establish a tie with the intelligence group under the Generalissimo. All in all, the visit of
Prince De and his group to Chungking was successful, except that his desire for a resolu
tion to the Mongolian problem remained unfulfilled. The personal aims of Li Shouxin,
Wu Heling, Wu Kuting, and even Chogbagatur were all settled.
After his proposal was accepted by Chiang Kai-shek, Wu Heling immediately
made contact with the military committee and started to organize the group for the reha
bilitation of the Mongolian banners under his leadership. He called the group the Mon^ The resolutions made by the sixth congress of the KMT, May 17, 1945 were (1) to provide a
higher degree of autonomy to Outer Mongolia and to Tibet, (2) to rehabilitate the Mongolian Local
Autonomous Political Affairs Council, and (3) to clearly divide the power between the Mongolian
banners and the Chinese provinces and xians.
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golian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group [Menggu xuantaotuan\. Wu Heling’s pur
pose was twofold. (1) During the occupation, the Inner Mongolian leagues and banners
had been separated from the central government for a prolonged period. After the victory
over Japan, leaders found it impossible to resolve immediately all of their problems be
cause rehabilitation of the Chinese provinces and xians would have hindered the reha
bilitation of the leagues and banners. Therefore, to strengthen the base of Mongol power,
it would be better to rehabilitate the leagues and banners first. This would be more practi
cal than to demand only a higher degree of autonomy. (2) He realized that the work of the
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was just for show, and that the so-called Mon
golian Consolidating and Guiding Mission was ineffective. Moreover, the leader of the
mission, Bai Yunti, was an old political foe of Wu who needed to do something to pro
mote his own recovery of power.
After receiving his appointment, Wu Guting was recruited by General He Zhuguo, head of the military committee’s northeast branch. He also gave Wu Guting the rank
of major general and had him recruit Mongol forces from places that had earlier been
under Japanese occupation. Chogbagatur was made counselor of the second bureau (in
telligence) of the National Defense Ministry to serve Prince De and to report on the ac
tivities of the Mongols.
As already mentioned, Li Yongxin and his Bureau of Border Region Party Af
fairs of the KMT Central Headquarters also operated in Inner Mongolia. His followers
(He Zhaolin, Xue Xingru, and others) were dispatched to Beiping to recruit capable per
sons from the former Mongolian government and to organize the KMT party headquar
ters in the Mongolian banner areas. The Mongolian Consolidating and Guiding Mission
advanced to Beiping with its head, Bai Yunti, and* members Wu Yunpeng, Rong Zhao,
Hang Jiaxiang (Damrindorji), and Chu Mingshan, its advisor. Rong Zhao, a Turned man,
had graduated from the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy. In the mid-1920s, he had joined
the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and was sent to the Soviet Union for
further education. In the early 1940s, he became a member of the People’s Political
Council in Chungking. Damrindordji was a Chahar delegate in Chungking. After their
arrival in Beiping, Chu Mingshan told Wu Heling (according to what Wu later told me),
“This mission is nothing more than an excuse to provide them with money and to have
them play and enjoy themselves in Beiping as a reward for the hardship they had endured
and for following the Chungking government.” Apparently, the Mongolian-Tibetan Af
fairs Commission was not designed to accomplish anything for the Mongolian banners.
In the early part of October 1945, the military committee prepared an airplane to
bring Prince De and his group back to Beiping. But when he received no answer from
Chiang Kai-shek, Prince De decided to stay in Chungking for a second visit. Therefore,
only Li Shouxin, Wu Heling, Wu Guting, and Urgungbu returned to Beiping on that
plane. After waiting for a month. Prince De had a second opportunity to meet with
Chiang Kai-shek face to face, but this time too he failed to reach an understanding with
the generalissimo. Instead, Prince De later told me he had told Chiang, “Outer Mongolia
is able to achieve its independence because of the promise of Your Excellency, the
chairman. The best way to solve the Inner Mongolian problems is to follow Dr. Sun Yatsen’s promise of self-determination and self-rule for the weak and small nationalities in
the country, and to follow the path of the British Commonwealth by the provision of an
autonomous region to carry out this self-rule. This is what is needed to successfully win
the hearts of the Mongolian people.”
Chiang answered neither yes nor no to this statement, but said, “A reasonable
solution for Mongolia should be achieved after the situation has settled down. But for the
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time being, it would be better for you to be more patient. As for your personal matters, no
matter what the problem, you can approach me and I will make the proper arrangements
to see that it is t^en care of.” When the conversation reached this point. Prince De felt it
was not the time to pursue other issues. He thanked Chiang and indicated that it was time
to leave.
In the latter part of November, Prince De, accompanied by Chogbagatur and
Gombojab, returned to Beiping from Chungking; at about the same time, I arrived in
Beiping from the Shilingol League. I met the Prince at the Nanyuan Airport. It was an
emotional reunion. The next day, I went to the Prince’s temporary residence on the Sixth
Lane of Dongsipailou Street. I reported to the Prince the situation in Shilingol after the
occupation by the Soviet-Mongolian Allied forces. While the Prince listened, he sighed
deeply, comforting me again and again. TTie Prince, although deeply distressed, smiled
and tried to hide his bitterness.

My Personal Recollections of the Soviet Occupation of Shilingol
Something strange was going on along the northern border of Shilingol League
in early August of 1945. Not only were many warnings given, there were also tracks of
Soviet soldiers. The guards of Ujumuchin and Abaga Banners arrested a few Russians,
probably parachutists sent to spy. Because these matters were extraordinary, the people of
these two banners hid the evidence and did not report the event to the Japanese.
On August 8, the Soviet Union formally declared war against Japan. At dawn of
that day, Soviet planes appeared on the horizon of Pandita-Gegeen-keid. The Japanese
special service office phoned Oguro, the top Japanese official in the league office, and
said, “The Red Army of the Soviet Union is already across the border and is moving
southward. Prepare immediately for the worst. Prepare all members for resistance.” By
then, the league head. Prince Sungjingwangchug, was in his own residence in the
Khauchid Left Banner; Deputy head Budabala was at his home in Abaga Left Banner.
The higher officials in the league office were myself, head of the General Affairs Bureau,
and Balgunsurung, head of the Civilian Affairs Bureau.
We immediately began to prepare. We wanted to telegraph Prince Sung, but the
radio in Khauchid was out of commission. So we sent a radio telegraph message to the
deputy head and told him not to go north to Pandita Gegeen-keid, but to wait for a second
report. Just then, Wang Shouben, the schoolmaster of the Shilingol Middle School, tele
phoned me and said, “The special service office has ordered all students to dress up in
uniforms, and will give them guns and other weapons for the protection of PanditaGegeen-keid region. What shall we do?” I answered, “Have all the students remove their
uniforms immediately, change into ordinary clothing, and dismiss them as soon as possi
ble. Tell them to hide in the temple or to take refuge in the people’s yurts in the vicinity,
or to go home, making their own way.” The principal agreed with me. He quickly dis
missed the students without consulting with the special service office.
Then I again telephoned the local brigade commander, Wang Zhushu. I told
Wang about the crisis and asked him whether he had received instructions from his super
iors. The answer was no. Wang also inquired about what he should do. I said, “It would
be impossible to confront the forces of the Soviet Union with only one brigade; it would
be better not to sacrifice the lives of your troops for nothing. Nevertheless, this is a matter
for military action. Please use your own judgment.” Later, it was heard that Wang also
dismissed his troops. They disbanded without incident.
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As for the matter of the league office, I warned Oguro and told him to not wait
for further instructions from the special service office. “We must destroy all the docu
ments and close the office immediately. All the Japanese members can use the trucks of
the league office and retreat into the border region of Manchukuo. As for the Mongol
members, 1 will make arrangements for them.” Oguro agreed with me. Then at eight
o’clock, the hour for flag raising, I gathered all members of the office and carried out the
ritual as usual. I then reported the news of the Soviet attack and ordered the abandonment
of the office. I also had the cash and guns divided evenly. Half of them were given to the
Japanese members for their personal protection and transportation. The other half was
distributed to the Mongol members. Oguro and other Japanese realized that for lack of
fuel, only two trucks were available. These we gave to them. So Oguro asked me to go
with them, but I rejected this kindness by arguing that a Mongol should remain in Mon
golia with other Mongols. In any case, even at that moment, it was difficult to trust any
Japanese. I saw them off, then stayed with the other Mongol members and their families.
Only after everyone had left the office did I leave.
By this time, Balgunsurung had already prepared horses for me and my com
pany to retreat to Balgunsurung’s home, about twenty kilometers south of the league of
fice. Upon our arrival, we saw black smoke in the north over the special service office.
The first thing Balgunsurung and 1 did was to toast with kumis, pointing toward the
smoke, in celebration of the end of Japanese oppression. Afterward, more calm feelings
settled upon us. We began to realize that as Mongols we could not escape from our na
tional responsibilities. Nevertheless, we were unsure how to confront this new situation
and turn it in a beneficial direction for Inner Mongolia. Indeed it was very difficult to
project any outcome.
During this crisis, Lieutenant Colonial Takehara Kiyoshi, head of the special
service office in Shilingol, who spoke Mongolian and was experienced in intelligence
work, was summoned by the Guandong Army to Xinjing and the special service office at
Abaga, which was under the leadership of the young and inexperienced Major Kimura
Koichi. Kimura was unable to control either the situation or his subordinates. Finally,
before they retreated, they killed all the Outer Mongolian spies they had imprisoned. In
order to cover up their cruel deed, they burned the entire quarter.
Balgunsurung and I hastened to the Yangdu monastery in the southernmost re
gion of Abaga, where Budabala and his family were attending a Buddhist ceremony. Our
bad news shocked everyone. Because we could not contact the league head, Sungchingwangchug, we hurriedly decided in the name of the deputy head of Shilingol
League, Budabala, and in my name, to write two letters to the commander of the Mongol
ian People’s Revolutionary Army, who we thought was collaborating with the Soviet
forces. The letters explained that Budabala and I wanted to contact them and help restore
order in that area. We wished to avoid disaster and losses to the local Mongol people that
might follow the Japanese withdrawal. Both sides were brothers through blood, the letter
continued, and we sincerely hoped both sides would be able to peacefully join as one to
struggle for a unified Mongol nation.
These two letters were delivered by Sainjiya, who had volunteered for the task.
Sainjiya was a section head of Shilingol League Office and a relative of Ulanfu. How
ever, after Sainjiya arrived at the Soviet forces camp, he was arrested, all his possessions
were confiscated, and he was stripped to his undergarments. The Russians then sent him
back, ignoring the letters. Upon his return, Sainjiya reported to Budabala and me: “I
didn’t see even the shadow of a Mongol. The Russians are extremely unreasonable. There
was no way to fulfill my mission.” His experience was similar to that of Mergenbator and
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Chogbagatur, who were sent by Prince De via Kalgan to the invading Russian forces.
Ironically, not long after, the two letters were published in Unen, the Outer Mongolian
Pravda, under the topic of hope for the liberation of Inner Mongolia.
Following Sainjiya’s return, a messenger hurried to Yangdu Ifom Balgunsurung’s home banner of Abkhanar with a grisly report from the monastery of PanditaGegeen. Russian officers had asked all the lama officials to gather together in front of the
monastery. One hundred or more were brought together in front of the main hall.
Crowded around were many who came out of curiosity to hear what would be said. But
no announcements were made by the Soviet officers; instead, they ordered the soldiers to
fire machine guns, slaughtering the innocent lamas without warning. This barbaric and
inhumane act caused all the people at Yangdu, including the monks and the officials of
the league office, to have no other choice but to cross the desert and head south. It was at
this time that I left the Shilingol League and my colleagues Budabala, Balgunsurung, and
others, with whom 1 had wholeheartedly worked for three years.
On my way south, I arrived at the house of Ochir, amban of Chahar, Gul-koke
Banner, following an earlier instruction from Prince De. “At a time of great change,” he
had told me, “it is important to gather together in the desert between Shilingol and Cha
har and wait to make a second move.” But the people of Gul-koke Banner knew nothing
about Prince De and the situation of Kalgan. Soon we heard reports that after the occupa
tion of the Yangdu monastery, the Soviet Red Army had killed eight lamas without rea
son. Magadburin Haltud, who was educated in Japan and later became an instructor of
Mongolian literature at the University of Bonn, was at this time a clerk of the khorshiya
(cooperative) of the Gul-koke Banner. Magadburin volunteered to represent the banner
and contact the army officers of the Outer Mongolian forces. On his way, however, he
met the Soviet forces, whose commander not only refused to listen but also stole his
clothes and possessions. This was the second failure to contact the Outer Mongolian side.
The Soviet Red Army did not pass through the territory of Gul-koke Banner but
instead turned toward Doloonnor. Then, after plundering, stealing, and destroying all the
monasteries of that famous historical religious center, the main forces marched toward
Chengde, the capital city of Rehe. Only then did the Outer Mongolian forces enter Inner
Mongolia and take responsibility for keeping order in areas Soviet troops had occupied.
A second detachment of Soviets crossed the border, entered Ujumuchin, and
marched south. On their way, they plundered the rich monastery of Lama-Kuriye.
Tusangga. The top official of Ujumuchin Right Banner, together with several officials,
advanced north to welcome the Soviet command. This act of good will was disregarded;
the Soviets captured Tusangga and looted the Prince’s residence of that banner. The So
viets then marched into the territory of Manchukuo and stationed themselves in the area
of Biruu (Jingpeng) and Linxi.
Now a split developed within the Ujumuchin Left Banner. A group under the
leadership of Dorji, the former jasag of the banner, expressed a willingness to support
Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union. They gathered about half of the banner’s popula
tion and moved northward into the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic. At the
same time, Dorji accused Dobdan, the designated jasag in charge of the banner, of being
a collaborator with the Japanese. The Soviet and Mongolian authorities then arrested
Dobdan’s whole family, together with Kabji Lama, another of Dorji’s political oppo
nents. This created chaos throughout the banner.
Another contingent of Soviet forces passed through the area of Khauchid Left
Banner. After looting and devastating the Prince’s residence, they captured Prince Sungjingwangchug, who was then the Shilingol League head. This abduction was not for po-
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litical reasons, but because they needed someone to take care of the horses they had sto
len. After several days, they released the prince. The Khauchid Right Banner was not
disturbed by any invading troops. Nevertheless, most of the people in this banner, under
the leadership of their young jasag, voluntarily moved northward and asked for citizen
ship in the Mongolian People’s Republic.
In the 1920s, a group of Buriyad Mongols living in the vicinity of Lake Baikal
had deserted their homeland because of their anti-Communist sentiments and moved to
the Hulunbuir area. Under the leadership of Rinchindorji, some of them had moved
westward into Shilingol and settled on the plateau of Modong-yin-shili in the Banner of
Right Khauchid. After the occupation by the Soviet Red Army, the Soviets became de
termined to bring these Buriyad Mongols back. They executed some Buriyad youth who
had been educated in Japan and those who had had any close relationship with the Japan
ese special service office, then forced the rest of the Buriyads to return to their old
homeland. However, they could not capture Rinchindorji, who took refuge in the desert
with a group of Buriyads who refused to go back.
The home of Budabala was destroyed and looted by the Soviets, but Budabala
and his father. Prince Yangsang, who was then eighty years old, together with their fam
ily, hid in the desert and avoided capture. The Abaga Right Flank Banner was occupied
by Soviet troops, and the Jasag Shonnudongrob was captured and tortured. He was finally
released after the arrival of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army. Soon after.
Major General Duingkhorjab, head of the Interior Defense Bureau (intelligence) of the
Mongolian People’s Republic, arrived in Shilingol to establish an intelligence network.
Duingkhorjab issued secret identifications to Shonnudongrob and Urgungge, senior offi
cials of Abaga Left Banner, instructing them to carry out tasks he would designate from
time to time. In addition to these two men, many others were similarly instructed.
The great monastery of Changan-oboo sume along the northern border of Sunid
Left Banner received no damage. Though the Soviet Red Army passed through, the resi
dence of the prince was only slightly damaged. Prince Rinchinwangdud, the former head
of Shilingol League, was also left undisturbed. But when the same troops arrived at
Prince Khorjurjab’s palace, they captured Khorjurjab and brought him to Rehe, where
they left him. He was captured for the same reason as Prince Sung: they merely needed
him to look after the military horses.
The Sunid Right Banner was the home banner of Prince De. Due to unprepared
ness, Prince De’s residence was heavily looted and destroyed. Fortunately, Prince De’s
family escaped harm. To protect the safety of the whole banner, the eldest son of Prince
De, Dugursurung, who was then the Jasag of the banner, together with Altanochir’s as
sistant, went to meet with the commanders of the Soviet-Mongolian Allied forces. He
expressed his willingness to see unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia and said he
wished to go to Ulaanbaatar. Together with them was Delgerchogtu, who was earlier un
der suspicion by the Japanese military police because of his ambition and attempts to
organize the Mongol Youth Party. Dugursurung’s action had probably been instigated by
Delgerchogtu. Later, both Altonochih and Delgerchogtu returned to Inner Mongolia, but
Dugersursung would never be able to return to his homeland. Because of the Jasag’s
“voluntary exile,” this banner fell into chaos. Soon Namdag, who had been promoted by
Prince De to be a battalion commander of the Mongolian Army, organized a preliminary
“revolutionary” organization.
At the same time, the officers and students of the Mongolian Preparatory School
for the Mongolian Military Academy in Sunid were ordered by Buyandelger, head of
staff of the Inner Mongolian Army, to move southward and advance to Hohhot. In the
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middle of the journey, however, the entire student body, realizing that this was a good
opportunity for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia, refused to move southward.
They disbanded, and the majority moved north to join the Outer Mongols.
The Ulanchab League was also disturbed, but the damage was not as great as at
Shilingol. Soviet and Mongol forces did not enter the three Urad Banners or Muuminggan in the western part of the league. Only the banners of Dorben-keud and Khalkha
(Darkhan) were penetrated; the Shira-muren monastery, the residence of Prince Yon,
together with the monastery of Beile-yin sume, were looted and devastated. Shirabdorji,
head of the league, escaped from this disaster and arrived in Hohhot. Soon Fu Zuoyi, the
Chinese warlord, occupied the city. Because Shirabdorji had been a faithful supporter of
Prince De and the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement, Fu’s attitude towards Shirab
dorji was hostile. Soon after, Shirabdorji had a heart attack and died.
As noted, a contingent of the Soviet Mongol forces marched toward Dorloonnor
through the border of Gul-koke Banner. Another group of Soviets marched from Sunid
southward through Shangdu Banner and the counties of Dehua and Zhangbei. The dam
age was not serious. The fall of Zhangbei caused the collapse of the Chahar League Of
fice, but Jodbajab, the league head, then in retreat at his summer house in Minggan Ban
ner, was not threatened. The defense division of the Inner Mongolian anny stationed in
the Chahar region, headed by the chief of staff. Major General Golminse, decided to
march north and voluntarily join the ranks of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary
army. In this division there was a Japanese advisor named Shimokawa who opposed the
decision of the troops. Shimokawa was shot by a Mongolian soldier, thus becoming, per
haps, the only Japanese deliberately killed in this turmoil.

Mongol Activities Immediately after Soviet Oecupation
In the Minggan Banner, a lama named Narwa proclaimed himself master of
Tantric magic. Now he enlisted as an agent for Ulaanbaatar in Inner Mongolia, saying he
would organize Inner Mongolia into a political regime ready for unification with Outer
Mongolia. Formerly a chanter of tarani and sutra, Narwa now began shouting Marxist
and Leninist slogans. His plan for political reorganization was similar to the organization
of the Outer Mongolian regime. Ruiyong, who was sent to Minggan Banner by Prince De
from Kalgan as a special envoy, also felt Narwa lama must have some special assign
ment. Soon after, Ruiyong realized that I was in Gul-koke and sent a man to ask me to
come to Minggan and join with him to prepare for the second phase. When I arrived,
Narwa had already established his organization. Both Ruiyong and I had to confess all
our past history to Narwa, and we then were assigned to work for the organization. Both
sides remained suspicious of each other.
Soon it was heard that Marshal Choibalsan, the leader of the Mongolian Peo
ple’s Republic, had arrived in Doloonnor to strengthen the morale of the SovietMongolian allied forces. Narwa demanded that the newly established organization elect a
representative to go with him to Doloonnor to meet with the Marshal. Ruiyong was
elected as a delegate. At the same time, it was reported that Jirgalang was sent by Prince
De to Bordered Yellow Banner. Jirgalang was to discuss the present situation with the
Banner amban, Mugdenbuu, and organize the Mongols, in expectation of a subsequent
move. Ruiyong discussed the matter with me and decided that he himself had to go to
Doloonnor and meet with Choibalsan, and he selected me to go to Bordered Yellow Ban
ner and meet with Jirgalang.
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After Ruiyong arrived in Doloonnor, he was not able to meet with the Marshal;
Narwa lama was arrested by the Outer Mongolian forces as a deserter from his home
country and was sent to Ulaanbaatar for punishment. Afterward, Ruiyong returned to
Minggan Banner, where he found that the organization established by Narwa had already
collapsed. Most of the members had left for Sunid to try again to establish an organiza
tion. Soon it was heard that Jodbajab, head of Chahar League, had been arrested by Outer
Mongolian forces and sent to Ulaanbaatar. Several years later, it was heard that he was
accused of antirevolutionary activities and executed. He had been tried on the basis of his
opposition to Outer Mongolian independence three decades previously. Discouraged,
Ruiyong returned to his home in the valley of the Nonni River.
Arriving at the banner office of Kubegtu-shira, 1 met with both Jirgalang and
Mugdenbuu. Jirgalang explained why Prince De had sent him there. The prince had said,
“The Chinese Communists have already entered Kalgan. Now the people dispatched from
the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army are stationed in the Sunid Right Banner. It
is thought that they have agreed to establish some sort of a political organization. Perhaps
it would be better for us to go there and see.“Moreover, Prince De added, "No matter the
situation, the present strengths should not be dispersed.” The next day both Jirgalang and
I, together with Mugdenbuu and others from Minggan Banner, climbed aboard the only
truck at Mugdenbuu’s Banner office that would run and drove to Sunid.
In the Sunid Right Banner, Yidamsereng, Combo, and several students who had
been sent earlier to Japan by Prince De were working at this time in an office under the
leadership of Namdag. Everything was in a mess. The doors and windows in the Prince’s
residence were broken, and the building was uninhabitable. The temporary office was
located in a temple which Prince De had built for the Panchen Lama about two kilome
ters from the Prince’s residence. This temple had also been looted, but because the houses
were not damaged it became a temporary center for the Sunid Right Banner.
By then there was in Sunid a Soviet lieutenant colonel named Ivanov, probably a
member of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence organization. With him was a Mon
gol lieutenant colonel of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army named Lubsang,
also a member of the intelligence organization, the Internal Defense Bureau. There was
also a Buriyad Mongol military officer, their interpreter, but he could not interpret. These
were the people who possessed the ultimate power of life or death. They made all deci
sions in that area.
Just before the invasion. Prince De had sent Tegshibuyan to Sunid to take his
wife and children to Kalgan. After the sudden invasion, Tegshibuyan was unable to fulfill
this mission and remained in the temple. At the same time, Buyandalai, head of the Bayantala League, who was then vacationing at his home in Chahar, also rushed to Sunid.
Almost at the same time, Oljeiochir, former cpmmander of the ninth division of the Mon
gol Army, also arrived. With him was a tall Chinese, said to be an agent of the Chinese
Communists. Oljeiochir did not behave as a commander of the former Mongol forces, but
as a revolutionary who had contact with Chinese Communists. Namdag, who had been a
battalion commander of the Ninth Division under Oljeiochir, now became the leader of
the Sunid area.
Then those who called themselves “revolutionaries” gathered with those who
were accused as “counter-revolutionaries” to discuss how to concentrate their various
strengths in confronting the changing situation and to try to realize their goal to unify
Inner and Outer Mongolia into one Mongol state. Regarding these issues, Ivanov and
Lobsung did not offer their support. They said, “These are your own matters. You do not
need permission from us.” In reality, they showed some appearance of agreement at the
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start of the political movement. Ivanov and Lobsung did reveal their intentions to Namdag. They meant to hold a mandatory meeting to propagate the liberation that the great
Soviet Union offered to the people of Inner Mongolia. At the same time, they hoped the
Inner Mongolian people would express acknowledgment and gratitude to the Soviet Un
ion and the Mongolian People’s Republic for their liberation.
At this meeting, Ivanov delivered a speech, but most of his speech, because of
the incompetence of the interpreter, did not get across. After his long speech, the masses
under the leadership of Lubsang shouted slogans of thanks and goodwill from the Inner
Mongolian people toward the USSR and the MPR. First, Lubsang shouted, “Long live the
great Soviet Union. Long live the Mongolian People’s Republic. Long live the great hero
comrade Marshal Stalin. Long live the great hero comrade Marshal Choibalsan.” The
Mongols expressed in these slogans acceptance of their position as subordinates of the
“Big Brother.”
1 was at the mass meeting, and it struck me that the slogans were similar to the
banzai first shouted to the great Japanese Empire, to the Emperor, then to the Mongolian
Autonomous State, and to Prince De under the Japanese occupation of Mongolia. Al
though the names were now different, the political situation remained the same. “Since
we opposed imperialistic Japan,” 1 thought to myself, “how can we accept the imperial
ism of the Soviet Union? Although one is capitalistic and militant, and the other socialis
tic and Communist, both demand of the Mongols exactly the same thing.” The shouting
of the slogans interrupted my reflections. 1 decided just to watch the continuation of this
drama, which had begun long before with the Japanese occupation. This was an impossi
ble situation; I felt discouraged over the outcome.

The People’s Delegate Conference of the
Inner Mongolian Leagues and Banners
The Soviet-Outer Mongolian “liberators” confiscated and destroyed all the in
struments of Inner Mongolian communications, and they refused to give any news to
their fraternal Inner Mongolian brothers, whom they had claimed to “liberate.” To ma
nipulate them, they isolated the Inner Mongolians from the entire outside world. At this
moment, Jirgalang, Tegshibuyan, Mugdenbuu, and 1 found that Prince De and a group of
Mongols had gone to Beiping. When 1 heard this, I thought of the Prince’s last words to
me in Kalgan. I had anticipated that the Prince would go to Chungking to meet with the
leader of the Chinese government and propose a new solution to the Mongolian problem.
Because the Mongolian leaders in Sunid also desired a breakthrough, we asked permis
sion of Ivanov and Lubsang to convene a conference of the people’s delegates of the
leagues and banners and organize a political movement to renew our nation-building
movement. They decided the name of the conference should be The Conference of the
People’s Delegates of the Inner Mongolian Leagues and Banners.” After a period of
preparation, this conference was held on the ninth of September 1945 at a primary school
located on the west side of the residence of the Sunid Right Banner’s Prince.
The conference was attended by the delegates of the ten banners of Shilingol
League, the eight banners of Chahar League, and the delegates of four banners of Chahar
Right Flank (the former Bayantala League), the delegates of the Dorben-ke’ud Banner of
Ulanchab League, and several officials from the Ulanchab League Office, as well as
other Mongol elites from various banners. Among the more influential participants were
Jirgalang, Tegshibuyan, Buyandalai, Damringsurung, Oljeiochir, Mugdenbuu, and 1.
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At this conference, the name of the conference was formally accepted, mainly
because we could no longer continue to use the title of “Mongolian Congress,” as in the
past. Additionally, many delegates were formally sent by the banners, but there also were
those not appointed as formal representatives of banners. These were called “people’s
delegates.” Third, the term “Inner Mongolia” was officially adopted, to show that this
conference had no association with Outer Mongolia and that it could include any dele
gates from Eastern Mongolia who were not represented by Outer Mongolia. Jirgalang
was elected secretary-general of the conference, and I was elected vice secretary-general
and was assigned to propose the organization of the new regime and draft a policy out
line.
The officers from the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia were different from
their Japanese predecessors in that they did not attend the conference, even though they
were invited as guests. They declined, saying, “This is your affair, and there is no need
for us to join in.” It was understood that they officially desired the Inner Mongolians to
make decisions without outside influence. On the other hand, it was evident that they
would not share responsibility for further problems thereby created.
After the conference was convened, Lubsang and some of his soldiers arrived
with machine guns to offer “protection.” But the mouths of the guns were pointed from
four directions into the hall where the conference was being held. When 1 asked Lubsang
what the guns were for, he answered, “An important conference like this must have secu
rity. How can we be sure there are no bad elements inside the conference?” This showed
the lack of trust among officers of the Soviet-Mongolian Allied forces regarding this con
ference. Participants in this conference openly discussed how to reorganize Inner Mon
golia and how to unify the Inner and Outer Mongolian brothers. This had been their de
sire for years.
As for the name of the organization, all pointed either to accepting “Mongolian
Government” or “Inner Mongolian Government.” I was among several elected people
asked to submit proposals for a name. After secretly discussing the question with Jirga
lang, I told the gathering, “Prince De has arrived in Beiping. Undoubtedly, he will pro
mote the Mongolian autonomy movement to the Chinese government. There is no way
for us to know the situation in Beiping; we must propose a way to make it possible for
Prince De to return. To establish a government and elect a chairman would cancel any
chance for him to return. To leave this option open, it would be better to name the new
governing body the ‘Inner Mongolian Liberation Committee.’” Jirgalang said, “We don’t
know if this type of arrangement will be acceptable to Ivanov and Lubsang.” The next
day, after a long discussion, this name was chosen.
As for the form of organization, both Jirgalang and I proposed to adopt a com
mittee without a chairman. This was proposed so as to allow the possible return of Prince
De. However, Buyandalai insisted that a chairmanship be established because he wanted
the position himself. Finally, the conference accepted Jirgalang’s and my proposal,
choosing to establish several departments under the committee. Then the conference
elected the members of the committee and the heads and deputy heads of the depart
ments. The elected members of the committee were Jirgalang, Buyandalai, Oljeiochir,
Tegshibuyan, Damrinsurung, Golminse, Khorchinbilig, and I. At the same time, the par
ticipants elected Jirgalang as head of the General Affairs Department, and me as deputy
head.
Among the many items discussed was how to express thanks to the SovietMongolian Allied Forces for liberating the Inner Mongolian people from the oppression
of Japanese imperialism. The conference decided to elect delegates to go to Ulaanbaatar
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to express appreciation to Marshal Choibolsan and try to promote the unification of Inner
and Outer Mongolia. This proposal was unanimously supported. Jirgalang, Damrinsurung, Khorchinbilig, Burinsain, and I were elected as delegates, with Mugdenbuu as an
alternate. As mentioned earlier, I felt disappointed at the slogan. 1 also found offensive
the machine guns pointing toward us in the hall, and I had no interest now in going to
Ulaanbaatar. But Mugdenbuu was very eager to express his zeal for the “revolution” and
establish more influence in the new political regime. Realizing this, I used the excuse that
it would be inconvenient for both the head and the deputy head of the General Affairs
Department to leave at the same time. Since the committee had just been established, it
would be better for me to stay and have Mugdenbuu go instead. The conference reluc
tantly accepted my proposal, and Mugdenbuu was appointed to go.
The most “progressive” person at the conference was Oljeiochir, who argued
that it was not necessary for the conference to decide anything on its own; he favored
meeting the demands of the USSR, the MPR, and the Chinese Communist Party. Oljeiochir’s comments did not express true zeal for Mongolia’s national freedom, but rather a
willingness to serve the new set of alien occupiers. Another radical person was Khor
chinbilig, who had studied medicine in Japan. During his stay at the dormitory of the
Zenrin-gakuryo, he was discriminated against by the Japanese superintendent. He tried
unsuccessfully to commit suicide, and he became extremely anti-Japanese. Of the top
officials of the former Mongolian government included in the conference, Tegshibuyan
was the most radical. Sometimes, because of his emotional intensity, he became fanatical
and lost control of himself. Damrinsurung and Golminse wholeheartedly pushed for the
unification of both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Their only motive was their love of Mon
golia; Buyandalai’s and Mugdenbuu’s acts exposed their selfishness. Jirgalang did not
oppose their visit to Outer Mongolia, but because of youthful zeal, he intended to go to
Ulaanbaatar too and observe the real situation. Now eager to get out from under the con
trol of the Soviet and Outer Mongolian agents, I began to look for an opportunity to
leave.
Inside the Sunid Banner, Namdag, who earlier had been trusted by Prince De
and made a commander over a battalion of the Mongolian Army, now became a yesman” to Ivanov, Lubsang, and Oljeiochir. Similarly, Altanochir, a nephew as well as a
pupil of Prince De, became top assistant to De’s son. However, his outward countenance
concealed a very bad heart. Earlier, he had accompanied the eldest son of De, Dugursurung, to Ulaanbaatar and returned to Sunid by himself. He never talked about what he
experienced in Outer Mongolia. If someone asked about Durgursurung, he always an
swered that the young prince had desired to stay and study. He refused to say any more
and showed special obedience to Ivanov and Lubsang. Later, we found that during his
stay in Ulaanbaatar he had been recruited into the organization of the MPR Internal De
fense Bureau and sent back to Sunid as a spy.
As for the other delegates, those from the Chahar banner were active, but the
delegates from the Shilingol banners, with the exception of Sunid, did not express any
opinion. Those from the Ulanchab banners also adopted a prudent approach like that of
Shilingol. Only Dewagenden, a senior politician of Dorben-ke’ud banner of Ulanchab
League, showed great anxiety for the future.
The conference ended smoothly. Colonel Ivanov gave a reception for some of
the leaders. In addition to his praise for ^e greatness of the military and economic power
of the Soviet Union, he called special attention to all the delicacies provided by the Soviet
Union. He then brought his guests to see the jeeps of the Soviet army, explaining that
these vehicles built by the Soviet Union could run in the desert without hindrance. But
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the Ford trademark and Goodyear tires were easily identifiable. Also at the camping
ground of the Soviet forces were large numbers of empty food cans bearing English la
bels, traceable to the USA and Australia. This Soviet colonel of the intelligence division
was pushing propaganda to convince the Mongols of Soviet superiority. Only Jirgalang
and I knew English, but under the threat of the machine guns, we did not ask this pleasant
colonel any questions.

Arrival of the Outer Mongolian Vice Premier and Creation
of the Inner Mongolian Government
Several days later, we received a visit from a formal delegation of the MPR:
Lhamujab, vice premier of the Mongolian People’s Republic; Major General Duingkhorjab, head of the Interior Defense Bureau; and Namsarai, secretary of the vice
premier. Earlier, they had gone to the front line to encourage the Mongol forces. On their
return, they passed through Khauchid, Pandita-gegeen-keid, and the Sunid Left Banner.
They also met with Sungjingwangchug, head of the Shilingol League, Rinchtnwangdud,
the jasag of the Sunid Left Banner and the Chagaan Gegeen, the abbot of the monastery
of Chagaan-obootu-sume on the way to Sunid Right Banner. Lhamujab had invited these
Inner Mongolian dignitaries to go with him.
At their arrival, I was given a chance to meet with Prince Sung, who had been
my superior in the office for many years. Prince Sung told me that he had discussed the
Mongol problem with the Outer Mongolian vice premier: “Lhamujab told me frankly,
‘Our [Outer Mongolian] independence has just received the support of the Soviet Union
and other countries and the recognition of the Chinese government. Our territories are to
remain the same as they are now, and Inner Mongolia is not to be included. Since our
independence has just been recognized, we cannot intervene in matters across the border.
You must handle your own affairs. Even if we would like to help, we are unable to do so.
However, I think the Chinese government has some kind of an understanding. It will not
try to oppress you as before. But the situation may change.”’
With these words, the hope for unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia passed.
The future of Inner Mongolia now depended on its own efforts. I now had no expecta
tions from the events that were occurring in Sunid. And except for me. Prince Sung did
not reveal this information to anyone else. The next day after his arrival, Lhamujab met
with Inner Mongolian leaders in Sunid. In addition to a word of comfort, he asked, “Why
did you name your political regime the Liberation Committee? Who recommended this?”
I was not present. The query made Jirgalang, Tegshibuyan, and Mugdenbuu anxious. Not
knowing Lhamujab’s real intentions, they avoided a direct answer. They asked, “Could
we not alter it and call it the government?” They called together all the participants from
the dismissed conference and declared that the title of the political regime would be
changed to “Inner Mongolian Government.”
Buyandalai, without consideration for Prince De, elevated himself to the posi
tion of this new government’s leader, thereby reaching the goal he had desired for many
years. Although opposed by a few people, Buyandalai was able to gain more support and
was elected chairman. Soon after this, on his way back to his home in Chahar, he was
killed by unidentified armed assassins. Someone said he was assassinated by the guerril
las of Fu Zuoyi, who were organized by Wu Sier, a former bandit. Someone else said it
was done by a contingent sent out by the Chinese Communists. No one knows for sure.
Since I had heard about Lhamujab’s words from Prince Sung, and I realized that
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this temporary organization in Sunid could be dispersed following the withdrawal of the
Soviet-Mongolian Allied forces, I decided to leave. I reported the matter to Prince Sung
and decided, while Lhamujab was still there, to ask Lhamujab’s permission to return to
my homeland, Kharachin, to propagate the “good deeds” of the “liberators.”
Together with the other delegates of eastern Shilingol, I went eastward to Pandita-gegeen-keid on horseback. On our way, we met with many people. Everyone asked,
“Where is Prince De? Is he all right? Will he try something to help us?” I realized that the
existence of the former Mongolian government and the good deeds of Prince De had
deeply impressed the hearts of the people in Shilingol League.
When 1 arrived at Pandita-gegeen-keid, I met with Balgunsurung, the jasag of
Abkhanar Left Banner and the former head of the Civilian Administration Bureau of the
Shilingol League Office. Balgunsurung informed me that after the Russian devastation of
the monastery and the office buildings, many people had moved away from the main
route for refuge. After the arrival of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army, order
was restored, and no more robbing by the Soviet troops occurred. Nevertheless, the offi
cers of the Outer Mongolian forces interrogated most of the elite in this area at their
headquarters. The elite were ordered to write their autobiographies over and over again in
order to find out who had collaborated with the Japanese as spies. Fortunately, none of
them were arrested. When Balgunsurung had asked the Outer Mongolian officers about
the Soviet massacre of the lamas of the monastery, he received no explanation.
On the same night, Lhamujab dispatched one of his secretaries with a Jeep to
carry Prince Sung back to Pandita-gegeen-keid. The vice premier demanded that Prince
Sung reestablish order in the league. The league head was himself very eager to restore
order, but all the documents and officials had disappeared. It was impossible to carry out
any restoration. Prince Sung ordered me to draft a document for all the banners in the
area, asking them to do their best to restore order and to facilitate the transportation of the
Mongolian army. This was the last service I performed at the devastated Shilingol League
Office. Prince Sung knew that I was going to leave, but he did not try to stop me. After
midnight of that day, I never saw my benevolent superior again. To this day, I have
strong feelings of sadness at our having been separated.
After I left Shilingol, Marshal Choibalsan arrived in Sunid from Ulaanbaatar to
survey the situation. He expressed no opinion regarding the new political regime estab
lished there. Soon after, the delegates of the Inner Mongolian People’s Delegates Confer
ence went to Ulaanbaatar. There they received a warm welcome from both the party and
the government. Choibalsan hosted a dinner party at his villa south of the Mongolian
capital. Dugursurung, the eldest son of Prince De, was also invited. Jirgalang had asked
Choibalsan’s opinion on Inner Mongolia’s future and the possibility of unification with
the northern brothers. Choibalsan had answered, “Because of the Yalta Agreement, our
independence has been recognized on condition that our nation retain only its existing
territories. How could we become involved in the problem of a neighboring country?
There is no possible way to unify Inner and Outer Mongolia. However, through party to
party relationships, we can tell the Chinese Communist Party to exercise caution in han
dling the Inner Mongolian problem. For your sake, it would be better to establish more
contacts with the Chinese.” After receiving this answer, the delegates returned to Sunid
under a cloud of disappointment. From among these delegates, only Damrinsurung de
cided to stay in the Mongolian People’s Republic permanently.
By this time, the influence of the Chinese Communist Party loomed over the
Chahar and Shilingol Leagues. Ulanfti (Yun Ze), together with his comrades, arrived in
Kalgan from Yan’an. It was at this point that Buyandalai was kidnapped and killed and
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the Inner Mongolian government disbanded. Receiving support from the Chinese Com
munists, Oljeiochir recruited former Iimer Mongolian military factions and organized
them into the Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Forces at Chagan-bogda. He then carried
out a violent revolution. Faced with this violence, the conservatives were aroused to or
ganize and carry out an armed resistance against the Chinese Communists. There was
heavy bloodshed, and many innocent people were killed.

The Changing Situation in Eastern Inner Mongolia
At the beginning of the Soviet Red Army’s intrusion into Manchuria from the
Soviet strongholds in Eastern Siberia, the Soviets encountered only weak Japanese resis
tance. The powerful Japanese Guandong Army had been much depleted by the changing
situation in the Pacific War. Its best soldiers and most powerful armaments had all been
transported to other fronts, leaving them open to an attack by the Soviet Union. The
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary army also entered Manchuria without any resistance,
and they soon occupied the territories of Hulunbuir and Wang-yin-sume. In Hulunbuir,
they encountered great numbers of Buriyad Mongols who had fled their homeland in the
Lake Baikal area. These Buriyads, along with their leader, Urjin, were captured by the
Red Army and treated as Soviet deserters. In Wang-yin-sume, the Mongol leaders were
greatly excited, thinking that this would be a good opportunity for unification. There was
no opportunity for us to learn their views on western Inner Mongolia nor on Prince De’s
activities. Following the Soviet intrusion. Colonel Kanagawa Kosaku, head of the Japa
nese Wang-yin-sume special service office, who together with his assistant, Asau Tatsuo,
escaped, later told me they were helped by having been given disguises by Mongols.
The eastern Inner Mongolian leaders, like Prince De, did not seek revenge on
their former Japanese enemies when they were in a weakened condition. The Japanese in
eastern Inner Mongolia suffered no great casualties. Their experience was quite different
from that of the other Japanese in the Chinese territories of Manchukuo. On August 20,
the Soviet troops captured Puyi and Badmarabdan at the same time. With the fall of Ja
pan, Xinjing, the capital of Manchukuo, was restored to its original name, Changchun.
The eastern Inner Mongolian leaders, except Badmarabdan, who was captured, gathered
in the city to wait. These leaders included men such as Shumingga, Khafungga and
Namkhaijab.
At Wang-yin-sume, Buyanmandukhu, the former governor of Kinggan General
Province, together with Khafengga, Askhan, Manibadara, Sangjaijab, and others, tried
hard to carry out a movement for Mongolian self-government. With the support of the
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army, authorities from Wang-yin-sume sent out re
cruiters to the leagues and batmers, hoping to convince the people to join the movement.
They also sent Buyanmandukhu and Khafungga as the heads of a delegation to go to
Ulaanbaatar to express appreciation to Marshal Choibalsan for their liberation. When
they left, they were very excited. They earnestly hoped that through the Japanese defeat,
unification of the two Mongolias would be possible. The answer they received was simi
lar to the response received by the western Inner Mongolian delegates. Upon their return,
realizing that hope for unification of the south and north had vanished, they quickly or
ganized the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government.

The Soviet occupation of China’s northeastern territories was based on the Yalta
Agreement, but even after disarming the Japanese, the Soviets hindered the pro-American
Chinese government in restoring its rule over this domain. The Chungking authorities
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appointed General Xiong Shihui as head of the Militar>' Committee Northeastern Branch
to handle the takeover, with the cooperation of Marshal R. Y. Malinovski, commander in
chief of the Soviet forces in Changchun. However, all General Xiong’s activities were
stopped or hindered by the Soviets. Xiong and his subordinates had no choice but to re
treat to Beiping to wait for another opportunity. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist forces
under the leadership of Lin Biao had already entered the northeast region and had started
to recruit from the remnants of the former Manchukuo army. The Soviet authorities
greatly strengthened the Chinese Communists by equipping them with arms surrendered
by the Japanese. The Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government organized in the early
spring of 1946 faced this unfavorable situation.
After leaving Shilingol, 1 arrived in Keshigten Banner of the Juu-uda League,
where I met with Bao Yonghe, the head of the banner, who was trying to restore order
after the Soviet invasion. I heard that in Wang-yin-sume, a few Mongol leaders had gath
ered to work out some sort of plan for Mongolia’s future. From Keshigten, 1 went to
Ongni’ud Right Banner Office in Chifeng, where I had a long night’s talk with Sechinchogtu, the head of the banner. Sechenchogtu talked bitterly about the barbaric acts of the
Soviet troops. He also reported that Mongolian forces had followed the Russians from
Chifeng to Rehe to restore local order.
Sechenchogtu noted that at the downfall of Japan, the people of Western Kinggan Province and the eight banners of Jinzhou and Rehe district were frightened because
the loss of Japanese power might cause a recurrence of the 1891 Jindantao tragedy (also
known as the Red Caps Rebellion), in which local Chinese immigrants massacred many
Mongols. The Chinese in the area, even during the Japanese occupation, had expressed
hatred toward the Mongols, whom they considered collaborators with the Japanese. With
the Japanese gone, it was fortunate that the Outer Mongolian troops arrived, for they
thereby averted a possible tragedy. 1 had heard similar words of animosity as I traveled
through the Chinese areas in Juu-uda League, and I suspected that these rumors were not
unfounded.
One of the recruiters from Wang-yin-sume arrived in Chifeng while 1 was there,
and delegates from the banners of Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues gathered for a conference
to discuss establishing a political regime to unify the Mongols in preparation for the
struggle for their future. The following are brief sketches of the leaders of eastern Inner
Mongolia.
Buyanmandukhu, a more than fifty-year-old man from the Khorchin Left Front
Banner, was a graduate of the Frontier Management College (Choupian zhuanmen xuexiao) in Mukden. After Manchukuo was established, he became the head of the Civil
Administration Bureau of Southern Kinggan Province. Later, he was appointed section
head of the Mongolian Administration Ministry. Shortly after, when this ministry was
reorganized into the General Bureau of Kinggan Province, he was appointed a counselor
in this bureau. His last political post in the Manchukuo period was as governor of King
gan General Province. Soon after the Manchurian Mukden Incident of 1931, an investi
gation group was sent by the League of Nations to Mukden. Buyanmandukhu, together
with Namkhaijab, was made a representative of the Mongols by Japanese military
authorities to show Mongolian support for the establishment of Manchukuo and to em
phasize the oppression the Mongols had suffered in past decades under the Chinese. As
for his ideology, Buyanmandukhu opposed the traditional feudal system of Mongolia, but
his personal activities, both romantic and practical, showed him to be an experienced
bureaucrat. Even after the Chinese Communist regime was established, he remained a
resilient politician. He died in the late 1970s.
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Khafengga was from the Khorchin Left Center Banner, commonly known as the
Darkhan Banner. He graduated from the Northeastern Mongolian Banners Normal Col
lege with honors just before the Mukden incident. During his college years, he was no
ticed by the president, Merse, and was influenced by his college president’s politically
leftist nationalism. After the Mukden Incident, as mentioned in a previous chapter, Khafungga, together with Jirgalang and other Mongol nationalist youth, started a movement
for Mongolian independence. But by then the founding of Manchukuo was already an
established Japanese policy, and the movement was sternly suppressed by the Guandong
Army. Later, Khafengga was appointed as a counselor of the Manchukuo Embassy in
Japan, and eventually became a counselor of the General Bureau of Kinggan province.
During this period, he was able to establish a good relationship with many Mongol intel
lectuals, and he achieved tremendous personal prestige within the Mongolian community.
Even at the peak of Japanese strength, some suspected he had secret contact with the
Communist International (Comintern) organization. Not surprisingly, he was the real
initiator and leader of the Eastern Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. For political
convenience, he always placed Buyanmandukhu before himself.
Manibadara, like Buyanmandukhu being from the Bingtu Banner, was a gradu
ate of the Law and Politics University in Beijing. After Manchukuo was established, he
was appointed a section head and a bureau head in the Mongolian administration. He
later was appointed to be head of the General Affairs Bureau of Kinggan Province. While
head of the Civil Administrative Bureau of the Southern Kinggan Province, Manibadara
felt that a person holding government office could not accomplish the task of restoring
the Mongol people’s unity and culture. Thus, when the Japanese authorities in Manchu
kuo established the Mongolian Livelihood Improvement Association to help solve con
troversies between Chinese settlers and Mongol landowners, he resigned his official Job
and received support to become the chairman of this new association. This nonprofit or
ganization established many schools and educational centers and sent many Mongol stu
dents to Japan. Also through Manibadara’s efforts, a shrine to Chinggis Khan was pro
posed at Wang-yin-sume.
Manibadara came to Kalgan to solicit donations for this shrine project, and he
used the opportunity to speak with Prince De about Mongolia’s future. Although they had
reached a common understanding, the sudden intrusion of the Soviet forces severed all
connections between eastern and western Inner Mongolia and made such an understand
ing impossible to pursue. Manibadara, although able to speak some Russian, felt it im
proper to lean unconditionally toward the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. It would be
better to pursue other political options. In particular he hoped to maintain the relationship
with Chungking and use the power of the Chinese government to check the expanding
influence of the Soviet Union.
Askhan, was from Khorchin Left Center (Darkhan) Banner. In the late 1920s he
studied at the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beiping, and later received military train
ing in Japan. After the Mukden Incident he returned home and Joined the Mongolian in
dependence movement. He organized military forces and attacked the Chinese city of
Tongliao. After the movement was suppressed by the Guandong Army, Japanese
authorities put Askhan in the Kinggan military forces. Soon, because of his excellent re
cord, he was sent to a Japanese army university. After his return, he became an idol
among young Mongolian officers. Because he married a younger sister of Khafimgga,
and because he had a close relationship with his brother-in-law, Askhan was suspected of
being a collaborator with the Comintern. During the formation of the Eastern Inner Mon
golian Autonomous Government, he was not only a zealous supporter but also the or-
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ganizer of the military forces of this regime.
Temurbagana, from the Kharachin Right Banner, was educated in Outer Mon
golia. Later, he received an assignment from the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
and the Comintern, returning to eastern Inner Mongolia as an agent remaining under
ground. It is thought that he was the man who established secret contact between the
Comintern and Khafengga.
Dagraachir (Fu Lianke) studied at the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beiping
before entering the political science department of Beijing University. Because of the
Manchurian incident, he returned to eastern Inner Mongolia before his graduation and
was made an officer in the Mongolian administration in Manchukuo.
Oyundalai was also from Darkhan Banner. After Manchukuo was established,
he was assigned as a counselor to the Manchurian Embassy in Japan and later as a coun
selor of the General Bureau of Kinggan Province. While in Japan, he formed a good rela
tionship with many Eastern Inner Mongolian students studying there. He was also very
popular among the intellectuals.
Sangjaijab, a fanatical nationalist, was in one of the first groups of students sent
to Japan by Manchukuo. Of course a national movement was not possible with the sup
port of so few people, although it was popular among the great majority of those who
studied abroad. The leaders I describe above were only those whom I knew personally.

Activities of the Mongols in Beiping
When Prince De returned from Chungking to Beiping, General Li Zongren was
already head of the Military Affairs Committee, Beiping Branch. At that time, Mongols
in Beiping, including Prince De, still hoped to return to the steppes and restore the Mon
gol nation. They thought that the occupation by the Soviet and Mongolian forces would
be temporary and that the intrusion of the Chinese Communists also could not last long.
Following the advance of the Chinese government’s forces, the situation in Inner Mon
golia would rapidly change. Thus the Mongols in Beiping felt justified in becoming quite
politically active. However, they were not always in agreement. The group with Prince
De as its leader always hoped to unify the various factions into one voice in order to de
mand a higher degree of autonomy from the Chinese government. These Mongols also
wished to establish contact with local authorities to reinforce their strength. At the same
time, they wished to win the support of international and national opinion so as to influ
ence the Chinese authorities. They hoped public opinion would convince the government
that the demand of the Mongols for self-determination and self-rule were those of a
movement of cooperation, not separation. The more realistic group headed by Wu Heling
argued that the restoration of the league and banner organizations should not be neglected
by a concentration only on self-determination and self-rule.
At the same time, a small group led by Wubao, a former jasag of the Bingtu
Banner, appeared as “loyalists” on the Chinese side and attacked Prince De, Wu Heling,
and their groups as “traitors” who had collaborated with the Japanese. Wubao had be
come jasag before the Mukden Incident. Because he was persona non grata in his own
banner, he escaped to Beiping and joined Wu Heling’s faction. After the Marco Polo
Bridge incident, he went to western Inner Mongolia as one of the representatives of the
Beiping Mongolian Association and joined the second Mongolian Congress. After the
conference. Prince De gave him a position in his government no higher than that of a
clerk. Angered, he retreated to Beiping. By then, Wu Heling had been ousted from the
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Mongolian political center by Kanai and exiled to Japan.
Several years later, when Wu Heling was made head of the Political Affairs De
partment in the Mongolian government, Wubao returned from Beiping to look for a better
job. Because of Wubao’s incompetence, Wu Heling neglected his applications. Wubao
sought revenge for this slight. The one who allied himself to Wubao in this revenge was
Kichiyeltumergen, whose ancestors had established a marriage relationship with the
Manchu imperial household even before the Manchu occupation of China (thus making
their descendants high ranking princes). In 1931, before the Manchurian incident, Kichi
yeltumergen had supported Prince De in the political struggle against Wu Heling. But
after the Japanese occupation of North China, he was ignored by the Prince, and he re
turned to Khorchin Left Center Banner. Because of his lack of education, the Manchukuo
government never gave him a post higher than that of a lowly clerk. During this period,
Kichiyeltumergen had no money, and was reduced to selling the great Beiping residence
of his ancestors to Li Shouxin. After the Soviet invasion and the formation of an Eastern
Mongolian Autonomy Movement, he escaped to Beiping and served as a loyalist to those
elements in the KMT government opposed to Mongolian autonomy.
In 1931, right after the Mukden Incident, Namjilsereng, Prince of the Darkhan
Banner and vice-head of the Jerim League, left his homeland and stayed in Beiping with
out making any political contacts. A loyalist to the Chinese side, he was eventually pro
moted by the Chinese government to head of the Jerim League and made a member of the
Northeastern Political Affairs Committee. Nevertheless, Namjilsereng had no political
ambitions and no political experience. Now he was forced into politics basically against
his will. Chu Mingshan, taking advantage of this, tried to use Namjilsereng as a figure
head.
Another Chinese loyalist, Mergen (Liang Chixiang), had been one of the gobetweens for Prince De and Chungking and had been imprisoned by Japanese militants.
Because of his close relationship with Prince De, he remained loyal to the Prince and
from time to time still acted as a go-between linking Prince De and Ma Hansan, the chief
of Chungking intelligence in North China.
Despite the complexity of the situation among the Mongols in Beiping, the great
majority still looked to Prince De for leadership. Even those who were with Wu Heling
shared this sentiment.
At about this time, Li Shouxin, who was assigned as commander of the Tenth
Route Army, began to recruit his former Chinese followers. He concentrated these in
Nankou, forty kilometers northwest of Beiping. He appointed Ding Qichang as the di
rector of those units that would confront the Chinese Communists’ strongolds in the bor
der areas of Shanxi, Hebei, and Chahar Provinces. When Prince De left Kalgan, he had
two companies of personal guards and troops stationed near Nankuo. Later, because he
did not wish to throw them into the battlefield, he ordered them to disband and return
home. Li Shouxin was able to recruit his old followers, but salaries and equipment in his
units were insufficient, and the morale of the soldiers very low. The future seemed grave.
Ding Qichang shot himself and died on Chinese New Year’s Day of the year pingxu
[1946], His death accelerated the collapse of Li Shouxin’s group.
After returning from Chungking to Beiping, Wu Guting followed the Military
Affairs Committee Northeast Branch to Mukden. By then, the commander of the Chinese
forces. He Zhuguo, had lost his sight; General Xiong Shihui was assigned to General
He’s post, and General Tu Yiming was appointed as peace preservation commander of Northeastern territories. However, under heavy pressure from the Soviets, they were not
able to stay in Mukden with their troops. Wu Guting was able to travel from Mukden to
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Changchun. More than one hundred Mongols were staying in Changchun, thus enabling
Wu to talk to some of them about the situation of Mongolia. Soon after, the Mongols in
Mukden discovered Wu Outing’s involvement with Chungking and canceled further
contact.
Following the takeover of the Northeast by the Chinese government, Wu Outing
was able to gather some local Mongolian military forces and organize them into the
Northeastern Mongolian Banners Allied Peace Preservation Troops under his own com
mand. They were all cavalry, and numbered about 2,000. Later, this group was reorgan
ized into a cavalry brigade. These anti-Communist Mongol forces fought in the area of
Liaobei, Rehe, and Jinzhou. In 1949, following the communist occupation of the North
eastern region, they fought their way out and moved to western Inner Mongolia to join
the autonomy movement at Alashan under the leadership of Prince De.
Wu Heling was very active. He established the Mongolian Consolidation and
Rehabilitation Group, with himself as director. Under him. Joined former officials of the
Mongolian government, Enkeamur, Jirgalang (Ji Chixiang), Kogjiku, Suchungga, and
others. Wu Heling’s group uncovered the fact that the aged Prince Dagdanwangchug,
who was appointed head of Josotu League just before it was occupied by the Japanese in
1933, had been sorely neglected by the Japanese after their occupation. Now Wu Heling
and his group recommended this aged Prince to Chungking as both anti-Japanese and as a
loyalist to the Chinese government. Consequently, Dagdanwangchug was recognized by
the Chinese government as the head of the Josotu League. Following this success, Wu’s
group discovered the jasag of the Naiman Banner, Sodnamdarjia, formerly the deputy
head of the Juu-uda League. They recommended him to the Chinese government, and
soon he was appointed as league head in charge of Juu-uda. As for the Jerim League,
since Namijilsereng had already been recognized by the Chinese government as the head
of the league, there was no need for further recruitment. In this manner the three Eastern
leagues of Inner Mongolia were reestablished at least nominally through the efforts of
Wu Heling and his group. After 1 arrived in Beiping, Wu Heling also tried to recruit me
into his organization, but I declined the offer because of differing views on the solution to
the Mongolian problem.
After Chinese Communist forces entered Kalgan, Ulanfu and a group of other
Mongol cadres under him also arrived in that city. Ulanfu and his group tried hard to re
cruit Mongol activists who were concentrated in Sunid, but they also struggled to win the
support of the Mongols in Beiping. Ulanfu dispatched Shuwangchu (Wu Yaochen) and
Bai Wenhua to the old capital city to persuade the Mongols there to return to Kalgan.
Shuwangchu, a Kharachin Right Banner man, had been a clerk in the Beijing MongolianTibetan Academy while Ulanfu was a student there. Later, Shuwangchu had been re
cruited by Wu Guting as a lieutenant colonel in the Mongol Army during the Japanese
occupation. Because Shuwangchu was an acquaintance of Ulanfu and because he knew
most of the graduates of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy, it would be easier for him to
contact those Mongols in Beiping.
Bai Wenhua was the top manager of the Prince’s residence of Kharachin Right
Banner. During the Soviet occupation, he was in Chengde, Rehe, and it was easier for
him to contact Ulanfu, his schoolmate at the Beijing Mongolian-Tibetan Academy. Be
cause of his neutrality and his lack of involvement in politics, it was thought that he could
persuade the Mongols in Beiping to come back to Kalgan. Moreover, because Chungking
had no clear policy on the Inner Mongolian problem, a group of more active Mongols
who were disappointed in the KMT returned to Kalgan. About this time, Xue Xingru and
others were sent by Li Yongxin from Chungking to Beiping to recruit Mongols to the
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KMT side, and they were able to pull back some of the people who had already been per
suaded by Ulanfu’s messengers.
Soon after my arrival in Beiping, I was to attend a meeting of the Mongols in
Beiping convened by Bai Yunti, He Zhaolin, and others sent by the Chinese government.
The meeting was held at the old site of the Beijing Office of the Mongolian Government.
Bai and He lectured on the goodwill of the Chinese government, the Kuomintang Party,
and Chairman Chiang Kai-shek toward the Mongols and their concern for the well-being
of those Mongols who were already in Beiping. During the discussion period, someone
asked, “Does the central government have any true intention to carry out the promise of
Mr. Sun Yat-sen for self-determination and self-rule of the minorities?” Someone else
asked, “Why is the government unable to establish by ordinance an institution to achieve
Mongolian autonomy?” Irritated by these questions, Rong Zhao, a member of the Peo
ple’s Political Council, answered in a threatening voice by warning that those who had
Joined the Mongolian government under Japanese occupation should know their place
and exercise self-restraint.
Before Rong Zhao finished speaking, Khatanbagatur, formerly Prince De’s
commander of the guards and well known for his strictness and uprightness, spoke out
angrily. “When the Japanese came,” he said, “they put their swords to our necks. Even so,
we did not consider our own life or death, and we were still able to do something for our
own people. But you people oiled your shoes and escaped as quickly as possible. Now
you have returned. How could you have the nerve to speak to us?” At this, the audience
applauded, and Rong Zhao became furious. He Zhaolin quietly left the hall to call on the
military police to surprise these “anti-central government and anti-KMT Mongols.” Sev
eral military trucks soon arrived. Fortunately, Bai Yunti went out to meet the military and
civilian police to explain that it was only a misunderstanding; he was able to persuade the
police forces to leave.
Bai Yunti returned to the hall and spoke to the audience, saying, “Let us recall
our old Mongolian saying: If your arm is broken, keep it in your sleeve; don’t show your
scars to outsiders.” And with Bai’s comments, an unpleasant meeting came to an end.
Nevertheless, from this moment, a wide gap developed between the so-called
anti-Japanese Mongols and the locals. Rong Zhao was furious, demanding that the central
government punish the Mongolian "hanjiari" who had collaborated with the Japanese.
Han means Chinese; and jian means traitor. The word thus means “traitor to China.” The
local Mongols responded, “We are Mongols, not Han\ so how could we become Hanjian'! We are Mongols, and we struggled for our people. What is the difference between
us, who collaborated with the Japanese, and those who collaborated with Chungking, the
Chinese? They are all aliens. We should not be offended because of the pejorative
meaning of Hanjian. It doesn’t bother us.”
Soon after, Khatanbagatur realized that he could not cooperate with those KMT
Mongols. He asked Prince De for leave to return to Kalgan. We soon heard from Kalgan
that he went to Chifeng, where he again had a vicious debate, this time with the Com
munists, concerning Mongolian self-rule and self-domination. Afterward, he “disap
peared” on his way to Wang-yin-sume.

XIV
THE POSTWAR MONGOL STRUGGLE
FOR AUTONOMY AND THE CHINESE RESPONSE
Chinese Recognition of Outer Mongolian Independence
and the Arrival of the Eastern Inner Mongolian Delegation at Beiping
On January 5, 1946, the Chinese government formally issued a statement recog
nizing the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic. This news led an excited
Prince De to cut off his queue, which had been a symbol of Mongolian subordination to
the alien Manchu power. In early February, the Ulaanbaatar government sent its vice
premier, Surungjab, to lead a delegation to Chungking to express appreciation for this
recognition. On February 9, they were received by Chiang Kai-shek in his official capac
ity as the head of the Chinese government. On their way back, the delegation stayed in
Beiping overnight, but they were “kindly protected,” and none of the Mongols in Beiping
were able to meet with them. Unexpectedly, while Prince De was strolling through Dongan shichang, a shopping mall-like market, he encountered several members of the dele
gation who were also there buying things. Prince De introduced himself and congratu
lated them. But they only whispered in a very soft voice, “You must know that we are
being followed. Good-bye,” and turned away. This shocked Prince De. He had been glad
because the Northern Mongols had achieved their independence, but his heart was now
broken because he saw that the people in this newly Independent country had no liberty at
all.
Also in February, the Eastern Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government dele
gation, with Manibadara as the head delegate and Sangjiaijab as his secretary, arrived in
Beiping. The mission of this delegation was to proceed to Chungking to meet with Gen
eralissimo Chiang Kai-shek to petition for increased Inner Mongolian autonomy. Chinese
military forces were still being hindered by the Soviet Union, and were unable to recover
the Northeastern regions, including Manchuria.
General Xiong Shihui, head of the Military Committee, Northeastern Branch,
had returned to Beiping from Mukden. He stubbornly refused to allow this delegation to
proceed to Chungking, under the pretext that no problems could be settled undtil after the
national troops had recovered the Northeast. Nevertheless, Manibadara insisted on pro
ceeding to Chungking, but he warned his counterpart that the Chinese government should
not confuse the Mongolian problem with the blockade by the Soviet Union, which pre
vented the Chinese troops from recovering the land in the Northeast. The Mongolian
problem was a problem of domestic politics. The occupation by Soviet troops was a dip
lomatic and international problem. Although Manibadara earnestly negotiated with Xiong
Shihui, the problem remained unsolved. At this time, Chu Mingshan, head of the Mon
golian Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Commission, was appointed by Xiong
Shihui to be the head of the Northeastern Mongolian Banners Rehabilitation Committee.
It was understandable that Xiong’s policy toward Manibadara’s mission would have been
negatively influenced by Chu Mingshan.
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At the beginning of this delegation’s visit, Xiong Shihui and his office decided
to isolate the delegation from other Mongols in Beiping, but they failed. By then, except
for Wubao and Kichiyeltumergen and a few followers of Chu Mingshan, all Beiping
Mongols anxiously desired that Manibadara’s mission be sent on to Chungking to express
the Mongols’ desire for autonomy directly to the highest authority of the central govern
ment. Of course. Prince De especially hoped that Manibadara would succeed in his mis
sion, for that would demonstrate that what the prince expressed during his earlier per
sonal talk with Chiang Kai-shek represented the general will of all Inner Mongolian peo
ple. The Beiping Mongolian Association threw a great welcome party for this Eastern
Inner Mongolian Delegation. The journalists of the Beiping newspapers were invited so
they could spread the news to arouse public support. Manibadara explained to the Jour
nalists that his goal was to go to Chungking and give reasons for the Mongolian demand
for autonomy. He also emphasized that his desire was to institute self-rule, not to separate
from China, though this autonomy would be a higher-degree autonomy, different from
local self-rule. He noted that the central government would surely promote the teachings
of Sun Yat-sen, and he argued that the will of the Mongols should not be mixed with
military affairs and diplomatic problems. Following Manibadara’s speech, many ex
pressed their agreement. I too supported Manibadara and made a speech backing him up.
To avoid trouble, neither Prince De nor Bai Yunti attended this conference.
Because my speech at the party was very well received. General Xiong Shihui
asked me to come over for a talk. The result was disappointing; there was no way to
reach a compromise. Xiong desired that I and the other Mongol intellectuals be more
realistic. I tried to convince the general of the justice of our national aspirations, but after
these talks, I realized that his thinking was outdated and rigid. He desired only to bribe
individuals, without attempting to understand the nationalist movement. That the Chinese
government had chosen so backward a man to face so modem a problem guaranteed its
failure.

The KMT Decision on the Mongolian Problem
On March 1, 1946, the KMT held its Second Conference of the Sixth Session of
the Central Committee in Chungking. Bai Yunti left Beiping to attend the meeting. Be
fore he left, he discussed the forthcoming conference several times with Manibadara who
hoped that Bai would convey his ideas to the KMT central authorities, from whom he
hoped to receive an answer. After Bai arrived in Chungking, he discussed the matter with
the Mongol elite in that city and with the Mongolian members of the KMT central com
mittee. These Mongols allied with the Uighur members of Xinjiang Province and the
Tibetan members of Xikang Province in a joint call for the grant of national autonomy.
After a lengthy debate, on March 17, the conference passed the “Resolution for Frontier
Problems.” The text reads as follows:
The people of the three nationalities—Mongol, Tibetan, and Islamic—favor the for
mation of the great Zhonghua [Chinese] nationality; the areas these peoples occupy are in
tegral parts of our national domain. . . . This Conference . . . formulated the following
points, which may facilitate the realization of a harmonious unification of all our nationali
ties on a foundation of peace;
Article 1: According to the doctrine of the People’s Three Principles and a constitution of
five powers [wuquan xianfa], there should be established a unified democratic nation, and
under these principles a clear guarantee for the right to autonomy of the frontier nationali-
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ties.
Article 2: Members of the National Government and the Executive Yuan should include
faithful and experienced comrades drawn from the Mongol, Tibetan, and Islamic nationali
ties,.
Article 3: The brilliant and capable elites of the three nationalities should . . . join in the
real work of the;^«ans, ministries, and commissions.
Article 4: Additional members from the three nationalities should be selected by the central
authorities as delegates to the newly enlarged national assembly.
Article 5: The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission should be reorganized into the
Frontiers Committee and staffed with capable trained elites from the three nationalities....
Article 6: In the frontier areas, all schools should honor the writings of their own people,
but also require a course in the Chinese language ....
Article 7: As for the autonomous institutions of the frontier areas, the central government
should establish settlements in a responsible fashion according to local circumstances.
(A) As for Inner Mongolia, the original Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs
Council should be reestablished, and the right of the leagues and banners should be clearly
separated from those of the provinces and xians....
Article 8: As for the economy, community, transportation, education, public health, relief,
and other matters of the frontier areas, a separate budget should be provided....
Article 9: The national defense troops stationed in the territories along the frontier should
be concentrated at several strategic points. Their support should be provided by the central
government. These troops should not interfere with the local administrations.

This resolution was one of the most favorably worded statements ever made by
the KMT toward minority nationalities. It guaranteed the rights of minorities. This im
portant document clearly reflected Sun Yat-sen’s teachings in the fourth article of Outline
of Nation Building, which says, “The Government should foster the weak and small na
tionalities, so they can carry out self-determination and self-rule.” This resolution seemed
to deal with the unsolved problems of the Mongols, Tibetans, and Islamic peoples.
Li Yongxin, head of the Border Area Party Affairs Bureau of the KMT Central
Committee, immediately ordered his followers to carry out active propaganda on behalf
of the party to win the hearts of the Mongols and the other minority peoples. In Chung
king, the Mongols from the various factions were satisfied with the KMT’s great com
promise. In the Yekejuu League, the leaders of the Suiyuan Provincial Mongolian Local
Autonomous Political Affairs Commission were all happy with the seeming prospect that
the original Mongolian Political Council would be restored under their leadership. Bai
Yunti, who returned to Beiping from Chungking, was convinced that this success was the
result of his endeavors in Chungking. Wu Heling, usually pessimistic, was also satisfied,
because the articles clearly showed that the powers and the functions of the leagues and
banners would be separated from those of the provinces and xians.
Prince De, however, realized that Mongolia was no longer the Mongolia of
1933. The demand of the Mongols was now no more than to restore the original Mongol
ian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Commission. Unless the Chinese government
recognized a much higher degree of autonomy in a self-ruling Mongolian domain. Prince
De felt it could not meet the demands of the Mongol people. The advocates of the higher
degree of autonomy also realized that the KMT promise did not satisfy their expectations.
Manibadara, who was still waiting for an answer from Chungking, was also somewhat
disappointed. Surely the radicals at Wang-un sume could not be satisfied with this solu
tion.
The great majority of the Mongols still felt that this policy of the KMT regime
would solve the Inner Mongolian problem. In any case, compared with the period before
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the war, this resolution seemed to be more progressive and reasonable. Consequently,
when the Mongol elites negotiated with Xiong Shihui and Fu Zuoyi, they usually ac
cepted this resolution as a basis for their discussion. Nevertheless, those KMT govern
ment officials who had solid regional military and administrative power in their hands
openly rejected the resolution. “This was a party document,” they said, “not a govern
ment law. It places no constraints upon us, and we are not obligated to uphold it.” Al
though they were members of the central committee of the KMT, they consistently ne
glected the resolution of the party conference as mere empty words. Apparently, the
powerful central leaders of the KMT and the Chinese government did not sincerely share
a desire to carry out such a resolution. The resolution, which could have won the hearts of
the Mongols, instead became an obstacle separating the Mongols from the KMT.

Struggles in Eastern and Western Inner Mongolia
The eastern Inner Mongolian delegates headed by Manibadara returned to
Wang-un sume greatly disappointed. Manibadara had hoped to establish a relationship
with the KMT government. His failure decisively severed the Wang-un sume group from
Chungking. When he returned, Manibadara agreed to bring Togtakhu back with him and
some Chinese military intelligence agents. This plot was discovered, and Manibadara’s
career came to an end. (It was rumored that Togtakhu was executed immediately, but
later in 1950, he appeared at the court in Ulaanbaatar to testify against Prince De as a
collaborator with Japan.) Manibadara’s failure caused the Mongol activists in Wang-un
sume to establish even more contacts with the Chinese Communists. As mentioned earl
ier, the Chinese Communists easily occupied Kalgan with the support of the Soviet
forces. Ulanfu, leading a group of Mongol cadres, came in along with the Chinese.
The group in Sunid, after receiving their delegation returning from Ulaanbaatar,
realized that the opportunity for unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia had passed. It
was impossible for the Outer Mongolian authorities to assist Inner Mongolia. The Outer
Mongolians had no reliable information about eastern Inner Mongolia and no way to es
tablish formal contact with it. Although a government was nominally established in the
east, in reality it had no authority; and after Buyandalai’s death, the regime found it even
more difficult to function. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Ulanfu invited the group
to come to Kalgan and establish the Mongolian Autonomous Allied Institution {Khamtaral-un Khurat). With the support of the Soviet forces, the Chinese Communists were now
able to expand their influence into Shilingol and the eastern half of Ulanchab. As a result,
the Mongol Government in Sunid dissolved itself and joined with Ulanfii’s group.
In Inner Mongolia, especially the eastern half, an unfortunate and bloody inci
dent broke out during this transition period. At Wang-un sume, a group of radicals tried
to sweep out all the moderate elements so as to facilitate a socialist revolution. This high
handed attitude forced moderate people to organize and protect themselves with arms.
The struggle between the two groups eventually led to bloodshed, and many moderate
people left their native land to escape from the control of the leftists, moving to areas still
occupied by the KMT forces.
The conservatives of both Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues were influenced by Wu
Heling and his group. They refused to make contact with the organization under Chu
Mingshan, and instead established direct contact with the Mongol-Tibetan Affairs Com
mission in Chungking and the Military Affairs Committee in Beiping officially headed by
General Li Zongren. They were able to carry out some rehabilitation work in these same
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areas under the influence of the Chinese government. The people who did the real work
locally were Suchungga, head of the General Affairs Bureau, Josotu League; Yu
Huachen, head of the General Affairs Bureau of Juu-uda League; and Yang Zunsheng
(Sechenchogtu), head of the Civilian Affairs Bureau of the same league.
There were also those who desired to use armed violence and struggle against
the Wang-un sume group and the Chinese Communists. In Jerim League, these included
Han Sewang and Bao Shanyi. In the Josotu League, there were Chinbudorji, ih^jasag of
Tumid Right Banner, and Yondansangbu, the jasag of the Tumid Left Banner. In the Juuuda League, there was an influential lama, Tarba of Aru-Khorchin Banner, and also
Chingjorigtu (He Zizhang)) of Baarin Left Banner. They all recruited local armed forces
and aimed to carry out a decisive counterattack against the leftists.
As already mentioned, Wu Guting also expanded his activities by recruiting a
cavalry brigade under the name of the Northeastenj Allied Mongolian Banners Defense
Forces. The internecine struggles were especially heavy in the Juu-uda league. Tarba
Lama and his followers were especially cruel to the agents sent from Wang-un sume.
This excessive violence caused the common people to lose sympathy for the anti-com
munist groups.
In western Inner Mongolia, many irrational incidents also occurred, most begun
by the violent activities of Oljeiochir and his followers. In order to demonstrate their
revolutionary spirit, they adopted a violent attitude toward conservatives and moderates.
First, they killed Dewagenden, an aged politician of Dorbed Banner of Ulanchab. Fol
lowing this, Nasunbayar, a senior official of Sunid Banner and faithful follower of Prince
De, was tortured and killed, along with his wife. These incidents only stiffened the resis
tance of the local people.
In the Shilingol league, the first anti-communist forces were organized by
Rinchindorji, the headman of the Buriyad Mongols who had migrated from Hulun-buir
region to Modeng-yin-shili of the Shinlingol League. Later, during the Japanese occupa
tion, these people had been under suspicion by the Japanese military, had been specially
“protected” by the Abaga special services office and isolated from the rest of the Mon
gols in that area. After the arrival of the Soviet Red Army, they were accused of being
traitors against their mother country, the Soviet Union, and were forced to move back to
Siberia. Those who had studied in Japan or who had contact with the Japanese were ar
rested or executed. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Rinchindorji escaped with a
group of his followers and hid in the desert. After the retreat of the Soviet-Mongolian
forces, Rinchindorji came out of hiding, recruited the conservatives of the eastern banners
of Shilingol League, and struggled against the communists and those Mongols who coop
erated with them.
In the Ujumuchin Right Banner of Shilingol, Khuturungga also gathered a group
of hard-headed conservatives, and continued the anti-communist struggle even after Rinchindorji’s forces were destroyed. His violent activities also caused numerous casualties
among the people of both sides.

Chinese and International Events that Affected Inner Mongolia
The most important event in China during the early postwar period was the be
ginning of peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This event had
a great impact on the development of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement. In mid
October 1945, through the intervention of United States Ambassador Patrick Hurley,
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Mao Zedong visited Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking, raising great hope for peace. By the
end of December of the same year, President Harry Truman dispatched General George
Marshall to China to mediate between the KMT and the Communists. In early January of
1946, a special executive organization for managing an armistice was established, which
included delegates of the United States government, the Chinese Chinese government,
and the Chinese Communist Party. Based on the agreement between the KMT and the
Communists, a Political Consultative Conference was convened on January 10, in
Chungking. This conference included not only delegates from the KMT and the Commu
nists, but also from minor parties and nonpartisans.
While this conference was at its peak of activity, the Inner Mongolian leaders,
who were excluded from these important talks, were eager to know what was being de
cided. Manibadara wanted to go to Chungking to voice the desires of the Mongol people.
He and his supporters hoped that Mongolian autonomy would be recognized as one of the
important matters facing the nation during the peace talks.
However, the peace talks gradually cooled off. At first, both sides restrained
their activities, in accordance with the preliminary agreement they had already reached.
But while the peace talks continued inside, the war escalated outside. Of course this also
had a great impact on Inner Mongolia. In the areas that the military forces of the Chinese
government could not reach, the Chinese Communists became more active. At the same
time, where the influence of the Chinese government did reach, anti-Communist activi
ties also increased and with heightened vigor. Rinchindorji’s anti-Communist forces were
caught up in these contradictory circumstances.
Meanwhile, James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, in a move to
block Soviet intervention in Inner Mongolia after the grant of independence to Outer
Mongolia, issued a statement affirming that Inner Mongolia was an integral part of
China. Although this had no direct impact on the autonomy movement, it did create a
very negative attitude among the Mongols toward America.

Fu Zuoyi’s Occupation of Kalgan
In the early part of April, at the suggestion of the Chinese Communist Party, the
leaders of the Mongolian regimes in Kalgan and Wang-un sume, Ulanfti, Buyanmandu,
and others, met at Chengde, the capital of Rehe district. They issued a joint communique
favoring the unification struggle being waged for the well being of the Mongols under the
leadership of the Allied Association and the Mongolian Autonomy Movement. They
urged that two separate headquarters be established, one in east and one in west Inner
Mongolia.
Following the breaking off of the peace talks and the renewal of the war, the
KMT forces occupied Chengde in the latter part of August 1946 and occupied Kalgan on
October 11. This had great impact on both pro- and anti-Communist Mongols. With the
KMT occupation of Kalgan, the Beiping-Suiyuan railroad was repaired, uniting the Mon
golian leagues and banners of the non-Communist areas. The various leagues and banners
still had differences, but they were willing to work together for the common cause of
national autonomy. This made it possible for Prince De and the former Mongolian gov
ernment leaders to contact the banners of both Shilingol and Chahar. The local people
were able again to unify under their former leaders and move toward the common goal.
Of course, this also heightened the prestige of Prince De, allowing him to better
negotiate with the Chinese government. At the same time, KMT central headquarters also
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moved to strengthen the party headquarters of the Chahar banners. It appointed Yu Dechun head of this headquarters, and he made the younger of the former Mongolian gov
ernment office workers secretaries at the banner party headquarters. Soon began the
struggle against the Communists. These newly appointed party secretaries were mostly
the former followers of Prince De. Although they were anti-Communist, their first prior
ity was Mongolian autonomy, not the KMT’s power. Yu Dechun nominally led them, but
he was unable to win their allegiance.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the situation, the changing hands of Kalgan
had great impact on the people of Chahar and Shilingol. They thought that the Commun
ists would eventually be forced out from their homeland; it was only a matter of time.
Under that illusion, some joined the anti-Communist forces recruited by Rinchindorji and
Khuturungga.
The recovery of Kalgan by the Chinese government forces did create a bigger
hindrance to the development of Inner Mongolian self-rule. The appointee to the gover
norship of Chahar, a man named Feng, was an old follower of Song Zheyuan, the head of
the 29th Army clique. He was also a friend of Prince De. However, Kalgan was recov
ered from the hands of the communists by Fu Zuoyi, the commander of the 12th War
Zone. Subsequently, Chahar, together with its capital, Kalgan, came under the domina
tion of this war zone and its commander, Fu Zuoyi. Once again, Prince De and Fu Zuoyi
confronted each other over the Mongolian problem. Fu’s goal was not only to throw De
out of Mongolian politics, but also to put both Chahar and Shilingol under his own con
trol. Soon after. Governor Feng resigned from his governorship, and Fu was appointed to
replace him. This resulted in the headquarters of the commander of the 12th War Zone
becoming the most influential institution within this district.
Although in formal terms Fu Zuoyi and his war zone were under the supervision
of General Li Zongren, head of the Military Affairs Committee, Beiping Branch, Fu was
too much for Li to handle. Especially on the matter of the Mongolian problem, Fu had his
own ideas. Fu got Zeng Houzai appointed secretary-general of the Chahar provincial
government. Zeng, a man from Zhejiang and a very shrewd manipulator and dealer,
brought back all the old practices that Fu had employed against the Mongol banners un
der the influence of the Suiyuan provincial government in Kalgan as the blueprint for his
own policy toward Chahar and Shilingol.
Under Fu Zuoyi’s influence, the three provinces of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan
joined to put down the Mongolian autonomy movement and resist separation of power
between the Mongolian leagues and banners and the Chinese provinces and xians. This
powerful group very actively tried to block the Mongols on every matter involving selfrule. These policies and activities of Fu Zuoyi were identical to those of Xiong Shihui in
the Northeast. Fu and Xiong formed a very strong anti-Mongolian autonomy alliance
within the administrative leadership of the Chinese government.
Following the fall of Kalgan, Ulanfu and the entire Mongol administration
moved to Pandita-gegeen-keid. Although this was a withdrawal, it brought the Commun
ist power directly into the heart of the Inner Mongolian territory. During this retreat,
Jorigtu (Guan Qiyi), who had been made head of Shilingol League by the Communists,
was killed by Fu Zuoyi’s forces. Jorigtu was a man from Darkhan Banner of the Jerim
League and a former follower of Prince De during the period of the Mongolian Auton
omy movement at Beile-yin sume. Trusted by the Prince, he had been appointed head of
radio communications. Later, after Japan’s expansion westward, he left Beile-yin sume
and proceeded to Yan’an. Jorigtu’s death severed any possibility for Prince De to main
tain contact with the Chinese Communist side.
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Realizing there was no hope for peace, Ulanfii pushed for unification between
his group and that at Wang-un sume, and this unification gradually formed the foundation
for the later Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region under Chinese Communist domina
tion.

Activities of the Mongol Local Elite
During the peace talks between the KMT and the CCP, the matter of the Na
tional Assembly and the drafting of a constitution became the focus of their debate. Later,
following the failure of the peace talks, the KMT government decided to convene the
Assembly in November to approve the constitution. This, of course, had great impact on
the future of Inner Mongolia. October 31, was the sixtieth birthday of the chairman,
Chiang Kai-shek. To express their congratulations to the chairman and to attend the Na
tional Assembly, the leaders of the Suiyan Mongolian Political Council organized a dele
gation from the Mongolian banners in the Suiyuan region to go to Nanjing. They also
wished to present their demands for Inner Mongolian Autonomy as well as for the sepa
ration of power and function between the leagues and banners on the one side and the
provinces and xiam on the other. In other words, their congratulations to the chairman on
his birthday was merely an opportunity to voice their opposition to Fu Zuoyi.'
When the delegation arrived in Beiping, some of its members suggested that
they visit Prince De to exchange ideas on the Mongolian problem. However, Rong Xiang
rejected this idea. His argued that since Prince De had collaborated with the Japanese, he
should no longer play a role in Mongolian politics. But the other members of the delega
tion went to visit with the prince personally to inform him that they would struggle for
the restoration of the Mongolian Political Council of the Beile-yin sume period. Prince
De frankly told them, “The time of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs
Councils of the Beile-yin sume period has already passed. Now the goal of our struggle
must be to attain a higher degree of autonomy. How else could we influence those who
have already established their autonomous government in eastern Inner Mongolia? Al
though the Chinese Communists still have not fulfilled their promises, even if we Judge
the restoration of the Mongolian Political Council to be merely a propaganda move, per
haps saying this could not have any impact.” He further said, “You call your group the
Delegation of the Suiyuan Mongol Banners. And yet you people agree that the underlying
reason for establishing the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council was to disrupt the unifi
cation of Mongolia. It also means that you recognize that the leagues and banners should
be under the administrative supervision of a province. I feel that the title of your group
should be reconsidered.”
The visitors agreed with Prince De’s idea. They returned and proposed to Rong
Xiang that the official title of their delegation be changed. Although Rong Xiang himself
disagreed with Prince De, he was still able to accept his opponent’s admonition and

' This delegation was headed by Rong Xiang, the deputy chairman of the Suiyuan Mongolian Poli
tical Council and the amban of the Turned Banner. Members were as follows: Ba Wenjun (Bayankhan), secretary-general of the Suiyuan Mongolian Council; Ochirkhuyagtu, vice-head of
Yekejuu League; Shongno, the son of the head of Ulanchab League; Qi Quanxi, the nephew of the
head of Yekejuu League; Kokebagatur (Hu Fengshan), delegate of four Chahar Right Flank Ban
ners; Kang Jimin, delegate of Turned Banner; arid others.
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changed the title of their group to the Delegation of Ulanchab and Yeke-juu Leagues.^
Two delegations were organized by Li Yongxin, head of the Border Area Af
fairs Bureau KMT Central Committee, who also instructed both Xue Xingru, head of the
party headquarters of the Rehe Mongolian Banner Party Affairs, and Jin Chongwei, head
of the party headquarters of the Liaobei Mongolian Banner Party Affairs, to organize
similar delegations for the Josotu, Juu-uda, Jerim, and Hulun-buir areas to go to Nanjing
to celebrate the birthday of Chairman Chiang and deliver the petition for self-rule of the
Mongols to the central government authorities. Another of Li Yongxin’s purposes was to
make sure that Inner Mongolia would not be represented by Rong Xiang, Ba Wenjun
(Bayankhan), and the other members of the western Inner Mongolian clique.
Two other Inner Mongolian delegations also arrived in Nanjing: One came from
Josotu and Juu-uda Leagues, with Yondansangbu (Jasag of Turned Left Banner) as its
head, myself as the spokesman, and Oljeibuyan, Mandukhu, Jorigtu, and other members.
The other delegation came from Jerim and Hulan-buir Leagues, with Jin Yanghao (Jingguleme) as the head, and other members including Jorintob, Saijirakhu and Bai Dacheng.
The delegation headed by Rong Xiang was only able to represent one third of the opinion
of Inner Mongolia at the conference.
After the arrival of these three delegations in Nanjing, their first activity, of
course, was to celebrate Chiang’s birthday. They then began to visit the concerned min
istries and offices to express their sincere hope for autonomy. At that time, the minister of
the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was Luo Liangjian, a man with no political
prestige or importance. Chu Mingshan, who was in Mukden, was summoned by Luo back
to Nanjing to act as the head of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the commission to help
him deal with the three delegations. In reality, though, Chu’s return to Nanjing was or
dered by Xiong Shihui to prevent the Mongols from expressing their opinions directly to
the top authority.
Because the national constitutional assembly was also going to be held in Nan
jing, the representatives of the three provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Rehe remained in
the capital. Following the instructions of Fu Zuoyi, they openly expressed their opposi
tion to the demands of the three Mongol delegations. Because of this pressure from out
side, Rong Xiang changed his stubborn touting of himself to the other two delegations as
a faithful anti-Japanese activist. So that all might struggle for the common goal, he was
willing to cooperate with those who supported Prince De. The “gap” between eastern and
western Inner Mongolia temporarily ceased to exist.

The Hope of the Inner Mongolian People
Before leaving Beiping, in an effort to attract national attention, to win the sup
port of public opinion, and to influence the forthcoming Constitutional National Assem
bly, I published “The Hope of Inner Mongolian People” in Dagong bao, the authoritative
non-KMT Chinese newspaper at that time, which usually presented an objective view of
the Mongolian problem. My article was published in the Dagong bao in both Shanghai
and Tianjin in the middle of November. Its contents are as follows:
The people of Inner Mongolia have their own blood origin, language, culture, cus
toms, tradition, and history. After the First World War, the tide of national self-

^ I was later informed of this personally hy Mr. Kokebagatur.
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determination rolled over the entire world.... [and] during the Northern Expedition period,
the Chinese government also adopted as its slogan; “to foster the weak and the small na
tionalities inside the nation and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination
and self-rule.” Recently, in many important world conferences, most nations have sup
ported self-determination and self-rule for oppressed nationalities. These thoughts and ac
tions deeply impressed the Inner Mongols and created in them a strong belief in selfdetermination and a zeal to carry out their demand for self-rule. . . . There should be no
misunderstanding that because of the establishment of provinces, the Inner Mongolian
problem has already ceased to exist.
Every time the Inner Mongols pushed for autonomy, the national authorities and the
people eyed this with suspicion. But they forgot that this movement for self-determination
was linked to the world political experience in the twentieth century. It is also the teaching
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen—it is the great enterprise that the government should accomplish, but
has not yet done. It is not a new invention of the Mongols, but a hope for the realization of
the great promise.
Now I would like to point out some facts as a reference for those who are concerned
with Mongolian affairs.
1. Article four of the “Outline of Nation Building” (Jianguo dagang} directs that “the
government should foster the weak and small nationalities inside the nation and make it
possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.”
2. A statement by the Chinese Kuomintang First National Congress reads: . . .“The
KMT dares to sincerely announce its recognition of the right to self-determination by all
nationalities in China.”
3. More recently, the Second Conference of the Sixth Session of the [KMT] Central
Committee passed the “Solution for the National Problems,” in which it advises, “In the
future, in the constitution, a clear guarantee for the right to autonomy of the frontier nation
alities should be guaranteed.”
At this time many people think that the independence of Outer Mongolia has already
fulfilled the teaehing of the National Founder on the part of Mongolia, and that Inner Mon
golia should not demand self-rule. This is an erroneous assumption ....
The government’s recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence brought great joy
to the Outer Mongols. Even we, the Inner Mongols, expressed congratulations to and
wished happiness for our fellow countrymen and great appreciation to the central govern
ment. However, the recognition of Outer Mongolian independence did not occur until after
the Yalta Agreement was signed. On the one hand, we must consider it a defeat for the
policy of the Chinese government; on the other hand, we must consider it a victory for the
Mongols who wanted independence. We recognize that in the last thirty-six years, the
Outer Mongolian attitude and its political movements have been entirely different from
those of Inner Mongolia. Consequently, the result it achieved is also very different from
ours. But now that Outer Mongolia has its independence, what will be the future for us, the
Inner Mongols? This is a question that every Mongol should ask.
When we talk about Inner Mongolian autonomy, someone inevitably says, “We do
not wish that you will become the second Outer Mongolia; with no freedom, false inde
pendence, and controlled by others.” The Inner Mongols also understand that it would be
very difficult to be a small nation squeezed between two giants. However, the present Inner
Mongolian problem is not a problem of independence. Therefore, we hope that under the
principle of freedom and equality among nationalities, and in the bosom of the Republic of
China, we will receive self-rule in order to facilitate our future development. We have no
desire to sever ourselves from the protection of the mother country and to throw ourselves
into the hands of outsiders, to be fooled, and to bury ourselves in an environment without
freedom.
Yet at the same time we would also like to ask, thirty-six years after the emergence of
the Outer Mongolian problem, who has provided a better solution for the Mongols? . . .
Who has concern for the sufferings of the Outer Mongolian people? Who has provided
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protection for the Outer Mongolian countrymen against foreign oppression? Why now re
cognize “their false independence”? Who should take on these responsibilities? Just be
cause there was no good solution found for Outer Mongolia and it has declined to its pres
ent state, you cannot deny the Inner Mongols their autonomy. Think of the road you will
otherwise cause them to take.
The demand by the Inner Mongols for self-rule asks that Mongols manage their own
administrative affairs while preserving the integrity of the national territory and sover
eignty. After all, the members of the weak and small nationalities understand best their own
sufferings and necessities. They would be able to manage their own affairs without causing
misunderstandings, and could avoid unexpected results. The reason the government was not
able to manage Mongolian affairs fairly and effectively is that the officials who managed
these affairs were not members of the Mongol nationality. Due to the many years without
success in Inner Mongolia, it is necessary to find an alternative and allow us to do some
thing for ourselves. The Mongols have the right to demand that the government change its
management of Mongolian affairs. If the government itself is not able to administer them
properly and also does not allow the Mongols to manage for themselves, that would be very
difficult to understand indeed. The push for Inner Mongolian autonomy is not a request for
separation but for cooperation. The Mongols hope to achieve autonomy under the fostering
care of the central government.... This is the type of self-rule the Inner Mongols demand.
Although it has created all kinds of suspicions, the higher-degree of autonomy that
we, the Mongols, demand is different from the local self-rule of a provincial district. We
hope that under the direct administration of the central government, a unified political or
ganization will be established in Inner Mongolia. Matters including national defense, di
plomacy, military affairs, national communication, and transportation are for the central
government to administer. ...
The opposing faction, in general, fears that if there were a unified Inner Mongolian
institution, it might be utilized or controlled by outsiders to create some kind of unexpected
incident. But if a unified Inner Mongolian institution may perhaps be manipulated by out
siders, why would our government be unable to control it and make it a cooperative institu
tion? We cannot believe that our government is as pessimistic or as cowardly as this. ... If
Inner Mongolian autonomy and a unified autonomous organization should be rejected on
the above pretext, it would greatly diminish Inner Mongolian confidence in the central gov
ernment. ...
After the eollapse of the Mongol empire, Mongolia moved in the direction of separa
tism. During the Manchu period, the Manchu court split Mongolia into many small feudalistic units; Mongolian politics, economy, and culture consequently declined. In recent
years, the Mongolian people have awakened and realized that unless unification takes
place, there will be no way to maintain the existence and growth of the nation. A unified
autonomy is the common desire of all Mongols.... We hope that the government is able to
guide this movement reasonably, and not build dikes to stop the flow and cause a flood.
The confrontation of the leagues and banners against the provinces and xians is what
created the present Inner Mongolian problem. The establishment of the league and banner
system in the early Manchu period was originally a measure to split Mongolia. At the same
time, a feudalistic “Mongolia ruled by Mongols” self-rule type of local institution was
founded. The leagues and banners ran the Mongolian local administration, and were not
interfered with by other local administrative organizations. During periods of . . . drought
and disasters in China’s inland provinces, under the pretext of borrowing Mongol land to
nourish the Chinese people, the court persuaded the Mongol nobles to allow Chinese to mi
grate into the southeastern sections of Inner Mongolia to become tenants on their land.
Following this, the Manchu Court established the tings (later changed into xians) to manage
the affairs of these Chinese but not to interfere with the Mongols and their administration. .
. In order to supervise the Mongols and to put pressure on them, the Manchu court also
established Jiangjun [generals] and dutong [military supervisors] in the areas of Suiyuan,
Chahar, and Rehe to administer military affairs but not to interfere with the league and
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banner administration directly.
After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the Beijing government is
sued “The Regulations for Mongolia’s Treatment” to protect the ruling power of the
leagues and banners. But the Republie also reinforced the funetions and powers of the
military governors of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan and of the xians under them to increase
their influence over the leagues and banners. In [1928], the Chinese government ehanged
these districts into Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningxia, and Qinghai (Kokonor) provinces, and
increased the ruling power of the xians. This intensified the conflict between the Mongols
and the provinces and xians. In [1931], the government issued “The Organizational Law of
Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners” so as to proteet the leagues and banners and to
separate their powers and functions from those of the provinces and xians. But this law was
never enforced, and the struggle between the leagues and banners and the provinces and the
xians increased. Even worse, the governors of these frontier provinces maintained vestiges
of the practices of the old warlords. . . . Therefore, when the Inner Mongolian Autonomy
Movement began in [1933], its objective was to abolish the provinces andx/ans.
After more than ten years of occupation by the Japanese, Inner Mongolia has just
now returned to the fold of the mother country. Today, in the land of Inner Mongolia, the
leagues and banners that have represented Mongolian local self-rule for years still exist; the
provinces and xians, which were always directed against the Mongols and aimed at the
elimination of the leagues and banners, continue in the same region. We would like to ask
if it is not reasonable for the Mongols to demand a clear-cut division of the territory, func
tions, and powers between the leagues and banners and the provinces and xians.
Some question why, in the twentieth century, the Mongols insist on maintaining their
feudalistic and backward leagues and banners. This sounds reasonable, but such questioners
do not realize that the demand of the Mongols has been to maintain the titles of the old
leagues and banners and create within them instruments by which the Mongols may carry
out their local self-rule. Just as the high officials of the frontier areas struggle to maintain
the provinces and xians, the Mongols also struggle to maintain their leagues and baimers to
ensure local autonomy. If the government allows a unified autonomous institution to be
established in Inner Mongolia and allows the territories of the autonomous region to protect
the Mongols’ right to carry out their self-rule, 1 believe the Mongolian intellectuals will not
struggle to maintain the leagues and banners, those remnants of feudalism....
For many years, whenever problems in Mongolia occurred, . . . they were always
linked to the problems of migration and cultivation. The Mongolian territories, located on
the high plateau, are cold, dry, and unsuitable for agriculture. In this environment, the
Mongols continued their lifestyle of pastoral nomadism. Although some parts of their lands
(mostly in eastern and southern Inner Mongolia) are suitable for agricultural development,
these had already been placed under cultivation. The rest of the land has remained unculti
vated; so it can be used for pastoral functions. If cultivation expands continually, this would
cause the Mongols to drive their herds into the arid desert area, and the Mongol people
would eventually disappear.
The traditional [Chinese] cultivation pattern is to rotate fields, cultivating a piece of
grassland one year, then leaving it fallow the next. But because of plowing, strong winds,
and the destruction of grass roots, the topsoil is blown away, eroding [former] grazing
fields into a manmade desert. These farming practices damage the pastoral economy rather
than increase agricultural production....
If China also desires to be an industrialized nation, it needs to preserve all kinds of
resources, including those that give rise to pastoral products. Undoubtedly, the Inner Mon
golian pastures should be protected from further development rather than be diminished by
wool and dairy import products from Australia and America. Mongolian pastures and the
people employed in the pastoral economy all contribute to the development of the nation;
yet they are interdependent on the parallel development of inland China farmers and the in
dustrialists of the cities....
The Japanese occupation of Inner Mongolia changed the situation greatly; it is en-
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tirely different from the way it was ten years before. Although the people have observed
this, the government still wants to continue the old method and policy in ruling Mongolia.
The government thinks that the Mongol people are still under the influence of the lamas
and the orders of the feudal princes....
From the beginning, they have failed to understand that the ecclesiastical power of
the lamas is already gone and their feudalistic power bankrupt. The best of the teudalistic
princes have realized that this institution has to be removed. Today, realization of the po
tential power of Mongolian society, found initially in the intellectual groups, has awakened
the youth at large. Youth from all classes have already assumed leadership positions in
Mongolia. They clearly appreciate the damage to the Mongol people caused by the Manchu
court’s religious policy and by feudalism. Therefore, if the central government were to now
revert to conservatism, it would lose the confidence of the Mongolian masses ....
To resolve the Mongolian problem, the government should pay attention to what
would benefit the Mongol masses rather then to what would benefit only certain individu
als. The influence of the established institutions is great, but any institution established for
selfish personal needs cannot provide a solution for the Mongolian problem....
Time has passed since the victory over Japan,. . . but the Government still does not
have a concrete plan for rehabilitation, even though many areas have rehabilitation centers.
On the one hand, the KMT Second Conference of the Sixth Session Central Com
mittee passed the Resolution for Frontier Problems; on the other hand, many administration
officials (all KMT members) said, “This solution is very difficult to put into effect.” Con
currently, another political party [the Chinese Communists] propagandized that “the reso
lution of the KMT will never be realized.” These opinions confused the Mongols, and it be
came impossible for them to judge exactly what was occurring....
Analysis of the problem was affected by each faction’s prejudices. The Mongols and
the top officials of the frontier regions hold conflicting opinions concerning the Mongolian
problem, caused by the opposing standpoints each adopted during the confrontation. Natur
ally, it is impossible for them to reach consensus from an objective viewpoint. The central
government should with a magnanimous spirit embrace the national platform based upon
the Outline of Nation Building, and assume the position of a big brother toward the minor
ity groups. It would be reasonable to accept the Mongols’ demand that the central govern
ment directly administer the Mongolian districts. Mongolia’s problems can be solved by a
central government that can prevent interference by the top frontier officials.
Since the completion of the Northern Expedition [1928-9], not only has the Mongol
ian problem remained unsolved, but no serious attempts at resolution have occurred. These
failures are the perverse result of the work of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commis
sion, originally established to manage Mongol matters. This failure was not only caused by
inefficiency and negligence by the organization, but also because the responsible leaders of
this commission are not Mongols, Tibetans, or Uighurs. This commission is without any
real influence in the central government. From now on, . . . this office needs to be infused
with a new spirit. Not just token changes may be carried out. The commission needs to un
derstand the frontier problem, and enthusiastically deal with frontier affairs and problems. .
Unfortunately, civil war broke out immediately after the victory over Japan. In the
great household of the Republic of China, the big brothers fought among themselves and
had no time to pay attention to other problems. Their younger brothers, the Mongols, were
already disappointed and hoped they would not be pulled into the big brothers’ struggle, be
forced to side with one or the other of them in the war. We [the Mongols] oppose separat
ing the Mongols by force and “liberating” them to one side or the other against their will.
We hope that our big brothers will help us and foster our goals, but we are not willing or
able to suffer their “struggles” and join their war. We hope the governmental authorities
will be sympathetic toward the circumstances of the Mongols in these areas. . . . We will
not agree to accept any names or titles as part of schemes to mobilize some Mongols to at-
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tack members of their own race and create a blood bath among the Mongols....
Inner Mongolia, after years of Japanese occupation, has looked to the government of
the mother country. Mongols have thought that the day of victory over Japan would also be
the hour of Mongolian freedom and self-rule that would abolish ail old measures and es
tablish a new policy for all nationalities. ...
Now the National Assembly is going to be held. We sincerely hope the Government
and the KMT will put into effect their promises based on . . . The Outline of Nation
building, The Declaration of the KMT First National Congress, and the recent solution of
the frontier problems proposed by the KMT Sixth Session Second Conference of the Cen
tral Committee; and that they make it clear in the constitution that all the frontier nationali
ties must have the right of autonomy. It is also sincerely hoped that other nongovernmental
political parties, members of societal elites, and our fellow countrymen will foster the
Mongolian cause for the development of democracy, wealth, devolution of power, and hap
piness.

Activities of the Mongolian Delegates in Nanjing
After this article was published, it won public support, but also provoked an
tagonism. Both Fu Zuoyi and Xiong Shihui and other top government officials actively
worked to place Mongolian administration under the control of provincial governments.
Their activities had a great impact on the Constitutional National Assembly. As men
tioned above, the three Mongolian delegations, after fulfilling their mission to celebrate
Chairman Chiang’s birthday, turned to support the Mongolian representatives who would
attend the National Assembly. We altered our official title from “congratulation delega
tion” to “petitioning delegation.” We remained in Nanjing and were invited to a tea party
by Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Chinese government. Chu Mingshan, the head of
the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, accompa
nied us. He repeatedly tried to discourage the Mongolian delegates by saying, “The time
for the chairman to talk with you will be very limited. It cannot be longer than ten min
utes, so I sincerely hope the spokesmen of your three delegations will limit their speeches
to three minutes each.”
When the delegations arrived and met with the chairman, we gave greetings
according to age: Rong Xiang started the proceedings, followed by Jin Yanghao, and then
myself The purpose of this arrangement, planned by Chu Mingshan, was to ensure that
my time would be limited. Nevertheless, I used my three minutes to address four of the
Mongol desires:
(1) To honor the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen concerning the nationalities inside the
nation; to achieve what was proclaimed in Article Four of the Outline of Nation Building
(“As for the weak and small nationalities inside the country, the government should foster
them and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule”); to ful
fill the promises that the KMT made to the Mongols; to put into effect the recent solution
of the nationalities problem that was decided upon by the Sixth Session Second Confer
ence of the KMT Central Committee.
(2) To establish a unified organization to achieve Inner Mongolian autonomy.
(3) To make a clear distinction between the functions and powers of the leagues and the
provinces and banners and xians.
(4) To emphasize the importance of a pastoral economy and to prohibit Chinese immi
grants from cultivating Mongolian soil.
After finishing this brief address, 1 presented to the chairman a written summary
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of my words. Chairman Chiang kindly received the document but deferred an answer.
Then he called his attendants to bring out the tea and cakes. This left some time for con
versation, but for the sake of courtesy, those who had already spoken did not speak again.
The chairman noticed a man with a long beard, Jorintob, and invited him to speak. Jorintob, not an eloquent person, stood up and said, “We Mongols are like sick people. We
need to buy some medicine to heal maladies and save our lives. Chairman, Your Excel
lency has a drugstore, so we have come here to find the medicine we need. If your medi
cine is good and able to heal, we will buy it here, or else we will go elsewhere to find it.”
Although these words were sincere and frank, it made the entire party nervous. Fortu
nately, the host did not choose to notice any unpleasantness, but only smiled and said,
“Good, good.” This ended the meeting at which the Mongolian problem might have been
discussed in depth but was not.
Later, the three delegations were invited to a dinner party by the Chen broth
ers—Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu—very powerful members of the central committee of
the KMT and leaders of the CC Clique. Nevertheless, the more they talked, the more
distant they became. The Chen brothers expressed the opinion that the Mongols should
feel satisfied, but we delegates repeatedly asked whether the KMT authorities were sin
cere in carrying out the will and teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the party, and
the KMT promises to Mongolia and the other minorities. These arguments brought an
element of contentiousness to the party.
This dinner party was planned by Li Yongxin, whose purpose was to make the
Mongolian guests realize that he had facilitated their visits with the high party authorities,
and to make the Chen brothers realize that he could lead the influential Mongol elites.
Nevertheless, the exchange of views was less than cooperative. Because of his official
position, Li could not express any sympathy with the Mongols’ cause. This only showed
the Mongols that a high ranking Mongol official could not express the true Mongolian
will to the party’s top authorities.
Another important gathering of the representatives of the Mongol, Tibetan, and
Xinjiang minorities was a banquet given by Wu Tiecheng, secretary-general of the KMT
Central Committee. Many people spoke, but the Uighur leader, Aisa-beg, and I voiced
the minorities’ desires. We emphasized the rights and privileges needed by the minorities,
and urged that the party not neglect its own promises.

Struggles at the Chinese Constitutional National Assembly
While these three Mongolian delegations were in Nanjing and were working
actively for the solution of Mongolian problems, confrontation inevitably erupted be
tween them and the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan representatives in the National Assembly.
In November 1946, the Chinese government disregarded the demand of the Chinese
Communist Party and opposition from the Democratic Alliance and convened the open
ing session of the Constitutional National Assembly. Twenty-eight Mongol representa
tives attended: Bai Yunti, Chen Xiaofan, Li Chunlin, Liu Zongping, Bai Fengzhao, Li
Yongxin, Jin Zhichao, Wu Yunpeng, Dorji, Hang Jiaxiang (Damrindorji), Jakhunju, Pu
Wenlin, Rong Zhao, Ba Wenjun, Jing Tianlu, Shongno, Qi Quanxi, Sodnamjab, Sugden,
Chen Erdenibatu, Dawa, Radnapad, Wu Jingbin, Choijab, Jorintob, Urgungge, Bai Haifeng, and Rashidondog. The largest group of representatives came from the Josutu
League.
These delegates had been elected in 1937, just before the Sino-Japanese war. At

XIV: The Mongol Struggle for Autonomy and the Chinese

361

that time the Mongols’ attention had been riveted on the movement led by Prince De and
as a consequence the election of these representatives had been neglected. Consequently,
aside from the Turned area, the Mongols staying in Beiping, Nanjing, and later in Chung
king carried out most of these elections. Ulanchab, Yekejuu, and Hulunbuir had no elec
tions, so their delegates were selected by the league authorities immediately before the
opening of the Assembly.
Liu Zongping was the most active of the Mongol representatives. His real name
was Liu Lianke, and he was then the head of the Education Bureau of the Rehe provincial
government. During this period, he had assistance in resolving the complicated entan
glements between the Josutu and Juu-uda Leagues and the Rehe provincial government.
At the Constitutional National Assembly, Liu Lianke proposed to introduce a special
chapter on nationalities into the constitution. However, other moderate Mongol repre
sentatives recognized this as too abstract. Finally, they agreed to demand the establish
ment of a unified autonomous institution.
Liu Lianke’s speech to the assembly evoked severe disagreement by the Rehe,
Chahar, and Suiyuan representatives. To win popular support, Fu Zuoyi and the repre
sentatives from the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces held separate press conferences
afterward. Aside from opposing Mongol autonomy, they also demanded that Mongol
banners be put under provincial administration. Fu Zuoyi pointed out that “basically there
is no Mongolia problem. The so-called problems are the creations of the Mongols’ own
foolish imaginations. [They] are entirely fabricated by those who take advantage of Mon
golia and use it as their own rice bowl.” Inside the National Assembly, aside from the
representatives from Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces, the most serious opposition to
Mongolian self-rule was led by Bai Chongxi, a Guangxi Moslem warlord, and Luo
Jialun, an academic and politician. The proposals of the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan rep
resentatives, which follow, in reality only replicated Fu Zuoyi’s opinion.
Statement by the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan Representatives
at the Press Conference:
Inner Mongolia, located on the northern frontier of China, is involved with the three
provinces of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan.... Therefore, we will offer a detailed explanation
of the true circumstances of these three provinces.
First, the Inner Mongolian situation differs from that of Outer Mongolia and Tibet.
The population of Inner Mongolia—comprising Mongols and Chinese—has a quite com
plex history. When the xians were established, banners also existed. This means that on a
pieee of land, a xian and a banner might exist concurrently. This creates two different
frameworks, but not “banner is banner and xian is xian." We cannot separate them. A vil
lage might ineorporate both Mongol and Chinese residents. Moreover, Mongols and Chin
ese often live together in one residence. Intermarriage further blurs racial lines. Not only in
the area where the xians were established, but even in the banners where the xian is not yet
established, the Chinese are often the majority.,..
Second, the Mongols are similar to the Chinese because of their tradition of mixed
dwelling arrangements. Only a few Mongols still maintain a nomadic life-style, mostly in
remote areas, while many Mongols practice agriculture. All Mongols in the mixed dwelling
areas can speak the national language and use the writing system [Chinese], and they read
ily become part of a unified friendly body.
Third, in matters of rights and duties, equality has existed between the two groups.
What the Chinese enjoy, the Mongols enjoy also. The Mongols are usually well treated. In
fact, perhaps it can be said they have had no burdens. All these assumptions are validated
by concrete facts....
Fourth, interrelationships between the Mongols and the Chinese ... are very positive,
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with no discrimination.... The Mongols and Chinese get along harmoniously.
Fifth, during the anti-Japanese war period, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan were occupied
territories. For eight years, the people suffered under the oppression of the enemy regimes.
After the victory, they were disturbed for more than one year by the Communist forces----After experiencing disastrous separation [from China] and aggression by the Japanese, the
Mongols do not wish for similar experiences.
Sixth, we, the representatives of the three provinces, . . . along with the local elites,
are sympathetic in principle to Mongolian banner self-rule... . Nevertheless, the autonomy
has to be a regional autonomy: this local autonomy has to recognize existing real situations
and accept national unity as the framework for reasonable self-rule.... We advocate:
1. In the area where Mongols outnumber Chinese, Mongols should assume responsibility
for local administration, even to eliminating the xian governments. We do not advocate the
existence of two different administrative institutions in one district. This would cause end
less conflict.
2. In the areas where xians are established, where Mongols live together with the Chinese
and Mongols are the minority, we hope that the principle of political and legal equality will
ensure appropriate rights and political positions for the Mongols, to enable capable Mon
gols to Join in local self-rule and to become representatives on the local council. .. .
3. The rights and duties of the Chinese and Mongols should be equal....
4. Certain schools already admit both Mongol and Chinese students, but this is not
enough. While honoring the cultures of other nationalities, we feel that the government
should establish schools so the Mongols can both teach the Mongolian language and edu
cate those Mongols who do not understand the national [Chinese] language.
5. In the Mongol banners, there are still some areas good for husbandry. To protect these
grazing fields and to develop the livelihood of the Mongol people, we advocate that these
areas should remain uncultivated.
6. More health centers should be established to promote public health, to improve the
breeding of domestic animals, to accelerate economic production, and to elevate the Mon
golian standard of living.
In addition, we would like to explain the following three points:
1. The Republic of China comprises many nationalities, and solid unification of all is re
quisite to the flourishing of the nation. During this period of nation building, the Mongol
and Chinese people of the three . . . provinces must move toward a more interdependent
relationship and not toward a separation.
2. Because the Mongolian leagues originally organized as meetings of the banners.... the
league is not an administrative institution and has no legally fixed form of organization.
The banners are the formal administrative units. This point should be stressed.
3. Although the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces are located along the frontier, they
have a great impact on the existence of the nation. This fact should not be ignored.

In order to refute these opinions, Liu Lianke suggested that I prepare a draft and
then have Rong Xian and himself edit it. Then this document would be distributed inside
the National Assembly Hall and be delivered to all news agencies for publicity. On De
cember 12, the Dagongbao published the whole text under the following title:
The Mongolian Response to the Opinion of the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyan Delegates
on the Inner Mongolian Problem
At present. . . we, the Mongol people, sincerely hope to follow the brilliant instruc
tion of the Founder of the Nation. His teachings provided a bright path for all the weak and
small nationalities to march forward upon toward the goal of equal coexistence. ... We
want our league and banner institutions, along with our grazing fields, to be protected. We
want to promulgate a new constitution that would provide coexistence with equality and
common development for all nationalities in the Republic of China ....
Since your opinion was published in the newspapers, misunderstandings may result
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. . . regarding the problem in Mongolia. Therefore, we must defend our position on the ac
tual situation of the Mongols.... First, we wish to clarify your reports:
1. Inner Mongolia, with the exception of the southernmost border areas and those near the
railroad, is occupied by both Chinese and Mongols. Much of it has only a few Chinese
merchants; in that land, there are no xians. As for the so called provincial territories, they
are nothing more than different colors on a map: they have no administrative relations with
us Mongols. In other words, even the land that has already been cultivated is still the pos
session of the Mongols. The Chinese tenants are still paying rent to the league and banner
governments and to the Mongol people. The leagues and banners are traditional political
institutions that have been established for several hundred years, but the xiam were estab
lished only by the end of the Manchu Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic. The his
tory of the provinces spans a mere ten years. Both the provinces and the xians deal only
with the affairs of the Chinese people and should not interfere with the administration of
the Mongol banners....
2. The Mongols cooperate with the Chinese, and no prejudice surfaces between the two
nationalities (except the prejudice of the province and xian officials against us). Neverthe
less, there is no reason to oppose Mongol self-rule and our existence as a nationality merely
because a few of us can speak Chinese.
3. As for the rights of the already-existing leagues and banners, the provinces and xians
have encroached upon them unreasonably. The Mongols’ obligations are therefore two
fold, but the provinces and xians offer them no concern and protection in return. In the past
three decades, we have suffered through the preferential treatment of the provinces and the
xians. Therefore, we dare not accept any further such treatment.. . .
4. The existence of a nationality is a product of nature. It cannot be manufactured or de
stroyed by human will. ... It is also impossible to eliminate nationality problems through
the denial of one side’s subjective view. The nationality problem and the nationalities’ de
mand for autonomy cannot simply be erased....
5. The livelihood of the Mongols is threatened. When a xian is established, many grazing
fields are cultivated and destroyed. If this policy continues, then all Mongols will be forced
onto the road to extinction. If the Mongols lack political liberation, then no one can ensure
them economic stability.
Second, we wish to comment on the six points of your proposals.
1. The Founder of the Nation insisted on equality among the nationalities. His greatest
suggestion was to “foster the weak and small nationalities inside the country and enable
them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” Consequently, we hope that when you
quote his teachings, you will not use them in a narrow sense. Equality and liberty cannot be
separated from one another; the liberty of a nationality depends on the protection of its right
to self-rule. If the Mongolian right of self-rule is eliminated, then how can we enjoy equal
ity and liberty?
2. We vehemently oppose having two sets of administrative institutions in one area, espe
cially when one of them heavily oppresses us. We hope for clear-cut territorial boundaries
and limitations of power between the leagues and banners, and the provinces and xians. We
wish to enjoy our own local autonomy.
3. As for the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth items of your proposals, you tried to consider
them from our point of view, and this deserves our appreciation. We do demand real equal
ity of rights and obligations among all nationalities, but we do not hope for a false equality
that would submerge the Mongols and their land under the provinces and xians. . .. The
central government had planned to develop Mongolian education, and had sent money for
this rehabilitation to the border areas. Yet the provincial governments siphoned away this
money, so our schools did not benefit from it. Our grazing fields have been encroached
upon, our pastoral enterprise violated. Mongolian economic life is bankrupt, hygienic con
ditions are deteriorating—all because of political oppression and extortion... .
Third, we must explain the three points of our proposal.
(1) The Republic of China is a commonwealth of all its nationalities. It is not possessed
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only by the Chinese, and the revolution led by the Founder of the Nation is not only for the
benefit of the Chinese. Since the Founder of the Nation emphasized the common benefits
which the national revolution would bring and recognized the right of self-determination
and self-rule for the weak and small nationalities, true unification of the nationalities de
pends on their interrelationships and the protection of their political, economic, and cultural
liberty and equality. . . . Forcefully placing the provinces and xians over the Mongols will
jeopardize close and friendly intimate unification with the Chinese.
(2) As for the assertion that the league ranks with the province, we wish that you gentle
men would carefully read the Organizational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Ban
ners, and only then express your opinions in order to avoid embarrassing yourselves when
you try to attract the attention of the public.
(3) Inner Mongolia is the first line of national defense. It is also a bridge to Central Asia.
The Mongols’ historical struggles show what they need to maintain long-lasting peace. But
it is ludicrous to claim that the provinces and xians must subdue the Mongols to reach the
goal of “final elimination of disastrous events.”
We hope these explanations clarify your misunderstandings, along with those of our
fellow citizens. We ask that you accept our admonition.

On the same day, December 1, the Mongolian representative to the national as
sembly and the three Mongolian delegations joined for a press conference. On the next
day, the Nanjing newspapers published the opposing opinions of the Mongol side and the
frontier provinces. Among them, Wenhuibao, the official newspaper of the Democratic
Alliance (Minzhu tongmeng), gave a sympathetic and detailed view of the Mongols’ po
sition. The headline was “The Inner Mongolian Delegates’ Demand for Autonomy and
Proposal of Six Concrete Items for Autonomy.” The newspaper reported that “Sechin
Jagchid and others spoke out at the press conference.” The following is the text of the
front-page article:
Inner Mongolia demands autonomy, and it has submitted to the government a docu
ment resembling an ultimatum. If it is rejected, the people of Inner Mongolia will throw
themselves into the embrace of the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union; they have no
alternative.
In an effort to petition for autonomy, the Mongol delegations and the Mongol repre
sentatives in the National Assembly convened a joint international press conference. . . .
Bai Yunti headed this conference. He stated that their hope for this National Assembly was
outlined in six items, and these should be included in the constitution as amendments. They
are as follows:
1. All the nationalities in the Republic of China should enjoy equality. Minority peoples
should have a guaranteed right of autonomy.
2. There should be equal representation of the leagues and banners as well as the prov
inces and xians in the National Assembly. They should each enjoy equal rights.
3. The thirty members of the Legislative Yuan and the seventeen members of the Control
Yuan should be elected by the leagues and tribes.
4. In the section on “Rights and Functions of Central and Local Government and Local
Government Institutions,” the position, functions, and powers of the league and tribe should
be stipulated as equal to those of the provinces, and those of the banners equal to those of
the xians.
5. The banners are the local units of Mongolian local self-rule.
6. In the section on the “National Economy,” the husbandry industry must be specifically
protected, and the well-being of the herdsmen and farmers should be honored equally.
Following this declaration Rong Xiang,... Jin Yanghao . . . and Sechin Jagchid ad
dressed the present situation of Inner Mongolia. Along with their speeches, they handed out
written statements....
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In addition, the Inner Mongolian associates in Nanjing issued a long joint statement
to emphasize the following three points. They hoped: (1) to request the central authorities
to carry out the “Resolution for Frontier Affairs” by the KMT Sixth Session Second Con
ference of the Central Committee; (2) to rehabilitate the unified Mongolian Political Coun
cil; and (3) to renew and reorganize the border affairs institute of the central government..,
. The following summarizes their statement.
Rong Xiang, the head of the Ulanchab and Yekejuu Leagues Delegation, said, “After
the victory over Japan, the Government’s treatment of the Inner Mongolian people has been
unfair—far worse than the Mongols suffered under the Japanese occupation during the war.
... He pointed out that the Government periodically arrested and imprisoned Mongols, and
he illustrated the contribution of the Inner Mongolians during the war. Then he said, “After
the victory, . . . only Inner Mongolia was excluded from rehabilitation by the government.
The relief materials the Mongols received were very limited. As soon as other regions ap
plied, special funds were provided, but the Mongolian banners were again excluded....
Jin Yanghao, Head of the Delegation of Northeastern Leagues and Banners, reported
on the situation of Northeastern Inner Mongolia: “Last year we saw the Independence of
Outer Mongolia. ... In January this year, the Eastern Mongolian delegates gathered at
Wang-un sume and dispatched their delegation to Chungking to petition for the right of
Mongolian self-determination. When this delegation arrived in Beiping, the government...
refused to allow the delegation to go on to Chunking.. ..” Then he gave a briefing on dis
crimination in the rehabilitation work of the twenty-two Eastern Mongolian banners and the
great loss of the Mongolian people’s rights and benefits as well as their suspicion of the
central government’s goodwill.
Finally, Sechin Jagehid . . . said . . . “The Inner Mongol Autonomy Movement em
bodies the unanimous demand of all the Mongols, who have decided to wage an unbending
struggle and make great sacrifices to achieve self-rule. The desire for autonomy is a quest
of all minorities. It is by no means a mere local issue.” He then quoted the words of Mr.
Sun Yat-sen and the talks of Chairman Chiang and the articles concerning national selfdetermination in the Atlantic Charter.
He said, “At this point, someone whose political outlook was different from ours said
that the Mongols do not really want self-rule. The so-called demands for self-rule are the
ideas of the few who are eating from the Mongol rice bowl.” Jagehid retorted, “This is a
complete distortion. A Mongol has the right to eat from the Mongolian rice bowl. This is a
privilege endowed by Heaven. The Mongol demand for autonomy is a holy obligation. The
political position of the Mongol banners is much worse than years ago. After the revolution
of 1911, the Mongols were still one of the five peoples that formed the Republic. Now we
can no longer enjoy such a position; so from now on we demand autonomy. The provinces
and the xians must maintain the Mongol banners and prevent intrusion of the plow onto the
grazing fields. The feudalistic institutions of Inner Mongolia have already passed away.
The class distinctions between the princes and the common people are not as vivid as be
fore. Their positions are becoming equal. We demand that the Government not view these
matters according to their old and biased perspective but instead make a new evaluation of
Mongolian affairs. We firmly oppose the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission’s back
ward policy. This must be reformed.”
Jagehid frankly pointed out, “Today, the Inner Mongolian people have only two ways
to go. The first way is the road of democracy. There is no need to mention the second way.
I dare guarantee that no Mongol leans to the left only for the left’s sake, is pro-Communist
for the sake of communism, or pro-Soviet only for the Soviets’ sake; but we must align
ourselves with one or the other side in order to exist. We support the Three Principles of the
People; nevertheless, none of the promises made by the government have been kept. We
sincerely hope that the government will keep its promises to guarantee our autonomy. We
hope that the mother nation will give us a place within her heart. I believe this time the
government will not disappoint us, or pour cold water on our faces, which is the reason we
are not running toward Moscow. We are not just looking forward from the present situa-
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tion, we are looking forward to an extensive future. Our autonomy movement is not a sepa
ratist demand; even the people of Outer Mongolia, who already enjoy independence, do not
oppose China. However, Mongolia bridges Asian society and has an important link to in
ternational matters and diplomacy; but how to take advantage of this position will depend
on the decision of the central government. Our demand for autonomy is aimed at equal co
existence; it does not threaten the frontier provinces.”
After the conference ended, he told a journalist, “We knock at the door of the mother
country, while another group of people knocks at the doors of Moscow and Yan’an. If the
door of the mother country does not remain open, Inner Mongolia will naturally seek better
lodging elsewhere.”

While the heated debate raged both inside and outside the Assembly Hall, Fu
Zuoyi had Fu Sinian, a well-known Chinese historian and Director of the Academia
Sinica, publish an article opposing Mongolian autonomy. It was published in The Central
Daily News, the official newspaper of the KMT under the title “The Problem of Inner
Mongolian Autonomy—A Clarification Opposing the Theory that the League Equals the
Province.”
After Fu’s article appeared, the Mongolian delegates asked me to write a re
sponse to it, which was published in the Shanghai Dagongbao on December 19, under
my pen name, “Serjimedug,” with the title “Please, Give a Fair Judgment on the Mongol
ian Problem.”
Of course, these two documents again clearly pointed out the sharp political
confrontation between the Chinese frontier provincial officials and the Mongolian lead
ers.

The Constitutional Convention of the National Assembly’s
Solution to the Mongolian Problem
The national constitutional convention met in several sessions to review and
consider the various proposals for the articles of a new constitution, but no consensus
could be reached on the articles dealing with the Mongolian problem. The opinions of the
Mongol delegates and those of the frontier provinces were still as contradictory as they
had been before. Finally, Liu Jianqun (who represented the KMT), Xu Fulin (who repre
sented the Democratic Socialist Party), Paul Yu Bin (who represented the nonpartisan
delegates), and ten other go-betweens reached a compromise. The following articles,
fully approved by the central government authorities, were incorporated into the new
Constitution of the Republic of China:
Article 5
There shall be equality among the various racial groups in the Republic of China.
Article 26
The National Assembly shall be composed of the following delegates:
2. Delegates to represent Mongolia shall be elected on the basis of four for each league
and one for each special banner.
3. The number of delegates elected from Tibet shall be prescribed by law.
4. The number of delegates elected by various racial groups in frontier regions shall be
prescribed by law.
Article 64
Members of the Legislative Yuan shall be elected in accordance with the following provi
sions:
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2. Those to be elected from Mongolian leagues and banners
3. Those to be elected from Tibet
4. Those to be elected by various racial groups in frontier regions
Article 91
The Control Yuan shall be composed of members who shall be elected by provincial and
municipal councils, the local councils of Mongolia and Tibet, and Chinese citizens residing
abroad. Their numbers shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
3. Eight members from the Mongolian leagues and banners
4. Eight members from Tibet
Article 119
The local self-government system of the Mongolian leagues and banners shall be pre
scribed by law.
Article 120
The self-government system of Tibet shall be safeguarded.
Article 168
The State shall accord to the various racial groups in the frontier regions legal protection of
their status and shall give them special assistance in their local self-government efforts.
Article 169
The State shall, in a positive manner, undertake and foster the development of education,
culture, communications, water conservation, public health, and other economic and social
enterprises of the various racial groups in the frontier regions. The State shall, after consid
ering the climatic conditions, the nature of the soil, and the life and habits of the people,
adopt measures to protect the land and to assist in its development.

After this compromise was made and accepted by the authorities of the govern
ment, but before it became a formal resolution, the Mongolian delegates to the National
Assembly hosted a dinner party and delivered a formal report to the three Mongol local
delegations. The Mongol delegate Liu Lianke gave a thorough report, and the gobetweens expressed their views from various different perspectives. They all hoped that
the articles in the new constitution would solve the Mongolian problem in a reasonable
manner. Most Mongol delegates to the national assembly felt they had done their best,
and were satisfied. But others, such as Rong Xiang, myself, and others who came from
Mongolian lands, felt that Mongol hopes had been dashed. Although the matter was al
ready a fait accompli, and complaining would be ineffectual, we still felt compelled to
express our opinions that these articles did not satisfy the hopes of the Mongolian people.
1 expressed deep disappointment that a unified Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Organization was not provided for in the constitution. I proposed an amendment that
would state how the articles should be read and interpreted; I also argued that since Mon
golia and Tibet fall outside provincial jurisdiction, and that since their position was equal
to or higher than that of a province. Article 119 (which read “The local self-government
system of the Mongolian Leagues and Banners shall be prescribed by law”) could be
made to read, “In Mongolian territory, autonomous institutions shall be settled by law”
by simply moving a single comma in the Chinese text. Through such a reading, some
small measure of Mongolian autonomy might have been obtained, but the answer 1 re
ceived after submitting this suggestion was negative: “Although the question of the posi
tion of the comma in the text is an interesting one, the text cannot be altered. This article
is clearly about local autonomy and not autonomy for Mongolia’s localities.”
After a long struggle, the only thing the Mongols received was a local autonomy
on a par with the Chinese provinces and xians. The Mongols got little autonomy, except
for the inclusion of the words “league” and “banner” in the constitution. This meant that
they could not easily be abolished or ignored by the provincial and xian governments.
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Another important part of this constitution was Article 169, included because of
the Mongol delegates’ proposal that the pastoral zones of Mongolia no longer be culti
vated by agricultural settlers. Even though the phrasing of this article was not quite clear,
it was a compromise provided by the opponents of Mongolian autonomy. Although the
Mongols did not achieve all their goals, neither did the frontier provinces abolish the
leagues and subject the banners to their desires. Therefore, until the establishment of a
new law for the local autonomy of Mongolian leagues and banners, the Organizational
Law of the Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners (as issued by the government in
1931) was again reinforced as the only law the Mongolian leagues and banners could
depend on.
The reason the Mongol delegates could not reach their goals was that they
lacked real leadership and cooperation with each other. They could not pursue their de
mands to the end. Although Liu Lianke waged a single-handed struggle, he did not have
unanimous Mongol support; thus his goals could not be reached.
All through the constitutional convention, the Tibetan delegates expressed their
contempt and disapproval by not participating in the proceedings. But in the end, they got
good treatment in the constitution. The delegates from Xinjiang were led by one Ahmedjiang, a leader of the Soviet-backed Eastern Turkestan Independence Movement. Their
spokesman was Aisha Beg, a longtime leader of the Uighur national movement. In the
assembly meeting, other delegates under Ahmedjiang’s leadership offered criticism but
did not strive for any gains. Aisha Beg’s delegates tried to achieve some gains, but re
ceived no special treatment for the Uighurs as a people because Xinjiang had already
been established as a Chinese-style province. Later, after their return to Xinjiang, this
unresolved situation fueled the pro-Soviet propaganda mill, which attacked the pro-KMT
group among the Uighurs. The increased Soviet influence created by this situation was
similar to that in Inner Mongolia.
Article 64 provided for the election of members of the Legislative Yuan from
Mongolia and Tibet. Of course, other national minorities could state that this article ap
plied to them too. In fact, this article had been included in the new constitution only be
cause of the demands of the Mongolian delegates. Nevertheless, the term “Manchu peo
ple” was officially avoided.
After these disappointments and setbacks, the three delegations from Inner
Mongolia returned silently to their homeland. Rong Xiang had not accomplished any
thing, and the central government could not solve the clash between Rong’s own Turned
banner and the Suiyuan provincial government. Because of this, Rong decided to remain
and continue his struggle to resolve this matter, but his hopes did not materialize until the
winter of 1947.

Formation of the Mongolian Youth Alliance
While the Mongol delegates were gathered in Nanjing, Rashidondog and 1, who
had been high school schoolmates during our days in Beiping, talked frankly with each
other about the Mongolian problem and discovered that our opinions were nearly identi
cal. Later, we invited Kokebagatur, once an important figure in the Mongolian Student
Association in Beiping, and Urgungge Onon, educated in Japan and formerly a teacher in
the Sunid Right Banner school, to talk about the future of Mongolia. We recognized that
Bai Yunti had already lost the spirit of struggle. Li Yongxin and others dared not advo
cate ideas different from those of the Chinese authorities. Among the old conservatives in
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Mongolia were many who were eager for compromise, while others had become slav
ishly obedient yes-men for the Chinese border officials.
Among the intellectuals, many had turned to the Soviet Union and the Chinese
Communists, not realizing that nationalism is taboo in communist dogma. Moreover,
such activities were basically adventurism, given the changing international situation.
These people were naive enough to stake all their hopes on the changing world currents.
For the future of the entire nation, we all felt the need to organize together to carry out a
unified movement in times of need.
After several discussions to this effect, our opinions became more unified. We
then invited Jakhunju (Ji Zenfu), a section head of the Bureau of Education of the Bailingmiao Mongolian Political Council, to meet with us and discuss these issues.^ We all
recognized that time was passing and that we should organize a body immediately, which
would be called the Monggol Jatagus-un Andalaga (The Mongolian Youth Alliance).
The word Anda here means “sworn brothers,” indicating the status of the members of this
alliance. The alliance’s main goals were (1) to struggle for liberty, freedom, and inde
pendence, and to shun alien (non-Mongol) domination; (2) to use nonviolent measures to
promote democracy and cleanse Mongolia of the damage created by feudalistic institu
tions; and (3) to create a cooperative economy and struggle for equal development in the
people’s livelihood.
Following the decision to accept these points, the Mongolian Youth Alliance
(MYA) was formally established on January 1, 1947 in Nanjing. The members, beside
the five persons mentioned above, were Shongno (delegate to the national assembly,
commander of the militia forces of the Urad Central Banner, and son of Rinchinsengge,
head of the Ulanchab League); Qi Quanxi (delegate to the national assembly, tusalagchi
of the Ordos Left Central Banner, and nephew of Tobshinjirgal, head of the Yekejuu
League); Jorigtu (from the Naiman banner, Juu-uda League, who had studied in Japan
and was a former official of the Mongolian government [Kalgan]); Oljeibuyan (from the
Kharachin Right Banner of the Josotu League, a graduate of Nanjing Central Political
College, and a former Mongolian government official [Kalgan]), Bai Dacheng (of the
Khorchin Left Central Banner, a former official of the Shilingol League); and Namdag (a
Torgud youth and member of the Mongolian Cultural Association of Xinjiang who was
assassinated by a Kuomintang agent, soon after his return to Xinjiang). There were sev
eral other members, but out of consideration for their political and personal welfare, their
names will not be given here.
We made the following four resolutions: (1) the word “Youth” in the name indi
cated youthful thought and action but did not limit membership to young people; (2) the
members should not be guided by localism or localistic ideas; (3) the alliance should be
enlarged and the political leadership of Inner Mongolia was worth struggling for, and (4)
international friendship should be actively sought in order to bring international influence
to bear in creating a counterbalance of power in Mongolia, thereby preventing any one
sided leanings or external power from controlling Mongolia.
In line with the fourth resolution, we also decided to establish contact with
United States authorities to counterbalance the hegemonic influence of the Soviet Union.
Soon after, these members left Nanjing and returned north. Branch organizations of the
Mongolian Youth Alliance were gradually established at important places in Inner Mon
golia. Because the main goals of this alliance were very clear, many nationalistic Mongol
^ Earlier, because of Prince De’s contact with the Japanese, Jakhunju had followed Bai Haifeng,
Yun Jixian, and most of the Peace Preservation Troops in a rebellion based in Bailingmiao.
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youths gravitated toward the Alliance and its struggle for the future of Mongolia.

Turmoil in Inner Mongolia
After we returned to Beiping, we reported to Prince De and other Mongols on all
aspects of our experience in Nanjing (but not the formation of the Mongol Youth Alli
ance). The responses we received varied. Prince De and those who had strong nationalis
tic ideologies were greatly disappointed. Wu Heling and moderate realists realized that
the problem of establishing a unified autonomous institution could not be successfully
concluded and was doomed to failure, and that even the mere guarantee of the existence
of leagues and banners was actually an accomplishment. Wu was especially satisfied with
this development, since he had been the promoter of the Organizational Law of Mongol
ian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners while he was in Nanjing.
During this period. Nationalist forces recovered Kalgan from Communist occu
pation. Wang-un sume, renamed Ulanhot temporarily, became the political center of In
ner Mongolia under the Chinese Communists. A few members of the Inner Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary Party, who had the support of the Mongolian People’s Republic,
now became the dominant force in this area. Later, on May 1, the Mongolian Allied As
sociation for the Autonomy Movement was formally renamed the Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Government. Although Ulanfti was made chairman, many eastern Inner
Mongolian factions had more power. However, because Ulanfu and his group were part
of the Chinese Communist Party, they were able to gradually gain more power.
Also at this time, the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (Neimindang)was dissolved and subjugated to the Branch Political Bureau for Inner Mongolia of
the Chinese Communist Party. Ulanfu and Khafengga were appointed as secretary and
deputy secretary respectively to carry out a co-leadership. From this time forth, the lead
ership gradually turned into a clique led by Ulanfu. During the Cultural Revolution, Kha
fengga was greatly harassed, and the members of the Neimindang mercilessly purged.
After their loss of Kalgan, the Chinese Communists also lost control over the
Chahar banners. Even the southwestern area of Bandita Gegeen Keid (present Shilinhot)
slipped from the control of the Chinese Communists. Rinchindorji of Buriyad, taking
advantage of this opportunity, contacted Sungjingwangchug, the former head of the
Shilingol League, and Budabala, the former vice-head of the Shilingol League, to organ
ize militarily to eradicate the remaining influence of the Chinese Communists in Shilin
gol. Prince Sung, a prudent person, advocated a wait-and-see attitude. However, his
tusalagchi, Naidang, supported this plan wholeheartedly. According to what I heard, they
dispatched an official of the banner, Radnashidi, to contact Rinchindorji, but Radnashidi
was captured by the Communists on his way, and they decided to execute him. After re
ceiving this report. Prince Sung himself interceded in his favor, saying, “I dispatched this
man; he himself did nothing wrong. If there is any punishment, I would like to take it on
myself Do not punish an innocent man.” Because Prince Sung was such a popular leader
in Shilingol, Radnashidi was released, and Prince Sung was not held responsible for his
actions. Nevertheless, Naidang, greatly frightened, committed suicide. Soon after. Prince
Sung was invited to a conference in Ulanhot, and he died there of his sickness at age 63.
The reason for the inclusion of Prince Sung and his death in this account is my desire to
remember him as an honorable, beloved superior officer.
At the urging of Rinchindorji, Budabala prepared for action and sent his brotherin-law, Urgungge, to Beiping via Kalgan. Rinchindorji was to visit Prince De and ask for
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his instructions. I was present at this meeting, having just returned from Nanjing to
Beiping. Urgungge said, “Before the retreat of the Outer Mongolian forces, Duyinkhorjab, the head of the Inner Defense Bureau at Ulaanbaatar, personally gave an assignment
to Budabala, Shonodondob (the jasag of the Abaga Right Banner), and me to spy for the
Mongolian government.” With a pair of scissors, they had cut jaggedly through an old
Mongolian (Kalgan) bank note as a token of their cooperation. These two halves were to
be joined at a later date in order to prove that they were of the same group.
Prince De told Urgungge, “I hope Prince Budabala will be careful not to do
anything in great haste. He should wait and examine the situation for a while. His rela
tionship with Outer Mongolia had best be kept secret. Both the Chinese Communists and
the Mongolian communists are under the direction of the Soviet Union. Contact with
Outer Mongolian intelligence organizations might achieve some protection under Chi
nese communist control, but you yourself must keep your visit to Beiping secret and not
increase difficulties for Prince Bu. As for the Mongolian problem, right now there is no
concrete solution. Further efforts are needed.” Prince De also warned them that they
should not rely on Fu Zuoyi’s military power.
Rinchindorji’s visit to Beiping was intended to secure the full support of Prince
De and also to ask Li Zongren, head of the Military Committee of the Beiping branch,
and Fu Zuoyi, the commander at Kalgan, for military assistance. Prince De introduced
Rinchindorji to the Military Committee authorities of the Beiping Branch but admonished
him to be prudent and careful, and not to shed the blood of other Mongols. However,
Rinchindorji did not accept Prince De’s advice. On the contraty, he felt that to ask for
help directly from Fu Zuoyi would be better than disturbing Prince De. Of course, this
thinking came from his long experience, which had showed him that it was best not to
deal with the Mongolian government but instead to establish direct contact with the Japa
nese special service office. He himself had no interest in Mongol autonomy or the right or
wrong of Fu Zuoyi’s actions and policies. His goal was only to eliminate communism in
the Shilingol area. So he soon split from Prince De and could no longer cooperate with of
other Mongols. He hoped that Fu Zuoyi might eventually provide support.
But how could a man like Fu Zuoyi, who was hostile toward the Mongols, help
Rinchindorji become leader of a powerful body of Mongol troops during the Mongols’
struggle against the Communists? Consequently, the more Rinchindorji became isolated
from Mongol concerns, the weaker his goals became. At this same time, Mugdenbuu, the
amban of the Bordered Yellow Banner of Chahar, who had once visited Ulaanbaatar and
was quite pro-Communist, suddenly hoisted the anti-Communist banner. His troops, who
were strong and disciplined and could maintain peace wherever they went, also changed
their attitudes and followed his anti-Communist leadership efforts.
Therefore, the former Chahar leaders such as Serengnamjil, the vice-head of the
Chahar League; Norbujana, the amban of the Right Taipus Banner; and others rushed to
Kalgan. Their arrival in this city and the activities of the Chahar Mongolian KMT Head
quarters again rendered Kalgan an active center of Mongol activity. However, Fu Zuoyi
hindered their hopes for the rehabilitation of the Chahar League. When the Communists
later took over all Inner Mongolia and North China, their hopes were completely dashed.
The central government had already agreed to the proposal to make the Chahar
Tribe into a league, this with the resolution of the Eight Articles of Principles for Mon
golian Autonomy as passed by the KMT Political Committee, and the establishment of
the Bailingmiao Mongolian Political Council in 1934. Nevertheless, the Chahar provin
cial government stubbornly hindered this change. After the Japanese occupation, the
Chahar Tribe was immediately reorganized into a league, and the league system persisted
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until the end of World War II. After the government recovered Kalgan from the Commu
nists, the Chahar leaders in Kalgan again expressed their old hopes that the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission would rehabilitate the Chahar Tribe and reorganize it into a
league. Fu Zuoyi insisted that the banners of Chahar be subject to the Jurisdiction of his
provincial government, but he did agree to the rehabilitation of the Chahar’s branch of
fice (Jbanshi chu) in Kalgan. Consequently, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission
was unable to resolve this matter.
Fu Zuoyi’s assistance to the Chahar banners’ anti-Communist efforts was inef
fectual. While Rinchindorji of Buiryad and the ambans of Chahar failed to receive satis
factory answers and help from Fu Zuoyi in Kalgan, the extreme anti-Communist activist
Khuturungga, a former official of the princely residence of the Ujumuchin Right Banner,
and Togtakhu, a minor commander of the former Peace Preservation Forces of the same
banner, organized an anti-Communist military group and carried out merciless struggles
against the pro-Communist military groups of that area.
Khuturungga also arrived in Beiping via Kalgan to visit Prince De. Although the
Prince agreed in principle with Khuturungga’s anti-Communist activities, he repeatedly
warned Khuturungga not to shed blood. Khuturungga not only flouted this advice, he also
cooperated with Fu Zuoyi. Khuturungga thought this was the only way he could obtain
full support for his anti-Communist efforts. He only knew how to eliminate Communist
elements; he knew nothing of Mongolia's real political problems. In any event, the small
amounts of equipment he received from Fu Zuoyi were faulty, and this curtailed his ac
tivities.
In short, the anti-Communist efforts of Rinchindorji and Khuturungga failed
because of their approaches and violent, unmerciful tactics. Because they killed so many
innocent people, they gradually lost support and sympathy and came to ignominious
ends.
Also during this period, Fu Zuoyi’s troops pushed forward into the southwestern
area of the Sunid Right Banner. Following this move, Altanochir, the former tusalagchi
and later the temporary head of the banner, together with Dayanchi Lama, who was an
intimate friend of Prince De and had given up his lamaship to return to lay life, left Chin
ese Communist control and arrived in Beiping. Others soon arrived: Shonodondob, the
Jasag of the Abaga Right Banner, and Jurkhaichi Lama Gungga, the abbot of the Jurkhaichi Temple of the Sunid Left Banner. Earlier, at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese
War and the Japanese takeover of Kalgan, two young officials, Giljintei and Agdungga,
both of the Ujumuchin Right Banner, had been in charge of the Shilingol League Branch
Office in Kalgan. To obey the former league head Sodnamrabdan’s desire to support the
Chinese government, they both left for Beiping, Later, following the move of the gov
ernment from Nanjing to Hankou and then to Chungking, they finally went to Xi’an.
Now they had returned to Kalgan. Seeing the arrival of these people. Prince De, hoping
for the rehabilitation of the Shilingol League, summoned Shonodondob, together with
Giljintei, to come forth and negotiate with the Chinese authorities.

Contact with International Organizations
The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission had to seek Fu Zuoyi’s approval
for its solution to the Mongolian problem. Of course, Fu’s answer was negative. Before
the Sino-Japanese war (1937), the central government had already appointed Prince De as
the head of the Shilingol League. They therefore demanded that Prince De, as the head of
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the league, petition for the rehabilitation of the Shilingol League. In so doing, they could
pull Prince De down from his Mongolian leadership position and make him equal to the
other league heads. Prince De could not accept this request; he hoped that the government
would appoint Shonodondob to be the head of the Shilingol League. However, Fu again
hindered this request. He disagreed with having Prince Shon as a league head and said
that since the territory of the Shilingol League was still not all recovered, not all of it
should be rehabilitated immediately. These political and military setbacks provided good
opportunities for the Chinese Communists to expound their propaganda, and they made
many people feel that it was impossible to bring any fruit back from Nanjing.
On their return from Nanjing to Urumchi, the Xinjiang delegation passed
through Beiping. Aisha Beg and several members of this Xinjiang delegation visited with
Prince De. Their talks went smoothly and amicably; finally, they agreed that the Mongol
and Uighur nationalities should jointly struggle for the preservation and self-deter
mination of all national minorities in China.
Just before this, Owen Lattimore, known as a friend of the Mongol people and
then serving as an adviser to Douglas McArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo, arrived in
Beiping and visited Prince De. Prince De asked him to convey to the U.S. government the
Mongolian people’s desire for a higher degree of autonomy. Soon after this, George Mar
shall came to China to mediate the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communist Party. During these negotiations, Frank B. Bessac, now a professor emeritus
of anthropology at the University of Montana, was sent by the American government to
Kalgan and other parts of Inner Mongolia to observe the situation. At Kalgan, Bessac met
with Ulanfu and others. In Beiping, he met with Prince De. Because of his interchanges
with these people, his interest in the Mongolian problem grew.
Togtakhu, who was then in Beiping, had previously established contact with the
Military Statistics Bureau of the Chinese government; through this agency, he had made
contact with a Mr. Richardson, who was then the Beiping agent of the American naval
intelligence office, of which Frank Bessac was also a member. Togtakhu then brought
Richardson to meet with Prince De, and they asked the Prince to recommend to them
several trustworthy assistants who could operate radio transmitters. Prince De introduced
two Mongol youths, Wang Guicong and Yi Guohuang, who were both from the Turned
area and had worked for Prince De’s radio station. Later, these two recommended Nairaltu, a Dahur youth educated in Japan, and he was sent to work at Richardson’s organi
zation, which was responsible for the areas of Mukden, Changchun, and other northeast
ern Chinese areas. Nairaltu introduced to his employers Asau Tatsuo, also known to the
Mongols as Maidarjab, formerly a high-ranking official of the Wang-un sume special
service office, who was well-versed in the Mongolian language and literature. This also
influenced Richardson and increased his interest in Mongolian political problems.
After returning to Beiping, 1 talked to my friend Dagwaodsar, a Hulunbuir man
trained at the lama training center at Koyasan, and told him of the establishment of the
Mongolian Youth Alliance. During the period of the Japanese occupation, Dagwaodsar
usually passed on to me secret news he had picked up from the Japanese because he was
then an interpreter for Japanese intelligence groups. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the
Japanese military had wanted to assassinate Prince De; this Dagwaodsar had also told me.
In my eyes, Dagwaodsar was a very active Mongolian nationalist. After the Japanese
defeat and withdrawal from China, Dagwaodsar established some contacts with the
members of the Soviet Embassy in Beiping. The famous Mongolist, Pankratov, was one
of the people with whom he had contact. Dagwaodsar spoke to me about all his Russian
contacts. It was for this reason that he was the first one I invited to join the MYA.
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After this, we invited the following people to become founding members of the
MYA: Magadburin Haltod, then also known as Madai (a mispronunciation of “Matthew”;
Madai died in Germany in 1975, having been a teacher of Mongolian literature at the
University of Bonn); Lubsangnorbu (Buyandalai’s son); Unensechen (also known as Bao
Guoyi; he taught Chinese and Mongolian at UCLA for years); Gombojab Hangin (late
Professor of Mongolian literature, Indiana University; but at that time, Prince De’s sec
retary); and Oyongerel (my wife). The second step of this group was to expand its activi
ties in the Kalgan, Chahar, and Shilingol areas. Prudently, we decided to wait to report
our activities to Prince De, and we did not immediately invite him to join the alliance.
This was done to preclude Prince De’s influence in the alliance from being too extensive.
Soon after this, at Dagwaodsar’s recommendation, the members of the MYA
made contact with Bessac and Richardson’s group. These people were important because
they were intelligence agents of the U.S. government, and interchange with them would
present the opportunity to bring Mongolia’s aims and the seriousness with which they
were held to the attention of the American authorities. Moreover, the main proposal of
the MYA was to check the expansion of Soviet influence in Mongol territory. Also dur
ing this period. Colonel David Barrett, then the U.S. embassy’s military attache in Beiping had earlier traveled to the Beile-yln sume (Bailingmiao), and to Yan’an. He was also
interested in Mongol problems, and visited Prince De. Thus the members of the MYA
could also make contact with him.
Through Colonel Barrett’s recommendation, 1 met George Soderbom, a Swedish
man who had lived in Kalgan for many years. George’s father was former minister of the
Swedish Mongol Mission, and George had been bom in Mongolia, so he was fluent in
both Mongolian and Chinese. Soderbom had been the guide and interpreter during Sven
Hedin’s travels through Central Asia. He later became a merchant in Kalgan. During the
Japanese invasion of Kalgan, he was subjected to Japanese torture and finally shipped off
to a prison camp in Shandong.
After the victory over Japan, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad
ministration (UNRRA) started its activities in China, and because of Soderbom’s talent
and knowledge of Mongolian culture, he was recruited into this group. When Soderbom
came to Beiping and started his UNRRA work, I informed him that many Mongols had
retreated from Kalgan and become refugees; their livelihood was difficult, and they had
received no help. He asked me for a comprehensive list of the Mongols in Beiping. With
this list, Soderbom had the UNRRA Beiping office designate some of their relief materi
als for the Mongolian refugees. The MYA decided to have Magadburin Haltod act as
manager of these relief efforts under Soderbom’s supervision.
Soderbom also introduced Dagwaodsar and me to Patrick, one of the top offi
cials at the Shanghai general headquarters of UNRRA to gain his aid in getting relief de
livered to Mongolia. At this time, Shongno and Qi Quanxi returned from Nanjing to Bei
ping and then went back to the Ulanchab and Yekejuu leagues. They also participated in
talks subsequent to it being decided that part of their relief materials would be delivered
directly to the banners of the Ulanchab, especially to the Yekejuu leagues, without out
side interference. George Soderbom was assigned to supervise these matters. Before
these arrangements were made, the municipal government of Beiping and the Suiyuan
provincial government had delivered none of the UNRRA relief materials to the Mongol
ian poor. These relief efforts continued even after the final withdrawal of UNRRA and
George Soderbom.
During this time, many Buriyad refugees realized that the activities of their old
leader, Rinchindorji, could not bring results, and they decided to migrate to Kokonor.
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Among these people were many from the Shilingol League. George Soderbom aided
them and provided transportation to their destination, rendering his assistance out of a
real love for the Mongol people. He was apolitical; he never discussed Mongolian politi
cal problems or issues. In 1976, after Soderbom’s death, 1 visited a folklore museum in
Stockholm. There 1 discovered many of his documents and materials. Among them were
his plans to improve Mongolian animal herds and the animal husbandry industry. Re
grettably, these plans were impeded by the civil war in China. The heart of this great
friend of the Mongols is clearly evident in these materials.
By this time, the “rehabilitated” leagues and banners, or the banners outside the
areas occupied by the Chinese Communists, had as their main problem how to distinguish
clearly between the power and functions that belonged to the banners and those that be
longed to the xians. For instance, some banners in the three leagues of Jerim, Juu-uda,
and Josotu were rehabilitated at the same time as the xians. However, because the Japan
ese had abolished the xians and maintained the banners during their occupation, the divi
sion between the powers of the banners and the restored xians was unclear. This division
was lost on the KMT authorities who recovered the Mongolian territories from the Com
munists. All public facilities, especially the schools established by the Mongol admini
strations earlier, belonged, of course, to the Mongols. Now that there were two conflict
ing political organizations in the same area, the allocation of responsibility for these pub
lic facilities became a matter of great controversy. In addition, land problems arose as all
land rents were raised. This made the struggle between the leagues and the provinces
more intense. In the areas where Mongols and Chinese lived together (such as Yekejuu,
the Ulanchab leagues, the Turned banner, and the four Right Flank Banners of Chahar),
there was no improvement in relations between the Mongols and the Suiyuan provincial
government. As mentioned earlier, there was no progress in Chahar and little progress in
the problem of rehabilitation in the territory of the Shilingol league.
In the latter part of April, the Chinese government was reorganized. It invited
the members of other parties and nonpartisan elites to join the new government. Among
them, Xu Shiying was appointed minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission.
Xu had once been the prime minister of the Beijing government but was never a member
of the KMT. Before the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, he was the Chinese ambas
sador to Japan and had a good reputation in the Chinese political world. The two viceministers of the commission were Bai Yunti, a Mongolian, and Shirabjamso (Shes-rabgya-mtsho), a well-known Tibetan lama from Kham. This reshuffling of personnel on the
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, which was largely related to Mongolian affairs,
resulted in the replacement of Chu Mingshan by Jakhunju as head of the Mongolian Af
fairs Bureau. After Jakhunju took the position, he recommended that Oljeibuyan become
the head of the first section of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau. These changes made it pos
sible for members of the MYA to keep abreast of political developments concerning the
Mongols in Nanjing and gave them at least some influence in these matters.
In Nanjing, the most pressing political topic was how to ensure the election of
the delegates to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan, all
of whom would help construct the new constitution. Prince De felt that the reshuffling of
the personnel of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission might make it proper to
continue rehabilitating the two leagues of Shilingol and Chahar. He also seemed to imply
an anticipated solution to the Mongolian problem. He therefore mobilized the leaders
from Chahar, Shilingol, and Kalgan to voice their demands for rehabilitation. Gombojab
Hangin and I were appointed as delegates of the two leagues and went to Nanjing to peti
tion the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission to rehabilitate the two leagues and ex-
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plain the Mongols’ problems to the newly appointed minister, Xu Shiying. One of our
main purposes was also to discover the Nanjing authorities’ attitudes toward Mongolia.
After the breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, the entire
situation in China worsened. At the end of May, the Baitag-oboo (Baitashan) Incident
broke out, which disrupted Sino-Mongolian relations. To hinder or stop the expansion of
communist power in China and to decide on an effective China policy. President Harry S.
Truman sent General Wedemeyer to study the situation and give advice to the Chinese
government. Prince De and the MYA both recognized that this was a prime opportunity
for the U.S. government to become aware of the Mongolian situation and the hopes of the
Mongol people, because the national minority problems contributed to the struggle be
tween the KMT and the Communists. However, while Wedemeyer stayed in Beiping,
neither Prince De nor other Mongol leaders in that city had an opportunity to visit the
American general or to deliver a statement of their positions to him. So, when Hangin
and I went to Nanjing, Prince De told us to attempt to deliver the opinions and hopes of
the Mongols to this special envoy from the United States. In actuality, this move had
originated with the MYA.
Before our departure, we asked Frank Bessac to introduce us to someone he
knew in the U.S. Embassy in Nanjing. Through Bessac’s introduction, we met Ruth Bean
of the embassy. Because of her help, Rashidondog, Gombojab Hangin, Urgungge Onon,
and I were introduced to the political councilor, Mr. Schulties (originally a professor at
the University of Washington in Seattle), and became acquainted with him. We spoke in
detail of the Inner Mongolian situation and the Mongolian desire for a national existence
and autonomy. Schulties was quite sympathetic to our situation. General Wedemeyer
soon arrived in the Chinese capital. The members of the MYA, at their own initiative,
produced written documentation of their opinions and had their friends in the U.S. Em
bassy deliver it to the general. The content, aside from emphasizing the need for national
survival, explained how the Mongol people had been cheated and oppressed by the Chin
ese frontier officials; that this had caused most of the Mongols to ally themselves with the
Chinese Communists. All Mongols hoped for autonomy. This hope implied no specific
political affiliation or persuasion; its main goal was national existence and independ
ence."*

Contacts with the Mongoiian-Tibetan Affairs Commission
and Prince De’s Response
The new minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Xu Shiying,
had no special bias toward one side or the other in Mongolian affairs. During his inter
view with Hangin and me, he expressed hope that our petition for rehabilitating the two
leagues of Shilingol and Chahar would be carried out. He expressed no objection to
Mongolia achieving autonomy. Moreover, he said that the provinces and the xian institu
tions should be listed in the law of self-rule of the provinces and xians. This would com
ply with the constitutional statement that “the self-rule institutions of the Mongolian
"* Wedemeyer’s memoirs make no explicit reference to Inner Mongolia. His 1947 report to Presi
dent Truman notes that Outer Mongolia might recognize a de facto Chinese Communist govern
ment over Manchuria. To avert this he proposes a UN Trusteeship over Manchuria. This would also
have separated eastern Inner Mongolia from China. However, a trusteeship was never a realistic
possibility. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: The Devin-Adair Company,
1958) p. 465.
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leagues and banners should be decided by law.” Nevertheless, we waited in Nanjing more
than a month without receiving an official answer from the commission. We heard that
although Xu Shiying intended to make the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission a
powerful institution and to effect a solution for the Mongolian problems during his tenure
as minister, realistically, there was no hope for such a goal to be accomplished.
In matters regarding the two leagues of Chahar and Shilingol, Xu was unable to
go against Fu Zuoyi’s wishes. Fu, a strong opponent, was an important military figure
and anti-Communist fighter, prized by the central authorities. After many negotiations,
Fu agreed only to establish a preliminary office of league affairs and to wait until all ban
ners were recovered from Communist domination. The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Com
mission also drafted a law of self-rule for the Mongolian leagues and banners. Neverthe
less, there was no way to submit this, because Fu was vehemently opposed to the matter.
Although difficulties kept arising, Xu Shiying did not forsake his original position; he
continued to hope for a breakthrough in the Mongolian problems that had been festering
for so many years.
After receiving a report of these Mongolian activities in Nanjing from Hangin
and me. Prince De wrote a long letter to us;
Demchugdongrob sends greetings to his dear brethren Sechin Jagchid and Hangin. I
have received your report. Regardless of the matter of the Shilingol League, your petition
must be authorized and entered into the file. If this is impossible, then you may put the
matter aside. Regardless, you should not accept the establishment of a temporary office—
absolutely not! Their statement that it is impossible to deal with this matter according to the
petition of the Mongolian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group [Menggu xuandaotuaii\ headed by Wu Heling is very unreasonable. You must push for Shilingol’s petition.
How could they take other documents as a pretext to prolong this matter? As they said, not
one banner in Shilingol has yet been rehabilitated. This is only an excuse: witness the fact
that the provinces of the Northeast have already had their governments established, even
though their territories have not yet been recovered. If it is said that this is the ordinance of
the central government, then it is correct to deal with Shilingol according to the same prin
ciple. But they deliberately stalled on this matter and said that a document from some or
ganization cheats us in some enormous way.
In sum, the authorship of the petition determines whether it is acceptable or not.
There is no reason to impede the petition simply because of who wrote it. If Shilingol is re
formed and receives an official seal, then accept it. If it is not, then cease your efforts.
There is no room for discussion. This is the point which I wish you, my brothers, to know,
and I hope you will strive to realize it. At this point, there is no room for compromise.
Recently 1 have been thinking that we should suggest convening a conference for all
Mongols. Then we could issue demands according to the opinions that the people voice.
Only in this way can we establish that there is no such thing as a distinction between high
and low status people’s demands among the Mongols. In dealing with the Chinese, it is
better to negotiate according to the will of the entire body of the Mongols. Then it will be
difficult for the Chinese not to agree. If there is any possibility for this proposal to be im
plemented, then 1 wish you to follow through on it. It would be beneficial if the government
would not make any decisions concerning Mongolia before this Mongolian conference is
sues its petition; I do not want the desires of an entire people to be ignored. Our demand is
for self-determination. When the time comes to advocate the convening of this conference,
we will have to talk about it in a direct, but firm manner. I think you should explain that for
the following reason, the Mongols’ hope is that each will have free speech. Many Mongols
have individual demands, and the government cannot determine a consensus of these de
mands unless this conference is convened. If this conference is convened, Mongolian de-
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mands could be expressed in a coherent manner and be resolved. This will enable the cen
tral government to understand the consensus among the Mongols, while the Mongols can
come to understand the stance of the central government.
Again, there is something you must be very careful of: when you talk of this matter
with other Mongols, you must be very careful when expressing your ultimate goals and de
sires. Unless others are very trustworthy and can keep secrets, you should not discuss this
matter with them. As Huang Shigong has stated, “Because one soul divulged secrets, the
entire enterprise ended in failure.” You must be very careful in this regard! If this confer
ence can be held, then our demands, high or low, can be explored at our convenience. I
think we should depend on the endeavors of the entire body to make this conference a per
manent organization; this conference should have the power to approve or reject any policy
decision made by the central government. In other words, we should struggle for the right
to veto. If this is decided, it would be a great success for our nation. I hope that we can pro
duce a national people’s conference somewhat akin to the system used in India. 1 hope you
will carry this out secretly. My wise brothers, what do you think of my idea? Please do
think it over carefully.”
—August 7, seven-hundred forty-second year of the Holy Khan Chinggis

A brief explanation will help the reader understand the background of Prince
De’s letter. First, the rehabilitation of the Shilingol League office was not achieved be
cause of Fu Zuoyi’s interference. There was, in fact, a temporary office of the Shilingol
league in Kalgan that had been established earlier, before the outbreak of the SinoJapanese war. After the war, Giljintei headed that office. During the war, he went over to
the Chinese, but still supported Prince De’s proposals. Fu tried to drive a wedge between
De and Giljintei but failed.
Second, the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission dissolved the Mongolian
Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group under Wu Heling’s leadership because of pres
sure from Fu Zuoyi. Before its dissolution, Wu sent the commission a petition pleading
for rehabilitation aid to be sent to the Shilingol League. Unfortunately, the commission,
being under Fu’s thumb, could not help the Shilingol league because they could not
openly oppose Fu. Some officials at the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission told
Hangin and me that Xu Shiying was angry because of Fu’s interference; Xu even decided
to resign.
Third, Prince De’s desire to convene a discussion of the issues facing Mongolia
was unanimously ratified by the Mongols in Nanjing. Rong Xiang, who was still in Nan
jing, also showed his support. Of course, they did not realize that Prince De’s motive was
to demand national self-determination, or to struggle for a veto right. The MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission also did not express opposition, but felt that because of the
tense war situation, it would have to await a more opportune time to act. In fact, even the
Mongols’ proposal was not openly opposed; nevertheless, it did not become a reality.
Fourth, Prince De quoted in his letter from the ancient Chinese strategist Huang
Shigong, showing that he had a thorough understanding of Chinese strategy.

Elections and the Mongol Response
No matter what the Mongols did, Fu Zuoyi always did his utmost to stand in
their way. Because of this, Xu Shiying, not to disappoint the people of Shilingol and
Chahar, argued that according to the election regulations for National Assembly delegates
and legislators of the Legislative Yuan, the supervisor should be the governor of the
province. He also argued that the institution for general supervision should be the interior
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ministry, the chief of the league should be the local superintendent, and the general su
pervisory institution should be the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. Xu recom
mended that elections in Shilingol and Chahar be carried out and that the two leagues
each be allowed to establish an election office and appoint those qualified for the posi
tions of league head and superintendent. In this way, he reasoned, Shilingol and Chahar
would be in a position equal to that of the other rehabilitated leagues. Shonodondob and
Serengnamjil were appointed superintendents of this election within the Shilingol and
Chahar leagues. Nevertheless, in Prince De’s words, this was nothing but a “resultless
result.”
In the winter of 1947, Jirgalang realized that Chinese Communist control over
Inner Mongolia was becoming stronger and tighter and that the prospect of unifying Inner
Mongolia with Outer Mongolia was weakening. His experience in Ulaanbaatar also dis
illusioned him. Following the military setback suffered by the communists, he escaped
from Pandita Gegeen Keid and fled to Beiping, where he informed Prince De and other
trustworthy friends of his experience and opinions. Those who heard him felt that the
future of Inner Mongolia should not be handed over to the Communists and that other
roads should be opened.
As mentioned earlier, the Mongolian Consolidating and Rehabilitating Group,
under the leadership of Wu Heling, was disbanded. After this, Wu Heling was again at
tacked by Fu Zuoyi and Rong Zhao, who accused him of holding very high positions
during the Japanese occupation and insisted that he be punished. There were further accu
sations against Wu to the effect that he had been using the Mongolian Consolidating and
Rehabilitating Group to interfere with the progress of Mongol political affairs. Conse
quently, Wu was summoned by the Military Committee to go to Nanjing to answer to
higher authority.
After Wu’s arrival in Nanjing, he contacted Yu Jishi, head of the Military Af
fairs Bureau of the Committee and the man who had previously been the go-between for
Wu Heling and Chiang Kai-shek in 1936. At that time Yu Jishi had secured Chiang’s
agreement to allow Wu to return to Inner Mongolia. Wu now asked Yu to refresh Gener
alissimo Chiang’s memory of this incident and he finally received Chiang’s pardon.
However, Chiang asked Wu to stay on in Nanjing until the summer of the next year.
Therefore, during this period, Wu had no influence over Mongolian politics at all.
At this time, the most important problems for the National Assembly were stop
ping the military expansion of the Chinese Communists and smoothly carrying out the
national elections. These two problems were interrelated. The success or failure of the
election could influence morale, and military losses or gains could influence the outcome
of the election. This situation had a great impact on all regions of Inner Mongolia, except
those occupied by the Chinese Communists. After several discussions, the Mongolian
Youth Alliance in Nanjing decided that besides giving support to Prince De and helping
and encouraging its members to participate in the electoral struggle for seats in the Na
tional Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, they would also struggle to protect the rights
and privileges of the Mongol people. From the latter half of 1947 on, the situation in
North China and the Northeast became more and more tense. Even though the civil war
as a whole was being lost to the Chinese Communists, Fu Zuoyi’s troops always gained
the upper hand in their engagements. Thus, Fu’s reputation grew by leaps and bounds.
In September, the Chinese government appointed General Chen Cheng to re
place Xiong Shihui as the chief of the Military Committee Northeastern Branch. Chen’s
style, though very different from Xiong’s, did not bring about any change in the Mongol
ian problem in the northeast area. Chen was a great supporter of Fu Zuoyi, and they
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formed a front from east to west to stop Communist expansion. Thus Fu’s influence in
Mongolian matters greatly increased. Although the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commis
sion under the leadership of Xu Shiying wanted to solve the Mongolian problem, it did
not produce any results.
Because of the civil war, the Chinese Communist Party and the Democratic^Alliance {Minzhu tongmeng) announced they would not put forward candidates for the Na
tional Assembly election. The KMT’s supporters in the election were the Democratic
Socialist Party, the Chinese Youth Party, and nonpartisan elites. To satisfy these support
ers, the KMT yielded some electoral seats to them. Where the election of candidates from
these two parties had been decided, the KMT would support them, and no KMT candi
dates would compete. On the other hand, the competition for nominations was keen in
side the KMT. Because of this internal struggle, the people’s hearts and soldiers’ morale
suffered greatly.
As for political influence in Inner Mongolia, Li Yongxin, head of the Frontier
Party Affairs Bureau of the Central Committee Headquarters of the Kuomintang, ar
ranged the election districts as it suited him, with the support or at the direction of Chen
Lifu. Li appointed He Zhaolin as special commissioner for Inner Mongolian Party Affairs
and the heads of the Mongolian Banners’ Party Headquarters as special commissioners to
run the elections of each electoral district. But even though Li and his group occupied
leading positions in the party, they conflicted with the “Western Inner Mongolian Clique”
and other leaders who had shunned the anti-Japanese camp. The MYA’s decision to insist
on a part in the election led it to clash with Li’s group from the beginning. Because the
eastern Inner Mongolian leagues and banners were primarily under Communist occupa
tion, the election would be carried out among the refugees and defectors from these lo
calities, creating problems that otherwise would not have arisen. At any rate, in early
1948, fifty-three Mongolian delegates for the National Assembly were elected. Thirteen
of the fifty-three belonged to the MY A.
Competition, compromise, and conflict characterized the election. To push his
KMT candidates through, Li Yongxin had gone to Beiping to ask for Prince De’s help.
Prince De rejected the request, saying that he would not interfere in the election. Li
Yongxin and He Zhaolin then went to Kalgan to try to persuade the local leaders, but this
backfired; Li’s efforts were a complete failure.^
’ The following were elected:
from the Hulun-buir Tribe: Kogjintei (member, Mongolian Youth Alliance—
hereafter abbreviated as MY A), Dagwaodsar (MYA), Ji Xiaowei, and He Zhao
lin; from the Yeke-mingghan Special banner: Bai Shangqin;
from the Jerim League: Bao Jinqi, Jorigtu (Kuan Yinnan), Jin Chuanwei, and Yang
Lijun;
from the Josotu League: Suchungga, Bai Haifeng, Xing Fuli, and Shi Binglin;
from the Juu-uda league: Jorightu (MYA), Urgungbu, Bai Yunti, and Tudub;
from the Shilinghol League: myself (MYA), Oyongerel, my wife (MYA), Agdungga, and Chogbagatur (Chen Shaowu); from the Chahar Tribe: Jakhunju
(MYA), Bayanbilig (MYA), Kokebagatur (MYA), and Gombojab Hangin
(MYA);
from the Ulanchab League: Buu (He Shouye (MYA), Ba Yunying, and two others; from
the Yekejuu League: Oyunbilig (MYA), Erdenibolod (Qi Zhongyi), Jia Wenhua (MYA),
Ayurtazana (Qi Wenqing) (MYA), and one other;
from the Turned Special Banner: Jing Tianlu;
from the Alashan Special Banner: Chen Batudorji;
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Following the election of these National Assembly delegates, twenty-one Mon
gol legislators were also elected: five of them were MYA members.® As for the election
of the members of the Control Yuan, because the competition was so entangled, and in
order to alleviate the resulting tension, the local leaders decided not to continue the con
frontation with Li Yongxin and his KMT group. The requests from the KMT for ap
pointments were therefore accepted as a compromise.
While the Mongols were busy in the election contending with one another, the
Chinese government, in early December, 1947, ordered the establishment of the Northern
China Bandit [Communist] Extermination General Headquarters to direct the war against
the Communists in the five provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan. Fu
Zuoyi was made the commander-in-chief of this front and was also appointed as the dep
uty chief of the Military Committee, Beiping Branch. By the first part of January, 1948,
this new arrangement made Li Zongren, chief of the Military Committee, Beiping
Branch, a powerless figurehead. In like manner, the great bulk of military and adminis
trative power gradually fell into the hands of Fu Zuoyi, and his influence over Mongolian
matters increased.

The Mongolian Delegates and the First Chinese National Assembly
After this confusing election, the Mongolian Youth Alliance decided that the
right to Mongolian autonomy should be clearly spelled out in the constitution of the Re
public of China and that a special article to assure the autonomy of the national minorities
should be clearly incorporated into the constitution. At the same time, they decided that
they had to cooperate with the other national minority delegates to struggle for common
goals. Prince De also talked to those delegates who were traveling through Beiping on
their way to Nanjing and encouraged them to struggle for the goal of Mongolian auton
omy. He asked me, Gombojab Hangin, Kogjintei, and Chogbagatur to struggle for veto
power over Mongol problems and for a higher standard of Mongol autonomy than had
existed in the 1930s.
The First National Assembly of the Republic of China was convened on March
29, 1948, Just as the civil war took a turn for the worse. As its first order of business after
convening the assembly was to elect a president and a vice-president and add words to
the constitution to ease mobilization of force against internal disorder. The KMT wanted

from the EJine Special Banner: Nidun;
from the Kokonor Right and Left Leagues: Rashisereng, Guan Baojia, and six others;
from the Mongolian District in Xinjiang: Jia Zixin, Hai Yuxiang, Dugur, Xi Mouzhen
(Bombuge), and Tsedandorji;
from the Gansu Mazongshan district: Bobura;
and from the Mongolian Women’s Association: Ni Chunyi and Duo Shuxiu.
® From the Hulunbuir Tribe: De Gulai (Jirgalang) and Bai Lianzhen (Narangerel MYA); from the
Yeke-mingghan Special Banner: Xu Zhankui; from the Jerim League; Bai Dacheng (MYA) and Jin
Yanghao; from the Josotu League: Li Yongxin and Xue Xingru; from the Juu-uda League: Wu
Yunpeng and Yang Junsheng (Sechenchogtu); from the Shilingol League: Giljintei; from the Cha
har Tribe: Rashidondog (MYA) and Hang Jiaxiang; from the Ulanchab League: Batubilig (later
joined the MYA); from the Yekejuu League: Qi Huafu (later joined the MYA); from the Turned
Special Banner: Rong Zhao; from the Alashan Special Banner: Damrinwangchug (younger brother
of Damzana); from the Ejine Special Banner: Dawa; from the two Kokonor leagues: Sugden and
one other; and from the Xinjiang Mongolian district: Choijab and Wu Jinbin.
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to gather all power and concentrate it in the hands of the elected president, thus giving
him a free hand, unrestrained by the constitution.
The Mongolian delegates had no special plans for the presidential election. We
thought it a foregone conclusion that Chiang Kai-shek would be selected as president,
and we had no special prejudices against any of the vice presidents elect, Li Zongren, or
others. The Mongol delegates thought we could vote for each of them as we pleased.
Who we voted for would be determined by the candidates’ attitudes toward Mongol
problems. As the Mongol delegates came through Beiping on their way to Nanjing, Li
Zongren, as host, provided us with banquets and facilities and spoke of Mongolian
autonomy, saying that he wanted to give us reasonable hope. By not expressing any op
position to .the other hopes of the Mongol delegates, he was able to win their good will.
After our arrival in Nanjing, the Mongol delegates, especially those with little or
no experience, began to sense that something was strange. They realized that some of
their own countrymen serving as Nanjing officials would like to use them as political
capital. Li Yongxin was the one who first invited the Mongolian delegates for what the
Americans would call a caucus. As the host, Li expressed welcome and hope that all
Mongolian delegates would follow the instructions of the Kuomintang Central Head
quarters and manage their affairs prudently. Then he assured us that the assembly was not
intending to make any amendments to the constitution, and therefore the Mongolian
delegates should concentrate their strength and work for something realistically achiev
able. He did not mention the problem of autonomy; he merely asked all of us to put our
signatures on a document to petition for expansion of the troops under Bai Haifeng and to
put the Mongolian Cavalry Brigade and the Peace Preservation troops in the Northeast
(under the command of Wu Guting) under the control of Bai Haifeng. Li wanted to first
concentrate the Mongols’ core military power and talk about other things later. Other
than the people of Li’s own group, and He Zhaolin, Xing Fuli, Jin Chongwei, and a few
others, most of the Mongolian delegates disagreed with Li’s proposals. We insisted that
we were delegates elected by the Mongol people and could not Just put the matter of
autonomy aside and talk only of the concerns of one individual. The talks ended in dis
pute.
Soon after these talks, Li Yongxin, with Bai Yunti, convened another caucus.
Because Li Yongxin could not speak Mongolian, he asked the several delegates from the
Xinjiang Mongols who did not understand Chinese, to speak in Chinese. Following this,
several members of the MYA, who were already dissatisfied with Li Yongxin, said, “A
meeting of the Mongols without the Mongolian language—what an absurd meeting that
would be! From now on, the discussions should be carried out in Mongolian.” In reality,
this was meant to shut the mouths of Li Yongxin, He Zhaolin, Jin Chongwei, and the
others who could not speak Mongolian. Thus the caucus ended on an unhappy note. After
this setback, Li Yongxin got the mistaken impression that 1 had instigated this motion for
the deliberate purpose of embarrassing him. From then on, Li did not make any public
appearances. All public discussions by and meetings of Mongolian delegates of the Na
tional Assembly were controlled by He Zhaolin from behind the scenes. Xing Fuli was
put in charge of espionage operations to check everyone’s activities and report them to
KMT headquarters.
After the opening session of the assembly, the Mongolian delegates held lunch
eon talks every noon to exchange opinions. At the same time, the KMT Central Head
quarters also organized the Mongolian delegates into one group of the Assembly Confer
ence organization. He Zhaolin was appointed as the presiding official; Xing Fuli was
appointed as secretary. They were charged with controlling the activities of the entire
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Mongolian delegation. Though this was a common procedure for meetings between the
KMT and the Chinese government, it made the Mongolian delegates, who had no experi
ence with such an arrangement, feel strange, and consequently we refused to accept He's
and Xing’s leadership. As a result, many conflicts and confrontations arose that should
never have happened.
The first sign of conflict was an announcement by the members of the MYA:
“Our obligation is to struggle for the right to Mongol autonomy. We do not have to be
involved in anybody’s personal matters.” In so saying, we clearly expressed that we
would not sign the document petitioning for the expansion of Bai Haifeng’s military
forces. The second conflict was over how to present the proposal for amendments to the
constitution. This was supported by the members of the MYA but rejected by Bai Haifeng and several other active KMT members under the pretext that the KMT Central
Headquarters’ principle was not to make any amendments to the constitution. But the
amendments were agreed to by the great majority of the delegates; Bai Haifeng and his
followers had no choice but to yield.
At this moment, Guan Baojia and seven other delegates from the Kokonor Mon
gol leagues suddenly stood up and attempted to walk out of the proceedings. Their reason
was that they had come to vote for the president and vice president, and not to discuss
other matters. Then several young hot-headed delegates led by Jorigtu (of the MYA)
closed the door and said, “Any Mongolian delegate who leaves this discussion of the
struggle for the Mongolian people’s rights and privileges will be beaten to a pulp.”
Threatened by these militants, Guan Baojia’s group came back to the discussion but did
not participate in it. Later, Guan Baojia said to me, “The Kokonor Mongol delegates had
no other choice but to follow the instructions of the delegates sent by the warlord Ma
Bufang. Why else would a Mongol be unwilling to struggle for the protection of Mongol
ian rights? Ma had told us not to struggle for Mongolian rights.” This is clear evidence
that the Kokonor Mongols were being subjected to brutal, high-handed pressure by the
Moslems.
The high demands of the proposal were mainly the idea of the members of the
MYA, and were not accepted by Bai Haifeng’s or Li Yongxin’s groups. Bai’s group, be
ing realistic, realized that the central government would simply not agree to this kind of
request. Because of this confrontation, the two sides could not reach a compromise. Then
the MYA members announced that if it were impossible for them to present the proposal,
and if they had come to Nanjing merely to cast meaningless votes, then it would be better
for the Mongols to return to the steppes. Bai Yunti then demanded that both groups be
more moderate. He insisted that such important problems be discussed with other Mon
gols in Nanjing and that discussions not be carried out in an excessively emotional man
ner. Both sides then agreed to have Bai Yunti summon another caucus.
The caucus summoned in the name of Bai Yunti continued the discussion for
several sessions. Li Yongxin, Wu Heling, Wu Yunpeng (the head of the Nanjing Office
of the Mongolian League and Banner Delegates), and the newly elected legislators such
as Xue Xingru, Rong Zhao, Rashidondog, and others were all invited. After several harsh
debates, the caucus appointed Chogbagatur and me to prepare a draft of the proposal,
which would later be polished by Wu Heling.
At this moment, carrying out personal political agendas had become more im
portant than ideology. Chogbagatur was also a long time follower of Prince De, but he
and Li Yongxin were fellow bannermen of the Kharachin Left Banner. Chogbagatur
wanted to use this opportunity to establish better relationships with Li Yongxin and his
group. Chogbagatur also made secret contact with Xing Fuli to supply Xing with infor-
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mation about the activities of the Mongolian nationalists. Wu Heling had confronted Li
Yongxin’s group for years over their differing views on Mongolian politics, but he now
took advantage of this opportunity to criticize the proposals of the MYA as unrealistic
and branded me and my group as a “lunatic fringe.” Li Yongxin and his group also used
this opportunity to attack Li’s opponents and branded the members of the MYA as “sepa
ratists,” hoping that these attacks would attract the attention of the Kuomintang Central
Headquarters.

The Mongolian Proposal for the Assembly
Finally, though the MYA continued to press for its own proposals, they had to
reach an agreement which would be satisfactory to all the other Mongol delegates, in
cluding those based in Nanjing. The following is the original text that the Mongolian
delegates presented to the National Assembly.
Proposal to amend Article 119 and Article 168 of the Constitution....
A. Reasons
1. The first Article of the Constitution already clearly states that “The Republic of China
should be a democratic republic of the people, by the people, and for the people." The
meaning of this article is undoubtedly that the character and function of the entire constitu
tion is to carry out the doctrine of the Three Principles of the People.... It clearly incorpo
rates . . . concrete measures for the realization of the two parts of Democracy (min quan)
and People’s Livelihood (min sheng) of the Three Principles. As for Nationalism (min zu).
. . article 5 of the constitution says, “All the nationalities of the Republic of China should
enjoy equality without discrimination." It is very regrettable that there has been no concrete
decision on how to obtain the equality among the nationalities.
Now the adherents to democracy have two viewpoints, both interrelated; “equality
among the nationalities” and “self-determination for the nationalities.” In other words, if
the nationalities are unable to obtain self-determination, then there will be no way for them
to achieve equality among the nationalities. The two are as closely related as lips and teeth.
It was for this reason that the founder of the nation, Mr, Sun Yat-sen, solemnly stated in his
doctrine of nationalism \min zu] and in the Declaration of the First Congress [of the Kuo
mintang] that the nationalities within the country are all equal. He recognized the rights to
self-determination for all nationalities and also proposed that all the nationalities organize
into a free and unified Republic of China. Moreover, the Fourth Article of the Outline of
Nation Building states explicitly, “As for the weak and small nationalities inside the coun
try, the government should foster them and make it possible for them to carry out selfdetermination and self-rule.” This clearly states that equality among the nationalities should
materialize under the formula of self-determination and self-rule of the nationalities. We
should not twist or garble the words of Mr. Sun by arguing that self-determination and selfrule for the nationalities apply only to ordinary local autonomy and that Articles 119 and
168 are abstract non-entities.
2. A great republic does not just melt all different nationalities with many different cul
tures and make them into a truly unified and pluralistic body. All the nationalities have
their own national characteristics and special histories arid cultures. They also have differ
ent lifestyles and thus can make contributions to enable our nation to increase its wealth,
strength, and prosperity. Therefore, in the basic law of the nation, expressions must be
made of the real spirit and foundation underlying the creation of the state. All the nationali
ties in the country should be helped to develop and preserve their own traditions and spe
cialties and to contribute their good points in an endeavor to provide the necessities for the
entire nation.
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3. The national defense of our country is divided into naval and land defense. We will not
discuss naval defense here. As for land defense, the Southwest, Northwest, Inner Mongolia,
and the Northeast are all important areas, inseparably related to the national security of our
country. The nationalities that inhabit these areas have lived there for many generations and
have borne the heavy responsibilities of guarding the doors and gates to our nation. In view
of the tense world situation, it is especially necessary to provide an opportunity for self-rule
for each of the nationalities that live in the frontier areas. Their capacity for self-rule should
be encouraged, and they should be helped to stand on their own to develop their own
strengths in watching and defending the national boundaries. . . .Especially at present, the
northern national defense districts are under severe threats. These threats are dual in na
ture—both internal and external. A physical national defense line cannot be constructed at
this time. It is very necessary to foster the hopes and aspirations of the frontier nationalities.
Their rights should be clearly enumerated in the constitution. . . . The establishment of a
spiritual national defense to assist in the timely quelling of the [Communist] rebellion and
in working toward national construction is an important task that should not be set aside
any longer.
B. Measures
For these reasons, we petition that Articles 119 and 168 of the Constitution be
changed as follows:
1. The original text of Article 119 should be changed to read: Self-rule for the Mongolian
leagues and banners should be settled by law according to the following principles.
a) The original position of the leagues and banners should be guaranteed. In each
league, a league government should be established, and in each banner, a banner govern
ment should be established.
b) Above the leagues and banners, a unified self-rule institution should be estab
lished.
2. The original text of Article 168 should be changed to read: As for the position of all the
nationalities in the frontier areas, the country should provide legal guarantees and assist
them and make it possible for them to carry out self-rule. In the sessions of the National
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, legislation concerning national minority matters
should have the approval of the representatives of the national minority or minorities con
cerned.

In the Reasons section of the proposal, national self-determination was strongly
emphasized, but in the Measures section, only self-rule was mentioned. This logical con
tradiction was a result of the compromise between the two positions. The goal of the first
article of Measures was to avoid the phrase “local autonomy”; another goal was that “the
original positions of the leagues and banners should be guaranteed.” This second goal
was the idea of Prince De, who was not satisfied with the Organizational Law of the
Mongolian Leagues, Tribes, and Banners that failed to emphasize the original position of
the leagues and banners. The phrase “in each league, a league government should be es
tablished, and in each banner, a banner government should be established” was meant to
make the leagues’ position vis-a-vis the provinces and the banners’ position vis-a-vis the
xians equal. Although the phrase “in the sessions of the National Assembly and the Leg
islative Yuan, legislation concerning national minority matters should have the approval
of the representatives of the national minority or minorities concerned” does not explic
itly include the words “veto power.” Veto power was, however, the ultimate goal. Again
this was the idea of Prince De, and was put into this proposal by the delegates from the
MYA.
Although a final proposal like this did not meet the hopes of Bai Haifeng and his
group, they nevertheless had to agree outwardly to the compromise. All these struggles
among the Mongols were reported to the KMT by He Zhaolin and Xing Fuli. The zealous
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Mongolian delegates brought this proposal before the Assembly. On the first day alone it
got more than 400 signatures to second it. The next day, more than 100 additional sec
onds were added. These signatures were obtained easily because many delegates had
their own unrelated proposals for amendment to the constitution, and so they gladly
traded signatures on each others’ petitions, performing what the Americans call “logroll
ing.” No sooner had this large number of signatures been obtained than a severe hin
drance appeared. The Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang ordered all party delegates
to refuse to sign any proposals for constitutional amendments. Although this measure was
not for the sole purpose of blocking the Mongolian proposal, it stopped the further ob
taining of signatures. More than 3,000 delegates were present, and the requirement that
one-fifth of the delegates approve such petitions meant that only 700 signatures had to be
obtained. They lacked only one hundred of the required number of signatures before the
KMT issued this order. This action aided the plans of the KMT to see that the constitu
tion was not amended.
The delegates from Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan criticized the confrontation
among the Mongolian delegates as creating further rifts among the Mongols. They con
centrated their attacks on me and several other delegates from the MY A, arguing to the
central government that we should be punished. On the other hand, because the KMT
could not control the MYA, He Zhaolin and Xing Fuli also put the blame for their failure
to control the Mongol delegates on the MYA. Consequently, the Party’s Central Head
quarters and the concerned departments of the Chinese government ordered Xu Shiying,
minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, to take care of the matter.
One day at noon, Xu invited Oyongerel, Gombojab Hangin, Dagwaodsar,
Jorigtu, a few others, and me for lunch and a talk. Xu openly stated that we young Mon
gol delegates had been denounced, then said, “You people have no need to worry. Con
tinue what you are currently doing. It is proper for Mongols to struggle for Mongolia s
right of autonomy. For your long-range plan, do not regard these kinds of activities as
separatist movements. Once, at the time of the founding of the Republic of China, 1 did
propose a federal system, but Mr. Sun Yat-sen supported the system for a greater degree
of unification. If at that time a federal state system had been enacted and Mongolia had
become one of the states, these problems would have been solved. Your proposal has still
not reached the degree of local power of a federal state. How could it be called a separa
tist movement? You may put your hearts at ease. Do your best. 1 will assume all respon
sibility for your actions.” In this way, through Xu Shinying s brilliant open-mindedness,
the accusations against the MYA members came to an end.
At any rate, the MYA proposal was not submitted to the full body, and the MYA
members were greatly disappointed. They were nevertheless still able to articulate the
demands of the Mongols. I, together with Tudub, the son of Prince Gungsangnorbu and
not a member of Li’s clique, delivered one speech after another to emphasize that the
Republic was a country of many nationalities. The substance of these speeches was sim
ple: the Chinese government should strive to put into effect Sun Yat-sen’s promise of
moving “toward the weak and small nationalities inside the country; the government
should foster them and enable them to carry out self-determination and self-rule” to en
able all nationalities to enjoy the same rights and privileges. In one geographic area, there
should not be Chinese provinces and xiam placed over Mongolian leagues and banners;
there should not be an administrative system of two layers that confront each other in the
same area. The position of the leagues and banners should be protected, and their func
tions should be clearly distinguished from those of the provinces and xians. The Mongol
demand for autonomy is deserving; it should not be neglected. Why would we come here
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if we truly had separatist intentions? Why would we even bother submitting petitions at
all?
Following the second of the speeches of two Mongol delegates, two delegates
from the Uighur people, Mutiyi and Uighur, also delivered speeches on the principle of
national self-determination and self-rule. Their proposals were similar to those of the
Mongol delegates. These animated speeches attracted the attention of the greater part of
the delegates, and many foreign journalists came to interview us.
To confront the proposal for constitutional amendments by the Mongol dele
gates, the delegation from Chahar, Rehe, and Suiyuan offered many contrary proposals.
When these proposals came to the floor, many more hot debates ensued. The Rehe, Cha
har, and Suiyuan proposals were all opposed by the Mongol delegates, so none of the
proposals or counter-proposals passed. During these debates, Bai Yunti, Bai Haifeng, and
He Zhaolin and their group spoke not one word.
As for the election, there should have been no problem. Of the vice presidential
candidates, the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang originally intended to secretly
support Sun Ke. Most of the Mongol delegates recognized that Sun Ke’s father. Sun Yatsen, had made a very clear promise that “the government should foster the weak and
small nationalities inside the country and enable them to carry out self-determination and
self-rule.” Therefore, it was worthwhile for the Mongol delegates to give his son a vote,
or so they thought.
They gathered a group and visited him officially. Sun also had stated that the
Mongols should enjoy their right to self-rule. In this congenial and problemless atmos
phere, He Zhaolin delivered the secret order of the Kuomintang’s Central Headquarters,
which demanded that all Mongol delegates vote for Sun Ke. Then somebody asked He
Zhaolin whom he would vote for. He answered, “For the convenience of the Beiping Of
fice of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, I must vote for Li Zongren. But mine
is a special case. Others must obey the instructions of the Kuomintang Headquarters in
voting.” A debate ensued. There had been no problem before, but this statement caused a
debate. Then Xing FuH threatened each delegate separately and said, “Those who do not
vote according to the instructions of the Party Central Headquarters will be punished.”
This angered and frustrated most of the Mongol delegates, so they voted for Li Zongren.
This situation had nothing to do with the Mongolian problem, but it increased friction
among the Mongolian delegates.

The Mongolian Youth Alliance
and Its Contacts with the U.S. Authorities
While the National Assembly was in session, Bai Yunti, Li Yongxin, Bai Hai
feng, He Zhaolin, Xue Xingru, and their group gathered secretly to plan an attack on the
members of the MYA. They did not fear that their positions on the problems of Mongolia
would be questioned at the time, but worried that some time in the future the leadership
might fall into the hands of those strongly nationalistic individuals. At this moment, they
still did not realize that their opponents had already organized the MYA as an official
body. At any rate, for their own benefit, they had to use all their connections and power
to attack the members of the MYA. Li Yongxin and He Zhaolin depended heavily on
Xing Fuli, having him collect information secretly and create rumors against the mem
bers of the MYA. Later, after the Chinese Communist Government was established, Xing
Fuli wrote an article about his memories of the National Assembly in an effort to protect

388

The Last Mongol Prince

himself. He was very talented at distorting the facts; in reality, most of what he wrote
about the Mongols in this article was pure fabrication.
At this time, by arrangement of Schulties and Ruth Bean, the members of the
MYA—Rashidondog, Gombojab Hangin, Urgungge Onon, Oyongerel, and I—had a
meeting with John Leighton Stuart, ambassador of the United States to China. We told
Stuart that Inner Mongolia was currently sandwiched between the Kuomintang and the
Chinese Communists, and that the hopes and aspirations of the Mongol people should not
be neglected. Ambassador Stuart expressed his sympathy and concern for the unfortunate
experience of the Inner Mongolian people. He promised that he would find an appropriate
opportunity to admonish the Chinese government to address and improve the situation.
Soon after this meeting, news arrived fl'om the United States that Owen Lattimore was directing an institute at Johns Hopkins University and needed Mongol scholars
who could teach the Mongolian language and literature. The MYA members in Nanjing
decided to send Hangin and Onon to make contact with the United States and promote
international propaganda on the Mongols’ behalf They also decided at this time to in
form Prince De about the existence and purpose of the MYA. He might have heard about
it earlier, but this was a formal decision to let him know; however, it was not an invita
tion for him to Join as a member.
During the late summer and early fall of 1948, following a series of victories by
the Chinese Communist forces, both Prince De and the MYA members felt that time was
not on their side. Staying in Beiping would not help the situation. They thought it proper
to go farther northwest while the Communist forces were still unable to reach that area.
This area was also too remote for the Chinese government to worry about at such a time.
It might be possible, they thought, to take advantage of the extra time to win the sympa
thy of the local authorities and have them carry out some action to secure Mongolia’s
future, and also to try to find international assistance. In May, the Beiping Branch of the
Military Committee was dissolved, and power in North China gradually fell into the
hands of Fu Zuoyi, Commander in Chief of the North China Bandit Extermination Gen
eral Headquarters. Prince De sensed there was no longer any chance for discussion of the
Inner Mongolian problems, and Beiping was no longer a suitable place for him to stay.
At this moment, Ruth Bean was sent by the U.S. Embassy to Beiping to inter
view Prince De. At my initiative, the two met at my house. Prince De expressed his hope
that while the American authorities aided the Chinese government, they would also honor
public opinion of the Mongolian people and provide moral support for the Mongolian
demand for autonomy. Finally, he argued that the current continuing struggle between the
Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang might create a climate amenable to Mongolian
autonomy. Bean expressed her personal sympathy with Prince De’s requests, adding that
she would convey these matters to the proper U.S. authorities.
In order to strengthen Prince De’s contacts with the Americans, Rashidondog,
after his consultation with Schulties and Raymond Meitz (who succeeded Richardson as
head of the U.S. naval intelligence group), arrived in Beiping to visit Prince De and de
liver the opinion of these two Americans to him. Later, Rashidondog conveyed Prince
De’s opinions to these two Americans.’ During this tense period in Beiping, Meitz ar
rived from Shanghai. Through my introduction, he had a long conversation with Prince
’’ Lu Minghui said in his book that Rashidondog brought two million Chinese dollars to Prince De,
which was provided by the American side. This is patently false. In order to look further into this
matter, I interviewed Rashidondog on April 24, 1984; his response was negative—no money was
given.
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De. Prince De also told him about his plan to move to the Northwest. Meitz showed
willingness to support him as much as possible in this adventure.

Prince De’s Withdrawal from Beiping
During Prince De’s stay in Beiping, Chiang Kai-shek visited the city several
times. Any time he came to the old capital, Prince De always tried to visit with him.
Sometimes Chiang would dispatch a man to comfort and console him. But after his talk
with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking about the Mongolian problem. Prince De had no
further discussions with him.
From the autumn of 1948, the situation in north China greatly changed. The fall
of Beiping and Tianjin was imminent. The sound of peace initiatives arose both in Bei
ping and Nanjing. Fu Zuoyi, who had consistently been a hard-line anti-Communist, now
began to waver in his anti-Communist resolve. In Nanjing, people openly expressed their
desire for Generalissimo Chiang’s retirement. During this period of declining KMT mo
rale, military pressure by the Chinese Communists became greater and greater. Prince De
then became the focus of interest for those who had interest in the Mongolian problem.
Dayanchi Lama, who had secret contacts with the agents of the Soviet consulate in Bei
ping, suddenly informed Prince De tliat the Soviet consulate wanted to protect the Prince
in any time of necessity. Prince De did not reject this offer, but he also did not ask Da
yanchi Lama to make further contacts with the Soviets. On the other hand, the MYA
members contacted Meitz and negotiated with him to “rent” two airplanes to aid in with
drawing MYA members and other members of the Mongol elite, along with their families
to Lanzhou and Taiwan.
After a discussion among the alliance members, Dagwaodsar flew with a group
of MYA members to Lanzhou in early November 1948 to make the preliminary arrange
ments for resettling their political movement. In the middle of November, I and another
group flew to Shanghai and then to Taiwan to escape the crisis in Beiping and to plan for
our next move. We also discussed with Prince De our hope that he would leave Beiping
before its fall to the Chinese Communists. Prince De, while agreeing to have a group of
people embark for the Northwest to prepare for the future, insisted that he would remain
in Beiping until he could leave together with all his old followers. Among these were
Chogbagatur, who opposed Prince De’s departure most strongly. I am still unable to dis
cover Chogbagatur’s motive for insisting that Prince De stay behind. Fu Zuoyi also sent
someone to restore relations with Prince De and the Mongol leaders in Beiping and con
sole them. He said that if needed, they could go with him from Tianjin to southern China
by sea. Of course. Prince De and most of the Mongols did not trust Fu. After my depar
ture from Beiping, Makhashiri and others arrived in Beiping from Communist-occupied
Kalgan and advised Prince De to stay and await peaceful liberation.
When a group of Mongols withdrew from Beiping, Wu Heling went with them
to Nanjing, reporting the current Mongolian situation to Chiang Kai-shek through Yu
Jishi. At the same time, he asked for a special airplane to bring Prince De from Beiping to
the capital in the south. Chiang was quite generous to Prince De. Wu’s request was
authorized. By the time the plane reached Beiping, the airport outside the city had come
within range of Chinese Communist artillery, so the plane had to land inside the city.
This was on January 1, 1949. On the same day, Fu Zuoyi openly started peace talks with
the Chinese Communists. Prince De thus left Beiping under straitened circumstances.
Because Chogbagatur refused to follow. Prince De had only Tumendelger (his assistant
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for many years), the Dayanchi Lama, and a few other followers when he left Beiping. He
Zhaolin, in his role as special commissioner for Inner Mongolian Party Affairs of the
Kuomintang and head of the Beiping Office of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commis
sion, accompanied the prince to Nanjing. Before Prince De’s departure from Beiping, Li
Shouxin had already rented an airplane and flown with his family to Taiwan via Shang
hai.
After Prince De’s arrival in Nanjing, he visited President Chiang Kai-shek to
express his thanks for sending the airplane to get him. Chiang invited Prince De to dinner
at his official residence, but at this dinner they did not discuss Mongolian problems.
Prince De’s arrival in Nanjing greatly excited the Mongols in the city. Prince De also
discussed with Wu Heling his sincere desire to go to the Northwest to create a situation
favorable for Mongolian autonomy before the arrival of the Chinese Communist military
forces. Wu recognized that this was a solid plan, and he had Wu Yunpeng, Wu Heling’s
intimate friend and head of the Nanjing Office of the Mongolian League and Banner
Delegates, visit Bai Yunti, then Minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission,
to persuade Bai to agree to facilitate this adventure in Northwest China. Bai agreed and
planned to recommend that the Chinese government appoint Prince De as the ministersuperintendent of Mongolian league and banner autonomy. But Prince De insisted that
his obligation was to struggle for the self-determination and self-rule of the Mongol peo
ple. How could he become an official of the Chinese government and superintend him
self? He politely refused this gesture of goodwill.
Rashidondog arranged for a meeting between Prince De and the U.S. ambassa
dor, John Leighton Stuart, and with Schulties, the political consultant. Prince De ex
plained to them his plan for establishing autonomy in the Northwest. The ambassador and
Schulties regarded Prince De highly and were especially interested in De’s pro-American,
anti-Soviet attitude. Ambassador Stuart agreed to convey Prince De’s hopes to the U. S.
government. Schulties also expressed his willingness to offer any help he could.
Before the situation in Beiping became extremely tense. Prince De’s trusted old
friend, the Dilowa Khutugtu, had gone to Nanjing and planned to go to Tibet through
India; however, he instead accepted an invitation from Owen Lattimore to Join Lattimore’s Johns Hopkins University program to assist in research. Prince De recognized that
this was a good opportunity and had Giljintei, a legislator from the Shilingol League,
write a document making the Diluwa Khutugtu his personal representative and give him
the right to carry on the movement for Mongolian independence after his arrival in the
U.S.
While Prince De was contacting all sorts of political leaders, a great change oc
curred in the leadership of the Chinese government. President Chiang Kai-shek an
nounced his resignation on January 21, 1949, and Li Zongren, the vice president, took
over the presidency. Prince De felt that this showed the Chinese government’s loss of a
coherent center; it would be better to go immediately to the Northwest and there do
something for the Mongolian people. So Prince De abandoned his resolve, maintained
since August 1945 and the Japanese surrender, not to involve himself in politics. He
again plunged into the whirlpool of political intrigue.*
“ Perhaps more could be said about these events, but I was in Taiwan at the time and was not party
to any discussions during this period. I have decided not to incorporate into this book any informa
tion I did not gamer through personal experience and contact with the people mentioned in my
narrative. Lu Minghui’s book, supposedly based on three years of interviews conducted in Beijing
with Prince De, does have more material on these events. But these interviews conducted by Lu
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ended in October of 1965, just six months before Prince De’s death. Perhaps because of his declin
ing physical and mental condition, statements by Prince De as recorded in Lu’s book were embel
lished and distorted, or misrepresented chronologically. I have, therefore, chosen to regard these
statements as suspicious and unreliable.

XV
THE ALASHAN MONGOLIAN
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT
JANUARY - DECEMBER 1949
Prince De’s Departure to Alashan and Contacts
with the Northwest Chinese Authorities
The Alashan Mongolian Autonomy Movement began at Dingyuanying (now
Bayanhot, the capital of Alashan) under the leadership of Prince De. This was the
Prince’s last effort in his struggle for Mongolian freedom. By that time, it was clear that
no power existed in China capable of stopping the Chinese Communists. Although Prince
De recognized this fact clearly, he nevertheless resolved to struggle anyway. The Mongol
nation had become the symbol and embodiment of his indomitable will. It was not fool
ishness, but unselfishness and devotion to his people that led him to make one last at
tempt to free and vindicate the Mongol people.
With the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, Li Zongren’s ascent to the presidency,
and the overwhelming momentum of the Chinese Communist onslaught. Prince De felt
that remaining in Nanjing would be of no use for the Mongol people. It would be best to
return to his Mongolian homeland and work there for his people. Even though he knew
that success was no longer possible, he hoped it might at least attract world attention to
the Mongols’ demands. It might even establish some kind of foundation for a Mongolian
polity in the future.
Prince De went to the northwestern part of Mongolia under the pretext of having
some task to perform there for the Chinese government. He asked Li Zongren to send him
to Xi’an and then to Lanzhou via airplane. Li granted his request, and by the end of Janu
ary 1949, Prince De, accompanied by Damrinwangchug (the younger brother of the Ala
shan jasag, Damzana), He Zhaolin, Tumendelger, and the Dayanchi Lama, went from
Nanjing via Hankow to Xi’an, and stayed there for a few days, visiting General Hu
Zongnan, the top commander of the Chinese government forces in that area. Prince De
expressed his opinion that unification of the Mongolian banners under a system of Mon
golian autonomy would be one measure to block further Communist expansion. General
Hu felt that Prince De’s opinions were correct and expressed support for them.
Prince De also met with General Zhang Zhizhong, Superintendent of Northwest
Military and Political Affairs, and expressed his desire for autonomy. Earlier, when
Zhang was in Xinjiang, he was well-known for his brilliant, nonchauvinistic attitude to
ward national minorities. At this time, he claimed to be a faithful follower of the Three
Principles of the People and said he would willingly cooperate with and support Prince
De’s struggles for Mongolian autonomy. This was, of course, extremely satisfying to
Prince De.
Prince De also met Ma Honggui, Ma Hongbin, Tao Shiyue, and other military
and political Chinese leaders in Lanzhou. Ma Honggui, then the governor of Ningxia
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Province, was the son of Ma Fuxiang, the Moslem leader in the Northwest. During the
period while he was minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, Ma Fuxiang
had supported Wu Heling. This was because he hoped that if the Mongols were able to
obtain some kind of rights, the Moslem people could then take this development as
precedent for demanding their own rights. Consequently, Ma Honggui, in general at least,
had no special prejudices against the Mongols or their demand for political autonomy.
However, Ma Honggui’s personal relations with Damzana, the jasag of Alashan, were
very poor because of the confrontation between the provinces and xiam on the one hand
and the leagues and banners on the other. Nevertheless, Ma-Honggui had no conflict with
Prince De. When they discussed Mongolian autonomy, Ma’s answer was, “Then if your
demands are such, we should strive for Mongol-Moslem cooperation.” This kind of an
swer greatly satisfied Prince De.'

Damzana and the Situation in Alashan
After their arrival in Lanzhou, Damrinwangchug and He Zhaolin went to Dingyuanying. Prince De also showed his willingness to discuss the future of Mongolia with
Prince Damzana. Soon after. Prince De received a warm welcome from Damzana, which
was a great and important turning point for the Mongolian politics of that time. Damzana,
the jasag prince of Alashan, had always occupied the top position of that area. Now he
openly invited Prince De to come to Dingyuanying. This meant that he wanted to openly
recognize Prince De’s leadership of the Mongol people.
When Prince De arrived in the city of Dingyuanying. Damzana not only sin
cerely welcomed him but also those Mongols who had come to Lanzhou from Beiping
(including the members of the MYA). Damzana said he would do his best to sustain all
those who came to Alashan. Consequently, this small oasis city between the Helan
(Alashan) Mountains and the great desert overnight became Inner Mongolia's political
center and remained so until the arrival of the Chinese Communist forces.
The Alashan banner and the EJine banner to its west were usually known among
the Chinese as Xitao Menggu, or Mongolia west of the Great Bend of the Yellow River.
They were special banners not under the Jurisdiction of any league. In 1928, after Ningxia
became a province, these two banners were drawn onto the map of Ningxia Province.
And from that time on, confrontation between these two banners and the Ningxia provin
cial government was inevitable. Later, this confrontation turned into a personal clash
between the governor of Ningxia Province, Ma Honggui, and the leaders of these two
banners. Under these circumstances, the EJine banner always looked to Alashan for lead
ership in their common struggle.
The princely household of Alashan had once accepted an imperial princess from
the Manchu emperor, and thereafter they continued to intermarry with the Manchu imper
ial household. As a consequence, the livelihood of Alashan gradually had become
sinicized in the Beijing style. The residents inside and outside the city wall of Dingyuan' Ma Hongbin was a military leader of Ningxia and a cousin of Ma Honggui. Tao Shiyue was the
commander of the military forces sent to the Northwest by Chiang Kai-shek. Later, during the ex
pansion of Communist power, Ma Honggui and his family moved to the U.S. Ma Hongbin negoti
ated the surrender to the Communists. Tao Shiyue moved to Xinjiang, where he too surrendered to
the Chinese Communists.
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ying, with the exception of the lamas of a temple, had lifestyles that were quite different
from those of the nomadic population in the steppe and desert area. In other words, the
Alashan lifestyle, cultural tradition, and way of thinking were all dualistic. Damzana
himself was the husband of Zai Tao’s daughter, and Zai Tao was the uncle of Puyi, the
Manchu Emperor who had abdicated in 1912. Consequently, Damzana represented a Beijingized clique. Because the character of his conflict with Ma Honggui changed into a
league vs. province, banner vs. xian struggle, it also turned into a kind of nationalistic
struggle. However, regardless of considerations of lifestyle or political thought, Damzana
still wanted to be known as a ruler who would struggle for Mongol self-determination.
Opposing Damzana was the tusalagchi Luo Batumongke, the idol of the no
madic population in the desert and of people in general living outside the city wall, even
though he lived inside Dingyuanying and enjoyed the quasi-BeiJingese lifestyle. His
opinions always contradicted those of Prince Damzana. Because Luo Batumongke was a
man of real power, Damzana was unable to push him out of the local political world. Luo
Batumongke was also the leader of the Alashan peace preservation troops. Between these
two antagonistic powers, the mediators were Luo Batumongke’s relative, the jakirugchi
Chen Erdeni, and his younger brother, the deputy jakirugchi, Chen Nasunbatu. Luo
Batumongke was a zealous Mongol nationalist who had special regard for Prince De and
great sympathy for the Mongols who had arrived from Lanzhou.

The Complicated Situation in Dingyuanying
and Confrontations among the Mongols
Besides these complicated Alashan entanglements, other political factors must
be taken into account. Although many Chinese merchants who lived outside the city wall
of Dingyuanying posed no problem, the Moslem Ma family had dispatched one or two
battalions of troops to camp near the Chinese merchant quarters. These troops kept watch
over Damzana and the Alashan Banner. Although the military forces of Alashan were
more than a match for the Moslem troops, the latter had available more reinforcements
than did the Alashan troops. In addition, Major-General Luo Dawei was dispatched by
the Second Bureau of the National Defense Ministry, which meant that he was from the
military intelligence organization of the Military Statistics Bureau. Wang Junhui was also
dispatched by the Kuomintang Central Committee Investigation and Statistics Bureau,
more commonly known as the Central Statistics Bureau.
After Prince De and his followers arrived, they quickly became the object of
these officials’ surveillance. He Zhaolin was himself a high-ranking official of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, and also head commissioner of the Kuomintang In
ner Mongolian Party Affairs Commission. He regularly sent in reports on Prince De to
these organizations. These were transmitted either directly or through Wang Junhui. In
fluenced by the presence of personnel from the Chinese military statistics group and the
Kuomintang Central Statistics group, Damzana organized his own personal espionage
ring. Outside this organization there were also agents of Outer Mongolia, protected by
Luo Batumongke.
Because of the arrival of Prince De, many Mongols of different political persua
sions gathered in Dingyuanying and further complicated the political climate in the city.
It seemed that following the shift in the general situation, a change was already occurring
in the frontier city. The reason Prince De was able to persuade Damzana to accelerate the
autonomy movement was, according to Prince De,
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because we know that we should take advantage of the loss of control by the central gov
ernment to establish control ourselves before the Chinese Communists arrive, while the Ma
family warlords are still occupied with their own affairs. We should strive for autonomy
and create a fait accompli', then the Chinese will be unable to put heavy-handed pressure on
us. We will be able to preserve our own power and will have dignity even if we retreat.
Thus will we make our mark in history.

When Prince De arrived in Dingyuanying, Bai Haifeng, who had instigated the
rebellion of the Mongol Peace Preservation troops at Beile-yin sume in 1936, fled to
Dingyuanying for his own safety from the advancing Chinese Communist onslaught. His
suspicion-laden relationship with Prince De was already established because he had taken
part in this earlier rebellion and also because of his personal relationships with Damzana
and He Zhaolin. So from the beginning of the autonomy movement, there was a problem
of conflict and confrontation among the leaders.
Later, He Zhaolin wrote with a crooked pen a deliberate distortion of these
events, entitled “Outline from Beginning to End of the Western Mongolian Autonomy
Movement.” I reproduce the relevant part of it as follows.
Soon after Prince De’s arrival in Alashan, he proposed a Mongolian autonomy
movement to Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, and Ba Wenjun. Prince De said, “We
Mongols have consistently demanded autonomy, but our hopes for it have never material
ized. But now, the Kuomintang is completely occupied with its own affairs and has no
power to stop us. We should not be influenced by whether the Kuomintang assents to our
plans or not. We should take advantage of this opportunity. This is our best opportunity and
should not be missed.” At that time, everybody recognized that the situation was very tense
and wondered how a matter like this could be carried out. If it could only be carried out re
luctantly, it would be a labor in vain, they thought. They expressed their opinions that this
plan should be considered carefully before being acted upon. Prince De several times
pushed for discussion of the problem, but the others always had some reservations because
they feared that after liberation, there might be many difficulties for themselves.
Afterwards, Bai Haifeng secretly said to Damzana, He Zhaolin, and Ba Wenjun,
“Right now, the situation is very tense, and the outcome is a foregone conclusion. As for
Mongolian autonomy, it should not be carried out under the leadership of the Kuomintang.
If autonomy were carried out on our own, it might accrue some advantage to us and help us
gather together those armed Mongol military and political personnel who came here from
the Northeast. We could assemble them and not let them scatter and create trouble every
where. Even if the future sees the coming of liberation, it will be good. On the other hand,
if liberation [i.e. takeover by the Communists] does not come immediately, the power of
this group of people may be used to do some local construction work.” Damzana, He, and
Ba, after hearing these words. Judged them reasonable and recognized that if in the future
the liberation did not come, then the autonomous movement could not be attacked by the
KMT as a rebellion; if liberation did come, it could be represented to the Communists as a
prorevolutionary action aimed at holding these rebel bandits for the people’s liberation
army and thereby reducing the damage they could do to eastern Inner Mongolia. This
would kill two birds with one stone. This kind of opportunistic, counterrevolutionaiy politi
cal scheming was in keeping with Prince De’s feudalistic, counterrevolutionary ideology.
After this discussion, everybody agreed to carry out the movement for Mongolian auton
omy.^
^ This passage makes it clear that He Zhaolin was attempting to give the Chinese Communists an
account that would put all the blame on Prince De and make Bai Haifeng look like a political op
portunist. In relating these lies, he hoped to be able to exonerate himself, Damzana, and Ba Wen-

396

The Last Mongol Prince

In He’s account above, the words that read “gather together those armed Mongol
military and political personnel who came here from the Northeast. We could assemble
them and not let then scatter and create trouble everywhere,” could be related to the mat
ter mentioned in an earlier chapter—how at the Chinese National Assembly in Nanjing,
Bai Haifeng had desired to take over Wu Outing’s troops but failed. In the fall of 1948,
Bai carried out a similar plot, and it too failed. From these words of Bai in He’s account,
it appears that Bai may have intended to put these anti-Communist troops under his own
leadership and create his own political capital. Nevertheless, his plan never succeeded.
As for He’s words on political opportunism, according to my own experience with both
Bai and He, I think both of them might well have been involved in some opportunistic
scheme. He Zhaolin was well-known for his cunning and treachery.
As for Damzana, no matter how He twisted the truth under his crooked pen,
everyone still knew Damzana was a fervent patriot. When he first welcomed Prince De,
Damzana was sincere. Although later he changed his inclination because of the impact of
Bai and He, at the beginning he was not shifty on the matter of Inner Mongolian auton
omy. As for Ba Wenjun, who was then using a Mongolian alias and was known as Bayankhan, he was also a zealous and faithful person. He tried hard to create an outlet for
the Mongol people. His motive was entirely different from the motives of Bai and He.

Supporters of the Movement and Formation of the
Preliminary Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy
Both before and after Prince De’s arrival in Dingyuanying, some other Mongol
leaders also gathered there: Rinchinsengge, the head of the Ulanchab League and his son,
Shongno. Formerly, after Rinchinsengge had cut his queue, he had been humiliated by
Prince De, and this created enmity between the two men. Now, hearing of Prince De’s
arrival in Dingyuanying, he came from Bayan-shangdu-yin sume, Urad Central Banner,
to visit Prince De. His son, Shongno, was a member of the MYA.^
After the arrival of these people. Prince De’s proposal for autonomy received
greater support. Finally, after receiving the agreement of Damzana on April 13, 1949 in
Dingyuanying, with these people and others as a base. Prince De, Damzana, and the oth
ers who had gathered convened an Inner Mongolian League and Banner Delegate confer
ence to discuss how to gain Mongolian autonomy.
At this conference, because both Prince De and Damzana declined to preside,
Bayankhan (Ba Wenjun) was nominated as chairman; Prince De, Rinchinsengge, Dam
zana, Dugurengsang (Bai Haifeng), Nasunmongke (He Zhaolin), and Urgundalai were
elected as members of the presidium. Guests of honor were Zhou Baihuang, the secretary
general of the Kuomintang Ningxia Provincial Headquarters; a delegate of Ma Honggui;
jun. I do not know whether He Zhaolin actually wrote this account himself or not, but I do know
that Bai died in 1958 or 1959. This account of He’s was published in Inner Mongolia in 1962 in
Inner Mongolian Literature and Historical Materials, # 1.
’ Several other MYA members were also there, such as Budbazar, Urad West Banner National
Assembly Delegate; Dagwaodsar, Hulunbuir National Assembly delegate; Shonododub, acting
head of the Shilingol League; Altanochir, tusalagchi of the Sunid Right Banner. Other important
members were Agdungga, Ujumuchin Delegate for the National Assembly; Jagunnasutu, a former
official of the Mongolian Government in Kalgan; Urgundalai, Ordos Right Central Banner peace
preservation commander; and Gonchog (Bao Guomin), originally an officer of the Northeastern
Peace Preservation Troops.
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the governor of Ningxia Province; Major General Luo Dawei; a commissioner of the Na
tional Defense Department; and others. After Chairman Bayankhan delivered the opening
speech, the guests of honor also delivered speeches one after the other. Both sides used
very carefully worded speeches to avoid provoking the other factions. Even the Ma fam
ily of Ningxia did not want to appear to be opposing the others.
This greatly increased the courage of the opportunists. Bai Haifeng and He
Zhaolin had never used Mongolian names after Joining the KMT, but now they were us
ing their Mongolian names, Dugurengsang and Nasunmongke respectively, to show out
wardly that they were moved by nationalistic aspirations. But in reality this was nothing
but opportunism. If autonomy won out, they would have a place, and if it failed, they
could claim to the KMT that they had never participated in the movement. The confer
ence lasted three days. In addition to the outline of the work of the proposed Preliminary
Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy, the conference also passed the following
petition to the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission:
This is a request presented [to the Central Government] to secure permission to es
tablish Inner Mongolian autonomy in order to stabilize the Mongolian banners and to for
tify the national defenses. The territory of our nation is vast, and many national minorities
are settled along its border areas. The safety of the national defense cannot depend only
upon military preparations. There must be an increase in the national minorities’ goodwill
toward the central government in order to achieve true unity and produce a united front in
struggling together for our nation. Then and only then will there be gains and success.
We, the Inner Mongolian people, are approaching two million people in number, and
our culture, education, and economic standards are progressing steadily. It is possible for us
to say that we can assume a portion of the nation’s burdens. Moreover, we are able to be re
sponsible and manage our own affairs. For almost ten years, we Mongols have been des
perately seeking solutions and demanding Inner Mongolian autonomy. These demands are
based on Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s teachings in his Three Principles of the People and are similar
to the demands by minorities all over the world for more political autonomy. Right now, in
view of the current national situation, we Mongols need to unify and search for a way of
self-salvation and national salvation. On the thirteenth of April, therefore, the Inner Mon
golian League and Banner Delegate Conference was held, at which we discussed general
plans and made the following resolutions:
a. Following the teachings of the Three Principles of the People that “the weak and small
nationalities in the country should be fostered by the government, and it should be possible
for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule,” we petition the Central Government
to authorize Inner Mongolian autonomy, making it possible for us to defend ourselves
against invasions, and enabling us to fortify the national defense.
b. Before the establishment of the formal institutions of autonomy, we plan to establish a
Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy in order to prepare for the transi
tion to self-rule.
Therefore, following the resolution of the conference, we have already established
the Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy, have started preparing for selfrule, are fortifying national defenses and working for stability in order to relieve some of
the Central Government’s worry about the northern region. But beeause of the tense inter
nal situation, we sincerely hope that your Honorable Commission will consider the national
loyalty of us, the Mongol people, toward the nation and will perceive our enthusiasm for
self-salvation; and that you will, in view of the nationwide situation, make a brilliant deci
sion and assent to the declaration of Inner Mongolian autonomy. This will support national
policy and will fortify the frontier areas. This will be a great benefit to the Mongolian ban
ners and also to the entire countiy.
Therefore, prudently, we submit this to Your Excellency, Bai Yunti, minister of the
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Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission.
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Bayankhan, He Zhaolin, and Jagunnasutu probably drafted this document be
cause, although they agreed on the need to establish Mongolian autonomy, they were
absolutely unwilling to offend the Chinese government or the Central Committee of the
Kuomintang. Thus, all these documents emphasize the leadership of the central govern
ment in unifying the nation for defense against enemy invasion.
As for the personnel arrangements, although Prince De advocated the autonomy
movement, he did not wish that there be any indication that it was led or instigated by
him, to avoid the misunderstanding that he was the one who initiated all autonomy
movements. He hoped that Damzana might come forth and assume leadership of the
movement. Damzana, however, was quite reluctant to take over the mantle of leadership.
Consequently, Prince De and Damzana agreed to support Altanwachir, who was then the
head of the Yekejuu League and the chairman of the disintegrating Suiyuan Mongolian
Political Council, as well as the chairman of the Preparatory Committee. In order to bal
ance the personnel arrangements inside his own Alashan Banner, Damzana had his
younger brother, Damrinwangchug, act as one of the deputy chairmen. Finally, through
the support of Prince De and Damzana, Bayankhan became the secretary-general.
After this conference, without waiting for the Chinese government’s response,
the Inner Mongols founded their Preparatory Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy
in the city of Dingyuanying. The main tasks facing this committee were first, convening
the Conference of the Inner Mongolian People’s Delegates; second, drafting the Inner
Mongolian Declaration of Autonomy; and third, writing the organizational law of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous government.

Prince De’s Trip to Guangzhou
Although Prince De did not want to be chairman of the Preparatory Committee,
he did want to go to Canton (Guangzhou) to take up the difficult task of persuading the
leaders of the Chinese government to approve this new development. Because of the
tense situation in the Ulanchab League, Rinchinsengge did not accompany Prince De to
Guangzhou, nor did Ochirkhuyagtu go from Yekejuu. Only Jin Batudorji was able to
accompany Prince De. Although Jagunnasutu had been fired from his post in the Kalgan
Mongolian government, he was nonetheless appointed by Prince De as a personal atten
dant-secretary; Prince De realized that Jagunnasutu’s eloquence would be useful. After
everything was prepared, though, there was no money. The Mongolian delegates waited
for a solution to this financial problem until the middle of May, and then proceeded via
Ningxia, Lanzhou, Xi’an, and Chungking to Guangzhou.
Prince Altanochir had been planning to come to Dingyuanying to travel with
Prince De, but during Altanochir’s visit to the headquarters of the Kuomintang’s Suiyuan
Mongolian Party Headquarters, he suddenly died of a stroke. The people in Dingyuan
ying had hoped that Prince De would take the position of chairman of the Preparatory
Committee and dispatch others to Guangzhou on his behalf. Prince De refused this reAppended are the names of the Mongolian league and banner delegates: Altanwachir, Demchugdongrob, Rinchinsengge, Bayankhan. Damrinwangchug, and others, for a total of forty-nine signa
tures.
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quest; the people of Dingyuanying then selected Bayankhan as acting chairman, since he
was the secretary-general of the committee. Prince De decided to go to Guangzhou as a
representative of the committee.
Financial and political problems postponed Prince De’s visit to Guangzhou
again and again, and this delay created a confrontation among the Mongols in Dingyuan
ying just after they had joined together after a long-lasting rift. The delay also hurt the
friendship between Prince De and Damzana. Earlier, during the days when he was in Beiping. Prince De had expressed great interest in the Political Consultative Conference
{Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi). In this conference, the Chinese Communists agreed that the
national minorities that were concentrated in one definite area should receive the right of
self-rule, and Prince De had liked this suggestion. According to Prince De, the reason
why the national minorities were entitled to self-determination was that each minority
was a people {minzu). Therefore, he taught that the Mongols were justified in demanding
autonomy because they were a people.
He Zhaolin recognized that if Prince De’s demands were too high, selfdetermination would run up against a political taboo against fragmentation in central
government circles so that it would be impossible to realize such a demand. Though Bai
Haifeng tried to establish contact with the Chinese Communists, he also refused to offend
the central government. So some of Prince De’s options were cut off. As a result. He
Zhaolin and Bai persuaded Damzana not to accept Prince De’s proposals.
Damzana had his own personal motives. He had welcomed Prince De to his
home to take advantage of the prince's reputation in an attempt to achieve his own politi
cal goals, which were the recovery of the rights and privileges of his banner and gain the
finances for its rehabilitation. He was not necessarily interested in carrying out a decisive
struggle for national self-determination of all the Mongol people. In other words,
Damzana was a comparative realist, and after undergoing persuasion by He and Bai, he
lost the courage to accept Prince De’s proposal for self-rule.
At the same time, the active members of the MYA—Dagwaodsar, Shongno,
Shonnudongrob, and others—pushed resolutely for the demands of national selfdetermination and produced a clear slogan to that effect. This kind of political romanti
cism on their part antagonized the politically realistic Mongols, and at every meeting
confrontations between the two groups erupted into emotionally charged arguments. This
finally produced an ideological split among the Mongols. Prince De thought that the re
alistic camp had no zeal for a nationalistic movement; Damzana and his group thought
that the “wandering bums” he had welcomed to his home were impractical and doctri
naire and created problems for no good reason. Seeing the deadlock between the two
groups, Bayankhan also lost heart and stopped all his preparatory work. This was the
troubled situation in Dingyuanying when Prince De finally left for Guangzhou.
In January, when Prince De arrived in Nanjing from Beiping, President Chiang
Kai-shek had already resigned and had made Vice President Li Zongren the acting presi
dent. By the end of March, General He Yingqin was appointed as head of the Executive
Yuan. He Yingqin recommended that Bai Yunti be the minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan
Affairs Commission. Soon after the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communists collapsed in the latter part of April, the Communists took over Nanjing, and
the Chinese government fled to Guangzhou. The main force of the KMT withdrew to
Taiwan. In such chaotic circumstances, many of the Mongols in Beiping and Nanjing
also withdrew to Taiwan. Soon after Prince De’s arrival in Guangzhou, he sent a telegram
to Wu Heling, Jirgalang, Wu Guting, and Tserengdorji (formerly Prince De’s secretary),
and me, requesting that we first come to Guangzhou to discuss the future, and then go to
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Dingyuanying to promote the autonomy movement together. Beside these persons who
were requested to go to Dingyuanying, Li Shouxin and others also went there through
Guangzhou by their own will, having not been invited to do so by Prince De.
After Prince De’s arrival in Guangzhou, Bai Yunti, minister of the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission, hosted the prince’s party and arranged lodging for them at
the Hotel Fenghuang. Prince De immediately presented Bai Yunti with his petition for
autonomy and asked him to present it to the Chinese government. In addition, he re
quested as a personal favor that Bai stand on the Mongol side to deliver this petition to
the Chinese government and accelerate its realization. Although Bai agreed to give it his
full support, he really did not have the power to push this petition through.
During his visit with Li Zongren, Prince De explained again and again that the
Inner Mongolians must unite both to carry out self-defense and to struggle for national
existence because of the Chinese Communist threat. Prince De asked Li to be sympa
thetic and authorize this autonomy. Li Zongren did not give any definite response to
Prince De’s request, but said, “Tliis is a very important matter and needs more careful
consideration and study.” He then asked Prince De to negotiate with Li Hanhun, the
minister of the Interior. Consequently, Prince De met several times with Minister Li
Hanhun. In a conversation I had with Prince De, he said that Li had expressed his sym
pathy and recognized that the Mongol demands for autonomy were not excessive or un
reasonable. He also declared that according to the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the matter
should be pursued and that he would like to transmit the Mongols’ opinion on this matter
to his superiors.
Prince De also met with Qin Dechun, deputy minister of the National Defense
Ministry. When Qin held the post of governor of Chahar Province, his personal relations
with Prince De had been quite smooth. He now expressed sympathy with Prince De’s
requests and gave his support. But when Prince De requested a visit with He Yingqin,
head of the Executive Yuan and former Instructional Minister of Mongolian Autonomy in
the 1930s, he was refused. He Yingqin had strong prejudices against Prince De and used
his busy work schedule as a pretext not to see him. Later, Prince De asked Xue Xingru, a
Mongol legislator, to visit He and ask the reason for his refusal to see Prince De. Mr. He
said to Xue, “Prince De instigated the autonomy movement and then collaborated with
the Japanese. I’m afraid that he is unreliable.” Because of this political factor. Prince
De’s activities in Guangzhou were doomed.
At the end of May, General He Yingqin resigned as head of the Executive Yuan
because he had lost the support of the KMT in Taiwan. Yan Xishan, an important actor
on the political/military stage ever since the founding of the Republic, took his place. In
the earlier chapters of this book, I mentioned Yan’s views on Mongolian politics and his
machinations against the Mongolian autonomy movement of 1933. His appointment as
head of the Executive Yuan caused Prince De’s trip to Guangzhou to end in failure. Yan
did not like either Prince De or Bai Yunti. To please the legislators from the Northeast
area, he expelled Bai from the cabinet and placed Guan Jiyu, a northeastern person and
former minister of Finance, as minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission. In
addition to this step, Yan also had Zhu Jiahua appointed deputy head of the Executive
Yuan, in order to tighten his own web of relations with the central cadres of the KMT.
During this reshuffling of the Chinese government, Li Hanhun, who had a close relation
ship with Li Zongren and sympathy toward Prince De’s demands, left his post as minister
of Interior Affairs.
This high level administrative reshuffling obliged Prince De to explain his posi
tions and demands all over again. Of these new personnel, Guan Jiyu was unwilling to
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assume any risks for important matters such as Mongolian autonomy. He yielded to Yan
Xishan control of all matters pertaining to Inner Mongolia. Even before the formal visit
between Prince De and Yan Xishan, the prince realized nothing would come of it.
As expected, Yan again used his old tactic of delaying matters. “Right now,” he
said, “the most important matters are military. It would be best to wait for an improve
ment in these matters before undertaking a discussion of Mongolian autonomy.” Despite
these delaying tactics. Prince De persisted in his demands; but Yan did not budge. So
their meeting came to an end with nothing accomplished. After this meeting, Yan put on
a banquet in Prince De’s honor. During the banquet. Prince De argued that Sun Yat-sen’s
teachings regarding minorities—^that the central government should foster weak and
small minorities inside the country and make it possible for them to carry out self-deter
mination and self-rule—were sufficient precedent for his demands. Yan responded, “This
is a far-reaching tenet, but my own responsibilities at the moment are limited to matters
immediately at hand.” Thus it was that this second meeting between Yan and the prince
ended on an unpleasant note.
Subsequent to these meetings. Prince De discussed Mongolian issues with Zhu
Jiahua, the deputy head of the Executive Yuan. Zhu was usually known among the Chin
ese as a man with broad-minded attitudes toward the national minorities. Although he
expressed personal sympathy to Prince De, he did not give a definitive official opinion
for or against the issue of autonomy for Inner Mongolia. He agreed only to make avail
able to Prince De 10,000 silver dollars and 200 rifles. Prince De, greatly disappointed at
this, realized at this moment that the KMT and its Chinese government were completely
ignoring Inner Mongolian concerns.
After Prince De’s arrival in Guangzhou, the Chinese civil war greatly intensi
fied. Yan Xishan came to see that complete neglect of Mongol concerns might lead to
Mongol loss of faith in China and a host of other attendant problems. It was out of these
concerns that he decided to give a superficial reply for Prince De to carry back to
Alashan. It is a classic example of his tactics of vagueness and decisive indecisiveness:
Permission is hereby granted for the preliminary committee for Inner Mongolian League
and Banner Autonomy to be established. It is possible that when certain preconditions for
the implementation of autonomy (such as an accurate population census, educational at
tainment, and cultural and economic development) are met, autonomy might be authorized.

This answer clearly showed that while the preliminary committee was recog
nized, it was to have no authority to implement any autonomy without further authoriza
tion.
Gui Yongqing, the commander of the navy and an old friend of Prince De, also
felt that complete disappointment for Prince De would lead to an irreversible loss of the
Mongol people’s faith in the KMT. He personally presented one hundred handguns to
Prince De and said to him, “I am unable to support you openly and officially in your im
portant concerns. President Chiang has retired, and nobody is currently able to make de
cisions on important matters. I regret that I cannot be of more help to you than this. Do
forgive me.”
When he later returned to Dingyuanying, Prince De took 10,000 silver dollars
and the handguns given him by Gui Yongqing. Because of space limitations on the air
plane, the 200 rifles had to be left behind in Guangzhou. The material assistance given by
the central government to Prince De was limited to what could be stuffed into his small
airplane! This cynical gesture did not amount to even a symbolic expression of concern
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over the impending Chinese Communist threat to Mongolia.
While Prince De was in Guangzhou, the military forces under the leadership of
Wu Guting had broken out of the Communist encirclement in the Northeast and arrived
in the vicinity of Dingyuanying. For this reason, Bai Haifeng again became interested in
incorporating Wu’s troops into his own armies. Bai was, however, unsuccessful in this.
When Li Shouxin arrived in Guangzhou, he thought that by virtue of his past
relations with Prince De, he might be able to establish a position second to Prince De’s,
should the latter achieve a breakthrough. Li also thought that his former position in the
Mongolian army might enable him to gather all Mongolian military forces and place
them under his command. It was because of these arrangements that Li, having heard that
Prince De was going to Guangzhou, went there to see the prince without having received
an invitation.
From Guangzhou, Li went to Ningxia. One of Li’s old friends, Gao Yajie, a rich
merchant in Beijing, had introduced him to Ma Dunjing, son of Ma Honggui, the acting
governor of Ningxia Province. Ma wanted Li to come to Ningxia to gather his former
troops and confront the threat posed by the Communists. In Ningxia he learned that Ma
was not really serious in his anti-Communist resolve. Moreover, the Mongolian troops
from the Northeast who had gathered in Ningxia were unenthusiastic about accepting Li’s
leadership or fighting for the Moslem warlord Ma Honggui. Their main purpose was to
establish a Mongolian autonomous region in Dingyuanying. Li had no choice but to pro
ceed to Dingyuanying and await the establishment of the Mongolian autonomous regime.
Prince De had in good faith invited Wu Heling to Guangzhou. But Wu Heling
differed with Prince De on Mongolian national issues. Wu was more realistic than Prince
De. He recognized that Mongolian autonomy could only be achieved with the Chinese
government’s approval. He suggested that a compromise be reached. In other words,
though Wu’s stance was quite different from Prince De’s, he was still willing to act as a
middleman during negotiations. Since 1928, Wu had often acted as a mediator between
the Mongols and the Chinese government. As a result, Wu was able to convince the
Mongols that only he fiilly understood the mentality of the Chinese central authorities. He
had also succeeded in convincing the Chinese government that only his proposals could
be both acceptable to the Mongols and coincide with the interests of the government. In
Guangzhou, Wu negotiated with Prince De and had interviews with the leaders of the
Chinese government. After Prince De’s return to Alashan, Wu remained in Guangzhou
for quite a long period.
After Jirgalang and I arrived in Guangzhou, Prince De told us about the situation
in Alashan and told us that because of issues concerning national autonomy, a conflict
among the Mongolian leaders had erupted there. I admonished the prince not to create a
rift with Damzana and argued that as long as there was a definite territory designated as
an autonomous region, it would not matter whether the autonomy was referred to as na
tional or regional. Prince De agreed with my analysis and agreed that after his return to
Alashan, he would not again insist on the term “national autonomy.” He also pointed out
that in order to bring together the two conflicting groups, it would be necessary to draw
up a draft of the declaration of autonomy, the organizational law of the autonomous gov
ernment, and plans for a conference. He urged Jirgalang and me to leave Guangzhou and
proceed to Alashan immediately in order to take preliminary steps toward these ends.
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Prince De’s Contact with the Americans in Guangzhou
To open an international line of contact and to struggle for American support of
the autonomous movement, Prince De, accompanied by Rashidondog, met with Schulties, the political counselor of the American embassy in Guangzhou. Prince De explained
to Schulties the situation in Alashan and expressed hope that Schulties would convey to
the United States government the desire of the Mongols for national self-determination.
At this time, there was no ambassador in the U.S. embassy in Guangzhou; John Leighton
Stuart had already returned to the United States. The top political official in the embassy
at that time was Schulties, who said to the prince, “The hopes that you expressed earlier
have already been conveyed to the United States government by Stuart. The American
government recognizes you as the representative of the Mongols. If you are able to
achieve a breakthrough, perhaps we will dispatch a man to be stationed in your area. 1
will report your hopes to the United States government.” After receiving such a response.
Prince De was satisfied.
While in Guangzhou during this time, Prince De and 1 also met in the suburbs
with Raymond Meitz, an American intelligence officer. The prince, hoping that Meitz
would convey the hopes of the Mongols to the American government, explained to him
the situation in Alashan and the purpose of his visit to Guangzhou. Meitz expressed his
personal sympathy for the Mongolian movement for self-determination and self-rule and
his desire to support it. He said he would see to it that our concerns and hopes were con
veyed to the proper people in the American government. He also said, as mentioned in
the preceding chapter, that he would like to see some trained radio communication ex
perts dispatched to Alashan, and that he was negotiating with the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to have all of this organization’s remaining
relief materials, communications equipment, and trucks sent to the Mongolian autono
mous organization in Alashan.
Before Prince De had even arrived in Guangzhou, Raymond Meitz’s organiza
tion was already training several young Mongol intellectuals in radio communications. A
Mongol agent, Nairaltu, was instrumental in organizing these efforts and coordinating
them with Meitz’s group. The purpose of these activities was to provide liaisons between
the United States government and the Mongolian autonomous activists under Prince De’s
leadership. They had already determined that if the Communists took over Western Inner
Mongolia, these liaisons would go underground and continue their intelligence work.
Prince De, of course, wanted to use the services and materials of this group of
young Mongol communications experts. It was, however, necessary to find a pretext for
taking them to Alashan. The MYA decided that one of their number, a man named Oljeibuyan, head of the first section of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission, should take this communications group to Ningxia under
the guise of delivering relief materials, and that they should proceed from Ningxia to
Dingyuanying. This was a very risky undertaking, especially in view of the fact that they
would be in territory controlled by the Ma family of Moslem warlords. Oljeibuyan, how
ever, was willing to make this risky attempt to establish Mongol contacts with the outside
world. Long since disillusioned with the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, he felt
that it could only deal very superficially with the Mongols and Mongol issues.
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Prince De’s other Contacts in Guangzhou
Authorization of the Preliminary Committee for Mongolian Autonomy was
Prince De’s only accomplishment in Guangzhou. Most of the Mongols there were very
sympathetic with Prince De’s goals, but they thought that the momentum of the times
was against the realization of these goals. For this reason, they were not as unified in ac
tion in 1949 as they had been during the autonomy movement of 1933. One of their num
ber, Xue Xingru, was anxious to act as a middleman for Prince De. Another man, Bai
Rui, a former member of the Control Yuan, decided to go to Alashan to join the auton
omy movement there. Bai was an old man, in his eighties by this time. As 1 related ear
lier, Bai was one of the most zealous supporters of the 1933 autonomy movement. Rashidondog, the liaison between the Prince and the American embassy, also decided to go to
Alashan. But after Rashidondog’s arrival in Lanzhou, the war took a turn for the worse
and the roads were blocked, so he was unable to proceed to Alashan.
After Jirgalang and I left Guangzhou for Alashan, Prince De had Wu Heling and
Jagunnasutu deliver a document in his name to the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commis
sion, announcing the establishment of the Mongolian League and Banner Allied Com
mittee of Defense.
The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission did submit this proposal to the
Executive Yuan. Yan Xishan ordered a Joint examination of the matter by the MongolianTibetan Affairs Commission, National Defense Ministry, and the Ministry of the Interior.
The result was that these three organizations agreed that if the Mongolian League and
Banner Allied Defense Committee could achieve its aims of gathering anti-Communist
military leaders of the Mongol banners, organizing the military forces of the Mongol
banners, and defending against westward expansion of the Chinese Communist forces, it
would be a good thing and would lead to the approval of its establishment.
Prince De, however, had returned to Alashan by this time, and the situation had
greatly changed. Even though this Yuan decision existed, it was no more than a few vain
words committed to paper. All told, the accomplishments of Prince De’s trip to Guang
zhou were the central government’s approval of the establishment of the Preparatory
Committee for Mongolian Autonomy and his contacts with the Americans, which en
abled him to get political sympathy, materials for radio communications, and a chance to
receive the remaining materials and trucks of UNRRA in the northwest area.
Prince De left Jagunnasutu in Guangzhou to continue negotiating for the forma
tion of the allied defense committee and to demand more military equipment and finan
cial aid. Wu Heling was also ordered to keep pressing the government over these de
mands. Prince De took with him the other delegate, Jin Batudorji; his aide-de-camp, Tumendelger; and his former secretary, Tserengdorji and departed for Lanzhou on July 10.
Prince De arrived in Alashan via Ningxia. In Lanzhou, he met with the military com
mander of the Northwest, Ma Bufang; and in Ningxia with Ma Dunjing, the ad hoc gov
ernor of Ningxia. These Moslem leaders expressed support of Prince De’s efforts at selfrule, and at the same time they spoke of the cooperation between the Mongol and Mos
lem people.

The Situation in Alashan Before Prince De’s Return
After our arrival in Dingyuanying, Jirgalang and I were warmly received by the
brothers Damzana and Damrinwangchug, who arranged a suite of rooms for us in the
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residence of the Alashan Prince. These quarters were also used as the office of the openminded Bayankhan, chairman and secretary-general of the preparatory committee. Al
though Jirgalang and I were not members of the preparatory committee at that time, we
were often asked for our opinions. Damzana and his brother also had no prejudices
against us. We visited with Luo Batumongke on several occasions and had good conver
sations. Nevertheless, we were informed that Luo, a powerful Alashan tusalagchi, was
friendly to Damzana, the jasag, but unfriendly to Damrinwangchug. To avoid creating
trouble and becoming embroiled in local politics, we kept our contacts with this man to a
minimum. We also fried to alleviate the tension that had developed between Prince De
and Damzana’s group over the issue of “national autonomy.” Our arrival, however, at
tracted the attention of He Zhaolin, Wang Junhui, and Luo Dawei. It was even said that
they made many false reports about us to the Investigative Bureau of the Kuomintang
Central Committee and the National Defense Ministry.
At this time, the situation in the Northwest was changing rapidly. Zhang Chizhong, supreme military commander of the Northwest and the delegate of the Chinese
government to Beiping, refused to return and surrendered to the Communists. In May, the
Chinese government replaced Zhang with the Moslem warlord Ma Bufang, and stationed
him in Lanzhou. Hu Zongnan, the commander of the KMT's forces in the northwest, who
was stationed at this time in Xi’an, was moved to another place. The northwest of China
was coming rapidly under the power of the Ma family. Ma Bufang’s son, Ma Jiyuan,
defeated the Communists in the vicinity of Xi’an, but soon afterward the situation
changed and became tense again.
Alashan was far removed from other areas. The only source of knowledge of the
outside world was Damzana’s Zenith radio. The source of the news was the Chinese edi
tion of the BBC broadcasts originating in London. Every day after supper was the time to
hear the news. Damzana always invited Bayankhan, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, Jirgalang,
and me to hear these broadcasts. We would make analyses together and then discuss what
policies would be best in light of the international situation. These were nonofficial gath
erings but of much significance. Persons at these gatherings exchanged views freely, and
this reduced the knowledge gap among them. One night, Bayankhan suggested that there
should be no delay in important matters because of a mere difference of opinion. As the
ad hoc chairman, he appointed himself. He Zhaolin, Damringwangchug, Jirgalang, and
me as drafting committee members. This decision hastened the work of the preparatory
committee. I was assigned to draw up the declaration of autonomy. Jirgalang and 1 to
gether were assigned to draft the organizational law of the autonomous government, and
other documents were assigned to other members. The five members were then to hold
discussions and agree upon the final drafts.
During the drafting of these documents. He Zhaolin never shared any of his
viewpoints or opinions. When the declaration and organizational law drafts were almost
complete, Damzana suddenly spoke to me and said, “When you were drafting the decla
ration, were there any disputes or differing opinions?” I answered no. Damzana said,
“Because you did not ask my third brother what his opinion was, he felt that you were
ignoring him. Because of this he is planning to resign from the drafting committee.
Would you please visit him and remove this misunderstanding of his?” I agreed with this
request, although I felt that the situation was a little strange. 1 went to visit with Dam
ringwangchug, who revealed his complaints to me and then said, “You may go to discuss
these matters with He Zhaolin.” I thereupon had a talk with He Zhaolin, who emphasized
his dissatisfaction with Damringwangchug and then said, “Your draft of the declaration is
very good. There is no need to make any changes. The only problem is you did not say a
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few words to help the central government escape from its responsibility. This might cre
ate some trouble later. Do you think it would be possible to add a phrase like 'The central
government is occupied by military matters day and night and has had no time to concern
itself with this matter?’” Of course I agreed, because both Damringwangchug and He
Zhaolin were drafting members. Therefore, in the Chinese edition of the declaration,
these words of He Zhaolin, written in the literary style, were inserted into the colloquial
text of the document.
This, of course, was He’s way of making it appear that Damringwangchug was
the one who disagreed with me. This ploy also made it possible for He Zhaolin to keep
from severing his old ties with the Kuomintang Central Committee in case the Chinese
Communists failed. In that event, he could maintain that he had not been eager to write
these things. In He Zhaolin’s writings on the Alashan autonomy movement, he claims
that he, Prince Damzana, and Bai Haifeng, advocated using the words “Western Mongol
ia” instead of “Mongolia,” and that this gave rise to a serious debate with Prince De.^ But
to my knowledge, there was never any such debate. This shows that He was distorting the
record to obscure the nature of his relationship with Prince De. Of course, these writings
of his were penned during the dark days of the Cultural Revolution.
When the war in the Northwest turned from bad to worse, all the people in Dingyuanying realized that occupation by the Communists was only a matter of time. But as
nobody was able to come up with a reasonable solution for dealing with the inevitable; a
mood of hopelessness and passive submission to fate pervaded the city. Damzana himself
was wavering in his resolve. During the nightly hour of news and discussion, I often re
called the last-resort measures Prince De told me about while I was in Guangzhou, I tried
to convince Damzana that passively awaiting doom at the hands of the Communists was
not the only available alternative. I argued that it would be best for us to move into the
great desert and enter Tibet via Kokonor. If Tibet could not preserve its own national
existence, I continued, we could pass over into India, establish a government in exile, and
attempt to channel world opinion in our favor. Jirgalang supported these alternatives, and
Damzana was also moved by them. Bayankhan, with some reluctance and with reserva
tions, also supported these alternative plans. Only He Zhaolin and Bai Haifeng refrained
from expressing their opinions. Damzana discussed this matter with the leaders of his
own banner, including Luo Batumongke. Damzana said that if we could mobilize some
trucks, it might be possible to flee toward Tibet as a last resort. I therefore leaked to him a
bit of information to the effect that Prince De might be able to obtain some trucks from
the ITNRRA. This became an important consideration in later discussions.

Prince De’s Return to Alashan
In the middle of a night in mid-July, Prince De returned to Dingyuanying from
Ningxia. Because Prince De’s arrival was delayed for almost seven hours, Damzana and
others had been greatly concerned about his whereabouts and welfare. They even worried
about Prince De being captured by the Ma warlord family. The atmosphere became very
tense. At his arrival, all the members of the Preparatory Committee lined up to meet him,
and Luo Batumongke had the peace preservation troops of Alashan banner receive Prince
^ He Zhaolin, Outline from the Beginning to the End of the Western Mongolian Autonomy Move
ment. [We could find no more detailed bibliographic information on this work. —Editors]
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De with military music. Although Prince De’s visit to Guangzhou did not result in any
concrete improvements or breakthroughs, his return still lifted the spirits of the people.
Before Prince De’s departure for Guangzhou, it had been decided that the Mongolian
convention would be held on July 20. This was the reason for Prince De’s return.
After returning to Alashan, Prince De began attending the evening news sessions
and engaging in the discussions about what to do in the worst case scenario. He agreed
with my proposal to enter Tibet through Qinghai (Kokonor). It seemed, therefore, that
this matter was settled and that the rift among the Mongolian leaders in Alashan over the
issue of “national autonomy” was resolved. Nevertheless, as the discussions on matters of
achieving autonomy continued, the possibilities for both a high and a low degree of
autonomy still proved divisive. As usual. He Zhaolin rarely said anything during these
discussions.
While these discussions were progressing, Wu Heling telegraphed that he had
arrived in Lanzhou and that he would soon be proceeding to Alashan. Prince De indicated
that he would welcome Wu Heling, but Damzana said he would not welcome him, and
even sent him a telegram telling him not to come. However, this unwelcome guest soon
arrived in Dingyuanying and disregarded his host’s cold welcome. Bayankhan was also
very suspicious of Wu’s intentions, regarding him as an agent sent by Yan Xishan.
During Wu Heling’s visit with Damzana, Wu stated that prospects for autonomy
should be considered realistically. This immediately changed Damzana’s attitude toward
Wu. Prince Damzana saw that Wu’s arrival was no threat to him. Consequently, he in
vited Wu to the news discussion groups and also asked about his opinions concerning the
worst possible scenario. When the retreat to Tibet as a government in exile was brought
up, Wu expressed his reservations. This alternative he regarded as very unrealistic, and he
said, “Mr. Demchugdongrob and other outsiders may have come up with this plan, but
you. Prince Damzana, and your family members are here. How could you just cast them
aside and leave? This is your homeland! This is an impossible thing. 1 think it would be
better to think this over from a realistic point of view.”
After these words. He Zhaolin, finally broke his normal silence, stared at me as
he began speaking boldly and excitedly: “Mr. Wu, since you are here, I dare to say what
has been on my mind for a long time. Today you have expressed my sentiments elo
quently. If you hadn’t come and said these words, I would not have dared to speak out for
fear of being beaten!” Bai Haifeng, taking advantage of this opportunity, also argued that
it would be better not to make plans to establish a government in exile. It would be neces
sary to work out a plan for remaining in Mongolia, he argued.
Thus, my plan for fleeing to Tibet and establishing a government in exile there
was destroyed in a moment by the officious tongue of Wu Heling. The end result of Wu’s
meddling was to make it impossible for Prince De to leave Dingyuanying in a formal
manner. By staying in Mongolia, Prince De would eventually be subjected to the injustice
of being branded a political criminal by the Chinese Communists, and he suffered greatly
from the Communists during the last years of his life. As 1 write these words, feelings of
fhistration, resentment, regret, and bitter sorrow well up in my soul.
After this discussion of plans. Prince De and the members of the MYA who had
advocated high-degree autonomy and a government in exile in the worst possible sce
nario had to revise their plans. Although Prince De and 1 insisted on our original plan, it
was impossible to overcome the strenuous and cynically realistic arguments of Wu He
ling. He Zhaolin, Bai Haifeng, and eventually Damzana decided to accept Wu Heling’s
stance against planning for a government in exile.
Shortly thereafter, Bayankhan took me aside and said, “Wu Heling has certainly
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been working for Yan Xishan ever since the days of the Batukhaalag autonomy move
ment. He has always tried to situate himself between the central government and the
Mongolian leagues and banners. During the Mengjiang period, he was doing Generalis
simo Chiang Kai-shek’s bidding. And now he is here! It is impossible that he has no di
rect ties to the central government!” Bayankhan’s accusation, though very plausible, will
perhaps always remain unverified.
These decisions in Dingyuanying did not delay preparations for opening the
convention, but it turned out to be delayed because all the delegates from the banners and
the Chinese government did not arrive on time. The people in Alashan hoped that Guan
Jiyu, minister of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, would personally attend the
conference because that would indicate official recognition of the convention. Their
hopes had some apparent basis in fact—Guan Jiyu had been dispatched by the Chinese
government to attend the coronation of the tenth Panchen Lama at the Kumbum monas
tery in Kokonor—and so they reasoned that he would also attend the Dingyuanying con
ference.
That the Guangzhou government also realized the significance of these Mongol
political activities is evidenced by its formal decision not to send official delegates to the
Alashan convention. By refraining from sending delegates, the government was asserting
its authority to withhold recognition of this, or any other, Mongol conference. This deci
sion was delayed and was not delivered until the last possible minute. After it arrived, the
people in Dingyuanying realized that there were no more reasons for further delay.

The Mongolian Conference in Alashan
The convening of the conference and the selection of delegates had to be flexi
ble because of the daily changes in the war situation. The Yekejuu and Ulanchab
Leagues, the four banners of Right Flank Chahar, and the three special banners of Tu
rned, Alashan, and Ejine were able to send delegates to the conference; but the leagues
and banners in the East had already been occupied by the Chinese Communists, making it
impossible for them to send their delegates. However, people from these Communistoccupied areas who had fled their homelands and gathered in Alashan began electing
representatives from among their number to attend the conference. The Xinjiang and
Kokonor Mongol areas, cut off from the outside world and in political upheaval, were
also unable to send delegates. After it became clear that these several areas would not be
sending delegates, it was decided to convene the conference without further delay.
The elections in Dingyuanying were carried out smoothly, although there was
some competition and divergence of views. Only one misunderstanding occurred. Li
Shouxin thought that if Prince De were the leader, he would naturally become second in
command under Prince De. The Mongols, however, saw him as having no prestige or
record of struggling for Mongolian independence. It was, therefore, impossible for him to
occupy the second highest position or even to be elected as a delegate. Li, originally a
native of the Turned Right Banner of the Josotu League, had left in his teen years. After
his departure, he had had no contact with the Turned banners or the Josotu League. It was
not surprising, therefore, that the people of the Josotu League did not want him as their
delegate. This rejection made the situation difficult for everyone. Even Prince De was at a
loss about what to do. Fortunately, Bayankhan suggested that both eastern and western
Turned were part of one family. Now, because there was no possibility for Li to become a
delegate for Turned of the Josotu League, Bayankhan wanted to nominate him as a dele-
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gate from the Turned in Suiyuan. So the problem was solved. I was selected to represent
the Shilingol people in Dingyuanying.
The Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference was finally convened on August
5, at 9:00 in the morning in the auditorium of a school outside the city of Dingyuanying.*^
The outside and inside of the school’s auditorium were decorated with white, blue, and
red. The flag of the Republic was everywhere, and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen was promi*
nently displayed. On both sides of the portrait was the inscription “The Revolution is still
not complete. Our comrades must be diligent,” and its Mongolian translation. This deco
ration was arranged by Damzana. The day before the opening session of the conference,
Damzana invited Prince De, Bayankhan, me, and others to preview these decorations.
There was no picture of Chinggis Khan, and Prince De started to ask Damzana why not.
But Damzana interrupted and said that with a picture of Sun Yat-sen only, it would be
impossible to make accusations of rebellion. Prince De still persisted in trying to make
some changes in the decorations, but I quietly took him aside and advised him not to
make another “national autonomy” type of fiasco out of this issue. Prince De took my
advice, but throughout the conference he had bad feelings about this omission. Many
other people felt the same way.
At the opening ceremony, Bayankhan, as the chairman of the Preparatory Com
mittee for Mongolian Autonomy, declared the conference convened. Prince De then de
livered the keynote address. His main theme was that the Mongols had in recent times
endured a fall from glory to weakness, but that all peoples had the right to selfgovernment in the twentieth century, and that the threat of a Chinese Communist take
over rendered self-government all the more indispensable.
After Prince De’s keynote address, Mr. Gong, the delegate sent by Ma Bufang,
superintendent of the Northwest Military Administration; Zhou Baihuang, chief commis
sioner of the Kuomintang Ningxia Party Headquarters; and the delegate of Ma Dunjing,
the acting governor of Ningxia; delivered their speeches, and the opening session was
® The people in attendance at the meeting included Demchugdongrob, Damzana, Buyanjirgal,
Sungdui, Sainjiya, Jamsu, Tsana, Buyandureng, Luo-Aldarchogtu, Qi-Temerbayar, Damrinwangchug, Luo Batumongke, Luo-Buyantegulder, Jin Batudorji, Zhang Darijab, Zhang Ermongke, LiSechinbilig, Yidam, Choijamsu, Tserengdorji, Gombo, Mashibatu, Wu Mengzhou, Bai Anshan, Bai
Jinming, Huang Jiming, Yangstu, Rinchinsengge, Dobjai, Batuoljei, Sodnambaljur, Chilagunbatu,
He Shouye, Jirgalang, Tu Yaxiu, Han Shujuan, Li Tiesheng, Amurtu, Galsang, Lubsang, Kesigdalai, Dorjisureng, Lubtsang, Sumbur, Temursuke, Oljei, Choiji, Agdungga, Erdenochir, Serengnamjil, Norbujana, Sodnam, Gungsang, Monggutei, Radnabazar, Huang Weishi, Giljintci, Dobdan,
Tumenoljei, Urgun, Amurmendu, Gungga, Nadna, Surungjab, Galbagatur, Nasunbatu, Khafungbo,
Gungsang, Lobsangnorbu, Dobdan, Batu, Erinchin, Tttbbayan, Sedma, Unggai, Oljeibadarakhu,
Jamba!, Baljinima, Seden, Jirmed, Dungdub, Magsur, Gao Jichang, Shijiwangsum, Togtakhusang,
Nasuntogtakhu, Sainbayar, Dambijalsan, Zhao Jirantai. Dongrob, Erdeniochir, O Xingde, Wu
Heling, Bai Rui, Aminboke, Tobshin, Wang Yinqing, Goshingga, Jungnai, Bao Goudong, Han
Yixiu, Bayankhan, Li Shouxin, Chen Yingquan, Cheng Shouzhi, Yun Binchang, YunYingfei, Bao
Guoliang, Nasundelger, Orgen, Erdemtu, Chen Jianrong, Yun Linge, Urgundalai, Chogbagatur,
Jirgalang, Namkhaijab, Ombagatur, Tegshi, Duureng, Sagarajab, Almas, Genjin, Burindalai,
Mongsel, Sulechun, Oljei, De Guiyi, Buyankeshig, Gerel, Khaserdeni, Radnabagatur, Sechen, Zao
Jiwu, Wu Tianshou, Baldangjamsu, Dansurung, Shirab, Erinchindorji, Dagwaodsar, Tarba, Darijab,
Tumendelger, Rabdanr, Gesel, Tserengdorji, Urta, Bagator, Gabingga, Namur, Erkimbayar, Gonchog, Sengge, Wangchinjab, Sechin Jagchid, Oljeibuyan, Wu Guting, Hai Fuquan, Bai Haifeng,
Shongno, He Huaru, Bokenasun, Altanchilagu, Balchingjab, Sangdugurent, Suchungga, Doljing,
Badma, Choguirob, Jorintob, and Gombojob.
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ended.
To the large majority of the people in attendance, Prince De’s keynote speech
emphasized the necessity of achieving autonomy. Autonomy is a natural right, Prince De
argued, and there was nothing wrong with that. But Bai Haifeng disagreed with Prince
De’s speech. Bai asked, “What era is this? The current political market is not completely
understood. There are still attempts being made to blame the Communists.” As it turned
out, Bai had already sent someone to contact the Communists. This was why he did not
want to hear any anti-Communist rhetoric at this conference. Bai’s secret moves and
contacts were unknown to Prince De or to others at the conference.
The guest of honor was Mr. Gong, the delegate sent by Ma Bufang, who was
merely a section head in the Political Training Bureau of Ma’s office, but his arrival
symbolized Ma’s approval of the conference. This made Wu Heling, He Zhaolin, and
Damzana feel comfortable because they had originally feared that Ma would not approve
of the conference at all or would send someone to disrupt the conference. The Ningxia
delegate, Zhou Baihuang, was a man who had quite an open mind toward the nationality
problem. Earlier, after his attendance at the founding conference of the Preparatory
Committee for Mongolian Autonomy, he had submitted a proposal to the Central Com
mittee of the Kuomintang advocating that the Mongol demands for self-rule should be
accepted. He was still of the same opinion at the Alashan conference. Besides Gong and
Zhou, Major General Luo Dawei, a special officer sent from the National Defense Min
istry in Dingyuanying, and Wang Junhui, a specially dispatched member of the Kuomin
tang Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau, were present.
In addition, there were several international guests: a Reverend Prube, a minister
stationed in Dingyuanying; Frank Bessac, the representative of UNRRA, another Ameri
can; and an English journalist with his interpreter, Tsedandorji. Frank Bessac was an
American intelligence officer from Raymond Meitz’s group. While in Canton, the prince
had gotten Meitz’s promise to transfer various materials and several dozen big trucks to
the new Mongol authority from the UNRRA branch office in northwest China before it
closed its operations. Bessac said he would try to get these materials delivered to
Alashan. Bessac was authorized to receive these materials and see them transferred to the
Mongols. However, this never happened. A man sumamed Circassian, in charge of clos
ing down the UNRRA office, instead delivered the trucks and remaining materials to the
Gansu Provincial Government in Lanzhou. Bessac brought this bad news to Alashan.
This failure was one of the main factors that led Damzana and his group to lose confi
dence in Prince De.
Tsedandorji, who had studied in Germany, was one of the representatives to the
Chinese National Assembly in Nanjing from the Mongol banners in Xinjiang. Damzana
asked him to attend the conference as a delegate of the Xinjiang Mongols, but he had no
interest in politics and refused Damzana’s invitation.
After the opening ceremony, the preparatory conference got under way. The
delegates elected Prince De, Damzana, Bai Rui, Bayankhan, Wu Heling, and Bai Haifeng
to be members of the presidium, and I became the secretary-general. After the confer
ence, Damzana secretly talked to me and said, “1 felt that He Zhaolin was passed over
and was very embarrassed. For the sake of unity, please yield the post of secretarygeneral to him. Would you be the vice secretary-general, do the work, and allow him to
take the credit? You are a man careful in every respect. I don’t know whether you can
accept my advice.” In order to reduce friction, I agreed to Damzana’s suggestion. At our
first formal meeting, 1 nominated He Zhaolin to be secretary-general in my stead, and
myself to be the vice secretary-general to assist the secretary-general in accomplishing
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the mission of the conference. Although opposed by many, it was finally accepted.
During the discussion of how to advance toward autonomy, Bai Rui, Wu Heling,
Jirgalang, Ombatur, and I gave our speeches, pointing out that the Chinese government
had not carried out Sun Yat-sen’s teaching of granting the Mongols self-determination
and self-rule. Then Bai Haifeng and Damrinwangchug emphasized that after the Kuomintang’s Northern Expedition of 1926-27, there had been continuous domestic chaos
and external aggression, and hence much good legislation had to be postponed. This was
said to moderate the atmosphere of the meeting and avoid hurting the feelings of the
guest of honor and his Kuomintang superiors. It also kept Luo Dawei and Wang Junhui
from sending unfavorable reports to their superiors. At this moment. He Zhaolin, who
was still the special commissioner in charge of Inner Mongolian KMT Party Affairs,
stood up and said a few words in favor of the KMT. He talked about how loyal the Mon
gol party members were and about the sincerity of the Kuomintang authorities. He ex
plained that because of the disturbances of the warlords as well as the invasion by Japan
and then the Chinese Communist rebellion, the KMT’s goals could not be reached. As he
spoke, tears streamed down his face.
After his address, Monggutei unexpectedly stressed the natural right of the
Mongols to self-determination and self-rule, and rebuked the KMT for its failure to carry
out its promises. Because of this failure, he continued, the KMT had lost the faith of the
Mongol people. Then he said in a voice thick with emotion, “Such a man as He Zhaolin,
a special commissioner of Inner Mongolian Party Affairs, has no concern for the future of
the Mongol people. We have been cheated many times by men of his type. Even if we
want to weep, we have no tears remaining. I do not know with what face so high-ranking
a person comes here and blubbers with crocodile tears?!” This rhetoric mortified He
Zhaolin, who volunteered to resign from his post as secretary-general. The atmosphere of
the conference became very tense.
Fortunately, Bayankhan did his best to smooth ruffled feathers, making it possi
ble for other proposals to be voted on. There were three main tasks for this conference;
(1) passing the Mongolian Autonomy Law; (2) electing the chairman, vice chairman, and
other important leaders of the autonomous government; and (3) passing the Declaration
of Mongolian Autonomy.
The Law of Mongolian Autonomy follows:
The Conference of Mongolian Delegates realizes that the invasion from the outside is be
coming more serious with each passing day. Inwardly, because administration and educa
tion are not in order, the livelihood of the people has declined. Mr. Sun Zhongshan [Sun
Yat-sen] taught that the government of China should foster the weak and small nationalities
inside the country and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and selfrule. The sincere hope of our Mongol people is to struggle for continued national existence,
reform our livelihood, struggle for freedom, and endeavor to achieve national autonomy.
We have established the Law of Mongolian Autonomy and promulgated it all over Mongol
ia. We wish every person to respect and obey this law. Because of military struggles and
because many banner administrations have not yet been recovered, the laws and regulations
still have many loopholes and imperfections. After the situation has settled down, it should
be completely and thoroughly revised by all the Mongolian people. We wish to reach the
goal of peace and development.
Chapter l~General Outline
Article 1—It is the common desire of all the Mongolian people to see Mr. Sun Zhongshan’s teachings implemented: the Government should foster the weak and small nationali
ties inside the country, making it possible for them to carry out self-determination and selfrule.
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Article 2—The region of Mongolian Autonomy shall cover the original territories of the
Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners.
Article 3—The people inside the territory of Mongolian autonomous areas shall not be dis
criminated against because of race, religion, sex, or class. All are to be equal under the law.
Article 4—Foreign affairs and national defense shall be administered by the central gov
ernment. All other administration shall be carried out by the Mongolian Autonomous Gov
ernment.
Article 5—The Mongolian Autonomous Government is responsible for the general estab
lishment of autonomy: the internalization of democracy, the development of the economy,
the elevation of the people’s standard of living, the greater accessibility of education, the
development of culture, and unification for self-defense.
Article 6—^The armed forces of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners shall be reor
ganized, and a Mongolian self-defense army established to fortify the self-defense forces in
struggling against enemies of our national existence.
Chapter Il-The Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference
Article 7—The Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference shall represent the Mongolian
people by implementing instruments for exerting political power.
Article 8—^I'he Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference shall be organized by the fol
lowing [criteria for selecting] delegates: Item 1—Two people’s delegates from each ban
ner; if the population of the banner comprises more than 20,000 people, then each 10,000
people shall elect one delegate. If the population does not exceed 10,000, then banners with
above 5,000 people can elect one delegate. Item 2—Each special banner shall elect eight
people’s delegates. If the population exceeds 40,000, then each 10,000 people shall elect
one delegate. If the population does not exceed 10,000, then banners with above 5,000 peo
ple can elect one delegate.
Article 9—^The functions and powers of the Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference shall
be as follows: (1) establish and amend the Law of Mongolian Autonomy, and (2) elect and
recall the chairman, vice chairman, and speaker of the conference of the Mongolian
Autonomous Government.
Article 10—A presidium of nine to fifteen people from the Mongolian People’s Delegate
Conference shall be elected by the delegates to administer the agendas and affairs of the
conference.
Article 11—^At each meeting of the Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference, one member
shall be elected by the presidium to preside over the meeting.
Article 12—The Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference hereby establishes its Secretar
iat. The secretary general and one vice secretary-general shall be nominated by the Presid
ium and be approved by the conference. The secretary-general shall administer the affairs
of the conference according to the orders of the Presidium. The organization and the ad
ministrative regulations of the Secretariat shall be decided upon by the Presidium of the
Conference.
Article 13—The regulations governing the deliberations of the Mongolian People’s Dele
gate Conference shall be proposed by the Presidium and then determined by the Confer
ence.
Article 14—^The Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference shall be adjourned after its
tasks are fulfilled.
Article 15—The term for a Delegate of the Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference shall
be four years.
Article 16—The Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference shall convene once every four
years. However, a provisional meeting shall be held if one third of the delegates sign a re
quest for a meeting or the chairman of the government considers it necessary.
Article 17—Until order is restored, the time between convening conferences stipulated in
the preceding article, may be extended by the chairman, but such extensions must be ap
proved by the Mongolian congress.
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Chapter III—The Autonomous Government
Article 18—According to Article 1 of this law, the Mongolian Autonomous Government is
established.
Article 19—^The Mongolian Autonomous Government’s Chairman and Vice Chairman
shall be elected by the Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference from among persons of
forty years of age or older with superior reputations. Their terms shall be four years, and
they may be reelected only once.
Article 20—^The Chairman of the Mongolian Autonomous Government shall be the su
preme head of the military and civilian administrations.
Article 21—^The Chairman shall promulgate laws and ordinances, but must have the coun
ter signature of the concerned heads of the administration.
Article 22—If the Chairman is absent, the Vice Chairman shall take his place. When the
Chairman is unable to fulfill his duties, the Vice Chairman shall be responsible for the
Chairman’s duties. If neither the Chairman nor Vice Chairman can fulfill their duties, one
member shall be elected by the Political Affairs Members to take charge of the Chairman’s
activities. The Vice Chairman’s succession to the chairmanship [before the latter’s term has
ended] shall be limited to the remaining period of the Chairman’s term. If the Chairman’s
duties are taken over by a Political Affairs Member, such term of duty shall be limited to
four months.
Article 23—The Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish nine to eleven politi
cal affairs members and one secretary general.
Article 24—The Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish a Secretariat as well
as Bureaus of Internal Affairs, Finance, Industry, and Education, and a Peace Preservation
Committee. The heads of these Bureaus and this Committee shall be concurrently Political
Affairs Members. The organizational laws of the Secretariat, the Bureaus, and the Com
mittee shall be decided separately. The Bureaus and Committee members may increase or
decrease in number according to the decisions of the Mongolian Congress.
Article 25—The Political Affairs Members, the heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Pres
ervation Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman and approved by the Congress.
Article 26—The Mongolian Autonomous Government shall establish the Political Affairs
Meeting. It shall be organized by the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Political Affairs members,
heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee. The Chairman shall preside
over the Political Affairs Meeting.
Article 27—The Chairman, the heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Commit
tee shall establish administrative policies pertaining to their own unit. Matters involving
common interests of the Bureaus shall be submitted to the Political Affairs Meeting for ap
proval.
Article 28—The Chairman, the heads of the Bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Commit
tee shall have the responsibility to submit policy items to the administration, reporting on
the results of policies to the administration, and answer inquiries of the Members of the
Mongolian Congress.
The Chairman shall have the authority to ask the Congress to reconsider laws and
budgets that have been passed. If the Congress disagrees with important policies of the
Chairman, the Bureaus, and Peace Preservation Committee, it shall have the authority to
pass an act demanding that the policies be altered. However, the Chairman shall have the
authority to have the Congress reconsider its demands. If two-thirds of the Congress still
insist, their former law and budget decisions must be accepted immediately by the Chair
man. However, the Chairman shall have the authority to order the resignation of all the Po
litical Affairs members or the concerned heads of Bureaus.
Article 29—The Mongolian Autonomous Government may establish a Consultative Com
mittee to [help] make decisions on important policies, to assess popular opinion, to propa
gandize in favor of its political policies, and to spread understanding of the actual situation
involving each issue.
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Chapter IV—The Mongolian Congress
Article 30—The Mongolian Congress shall consist of thirty-one members elected by the
Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference.
Article 31—The functions and powers of the Mongolian Congress shall be as follows:
1. Exercise the legislative power of the Mongolian Autonomous Government.
2. Review each decision concerning the budget and allocation of revenues, including other
policy decisions of the Mongolian Autonomous Government.
3. Approve the personnel nominated by the chairman: the Political Affairs members,
heads of the bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Committee.
4. Demand that the chairman, the heads of the bureaus, and the Peace Preservation Com
mittee deliver to the Congress their administrative reports and [and facilitate inquiry by the
Congress] into the administrative acts conducted by them.
Article 32—The term of a Member of the Mongolian Congress shall be four years; mem
bers may be elected to subsequent terms indefinitely.
Article 33—The Members of the Mongolian Congress shall hold no other concurrent posi
tion in the government.
Article 34—'fhe Mongolian Congress shall establish one Speaker and one Vice Speaker,
elected by the Members of the Congress.
Article 35—The Mongolian Congress shall meet twice a year. The first session shall be
from the beginning of March to the end of May. The second session shall be from the be
ginning of September to the end of November. No formal convening of the Congress shall
be required, but in times of necessity, the chairman or more than half of the Members of
Congress may demand that an interim session be held.
Article 36—During periods of recess, if urgent matters listed in Article 31 above arise, the
Government may deal with them first, then subsequently ask the Congress to recognize
these measures.
Article 37—For the Congress to convene, more than half of the members must be in atten
dance.
Article 38—The Mongolian Congress shall establish a Secretariat under the SecretaryGeneral to administer its affairs under the orders of the Speaker.
Article 39—^The regulations of the Secretariat of the Mongolian Congress shall be estab
lished separately.
Chapter V—The Judiciary
Article 40—The judiciary system shall be established separately.
Chapter VI-Local Political Systems
Article 41—For the local political institutions, the names and titles of leagues and banners
shall continue to be used. Their organization shall be established separately according to
democratic principles.
Chapter VII—Bylaws
Article 42—^The laws specified in this document shall be reported to the central govern
ment [of China] for the record, after resolution to that effect be passed by the Mongolian
People’s Delegate Conference.

Jirgalang and I drafted the articles of this law. The introduction was drafted by
Bayankhan and He Zhaolin. During the discussion, the wording and phrasing were pol
ished by Wu Heling. As for the section dealing with the Mongolian Congress, 1 urged
that its members be elected by the People’s Delegate Congress. This I suggested because
1 had drafted the Organization of the Mongolian Government to submit to the Mongolian
Association in Beiping to bring to the second Mongolian Congress held in Hohhot in
1937. At that time 1 recommended that the legislators of the Mongolian organization be
elected by the congress. But by this time, 1 no longer insisted that these members be dele
gates to the Delegate Congress. As for Article 33, which holds that the members of Con
gress should not serve concurrently as officials in any other government position, this
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was proposed by Jirgalang and supported by Damrinwangchug. This separation of ad
ministration and legislation was influenced by the Chinese institution of the Legislative
Yuan, of which both Jirgalang and Damrinwangchug were members.
The second important item of the conference was the election. According to the
agenda, members of the Mongolian Congress should have been elected first; then the
chairman and vice chairman of the autonomous government should have been elected.
The results were that Wu Heling, Chen Erdenibatu, Giljintei, Tserengdorji, and twentyeight other people were elected as members of the Mongolian Congress. These people
then elected Wu Heling as the speaker and Chen Nasanbatu as the vice speaker. Although
Chen Nasanbatu was not a delegate of the Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference, he
was the meren-janggi (deputy administrator) of the Alashan banner. His election was
based entirely on the principle of balancing personnel and establishing closer contacts
with the local authorities.
The method of electing the chairman and the vice chairman had been discussed
repeatedly when the conference was not in session. Most of the persons in attendance
refused to approve of a nominee by acclamation. Instead, they wanted to use the secret
ballot. As for the nominees, they unanimously agreed that Prince De should be the candi
date for chairman, while Damzana should be the candidate for vice chairman. Prince De
felt it would be inappropriate for him to be nominated as the only candidate. He wanted
to have an opponent for the sake of form. So I was sent to ask Bai Rui to be the other
candidate because he was the oldest member of the congress. Bai Rui agreed but de
manded that he get some votes if he ran. 1 failed to get an opponent to run against
Damzana. Finally, of the 175 votes. Prince De got 160. The other 15 votes went to Bai
Rui. These fifteen votes included the votes of Prince De and myself Damzana did not
vote for himself, so he got 174 votes. This election was the high point of the conference.
The last item was the passing of the Declaration of Mongolian Autonomy. As
mentioned, I did the original draft. He Zhaolin later added the words “because for so
many years the nation has been continuously disturbed by war and rebellion, the central
government has been occupied with military affairs day and night and has had no time to
consider this matter.” At the time of the discussion, however, no change was made; the
text passed without hitch, as follows:
Mongolia is a land with its own people, political organizations, and strong nationalis
tic consciousness. Our ancestors once established the mightiest nation on earth, and they
bequeathed to us a glorious and splendid history.
In recent years, most of the oppressed peoples of the world have thrown off their
yokes and recovered their freedom; they have begun marching on the pathway toward selfdetermination and self-rule. Unfortunately, however, we Mongols continue to be influenced
and disturbed by domestic troubles and external calamities. At times, the territory of our
people has come under the iron hoofs of foreign enemies, and our people have been indis
criminately slaughtered by others. The lives and property of the people have been unrea
sonably and tyrannically destroyed. These hardships have given birth to the nationalistic
consciousness of every Mongol and as well have led Mongols to feel that defense against
enemies and struggle for existence can be achieved only through unification and self-rule.
Especially since the end of the Second World War, the world situation has become
more troubled and unstable day by day. Internal worries and external calamities have also
become worse with each passing day. The last turn by which existence or extinction of the
Mongolian people will be determined has been reached. This leaves us with no other choice
but to unite immediately and struggle for our national existence. The main current of the
history of the twentieth century is that nationalities are demanding liberation while gov
ernments move toward democracy. The Mongolian problem is one instance of the world-
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wide nationality problem. A reasonable solution to this problem, based on the principle of
democracy, will strengthen the base of national and international peace and democracy.
On the thirteenth day of April, the delegates of the Mongolian leagues and banners
held a conference in the banner of Alashan. Here they decided to establish the Preparatory
Committee for Inner Mongolian Autonomy, paving the way to achievement of autonomy
and establishment of permanent peace and democracy. The aims of this committee included
working toward the following goals; creating a stable existence for the Mongolian people,
finding a reasonable solution to the nationality problem inside the country, and concentrat
ing the hearts and wills of the Mongolian people.
With these objectives in mind, the Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference con
vened. The results of the eareful and considered deliberations by the entire body of this
conference are based on the common desire of the Mongolian people and on Mr. Sun Yatsen’s teaching that “the government should foster the weak and small nationalities inside
the country, and make it possible for them to carry out self-determination and self-rule.”
The Conference has implemented national autonomy by passing the Law of Mongolian
Autonomy, establishing the Mongolian Autonomous Government, and designating all the
original territory of the Mongolian leagues, tribes, and banners as our autonomous domain.
We support Mr. Demchugdongrob as government chairman and Mr. Damzana as vice
chairman as they lead all our people in the struggle to realize our hopes and ideals.
From now on, the basic political principles of Autonomous Mongolia should be as
follows: Politically, we shall surely guarantee the basic rights of our people, carry out true
democracy, and regard all people inside the territory of Autonomous Mongolia as equal.
We shall not discriminate against people or give them unequal treatment on the basis of dif
ferences of race, religious belief, sex, or class. Economically, we shall guarantee the peo
ple’s property. We shall increase our impoverished compatriots’ standard of living and
strive for the equal development of the national economy. As for education and culture, we
shall strive mightily for the dissemination of education and impart to our people the new
world culture to help the development of our own indigenous culture. Militarily, we shall
strengthen our national self-defense forces, protect our Mongolian people, both establishing
local order and fighting against aggression.
We recall the past. The central government has .said that it will make a commitment
as soon as possible to weak minority peoples, especially toward establishing the Mongolian
people’s autonomy. [Here, He Zhaolin’s words, as given above, were later added.] Now the
entire country faces a very serious situation. In order to fulfil our obligations as citizens of
our nation, we must relieve the central government of its worries and concerns about the
North. Thus we hope that under the leadership of the central government, we can sincerely
unify all of the nationalities of this country, establish close relations with the provinces near
Mongolia, and work and struggle together to maintain democracy and freedom. As for the
problems between the leagues and banners as well as the provinces and xians, these should
be reasonably adjusted after the situation has settled down.
This particular Mongolian People’s Delegate Conference represents the general will
of all our people and decisively marks our embarkation on the new road toward autonomy,
democracy, and freedom. At present, all Mongol people have stood up courageously for the
existence and identity of our nation. We are carrying out this sacred obligation and are dili
gently pressing forward. We hope that compatriots throughout the nation will understand
that Mongolian autonomy is not a separatist movement, but a centripetal movement that
will give us all proper support. We especially hope that fair-minded people of the world
will have sympathy for us and help us.

From the beginning of his political activities, Prince De had advocated that in
dependence or self-rule needed final approval by and recognition from the legitimate
government of China. This had always been his consistent policy. And in Dingyuanying,
he still emphasized this point. He hoped that the Chinese government would, before its
collapse, satisfy the Mongolian desire to see Sun Yat-sen’s teaching concerning minori-
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ties implemented. At this point, if the Mongols were able to get such recognition, then no
matter what kind of changes occurred in China, this approval of a high degree of auto
nomy would eventually work for the good of Mongolia. Therefore, Prince De cited with
approval the provisional extraordinary motion made at the conference. He had the dele
gates agree to send copies of the Declaration of Autonomy and the Law of Mongolian
Autonomy to Acting President Li Zongren and Yan Xishan, head of the Executive Yuan.
The conference ended formally on August 10. After the closing ceremony, the
celebration of the founding of the Mongolian Autonomous Government took place.
Chairman De and Vice-Chairman Damzana were inaugurated at the same time. In the
evening, there was a banquet, along with Chinese drama and Mongolian plays and Mon
golian music. The Mongolian plays emphasized the unbreakable unity of many arrows.
However, this happy banquet turned out to be a last supper.
Everyone had the feeling that this time of good feelings would not last. During
the conference, the war situation had become very bad. The important city of Xi’an fell to
the Communists; Lanchow was set to fall any day; and Dong Qiwu, governor of Suiyuan,
had already been persuaded by Fu Zuoyi and was preparing to surrender to the Commu
nists. The Ma warlord family in Qinghai and Ningxia was unable to stop the Commun
ists’ progress. Obviously, the fate of this newly founded autonomous government was
sealed. Moreover, at the banquet there were already some who were conspiring to sell out
the new organization. All the persons in attendance were pessimistic about the future.
Prince De’s own feelings could be seen in his constant drowning of his sorrows in wine.
Nevertheless, all were able to control their emotions and hid their worries by drinking
wine and making merry.

Military Organization
While the conference was still in the preparatory stages, the anti-Communist
Mongol forces in the Northeast led by Sukhbaatar arrived in the vicinity of the city of
Dingyuanying. Those who welcomed Sukhbaatar’s forces noticed that even though it was
the end of summer, the soldiers were still wearing the winter uniforms they had donned
the previous winter during their breakthrough from the Chinese Communist encirclement.
Their felt boots were tom and tattered. The people’s hearts ached at this sight, but there
was no way to give them new equipment. Even in their deprived condition, their morale
was still high. Sukhbaatar and his comrades accepted the welcome happily.
Among them was a Chinese leader named Sun Haiming, whose rank was second
to Sukhbaatar’s. As mentioned, the purpose of Wu Guting’s arrival in Dingyuanying was
to make new arrangements for this group of soldiers who were originally under his com
mand. Wu brought a former battalion commander of the Mongolian army, Darijab, who
was also a veteran of Babujab’s “Mongol Bandit” army. Darijab was in contact with
Sukhbaatar, who wanted to reorganize all the Mongol soldiers into one large unit.
After his arrival in Dingyuanying, Li Shouxin wished to make himself powerful
again by persuading these military reftjgees to Join his camp, taking them as his capital,
and procuring supplies for them from Ma Honggui, governor of Ningxia. However, this
anti-Communist group had never had any ties with Li, and they neglected him at first. Bai
Haifeng also had intentions quite early on to claim these courageous fighters. However,
they had no good feelings toward Bai. In Dingyuanying, Bai talked face to face with
Sukhbaatar and his men. Bai told him that since he had official Chinese military designa
tion, it was possible for him to formally reorganize Sukhbaatar’s troops. But Sukhbaatar’s
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group rejected this. They desired to come under Prince De’s leadership, but Prince De
had no way to secure supplies for them.
After the meeting, Wu Guting felt that the situation was hopeless. So he left
Dingyuanying and went to Taiwan. Sukhbaatar finally discovered that there was no other
way to get supplies, and since they had rejected Bai Haifeng’s offer, they had to have Li
Shouxin intervene to gain them permission to join the warlords of the Ma clan. Ma Dunjing, the acting governor of Ningxia, accepted this group in order to increase his military
power. A cavalry headquarters was set up near the border of Shaanxi, Gansu, and
Ningxia. Li Shouxin was appointed commander and Buyandelger chief of staff. Dugurensang, who had graduated from the Japanese Officer Candidate School, was appointed as
deputy chief of staff.
These troops had their manpower supplemented and were organized into three
divisions. But in reality, only the first division was a real division. Sukhbaatar was the
division commander. Sun Haiming the vice commander, and the Chinese Zhao Dianchen
was the chief of staff. Ma Dunjing immediately recognized these newly organized units
as military forces of the Mongolian Autonomous Government, hoping that would win the
hearts of Sukhbaatar and his group. Nevertheless, all these measures were carried out too
late. By this time, there was no way to stop the westward Communist advance. Even
among the Ma clan in Ningxia, Ma Hongbin, who had great influence in the army, had
already initiated contacts that would lead to his surrender to the Chinese Communists.

Prince De’s Contacts with the Mongolian People’s Republic
Just before the opening of the conference, Luo Batumongke, the real power in
Alashan, secretly transferred a letter written by Dugursureng, the eldest son of the prince,
to his father. It came with the blessing of agents of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Its
transmission suggests that some powerful leaders in Alashan werre in contact with the
Mongolian People’s Republic. While 1 was in Dingyuanying, I met a Hulunbuir man who
was a teacher at the primary school there, who was said to be an underground agent, sent
by the Mongolian People’s Republic and protected by Luo Batumongke.
Prince De showed me this letter and the photographs it contained. I still remem
ber its main points; “Our whole family is well. The attached photographs are sufficient to
show that the authorities of the Mongolian People’s Republic have treated us quite well.
Only Father is not with us. We have been assured that if you will not carry out political
activities, you may come here, and your safety will be guaranteed.”
Prince De, seeing the letter and the photographs, was greatly comforted. On the
other hand, he was worried about how to reply to this letter. He told me, “Perhaps this is
my fate in the end. I am a Mongol; to go to Khalkha [Outer Mongolia] is at any rate bet
ter than going to other places.” I suggested that it would be necessary to be flexible in his
answer. At the same time, I also admonished him that when things were at their worst, he
might try to flee abroad and wait for an opportunity to return again. He sighed and said,
“In the good old days, the Mongolian people treated me as their noyan. Now the times
have changed for the worse; how could I leave them now and go to a foreign country?”
These words came from the bottom of his heart. They suggest that from this time on, he
had already decided not to try to dodge his problems by escaping to a foreign country. At
the same time, it seemed that he had some longing for Ulaanbaatar. He recognized that
we all were conscious of our Mongol nationality. Surely the Outer Mongols would not
feel ill toward a man who had struggled for the identity and freedom of the Mongols.
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My Assignment and Departure from Alashan
Before leaving Taiwan, I had received a letter from George E. Taylor, professor
of Asian Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle, which notified me that his
university wanted me to teach Mongolian literature. Taylor also said that a formal ap
pointment would soon be sent. While I was in Guangzhou, I reported this offer to Prince
De, who told me that I should go to Alashan first and then to the United States. So after
my arrival in Dingyuanying, I accepted the commissions as drafter, delegate to the Mon
golian People’s Conference, and vice secretary-general of the conference, but not any
permanent government position. My visit to the United States was supported by Prince
De, Damzana and Bayankhan, and even Bai Haifeng had no objections.
Just before the closing session of the conference, Prince De said to me, “Since
you are going to America, 1 would like to assign you a mission. 1 wish you to be the rep
resentative of this autonomous government and do what you can do for the Mongol peo
ple.” I answered, “If I can go, I will accept your assignment; however, the formal ap
pointment is still not in my hands, and I do not know when it will arrive.” The prince
answered, “If you can go, you will be our representative. However, this matter should not
leak out. Do not tell of this mission to anybody.” Prince De then summoned Giljintei to
write a set of credentials, orders, and appointments from the chairman of the Mongolian
government.
Lu Minghui’ claims that “[Jagchid] carried a blank official document with the
seal of the Mongolian Autonomous Government on it.” This is a baseless lie. As it turned
out, the well-known Mongolist Nicholas Poppe who had defected from the Soviet Union,
arrived in Seattle, and the University of Washington immediately appointed him as pro
fessor of Mongolian literature and put my appointment aside. Consequently, 1 was unable
to go to the United States and fulfil the assignment given me by Prince De. I did go to the
United States in 1967 and taught at Brigham Young University, but circumstances had by
then radically changed. The Mongolian Autonomous Government had long since dis
solved, and Prince De had died a year earlier. I still possess the document Prince De gave
me, as a memento of my ties to Mongolia.
After the establishment of the autonomous government, acting in his capacity as
chairman of the government. Prince De appointed Bayankhan, Bai Haifeng, Li Shouxin,
Rinchinsengge, He Zhaolin, Jirgalang (from the Jerim League), Jirgalang (from Hulunbuir), Damrinwangchug, and Oljeibuyan as government officials. Bayankhan was again
appointed as the secretary-general of the Secretariat, He Zhaolin as the head of the Inter
nal Affairs Bureau, Bai Haifeng as head of the Bureau of Industry, and Oljeibuyan as
head of the Bureau of Finance. Soon after, the Peace Preservation Committee was estab
lished, with Damzana, the vice-chairman of the government, as head, and Li Shouxin and
Bai Haifeng as deputies. Their task was to strengthen and reorganize the local military
forces and arrange for support of Sukhbaatar and his troops. Chen Yingquan, a Turned
Mongol and former deputy commander of Bai Haifeng’s division, became chief of staff.
On August 12, 1949, Wu Heling, Jirgalang (from Hulunbuir), and I left Ding
yuanying and went to Taiwan via Lanzhou and Guangzhou. Before we left, we had a
farewell visit with Prince De, who saw us off outside the gates of his residence. He
grasped our hands in his and seemed reluctant to let go. His countenance communicated
impending personal loss. This was the last time I ever saw Prince De. This scene has
’ Lu Ming-hui, Menggu "Zizhiyundong" shimo (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju: 1980), p. 392,
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made an indelible impression on my soul. 1 shall never forget it.

The Last Negotiation with the KMT Government
Just before our departure, Prince De instructed us to cooperate with Jagunnasutu. He wanted us to urge the Chinese government to hasten its formal recognition of
the Mongolian Autonomous Government and have them deliver military supplies to our
troops. On our arrival in Ningxia city, the representative sent from the Communists to
negotiate with Ma Hongbin lodged with us in the same hostel. We arrived in Lanzhou the
night before the retreat of the Office of the Northwest Military and Civilian Administra
tion Superintendent. The fall of Lanzhou was at hand, and the momentum was irreversi
ble. After our arrival in Guangzhou, we immediately went to see Guan Jiyu, minister of
the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, and submitted a document of instructions,
with our signatures, from Prince De. This document contained a report concerning the
conference, a demand for recognition of Mongolian autonomy, an outline of its govern
ment organization, and a request for military assistance.
When Van Xishan had been head of the Executive Yuan, he was strongly preju
diced against the Mongols. A document like ours, which pointed out all the mistaken
policies of the Chinese government, never received a response. The duties which Prince
De left to Jagunnasutu also were never carried out. Everything dragged to a halt. The
situation in the Northwest was becoming grimmer by the hour. Dong Qiwu (deputy su
perintendent of the Northwest Military and Civilian Administration, and governor of Suiyuan), and Sun Lanfeng (the commander of the army) were persuaded by their old super
ior, Fu Zuoyi, to surrender to the Communists. In Ningxia, Ma Hongbin’s stance became
very clear. In order to try to stop Dong, Sun, Ma, and others from surrendering to the
enemy, Yan Xishan sent his old follower, Xu Yongchang, to Ningxia. Upon receiving
this report. Prince De, Damzama, Bayankhan, Bai Haifeng, and He Zhaolin also left for
Ningxia to meet with Xu. Prince De’s goal was to persuade Xu to forward their hopes to
the Chinese government, to advise the authorities to authorize the establishment of the
Mongolian Autonomous Government, and to provide financial and military assistance.
But Xu’s response was to stop them. He insisted that at such a time, it was not right to
attempt to gain autonomy—especially higher-degree autonomy—and with that the talks
broke off

The Split among the Mongols in Alashan
While the Chinese Communists continued their westward expansion and Ala
shan came under ever more pressure, the Mongols there became divided over what to do.
They were unable to reach a consensus about how to achieve a breakthrough. In order to
urge the Chinese government to recognize the establishment of the Autonomous Gov
ernment and to assist Jagunnasutu, Prince De dispatched Oljeibuyan as a representative to
Guangzhou. Prince De and Damzana sent an urgent telegram to Guan Jiyu, minister of
the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission, demanding that he transfer by airplane the
guns given earlier to Prince De. Guan, convinced by the tense situation, petitioned Yan
Xishan to give 140,000 silver dollars to meet immediate needs. But it was too late; nei
ther the money nor the guns were delivered.
Just before these occurrences, Damzana had sent his third younger brother,
Damrinwangchug, to Guangzhou to try to maintain contact with the KMT. Damrinwang-
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chug arrived in Guangzhou and met with me, but the news he brought to Guangzhou was
not very encouraging. At this time, Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin were helping Damzana
split from Prince De’s leadership. They were making secret contact with the Chinese
Communists. Relations between Prince De and Damzana worsened. Thereafter, these two
leaders made no effort to see each other. If there was a need to negotiate, Jirgalang (from
the Jerim League) would act as go-between. Damzana had even demanded that Prince De
pay for the expenditures incurred by the Alashan banner in providing relief for those who
had fled to Alashan from other banners. Originally, Damzana treated these people in a
friendly manner, but because they all supported Prince De’s ideas, he now chose to adopt
this policy of rejecting them. Since Prince De was also not willing to owe a personal fa
vor to the Alashan Banner, he had the deputy pay with the money he had brought from
Guangzhou. Prince De, seeing that he was becoming persona non grata, chose to leave
Alashan.
On August 27, the Communists took Lanzhou. To deal with this new develop
ment, Prince De opened discussions with Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhaolin, and Bayankhan. Prince De felt that however bad the situation, establishment of the Mongolian
Autonomous Government must be pushed. It might be best for the new government to
move away from the city of Dingyuanying to the steppes or desert of Alashan. If this suc
ceeded, they could then proceed to Tibet via Kokonor (Qinghai). If Tibet could not offer
protection, they would then flee to India as a Mongolian government in exile, and wait
for a change in the world situation. Bai Haifeng argued that no matter where they went,
the results would be the same—bad; there was no need to make plans for moving else
where. Rather, he wanted to change the Mongolian Autonomous Government into the
Western Mongolian Autonomous Government, thereby showing that the political regime
established in Dingyuanying need have no conflict with Ulanfu’s Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Government in Ulanhot (Wangin sume). Damzana, He Zhaolin, and Bayankhan all agreed with Bai’s proposal. Although Prince De insisted on his concept, he could
not change the opinion of Bai Haifeng’s group.
As mentioned earlier, before Wu Heling’s arrival in Dingyuanying, there was a
plan to move into the desert and then proceed to Tibet and India via Qinghai. But He
Zhaolin and Bai Haifeng had already decided to surrender to the Communists. Wu’s ob
jection helped Damzana agree to abandon the plan to move. Prince De’s failure to obtain
the trucks and supplies from the retreating UNRRA was, of course, one of the main rea
sons why Damzana became discouraged. Since it would be difficult to create a new gov
ernment under such unfavorable circumstances, Damzana felt it would be better to seek a
way to protect himself and his camp. This eventually caused him to break away from
Prince De.
I myself had left Dingyuanying in the middle of August. After my departure.
Prince De’s subsequent activities were reported to me by Damrinwangchug. For matters
not told me by Damrinwangchug, I depend on He Zhaolin’s Outline of the Beginning and
End of the Western Mongolian Autonomy Movement, and on the Personal Narrative of
Demchugdongrob Demuchukedonglupu Zishu} Prince De’s Personal Narrative came
orally from Prince De and Tobshin (Tao Buxin), who originally used the names Togtokhu
and Tao Libin. I do not know the conditions under which this second book was produced.
The tone of Prince De’s language seems authentic in places. However, quite a few
changes must have been made by Tobshin or other editors, because in other places, the
* Tao Buxin, ed., Demuchukedonglupu zishu Inner Mongolian Historical Materials, No. 13
(Hohhot: Inner Mongolian University, 1984).
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language is clearly not the language of Prince De. I do not blame my old friend Togtokhu
for writing with a crooked pen. Rather I sympathize with him because he had to protect
himself by distorting parts of the book to satisfy the Communist censors. Since 1 criti
cized He Zhaolin earlier in this volume (p. 406), there is no need to criticize him again
here. However, no matter how crooked his pen, he was never able to destroy Prince De’s
reputation among those who knew him.
He Zhaolin’s account says that to persuade Damzana to move toward Qinghai
and Tibet, Prince De said, “The Communists originally did not have a single soldier or an
inch of territory. Yet they were still able to rise to power. We now have many people and
much land; can we not accomplish something? Let us not wait for failure. Let us struggle
to the end. We will surely eventually succeed.” No matter what Prince De had said, it was
impossible to alter the proposals of the group headed by Bai Haifeng. On September 19,
Dong Biwu, governor of Suiyuan Province, surrendered to the Chinese Communists.
Prince De went to see Damzana and said, “Since you have decided not to move, I have
decided to move. In the future, perhaps you may help me, or perhaps I will help you."
Damzana expressed no desire to detain Prince De.

Prince De’s Activities after His Exile from Alashan
At first light on September 20, Prince De, took up the seal and the outside name
plate of the Mongolian Autonomous Government, and accompanied by his faithful entou
rage, left Dingyuanying. He headed toward the northwest part of the Alashan steppe. Ac
cording to He Zhaolin’s account, Prince De was accompanied by only a few attendants,
and his departure was known to few. In my judgment, this would have been impossible.
First of all, before his departure. Prince De made a farewell visit to Damzana. Second, the
gate of Dingyuanying city closed at sunset and opened at sunrise. With no special order
issued, the gate would not yet have been open at first light. Third, the large name plate of
the Mongolian Autonomous Government could not have been carried out secretly by only
two or three men. According to Prince De’s Personal Narrative, his secretary (Tserengdorji) and aide-de-camp (Tumendelger) accompanied him.
Soon after Prince De’s departure from Dingyuanying, everyone realized that
Ningxia would soon fall. Li Shouxin, now isolated by the impending surrender of the Ma
warlord family of Ningxia, led the anti-Communist troops of the Mongolian Autonomous
Government from Shizuishan through Dengkou (Sanshenggong) to Tukhum-yin sume.
There they met with Prince De, who had temporarily stopped there. Prince De, Li
Shouxin, Giljintei, Sukhbaatar, Buyandelger, and others discussed matters and decided
that instead of remaining passive, they would follow an active policy. They would use the
title “Mongolian Autonomous Government,” change the chronology dates to the years
since Chinggis Khan’s enthronement, name their armed force the Mongol Army, and
establish a fixed headquarters for it. Prince De became commander in chief; Li Shouxin
was made deputy commander; Buyandelger, the chief of staff; Dugurengsang, the deputy
chief of staff; Sukhbaatar, the commander of the First Division, Sun Haiming, the deputy
commander of the First Division; Zhao Tiancheng, the chief of staff of the First Division;
Giljintei, the commander of the Second Division, with Tarba as his deputy commander;
and Rashinamjil as chief of staff of the Second Divison.
After these divisions were organized. Prince De and a contingent of his troops
moved slowly westward. By the middle of November, they reached Guisin-gol (Guaizihu), near the border of the EJine Banner to the west and Outer Mongolia to the north.
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The Chinese Communist army held Jiuquan and Yumen, thereby controlling the corridor
west of the Yellow River, and blocking the way for them to move into Qinghai.
On the political front, on October 2, the Soviet Government formally recognized
the Chinese regime, under Mao Zedong’s leadership and with Beijing as its capital, as the
legitimate government of China. On the sixth of the same month, the Mongolian People’s
Republic and the People’s Republic of China established official diplomatic relations
with each other. However, I cannot judge whether or when word of this political change
reached Prince De or was analyzed by his group.
Once Prince De had departed from Dingyuanying, Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin
finally persuaded Damzana and Bayankhan to change the name of the “Mongolian
Autonomous Government” to “Western Mongolian Autonomous Government.” Accord
ing to He’s account, they “planned to minimize their territory to reduce the potential for
conflict with the autonomous organization in Ulan Khota (Wang-yin-sume), to lessen
tensions among the Mongols in general, and to escape from accepting responsibility for
the crime of rebelling against the people and the revolution. In reality, this scheme turned
out to be nothing more than something that becomes ‘more obvious the more you tried to
cover it up.’” I believe He’s words adopted this confessional tone to secure a pardon for
himself from his readers, but his brand of despicable opportunism and selfishness is
clearly evidenced here.
At this time I heard that Bayankhan’s health had turned very bad and that his
spirit had collapsed. He no longer desired to be involved in politics, but rather turned his
fate over to others. This obliged Damzana to send a telegram to Beijing before the formal
surrender of Ningxia, proposing an “insurrectionary surrender.” Even so, he still feared
the two battalions the Ma Family had sent from Ningxia and were still stationed outside
the city of Dingyuanying. Although the city surrendered to the Communists, Damzana’s
group dared not act openly. On the night of September 21, one day after Prince De’s de
parture, the Ma troops revolted, plundered the outskirts of Dingyuanying and escaped
untouched. Now Damzana’s Dingyuanying force got ready to surrender openly by tele
graphing Mao Zedong and the Political Consultative Committee.
After the Chinese Communists occupied Ningxia city, the Dingyuanying group
sent Luo Ruiguang, the deputy commander of the Alashan Peace Preservation Troops, to
Ningxia as a representative of the Western Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government to
welcome the People’s Liberation Army. On October 5, Damzana, Bai Haifeng, He Zhao
lin, and Buyankhan went to Ningxia to surrender themselves to Yang Dechi, the com
mander of the Communist Nineteenth Army, and Li Chimin, the political commissar. At
the same time, they placed under arrest the two leading spies of the KMT military and
party investigation bureau, Luo Dawei and Wang Junhui, whom they had honored and
feared for years. They brought these two spies with them to Ningxia.
From the middle of October to January 1950, Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin, rep
resenting the Western Inner Mongolian Government, visited Lanzhou, Beijing, and Hohhot. These two men met with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, and Ulanfu, the chairman of the
Mongolian autonomous regime, and reported Prince De’s departure as well as their own
“upright” surrender. Ulanfu ordered Bai and He to return to the west as soon as possible
and do their best there to win over Prince De and Li Shouxin. If those two would return
from the wilderness, their past would be forgotten and they would be pardoned. Ulanfu
gave them a personal letter for Prince De, in hopes of winning him over. However, by the
time Bai and He returned to Dingyuanying, Prince De had already entered the Mongolian
People’s Republic.
Before Bai Haifeng and He Zhaolin returned to Dingyuanying, Cao Yousan,
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deputy commander of the Chinese Communist Government in Ningxia district, had al
ready arrived in the city. On Cao’s orders, Damzana wrote a letter to Prince De, asking
him to come to the city of Ningxia personally and discuss possible arrangements for his
troops. Upon receiving his invitation. Prince De dispatched Tobshin (Togtokhu) to first
go to Dingyuanying and then to Ningxia. Even from so unfavorable a position. Prince De
still insisted on his proposal ceding a high degree of autonomy to Inner Mongolia. In his
letter to the Communist authorities. Prince De proposed that they “agree to accept the
results of a plebiscite to determine if Inner and Outer Mongolia should be united.” Upon
Tobshin’s departure, the Prince ordered him, “You go there and just discuss the matters
in my letter. Do not talk about my personal future and thereby cause others to look down
upon me. I do not want to lose face.”
After Tobshin’s arrival at the city of Ningxia, he met with Pan Zili, chairman of
the Ningxia’s People’s Provincial Government, and submitted Prince De’s letter to him.
After reading the letter. Pan explained to Tobshin the nationality policy of the Chinese
Communist Party, the history of the formation and the future of the Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region. Pan then asked him to convey these policies to Prince De and invite
him to come personally and discuss them face to face. The demands made on both sides
turned out to be irreconcilable.
Although Tobshin went back and forth between the two sides three times, no
conclusive result was reached. Lu Minghui’s interview with Tobshin records Prince De’s
heartfelt feelings: “Prince De still stubbornly insisted on his policy to demand autonomy
and refused to accept liberation, stubbornly insisting to Tobshin, ‘In this world now, I am
still the man destined to take responsibility for national survival as his personal obliga
tion. Where can another such man be found? Moreover, what is the difference between
the policy of the Communists for regional minorities and the Kuomintang policy of local
autonomy? At any rate, they are all Chinese. To the Mongols, they are all the same.’”’
These words truly express Prince De’s deepest sentiments, suggesting that he had no con
fidence in the words of the Communist negotiators. Given his idealistic mentality and the
lack of supplies for his followers. Prince De decided to turn to Outer Mongolia.

Prince De’s Exile to the Mongolian People’s Republic
He Zhaolin also writes that
Prince De was a Pan-Mongolist. He often expressed his admiration for the Mongolian Peo
ple’s Republic, saying that the Outer Mongols were concerned about the Inner Mongols
and took careful notice of them. “If we asked for help in time of need, they would give us
timely aid.” Therefore, when he fell into dire straits, he naturally would think about this.
Even though Outer Mongolia was a foreign country, it was still populated by Mongols. It
would be easier to negotiate with. Right now, it would be best to ask for help from the
Mongolian People’s Republic rather than surrender to the Chinese Communists.

Moreover, Prince De received another letter from his eldest son, Dugursurung. His trust
worthy nephew, Altanochir, also contacted the agents of the Mongolian People’s Repub
lic, who expressed their welcome. Of course, in this desperate moment, they tried to cre
ate a breakthrough in Ulaanbaatar. On December 29, Prince De, accompanied by his sec* Lu Minghui, p. 406
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retary Tserengdorji, aide-de-camp Tumendelger, and two other guides, entered Outer
Mongolia from Alashan. After Prince De arrived in Outer Mongolia, he invited Li
Shouxin, Sukhbaatar, and Ombagatur to join him inside the Mongolian People’s Repub
lic.
After Prince De left, Giljintei, Jirgalang, Serengnamjil, Darijab, Tarba, Togtokhu. Sun Maiming, and others gathered to discuss their future. They decided to have
Tobshin and Sun Maiming represent them by contacting Cao Yousan, the deputy com
mander of the Chinese forces in Ningxia (then stationed in Dingyuanying), to discuss a
peaceful liberation. Upon Togtokhu’s return, he brought Ulanfu’s letter addressed to
Prince De. Because the Prince had left, they read it to his followers. Its main points were
as follows: (1) those who desired to return home would be allowed to do so and would be
given travel expenses; (2) those who wished to remain residents could settle in Dingyuan
ying; (3) those who wished to continue their studies would be recommended for study
assignments in the Mongolian Autonomous Region; (4) those who desired to work would
be assigned jobs; (5) those who desired to join the military service would be reorganized
into peace preservation troops.
Under these conditions, more than 1,200 people put down their arms and surren
dered in the early spring of 1950. Among them, more than 400 joined the Alashan Peace
Preservation Troops. While more than 400 returned home, sixty or seventy were reas
signed for study in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region; more than 100 were em
ployed in the Alashan People’s Banner Government; about 100 were settled in the banner
of Alashan; and another 100 people, under the leadership of Sagarajab, a battalion com
mander, refused to surrender and moved westward. Later, after this group arrived in the
area of Mazongshan, north of Ejine Banner, they were wiped out by the Communist
troops. Another 200 or more soldiers, under their battalion commander Dagwaochir, tried
to move eastward to Ulanchab League. Cut off, they surrendered.'® Such was the tragic
end of the autonomy movement led by Prince De in Alashan.
Earlier, Prince De’s personal delegate, Jagunnasutu, who accompanied the Chin
ese government’s retreat from Guangzhou to Chungking and then to Taipei, was unable
to reach Prince De via radio telegraph. Mowever, working with the Mongols exiled in
Taiwan, he continued to petition the KMT government to recognize the establishment of
the Mongolian autonomous regime in Alashan. Later, in the fall of 1950, because jagun
nasutu was still searching for Prince De, he left Taiwan and returned to the continent via
Mong Kong. According to Lu Minghui, Jagunnasutu was immediately arrested. 01jeibuyan, another delegate sent by Prince De, saw Chungking fall to the Communists
after his arrival in the city. Mowever, Oljeibuyan was able to reach Taipei one year later
by fleeing through Vietnam. So his mission ended in failure too.
When Prince De left Alashan, he began a lonely, gloomy, and dangerous life’s
journey. But Damzana, Bai Maifeng, Me Zhaolin, and their group were able to get super
ior positions and treatment by the newly established Communist regime because of their
association with the autonomous regime created and led by Prince De. Damzana became
one of the deputy chairmen of the Mongolian Autonomous Region; Bai Maifeng became
a member of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Government and a deputy presi
dent of the Nationality Academy in Lanzhow. Me Zhaolin was appointed Secretary-Gen
eral of the Political Consultative Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.
Damzana was purged during the Cultural Revolution and died in a military camp
Lu Minghui, pp. 407-09
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in Dengkou. Bai Haifeng also departed this world in the late 1950s; He Zhaolin was still
alive when this manuscript was first being written (1983). It is said that Bayankhan died
soon after the surrender. Because of Luo Batumongke’s reputation and real power, he
was appointed the head of his own banner, but died from a stroke soon after.
These pages of Inner Mongolian history might be analyzed differently by people
of different political persuasions. Nevertheless, the historical facts of Prince De’s activi
ties and the struggle for Inner Mongolian autonomy in Dingyuanying will never change.
The immutable facts are available for honest men to examine.

XVI
IN ULAANBAATAR
DECEMBER 1949 - SEPTEMBER 1950
Prince De’s Response to the Mongolian People’s Republic
In the winter of 1911, Outer Mongolia, under the leadership of the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu and Prince Khangdadorji, had announced its independence from
China. Outer Mongolia traveled a very rough road indeed as an independent nation dur
ing the next thirteen years. Finally, in 1924, the Mongolian People’s Republic was estab
lished with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Its independence was aimounced on No
vember 22, 1945, as a result of the Yalta Agreement. On January 5, 1946, the Chinese
government in Chungking officially recognized its independence.
Prince De had been elated at this development; he was gratified to see that a
portion of the Mongol people had finally gained formal independence, and that China had
finally renounced its claims to suzerainty over Mongolia. Prince De celebrated this inde
pendence by cutting off his queue, a symbol of the Mongol nation under foreign domina
tion. Though this was a small gesture, it was very significant because it vividly demon
strated Prince De’s joy at finally seeing Mongol people achieve true independence and
nationhood. While he recognized that the differences in political ideology north and south
of the Gobi were considerable, he knew in his heart that the blood in the veins of the
Outer Mongols was still true Mongol blood. He hoped that Inner and Outer Mongolia,
though separated by their non-Mongol neighbors, would one day reunite and become a
single nation again.
Of course. Prince De still remained deeply suspicions of the social revolution in
Outer Mongolia and was disappointed that the new Mongolian nation there would be
limited to its current territory. But these disappointments did not diminish his belief that
all Mongols were one people. He felt there was nothing that human endeavor could not
eventually accomplish. The people of Inner Mongolia, especially the feudal princes (who,
of course, included Prince De himself), had long harbored deep suspicion toward and fear
of the Communist regime in Outer Mongolia. This fear led them to cast their lot with the
Japanese anti-Communist camp during the Second Sino-Japanese War. During this time
of cooperation with the Japanese, a steady stream of Outer Mongols deserted their
homeland and fled to Inner Mongolia. This flow of refugees reinforced the aura of suspi
cion and fear through which Inner Mongols perceived Outer Mongolia.
But with Chinese Communist expansion into Inner Mongolia expected in the
near future, old concerns about Mongolian communism decreased. If Inner Mongolia
were fated to come under communism, why not look to the north and seek to be ruled by
Mongolian Communists? The Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and the Commu
nist Party of China had the same basic ideology. But the Communists in the Mongolian
People’s Republic were Mongols who had Mongol blood flowing through their veins. As
such, surely they would be more trustworthy and approachable than Communists of an
alien race. At the end of World War II, this type of reasoning led many Inner Mongols to
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flee to Outer Mongolia. A similar line of reasoning led many Turkic-speaking peoples in
Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) to flee to the Turkic areas of Soviet Central Asia.
As mentioned earlier, after Prince De received a letter from his son Dugursurung, who lived in Outer Mongolia, he began to think more favorably of the Mongolian
People’s Republic. This letter was one of the factors that helped him finally decide to
proceed to Ulaanbaatar and seek the assistance of Choibalsan, the leader of the Mongol
ian People’s Republic. There are many striking similarities between the prince’s trip to
Ulaanbaatar and Amursana’s trip to Tsarist Russia to seek assistance in his struggle
against the oppression of the Manchu Qianlong Emperor. Amursana was protected from
the Manchus by the Czar; Prince De, however, was eventually extradited to Beijing by
the Mongolian People’s Republic and charged with committing crimes against the Chi
nese Communists.
I did not accompany Prince De to the Mongolian People’s Republic, nor have 1
heard anything from trustworthy sources about his sojourn there. The following account
is based mainly on a book entitled The Personal Narrative of Demchugdongrob.' For the
account below, I have drawn on the seventh and last chapter of this book, “My Experi
ences in the Mongolian People’s Republic.” The book as a whole reads like a confession
elicited from Prince De through relentless interrogation. Having been intimately ac
quainted with Prince De, I know that he would not yield easily to coercion. The overall
tone of the book suggests that it is an attempt to vilify the Prince because he had not
“come clean” and given a complete confession to the liking of the Chinese Communists,
as Puyi had done. If he had, he probably would have been treated as well as the last Man
chu emperor. But the prince did not give in. I think the internal textual evidence of this
book indicates that it began as a record of incomplete and hence unsatisfactory confes
sions, elicited through coercion and prolonged interrogation, but that it was later embel
lished and “polished” by Tobshin and others. Careful consideration of my reservations
about the book enables me, I hope, to extrapolate from it at least some aspects of what
happened to Prince De during his unhappy stay in the Mongolian People’s Republic.

Preparing to Contact the MPR’s Agents
According to the Personal Narrative, before Prince De left Alashan for Guang
zhou, he had Altanochir, a distant nephew, go to the border between Inner and Outer
Mongolia to make preliminary contact with the Mongolian People’s Republic. As far as I
know, before this move was made. Prince De and Damzana opposed each other over the
issue of “national autonomy.” The extreme nationalists—Dagwaodsar, Shongno, Shonnudongrob, Lubsangnorbu, and Altanochir—had all supported Prince De’s proposal. This
embarrassed Damzana, their host at Alashan. So they decided it would be better for them
to move away from Alashan and return to the Urad Middle Banner (Shongno’s home
banner) of the Ulanchab League. They eventually moved to the temple of Bayan-shangdu
because this location was far out of reach of the Chinese Communists but within easy
reach of Outer Mongolia.
Altanochir was reserved but shrewd. During the Soviet-Mongolian occupation
' Tao Buxin, ed. Demuchukedonglupu zishu (The Personal Narrative of Demchugdongrob), Inner
Mongolian Historical Materials, No. 13, The Research Committee on Inner Mongolian Autono
mous Region Literary and Historical Materials (Hohhot; Inner Mongolian Peoples' Press, 1984,
limited circulation).
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of Shilingol in 1945, he had already established personal contacts with secret agents from
Outer Mongolia, He was later dispatched by them to Beiping, disguised as a defector, to
work on Prince De. While he was on this mission in Beiping, his friendship with several
members of the Mongolian Youth Alliance enabled him to become a member of this or
ganization. After he joined the alliance, he often expressed some points of view that I
found very strange. I did not realize then that he was doing this deliberately.
Lubsangnorbu and Dagwaodsar had contacted Outer Mongolian agents while
Inner Mongolia was still under Japanese occupation. Lubsangnorbu had once been ar
rested by the Japanese military under suspicion of entering into contact with the Mongol
ian People’s Republic. Because he was a son of Buyandalai, Prince De was able to ar
range for his release. Shonnudongrob accepted the mission given to him by Lieutenant
General Duingkhorjab, head of Ulaanbaatar’s Internal Defense Bureau. He secretly told
Prince De and me of this decision after he had escaped from Shilingol to Beiping. Shon
nudongrob was the eldest son of Rinchinsengge, head of the Ulanchab League, and was
the head of the peace preservation troops of the Urad Middle Banner.
The backgrounds of these people made it easy for them to establish contact with
the Mongolian People’s Republic. That was why Prince De selected them to be his gobetweens with Ulaanbaatar. Ulaanbaatar dispatched a man to Dingyuanying, in response
to their hints, but by this time. Prince De was already in Guangzhou, and it was impossi
ble for them to meet. This man from Ulaanbaatar left a letter from Prince De’s eldest son
with Luo Batumongke, who later forwarded it to Prince De. Prince De showed me this
letter when 1 was in Alashan.
According to the Personal Narrative, Shonnudongrob came to Dingyuanying
after the conference in Alashan and brought a letter from Altanochir to Prince De. Altanochir said in the letter that he had met with Dordog and Bayar (also known as Ochirbatu) of the Mongolian People’s Republic. The three men talked about the propaganda
leaflets dropped in Kalgan at the time of the Japanese surrender; Altanochir said those
leaflets were printed as the result of a misunderstanding. They now realized that Prince
De had indeed resisted the Japanese, even during their occupation of Inner Mongolia.
These two agents of the Mongolian People’s Republic stated further that they knew that
Prince De had done nothing wrong and that their government did not want to leave Prince
De, an innocent man, with nowhere to go. They were, therefore, happy to convey to
Prince De the letters that his relatives in Outer Mongolia had written. They were dis
turbed, however, by reports that Prince De had recently been in contact with the Ameri
can imperialists. Judging from the attitude of the American imperialists toward the Ne
groes, they argued, it would be easy to predict the kind of attitudes they would have to
ward the Mongols. They expressed hope that Prince De would come to the Mongolian
People’s Republic, to be welcomed by Marshal Choibalsan and the people.
Later, when Prince De was planning to leave Dingyuanying, Duan Taldangdai (a
border guard of the Alashan Banner who had brought the letter from the Mongolian Peo
ple’s Republic to Prince De) came to see Prince De and said, “The Mongolian People’s
Republic has sent Batujirgalang to visit you. He has something to discuss with you.”
Prince De responded by saying that the situation at Dingyuanying was complex, and that
he would like to meet with Batujirgalang the next day at another location. Prince De trav
eled a day’s Journey away from Dingyuanying, and the two men met at an agreed upon
place. Batujirgalang presented Prince De with a khadag (a silk scarf) as a token of good
will and welcome from the Outer Mongolian authorities. He also gave Prince De a roll of
satin and other presents, including a letter written by his son Dugursurung. The letter said
that the Outer Mongolian authorities hoped that Prince De would be able to come. From
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now on, the letter continued, he could stay anywhere he wanted in Mongolian territory.
The success of the Chinese revolution under Mao Zedong is certain, Dugursurung con
cluded. It would be better for Prince De to come to Outer Mongolia.
After Prince De finished reading the letter Batujirgalang asked him to proceed to
Sharja to meet with other Mongolian agents, but Prince De demurred. It seems that he
still distrusted the Outer Mongolian authorities. While traveling to the temple of Tukum,
he expressed his desire to proceed on to the Bayan Shangdu temple. At this temple, he
thought, he could gather all the scattered troops from Shilingol and Chahar and use the
radio-telephone equipment he had placed there. He used the need to go to Bayan Shangdu
as a pretext for his delay and asked his Outer Mongolian counterpart to send someone to
the Bayan Shangdu for further discussions.

Contact with MPR Agents at the Bayan Shangdu Temple
While Prince De continued his journey to the Tukum temple, Shonnudongrob
sent his confidant Gombo to see him. Prince De asked Gombo about the condition of the
wireless telegraph equipment. Gombo said he had heard that this equipment had already
been given to the Mongolian People’s Republic by Altanochir. Prince De, angered by this
news, sent a man to fetch Altanochir. On his arrival, Altanochir urged Prince De to go to
the Mongolian People’s Republic immediately. Prince De rebuked him for this, demand
ing an explanation for his failure to report the contacts he had made from May to late
August. Prince De also wanted to know why Altanochir had given away the wireless
telegraph equipment. Altanochir did not give a detailed explanation; he merely stated that
since Prince De’s going over to the Mongolian People’s Republic was a certainty, he had
given the equipment to the Mongolian People’s Republic. Prince De was extremely upset
at this response, but he could do nothing about it. The loss of the equipment made it im
possible for Prince De to establish further contact with the outside world. All these ac
tions were, 1 believe, conspiracies arranged by Altanochir and his counterparts in the
Mongolian People’s Republic to discredit Prince De.
Prince De probably arrived at the Bayan Shangdu temple on the 19th of October
(the eighteenth day of the eighth month on the lunar calendar). Rinchinsengge, the head
of the Ulanchab League; his son, Shongno; and others, had all gathered there to welcome
Prince De. On the next day, Batujirgalang and two other people who had been sent from
Ulaanbaatar finally arrived. They presented Prince De with yet another letter from his son
Dugursurung. In this letter, Dugursurung explained that he and other members of Prince
De’s family had been in Chagan-tolugai and Khara-ereg for quite some time awaiting his
arrival. They urged him to come quickly.
That night. Prince De deliberated with Tumendelger, Shonnudongrob, and Alta
nochir about whether he should go. But these people refused to advise Prince De on the
matter, urging him to make the decision by himself. Because he still harbored some sus
picions about the Mongolian People’s Republic, Prince De finally decided to ask the
Outer Mongolian authorities to send yet another representative to Bayan Shangdu for
discussions. But the Mongolian People’s Republic rejected this proposal, insisting that
such discussions take place within the borders of the Mongolian People’s Republic.
Prince De eventually gave in and agreed to cross over into Outer Mongolia.
On the next day. Just before his departure, Prince De said to his followers, “If
one does not enter the tiger’s cave, how will he capture the tiger's cubs? I must throw all
caution to the winds and proceed boldly. If I lose my freedom, please take care of your-
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selves.” Rinchinsengge had been invited by the Mongolian People’s Republic to accom
pany Prince De, but he refused this invitation and sent his son Shongno instead. Altanochir and Tumendelger also accompanied Prince De. At the border they were welcomed
by Colonel Choijil, who politely said that the deputy chief of the Internal Defense Bureau
and the authorities of the central government had sent Lubsang and Dugursurung to the
border to await Prince De’s arrival. Because of the long delay, they had all departed. If
Prince De wished to return to Bayan Shangdu he (Choijil) would have to send a telegraph
to this effect to his superiors in Ulaanbaatar.
That night, Choijil gave Prince De a banquet. This put Prince De at ease and led
him to believe that Choijil did not want to detain him against his will. Altanochir traveled
secretly to the border the next morning. When he returned, he seemed to be staring at
something for a long time; Prince De did not understand what this meant. At noon, Bayar
arrived and greeted them with pleasantries. Bayar again explained that Dugursurung and
Lubsang, who were sent by Choibalsan, had waited at the border for a long time for
Prince De’s arrival, but because it was delayed, they had departed. Bayar explained fur
ther that he had just concluded some important matters and then hurried to the border to
meet Prince De. Prince De asked Bayar if Marshal Choibalsan had any important mes
sages for him. Bayar said he did not know, but Dugursurung might know. He offered to
convey to Choibalsan any message Prince De might have.
Bayar went on to say that, “the Mongolian People’s Republic has now been es
tablished. Our country will soon enter into diplomatic relations with China. If you have
any political goals, it would be best for you to petition Beijing in regard to them. We
cannot interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. Your eldest son is studying at
Choibalsan University. Your second son has completed his studies at the Normal Acad
emy and is now teaching. Your third and fourth sons are studying in a middle school.
Your daughter and daughter-in-law are now teaching at primary schools. All in all, your
family members are doing well.” Prince De then asked Bayar to tell his sons that he
wanted them to study well and endeavor to do something for the future of the Mongolian
people.
At dusk, Bayar asked Prince De to remain where he was for one more night.
They gave him much meat and wine at a meal that night, and this made both host and
guests very happy. Of course, all these things had been arranged beforehand by Altano
chir, who was acting as an agent for the Mongolian People’s Republic.
In my judgment, Bayar’s words cannot be regarded as lies. His statements re
sembled what Choibalsan had told Jirgalang (De Gulai) and Khafengga. At that moment.
Prince De should have realized that he would receive no help from Outer Mongolia and
should not have demanded that Ulaanbaatar push for the unification of Inner and Outer
Mongolia. He also should not have asked Outer Mongolia to assist Inner Mongolia in
establishing an independent regime or in resisting domination by Beijing. However, these
talks with Bayar only encouraged Prince De to continue hoping for the impossible. He
began to feel less suspicious of Ulaanbaatar and even began to believe that while the uni
fication of Inner and Outer Mongolia could not be achieved in the immediate future, it
could become a reachable goal in the distant future. He believed that any assistance to
Inner Mongolia offered by the Mongolian People’s Republic would be a step in this di
rection. This blind zeal eventually landed him in prison in Ulaanbaatar.
The next day, as Prince De was about to leave, Bayar came to see him again and
told him that he had already conveyed Prince De’s words to his sons by telegraph. He
also had received a telegraphed reply from Dugursurung; in this telegram, Dugursurung
expressed his acceptance of his father’s exhortations. He was willing to struggle for the
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good of the Mongol people his entire life. Moreover, he hoped that his father’s talks with
Bayar would come to a successful conclusion. The phraseology and style of this telegram
were definitely Inner Mongolian, so Prince De believed it was genuine. Bayar then asked
Prince De, “Just what do you plan to do?” Prince De replied to this question by asking a
question of his own: “Where do you think I should go?” Bayar said, “India would be all
right. But India is also a capitalist country.” Prince De was unable at this moment to dis
cern why Bayar, a Communist agent, would say something like this. Prince De learned
much later that because Bayar had already learned of Prince De’s plans from Altanochir,
he had said these words to elicit further replies from Prince De and elaboration of his
plans.
At the time of his departure, Bayar urged Prince De to take two half boxes of
cigarettes with him. In a symbolic gesture of his desire for Mongolian unification. Prince
De deliberately put the contents of the two boxes into one box and said, “I would feel
better about putting the two together.” Bayar smiled but did not reply.

At the Tukum Temple
Prince De rode with Bayar in an automobile to the border separating Inner from
Outer Mongolia. As he mounted a horse and prepared to cross back into Inner Mongolia,
Prince De said to Bayar, “This visit has given me an understanding of the new Mongolian
nation-state. It is certainly an independent and sovereign state. All my past misconcep
tions about the Mongolian People’s Republic have been corrected.” Bayar answered,
“Your thinking is very correct. I will definitely convey your words to Marshal Choibalsan.” On his way back. Prince De heard that Dagwaodsar, Lubsangnorbu, and Altanochir
had already decided to proceed to the Mongolian People’s Republic. It seems that only
then did Prince De begin to suspect their intentions and plans.
After Prince De returned to the temple at Tukum, his enthusiasm for the Mon
golian People’s Republic and his safe trip back were both celebrated by the people.
Sukhbaatar told Prince De that because his return from Outer Mongolia had been so long
delayed, the people had begun to fear that he had been taken captive by the Ulaanbaatar
authorities. Some even suggested that Li Shouxin be made their leader and that they
move westward. Sukhbaatar had resisted these suggestions and insisted that they await
Prince De’s return.
From Tukum, Prince De traveled to Baruun-sharja, where Hai Fuquan was
making preparations to enter the Mongolian People’s Republic. Prince De asked him to
carry a letter to Altanochir. In this letter. Prince De wrote, “I will decisively and with
unyielding determination continue in my work for the Mongolian people.” It seems that
by this time. Prince De had realized that Altanochir was not his follower but rather was in
the employ of Ulaanbaatar. He sent this letter to Altanochir so that it be made known to
Ulaanbaatar that his decision on whether to cross the border would be based on what
would best serve the Mongol people.
Duan Taldangdai brought a letter to Prince De from the Peace Preservation
Corps of the Alashan Banner. This letter demanded that Prince De keep tight control over
his own forces in order to prevent confrontation and bloodshed. Duan-Toldangdai said
that Batujirgalang, who had been sent from the Mongolian People’s Republic to meet
with Prince De, had been detained at the border, and that he wanted to see him. Prince De
immediately sent Gombo to negotiate. Soon a messenger returned and reported that the
Alashan Banner had already released Batujirgalang and sent him back to Outer Mongolia.
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Prince De then sent Gombo to Chagan-tolugai to contact the Mongolian People’s Repub
lic authorities. Bayar received Gombo and told him that he had originally decided to send
Altanochir to contact Prince De, and that since Batujirgalang had returned, he wrould send
Altanochir to invite Prince De to Chagan-tolugai for a meeting.
Prince De responded to this invitation by stating that he would first go to
Guisennur (Guaizihu) and then proceed to Chagan-tolugai. By this time. Prince De had
already decided to cross over to the Mongolian People’s Republic. Upon his arrival in
Guisennur, he discussed possible future problems with Li Shouxin, Jirgalang (Ji Zhixiang), Sukhbaatar, Dugurengsang, and others. Prince De told them about his plan to go
northward; the purpose of this meeting was to bid them a temporary farewell. The osten
sible goal of his travels would be to establish political contacts and consult a doctor about
his gout. Everybody agreed with this plan, and on December 29, his old friends and fol
lowers bade him farewell.
Thus he embarked on the most unfortunate journey of his career, accompanied
by his secretary, Tserengdorji, and aide-de-camp, Tumendelger, together with his scouts,
Batujirgalang and Gombo. At the moment of his departure, Prince De had a feeling that
he was parting forever from his friends and associates. As the prince shook hands with
each one of them, Li Shouxin said, “Please do go to [Outer] Mongolia and establish good
ties. I also plan to go. If I am to stumble, I would rather stumble on Mongolian land and
not into the hands of the [Chinese Communist] Eighth Route Army.”
Bayar was at the border to welcome Prince De and told him that Choibalsan had
important matters to discuss with him; he had been specially sent again to accompany
him to Ulaanbaatar. Prince De told Bayar that he had just received notification from
Alashan that the Chinese Communists had recently sent five delegates to the Mongolian
People’s Republic for negotiations; he wanted to meet with these delegates before pro
ceeding to Ulaanbaatar. Bayar urged him to proceed directly to Ulaanbaatar, adding that
he had nothing to worry about. Prince De replied that the Mongolian People’s Republic
had just recently established diplomatic ties with Communist China. He wanted to know
whether his trip to Ulaanbaatar would, in view of this new development, adversely affect
Sino-Mongolian relations. Bayar said that this matter had been considered by Ulaanba
atar; there was nothing to worry about. He then urged Prince De to proceed directly to
Ulaanbaatar; Prince De agreed to go. Bayar then said to him, “All our activities must re
main secret,” and asked Prince De to change his clothes before they began moving east
ward. Prince De then asked Bayar to have some supplies delivered to his own troops.
Bayar replied that all these matters could be looked after in Ulaanbaatar.
According to Prince De’s Personal Narrative, his thoughts at this time were as
follows:
First of all, Bayar claims that the Constitution of the Mongolian People’s Republic
says that all persons who have served in Mongolian nationalist movements shall be allowed
to take refuge in the Mongolian People’s Republic. Under these provisions, I myself should
be guaranteed protection. [This 1949 position later became an explicit part of the constitu
tion. Article 83 of the 1960 Constitution of the Mongolian People’s Republic; it states that
“those foreign citizens who struggled in national liberation movements . . . and as a result
are persecuted (by their home governments) shall be endowed with the privilege of residing
in the Mongolian People’s Republic.”]
Second, 1 imagine that Choibalsan’s aim in having talks with me is directed toward
the goal of Mongolian unification. If he and I agree to work together for this purpose, 1 can
return peacefully and begin anew my task [of endeavors Car the betterment of the Mongol
ian people and nation]. I should also be able to receive support from the United States and
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begin to sway world opinion in favor of Outer and Inner Mongolian unification. When
changing conditions permit and when the climate of world opinion is favorable, he and 1
can combine efforts to establish a unified Mongolia. Choibalsan is a Mongol. Surely he
would not allow himself to be a puppet manipulated by the Russians. Surely he has his own
independent line of thought. Surely my proposal will be agreeable to him. Although he
cannot [at present] give me open support, he will at least express his heart-felt sympathy
with, and support for, my endeavors. Although Outer Mongolia has now officially achieved
nationhood, its population is spread thin and its strength is limited. It would not pass up the
chance for unification with Inner Mongolia. If this unification cannot be immediately ac
complished, we can at least pursue a second course by laying some groundwork for the
eventual unification of Outer Mongolia with the predominantly Mongolian areas of Inner
Mongolia. Because the regimes of China and the Mongolian People’s Republic are ideo
logically related, it may well be difficult for Outer Mongolia to work openly for unification.
But it will still be possible to pursue this second course.

A Guest in Ulaanbaatar
After Prince De’s arrival in Ulaanbaatar, he stayed in the hostel of the Interior
Defense Bureau (the secret police). Tserengdorji, Tumendelger, Gombo, and Jana arrived
soon thereafter. Bayar asked Prince De with whom he would like to lodge, and Prince De
replied, “I would like to stay with Jana, my cook.” The others were put up at other places,
and Prince De never saw them again. Colonel Wandan was sent regularly from the Inte
rior Defense Bureau to contact Prince De. The prince was also usually accompanied by a
captain named Lubsangdorji. Lieutenant Gongdari, disguised as a cook for Prince De,
also tagged along, while another lieutenant by the name of Bayantogtakhu also seemed to
accompany him often. They treated Prince De with respect and friendliness, but unbe
knownst to him, they were secretly recording each word he spoke. His hostel contained
the collected works of Lenin and Mao Zedong—probably specially placed there for him.
Prince De dipped into them occasionally. This was his first exposure to socialist writers.
Soon after Prince De’s arrival, Bayar and his superior, Duingkhorjab, the head
of the Interior Defense Bureau, came to visit him. They were accompanied by a Soviet
advisor with the rank of lieutenant general. Duingkhorjab asked Prince De about his in
tentions. According to the Personal Narrative, Prince De replied, “After I accomplish my
tasks here, I wish to return [to Inner Mongolia] and work for the people. Even if the Chi
nese Communist Party takes advantage of its victory and oppresses me unreasonably, 1
will still continue in my resistance.” Duingkhorjab, surprised at this, asked, “You still
want to resist?” The Soviet lieutenant general said, “You are wrong. You should not op
pose the Chinese Communist Party again. You should use your reputation and good of
fices with the people of Inner Mongolia to urge them to accept the leadership and rule of
the Chinese Communists.” Prince De disagreed: “I am convinced that my position is cor
rect, and I will do what I think is correct.”
The Soviet advisor appeared displeased with these remarks. Prince De saw im
mediately that the Soviet advisor was the one who seemed to be in charge of the discus
sion, and that it was he who seemed to hold the real power in intelligence matters. Du
ingkhorjab, supposedly the head of the Interior Defense Bureau, was merely acting as an
interpreter for this Soviet advisor. Prince De then expressed to Bayar his desire to meet
with Choibalsan. Bayar responded, “Please arrange for this visit through the bureau head
[Duingkhorjab].” Duingkhorjab ignored Prince De’s request for an audience with Choi
balsan and said, “You can visit with your family members, and you will see how much
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they have changed.” He then urged Prince De to tell his family members to keep his visit
a secret. They were not to breathe one word of it to anyone in Ulaanbaatar.
Prince De then turned the conversation to the topic of unifying Inner and Outer
Mongolia. He told Duingkhorjab about his proposal, which he had sent from Guisennur
to the Chinese Communist authorities in Ningxia: “The issue of unifying Inner and Outer
Mongolia should be decided by plebiscite.” Duingkhorjab was, however, unimpressed
with this proposal and unmoved by the prince’s arguments. Prince De’s conversation
with Duingkhorjab and the Soviet advisor ended in failure. The failure of this conversa
tion perhaps made them decide to treat Prince De more severely and unfavorably.
On the evening of the second day, Duingkhorjab and the Soviet advisor came for
another session with Prince De. Duingkhorjab informed Prince De, “There is no need for
you to return to Guisennur. From now on, you may remain openly in the Mongolian Peo
ple’s Republic and reside with your family. This is a happy matter for you. You may dis
cuss the details of your stay with Bayar.” It seemed to Prince De that he was thereby both
given the privilege of remaining in the Mongolian People’s Republic and denied the
privilege of leaving it.
After they left. Prince De said to Jana, the only person with whom he could con
verse freely, “They are not going to allow me to return to Guisennur.” Jana responded,
“Noyan [superior], it was wrong to come here. You should have gone to Ningxia. Earlier,
when the jasag prince [Dugursurung, Prince De’s son] went to the Mongol state, he said
he would be back soon. But he has never returned.” One can imagine the anxiety and fear
that welled up in the heart of Prince De at this moment. He was a man who had for his
entire life acted according to his own will, and now he was essentially a prisoner.
According to the Personal Narrative, Prince De thought of asking Ulaanbaatar
to send him to Beijing or Lanzhou. But he hesitated to make this request because he felt
that staying in Ulaanbaatar would be better than being shamed in Beijing. He learned
from radio broadcasts that Mao Zedong had arrived in Moscow to celebrate Stalin’s
birthday. He thought of asking Ulaanbaatar to send him to Moscow for this occasion, but
he eventually gave up on this idea. Thoughts of his people in Guisennur were very dis
concerting to him. These people were his loyal followers, and he felt great moral distress
at not being able to do something for them. At the same time he worried about his per
sonal safety while in the Mongolian People’s Republic.

Under House Arrest
During Bayar’s next visit, Prince De discussed the problem of his followers in
Inner Mongolia. Prince De hoped that Ulaanbaatar would either allow him to tell these
people to go and surrender to Peng Dehuai—the commander of the Chinese Communist
forces in northwest China—or have them come to the Mongolian People’s Republic. Ba
yar agreed to have a few of the leaders among Prince De’s people come to the Mongolian
People’s Republic, but he said that he would have to confer with his superiors about
dealing with them as a whole. The next day, Bayar said that his superiors had agreed to
allow Prince De to send a letter to Guisennur, instructing several leaders to come to Chagan-tolugai for discussions with Prince De concerning future actions.
Altanochir drafted this letter. Its contents may be summarized as follows:
1 [Prince De] have conferred with several Mongolian authorities, and we have decided that
due to the present healing process of my leg gout, I will be unable to return and meet with
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the delegates of the Chinese Communist forces. 1 would like Li Shouxin, Buyandelger,
Dugurengsang, Togtokhu, Sukhbaatar, and Ombagatur to choose three from among their
number and send them to Chagan-tolugai to meet with me and discuss arrangements for the
troops.

Prince De originally wanted his faithful aide-de-camp, Tumendelger, to deliver this letter.
Bayar, however, thought that Gombo, who was more accustomed to riding on a camel’s
back, would be able to deliver the letter faster. The truth was, of course, that Bayar feared
Tumendelger would tell them of Prince De’s current predicament. All six of the men to
whom Prince De had addressed his letter eventually came to Ulaanbaatar through Cha
gan-tolugai. But none of them were able to meet with Prince De except Li Shouxin, who
saw him on the day of Prince De’s trial.
One day, Bayar handed a list of five issues to Prince De and asked him to re
spond to them in exhaustive detail: (1) a comparison of Japan’s Mongolian policy with
the Soviet Mongolian policy, (2) the goals of the establishment of the Mongolian
Autonomous Government and its organization, and (3) the total combined population of
all Mongol peoples. Questions four and five dealt with comparing Chinese Kuomintang,
and U.S. policy toward Mongolia. Altanochir was supposed to write down Prince De’s
answers.

Prince De thought that Ulaanbaatar knew the response to the first issue, so he
did not answer it in detail. He had Altanochir respond to the second issue by copying
down relevant portions of the Organizational Law of the Mongolian Autonomous Gov
ernment, a copy of which Altanochir had in his possession. Because there was no reliable
material on which to base an accurate response to the third issue. Prince De had Altano
chir write down a wild guess. He even estimated seven or eight hundred thousand Mon
gols living in Burma! (This estimate, almost certainly erroneous, might have had its roots
in the phonetic similarity that Hmong, the name of a tribe that populates certain areas of
southeast Asia, bears to Meng, the Chinese word for Mongol/Mongolia.) After he was
finished with these responses. Prince De gave the answers to Wandan. Wandan, on read
ing over the responses, said they were too brief and would not meet the expectations of
the questioners. These questions, of course, were posed in the Communist style of elicit
ing written “confessions” from their prisoners. Because Prince De had no way of recog
nizing these questions for what they actually were, he made his responses to them brief
and perfunctory. The Mongolian intelligence personnel later treated the incompleteness
of these answers as evidence of deliberate evasion.
After Gombo departed for Guisennur, Prince De’s gout worsened, and Wandan
finally brought in a Russian doctor to treat him. Wandan occasionally accompanied
Prince De to the movie houses. One day, Bayar told Prince De that he might be allowed
to visit with his family members. Prince De responded, “My public affairs are not yet
finished; I am in no hurry to attend to personal affairs.” These words, unfortunately, for
feited his last chance to see any member of his family, except for Dugursurung, whom
Bayar brought over one day for a brief visit. But because Bayar was present during the
visit. Prince De and his son were able to talk only of family matters. Dugursurung would
say only that after the surrender of Japan, he came to Ulaanbaatar and that the Ulaanba
atar authorities had asked him to write a letter to Inner Mongolia asking the entire family
to come to the Mongolian People’s Republic.
Not all of them were enjoying a comfortable stay in the Mongolian state, how
ever, Dugursurung continued. He said that he had entered the Cadre Academy and that he
was later transferred to Choibalsan University. His second brother, Galsangjirmed, had
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received pedagogical training and was now a teacher. His third brother, Ochirbatu, and
his fourth brother had all entered middle school. Dugursurung’s wife, Serjimideg, and his
younger sister, Batunasun, had both graduated from the Normal School and were now
teachers. His mother and his children were all well. The Mongolian government had
treated the family as if it were the family of a high-ranking government minister.
Dugursurung then said that he had heard that the discipline of Prince De’s troops
was bad, and that this might have a negative effect on him. During their conversation,
Dugursurung took a volume from Lenin’s collected works down from the bookshelf and
turned to Lenin’s discussion of the problem of nationalities. As Prince De was reading it,
Bayar left for a moment to use the restroom. Prince De took advantage of his absence and
asked Dugursurung, “When did you leave Khara-ereg?” Dugursurung answered, “Before
your arrival, father.’’ These were the only words father and son were able to have with
one another in private. Bayar returned from the restroom and left with Dugursurung.
Later, Wandan accompanied Dugursurung for a second visit with Prince De.
During that visit, Dugursurung suddenly blurted out, “Father, do not tell me anything you
would not want others to know!” This statement showed Prince De that their conversa
tion was being monitored, and he began to fear for Dugursurung’s safety. Dugursurung
talked only of family matters. As the entire family had moved northward, he said, they
took two or three hundred of their cattle and sheep along with them. The Mongolian gov
ernment had, he continued, hired someone to herd these animals for them, and they were
regarded as the family’s private property.

Prisoner in Ulaanbaatar
During his two-month stay in Lflaanbaatar, Prince De was constantly accompan
ied by Bayar, Wandan, and other members of the Interior Defense Bureau. They even
accompanied him on his visits to the city and trips to the picture shows. The medical at
tention he received for his leg gout was satisfactory. At times he was even tempted to
stay in Ulaanbaatar for the rest of his days and lead a life of leisure. But he felt uneasy
with this idea, because it would make it impossible for him to make any political break
throughs for his people.
There was no further word from Gombo after his departure to Guisennur. One
day during a visit from Bayar, Prince De said, “You said earlier that 1 would be able to
visit with my family. My responsibilities in public affairs are now at a standstill, and
there has been no word from Gombo yet. I would like to use this leisure time to visit with
my family.” Bayar hesitated at this suggestion. After a moment’s thought, he said, “Let
us wait a while.” On a subsequent visit with Prince De, Bayar said that he had to go east
ward to the Domod aimag and that Wandan would from then on attend to Prince De’s
needs. All important matters, he continued, would have to be approved by Wandan’s su
periors. Prince De never saw Bayar from this time until the day of his trial.
On February 17, 1950, Wandan came to invite Prince De to see a movie about
Sukhbaatar, the hero of the Mongolian revolution and founder of the Mongolian People’s
Revolution. However, the automobile in which they were to ride to the movie house
parked in front of a building that was not a movie house. After entering the building,
Wandan assumed an ominous expression and said, “Demchugdongrob, our party and
government recognize you as an enemy. You are under arrest.” They then searched him,
and since he realized that it would be useless to argue with them, the prince held his
tongue. When he was imprisoned, they confiscated the leather clothing Bayar had given
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him earlier and gave him prison dungarees to wear.
The next day, the warden of the prison, a major, brought Prince De to see Wandan and Choijil. Prince De was allowed to claim the personal effects confiscated from
him at the time of his arrest. Two days later, they carried out the formal procedure of in
dictment. Wandan orally declaimed the crimes with which Prince De was charged: “In
the past, you collaborated with the Japanese imperialists. Now you are collaborating with
the Chinese Kuomintang and the American imperialists. You are trying to overthrow the
Mongolian People’s Republic and the Soviet Union! Because you have broken many
Mongolian laws, you must be arrested and dealt with.” Choijil recorded the oral charges,
and Prince De was forced to affix his signature to them.

Interrogation
On March 1, Bayar, Prince De’s former escort, reappeared and assumed the role
of the prince’s interrogator. When he saw the prince, he declared, “In accordance with the
instructions of my superiors, 1 hereby assume the responsibility for interrogating you. We
have been exceedingly patient with you and have worked with you for a long time, but
you have shown no sign of remorse or regret for your criminal activities. The Chinese
[Communists] now recognize you as an extremely notorious criminal and are demanding
that you be extradited. We have not, however, complied with their demands. We have
told them that we are reeducating you.”
Prince De’s interrogation began on March 1, and did not end until September 18
—six months and eighteen days. His answers at each interrogation session were recorded
as “confessions.” Before I give a rough account of the course of these interrogations be
low, 1 wish to remind the reader that my account of these interrogations is based on the
Personal Narrative, written and published in 1965. It seems that by 1965, Prince De’s
memory had clouded a bit, and portions of his narration are confused. It is, nonetheless,
possible to sketch the essentials of the interrogations.
The most serious charge was collaboration with the Japanese Imperialists. Bayar
said, “Speak now of your experiences as an agent of Japan.” Prince De answered, “Even
if you are to cut off my head, 1 will never admit to being an agent for the Japanese. But if
you ask me to discuss my contacts with the Japanese, 1 will accommodate you.” Bayar
then told him to start with Morishima Kadofusa’s travels in the banners of the Shilingol
League, then give detailed accounts about Sasame Tsuneo’s visit to Sunid in his disguise
as a lama. Bayar also wanted to know about the founding of the Zenrin Kyokai (Good
Neighbor Association) and the activities of Nakajima Manzo and other Japanese special
service office agents in the Mongolian Political Council at Beile-yin sume. In addition, he
demanded an explanation of Prince De’s dispatch of Buyandalai to Manchukuo to buy
armaments from the Guandong Army, his visit with Itagaki Seishiro (the vice chief of
staff of the Guandong Army), the founding of the Mongolian Army General Headquar
ters, and the establishment of the Mongolian Military Government in Dehua. In his inter
rogation concerning Prince De’s contacts with the Japanese, Bayar paid closest attention
to the activities of Nakajima Manzo and other Japanese special service office agents. He
then compelled the prince to sign the text of his responses to these interrogations.
During the course of the interrogations on this matter. Prince De once said to
Bayar, “When we met at Khara-ereg, I felt that you had the intent to twist my words.”
Bayar, very £ingry at hearing this, said, “You have an evil heart! By saying this, you are
trying to implicate me and my superiors in deception! Your conspiracy for the unification
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of Inner and Outer Mongolia was aimed at destroying the friendship between Mongolia
and China!” Prince De asked, “Did you not say that your side was planning to have me
do nationalistic work?” Bayar responded, “We had originally thought about that, but the
time for that has passed. We do not want to employ you now. If, immediately after your
arrival in Ulaanbaatar, you had completely confessed your evil ways and made a clean
slate, we might have arranged for a position for you in the Academy of Sciences. You do,
after all, speak Mongolian, Manchu, and Chinese. How good that would have been for
you! But no, you continued to be stubborn and would not compromise! You continually
procrastinated and refused to come clean. If you had confessed, even as late as the time of
your arrest, it would have gone well for you, because much was still unknown at that
time. But it is too late for anything like that at this point—nothing you can tell us will do
you any good now. We have no choice but to treat you as a criminal.”
Bayar did not require Prince De to sign the transcript of the interrogations on
these matters, so the transcript did not become an official document. This procedure was
no doubt taken to protect Bayar from being implicated along with Prince De in the con
spiracy to unify Inner and Outer Mongolia.
Apparently Ulaanbaatar’s Interior Defense Bureau was especially concerned
about this matter. During his interrogation on this subject. Prince De was shown several
foreign name cards and asked if he recognized the names on them. He was also shown
the original manuscript of the letter that Dagwaodsar and G. Hangin had written to Owen
Lattimore requesting that he bring the Mongolian problem to the attention of the United
Nations. He was asked if he had taken the initiative for having this letter written and sent.
He denied this, but he admitted that these persons were members of the Mongolian Youth
Alliance; this brought him much greater problems. Prince De flatly denied that he was a
member of this alliance. However, he admitted that he had close ties with several of its
leading members, such as Rashidondog, Dagwaodsar, me, and others. He also admitted
having been in contact with several members of the American diplomatic and intelligence
communities: Schulties, Ruth Bean, Owen Lattimore, Richardson, R. Meitz, Circassian,
and Frank Bessac.
Prince De said that Bessac had encouraged him to send troops to attack Dong
Qiwu, the governor of Suiyuan province. Bayar immediately used this detail to threaten
Prince De with torture if he did not give a full account of his motives in this connection.
He also pressed him to discuss his personal involvement in this matter and its possible
implications for the Mongolian People’s Republic. Since Prince De had no military
power at the time of Bessac’s request and also because he did not want to make enemies
in Suiyuan, he had paid no head to Bessac’s urgings. But Bayar continued to try to impli
cate him in ill-intentioned activities against the Mongolian People’s Republic. At this
moment. Prince De erroneously surmised that the reason why Bayar was trying to charge
him with criminal deeds against the People’s Republic of Mongolia was to avoid having
to extradite him to the Chinese Communists.
It was for this reason that he signed a confession worded as follows: “Bessac
encouraged me to send troops to attack Dong Qiwu and then use this attack as a pretext to
enter the Mongolian People’s Republic for further activities.” After Bayar saw this con
fession, he added another sentence: “This was the mission that Bessac gave me,” and
demanded that Prince De sign it. After he secured Prince De’s signature, he went upstairs
to consult with his superiors. He came back and said to Prince De, “According to this
confession, you are an agent of the United States!” Prince De, fearing more incessant
interrogation, simply said, “Yes, yes.”
After these “confessions” had all been made, as is the norm under such circum-
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stances, Prince De felt extremely fatigued, even light-headed. Later realizing that these
“confessions” had been elicited through inappropriate coercion, he argued with Bayar
that they were illegitimate. Bayar maintained that the interrogation sessions he had con
ducted had not been coercive; the confessions had been made at his own volition by
Prince De himself. Prince De wanted another investigation of the facts. Bayar, becoming
extremely impatient at this point, said, “All right. You go and write down the truth in
accordance with the facts. Then we’ll have personnel from the Interior Defense Bureau
interrogate you one after another.” Interrogation “one after another” was basically a form
of torture. It was continuous, and its sole purpose was to induce psychological and physi
cal exhaustion. Fearing that continuous interrogation would bring on still more persecu
tion, and realizing that further argument was useless, Prince De simply threw up his
hands and let them have their way.
At one point during the interrogations, Duingkhorjab and his Soviet advisor said
to Prince De, “You are an evil person. You continually refuse to come clean. We’re going
to produce some new witnesses against you, and then we’ll see what you have to say!”
With that, Li Shouxin, Togtakhu, and Dagwaodsar were brought into the room. Prince De
was then asked if he recognized these men and if he had any personal hatred for them or
they for him. Prince De answered, “Yes, I recognize them, and no, we have no personal
hate for each other.” Li Shouxin then said, “While Demchugdongrob was in Mengjiang,
he planned to unity Inner and Outer Mongolia, and even the Buryat Mongol territory in
the Soviet Union, into one great Mongolian state. It was his ambition to become emperor
of this new state.”^ Togtakhu said, “The Japanese imperialists collaborated with
Demchugdongrob in establishing the Mengjiang regime. They intended to use the Meng
jiang regime as a military springboard for attacking the Mongolian People’s Republic and
the Soviet Union. I can speak of this in detail, if you desire.” The interrogators, however,
did not ask him to continue. Dagwaodsar then said, “Demchugdongrob is an important
member of the Mongolian Youth Alliance.”
By this time. Prince De was so weary that he was somewhat incoherent. He was
not really paying attention to what Dagwaodsar was saying and merely nodded his head
affirmatively in an absent-minded and dazed manner. Bayar then said, “We have now had
three witnesses testify against you. If you still refuse to come clean, we’ll have another
fifteen come and testify against you.” Prince De then “confessed” according to the de
mands of his interrogators; the other “witnesses” did not appear.
On the next day, when the interrogators asked Prince De to read and sign the
transcript of the interrogations, he saw that he had “admitted” to being an important
member of the MYA. He told the interrogators very angrily that he wasn’t a member of
the MYA at all, let alone an “important” member. He had not even had a chance to read
the alliance’s charter. A few days later. Prince De again made arguments to this effect.
Bayar, growing impatient, said, “You signed the transcript, so all the talking in the world
won’t do you a bit of good.” His signed “confession” became the basis on which his
“guilt” was established.
While the interrogations were still being conducted, Wandan opened a cabinet
and showed it to Prince De. It was full of materials concerning the prince, so how could
he continue to deny his guilt? Wandan also said that when the Japanese surrendered, he
had been in Kalgan and had had the intention of trying to win Prince De over to his side,
but Prince De had left for Beiping by that time. Another major appeared as a witness,

^ His use of the term “Mengjiang” here referred to Inner Mongolia.

441

XVI: In Ulaanbaatar

saying that he had previously disguised himself as a herder driving sheep to Kalgan for
the Mongolian Livelihood Association (Sheng-ji-hui), so he knew very many things about
Prince De.
Ten years later, while Prince De was endeavoring to commit these matters to
writing, Li Shouxin (who had been released from prison by that time) admitted to Prince
De that his testimony against him had been created by the people in Ulaanbaatar’s Inte
rior Defense Bureau. They had trained him for weeks until he could repeat it smoothly
and from memory. Li and the others were compelled to testify against Prince De for their
own personal safety and welfare. Dagwaodsar, of course, knew that Prince De was not a
member of the MYA. It is evident that he was under severe and unrelenting pressure to
make a confession against his conscience and knowledge of the truth. The perfidious
character of Togtakhu^ has been mentioned several times in this book.
Prince De’s “confessions,” as recorded in his Personal Narrative, are somewhat
confusing and discordant. The main points of this confession can, however, be extracted:
1. His collaboration with the Japanese imperialists and militarists.
2. His plans to unify Inner and Outer Mongolia and establish a single Mongol state.
3. His identity as an “important member” of the Mongolian Youth Alliance.
4. His collaboration with the KMT in carrying out counterrevolutionary activities.
5. His employment by American intelligence for the purpose of planning and facilitating
an invasion of the Mongolian People’s Republic and the Soviet Union.
6. The damage he inflicted on Sino-Mongolian relations.
In my judgment, one-third of these accusations are true; the rest are sheer fabri
cations. The first two accusations against Prince De—the “evil enemy” of the Mongol
people—are the only fair ones made by the Interior Defense Bureau, which otherwise
acted submissively and in humble obedience to its Soviet advisor.
Some of Prince De’s responses to questions posed during the interrogation ses
sions convey the impression that the Outer Mongolian authorities originally had intended
to use Prince De to achieve certain political goals. Circumstances changed, however, and
Ulaanbaatar decided to sacrifice him in exchange for an increased measure of SinoMongolian goodwill. At the beginning of the interrogations. Prince De could still mobi
lize his strong will and responded with vigor and conviction to the questions his interro
gators posed. But as the interrogations wore on and became sessions of psychological and
physical torture, his spirit was ever less willing and his body became completely ex
hausted. He finally, as do almost all victims of such treatment, decided to allow his inter
rogators to say and believe anything they fancied.

Extradition to Beijing
According to the Personal Narrative, one day in August, Prince De was given a
complete transcript of all his confessions and asked to sign them. While signing. Prince
De saw that these papers were preparatory to his extradition to China. Glancing through a
^ Suffice it to say that this was the first time Togtakhu had been seen since his disappearance in the
early spring of 1946. Soon after this disappearance, he and Manibadara were sent by the Chinese
Kuomintang intelligence community to Wang-un sume with a wireless. He was later arrested, and
rumors soon spread that he had been killed. It was only in the 1960s that the public knew he had
been delivered to the Mongolian People’s Republic and the Soviet Union after his arrest.
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few pages of the transcript, he discovered that it claimed he had defected across the bor
der of the Mongolian People’s Republic and been arrested. Not one word was said about
his journey to Khar-ereg and Chagan-tolugai. Prince De realized that this transcript did
not coincide with the facts, but he had long since given up on trying to prevail over his
tormentors. He simply signed.
On September 18, 1950, members of the Interior Defense Bureau came to the
prison and took Prince De into their custody. They tied his hands behind his back and
placed a black blindfold over his eyes. They then took him and three other prisoners to a
waiting automobile, drove him to the airport and put him on a plane for Beijing.
Prince De’s trip to the Mongolian People’s Republic had been taken with an eye
to improve the political situation in Inner Mongolia. But it was also undertaken out of
Prince De’s pure love for his people and his homeland. He believed that blood was
thicker than water; it was his conviction that although different subgroups of the Mongol
people lived under different political regimes, no Mongol would harm a fellow Mongol
who had consecrated his entire life to struggles for Mongolian self-determination. He
was, in a word, naive, too idealistic in his thinking and unaware of the political realities
in Ulaanbaatar. He got himself into trouble by throwing himself on the mercy of his
brethren in the Mongolian People’s Republic—a nation “loved and protected” by its Big
Brother, the Soviet Union. Prince De devoted his entire life to struggling for the good of
his own people, but never mastered the dark side of the art of politics. Cheated and be
trayed by his followers, his final destiny was to cease being a leader and to become a
prisoner.
After the Japanese militarists invaded and occupied Mongolia, Togtakhu had
constantly betrayed Prince De in order to gain favor with the Japanese. Togtakhu’s ulti
mate revelation of his own nefarious, treacherous, selfish, and opportunistic nature came
with his testimony against Prince De at the Ulaanbaatar interrogations. He bore false wit
ness against Prince De in order to secure favor in the eyes of his new master, the Soviet
advisor. Wu Heling, while not malicious, also worked against Prince De. During the time
of the Alashan Autonomy Movement, Prince De had begun planning to proceed to Kokonor and thence through Tibet and into India, where he could have established a govern
ment in exile. But this plan, which in light of future events would have been the best
course of action to take, was scuttled because of Wu Heling’s meddling.
Prince De and the Autonomous Government under him also were betrayed by
two supposedly faithful senior members of the Kuomintang: He Zhaolin and Bai Haifeng.
When the chips were down, these two men thought first of themselves and their own
selfish interests; they turned their backs on Prince De in his hour of need. In order to take
advantage of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Repub
lic, Altanochir shamefully betrayed Prince De, his very own uncle. Ultimately, Prince
De’s own people sacrificed him on the altar of international politics and offered him up as
a sacrificial offering to improve Sino-Mongolian relations!
Prince De’s extradition to Beijing and his incarceration as a criminal do not ne
gate giving him credit for the fruits of his many years of struggle for the good of the
Mongolian people. His efforts and the groundwork he had laid facilitated the establish
ment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China.
Knowledge of this must have been a source of comfort to him during his long and bitter
years of imprisonment and humiliation by the Chinese Communists.
According to the Personal Narrative, Prince De’s arrest was followed by the
arrests of Dugursurung, his eldest son, and Chogbadarakhu, his trusted secretary who had
represented him in contacting the Soviet-Mongolian Allied Forces. His second son. Gal-
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sangjirmed, was imprisoned on trumped-up charges that he had once sung a counter
revolutionary song. The other members of his family, including his third son (sixteen
years old at the time) and his fourth son (fourteen years old), were exiled to the excep
tionally cold climate of Arkhangai. Because of the severe climate of this region, his third
and fourth sons developed health problems.

XVII
THE LAST CHAPTER
SEPTEMBER 1950 - APRIL 1966
Prince De, who dedicated his whole life to the betterment of his Mongolian peo
ple, spent the last quarter of his life, from his extradition in 1950 to his death in 1966,
under very difficult circumstances.' He spent these last sixteen years of his life in con
finement, undergoing interrogation, confession, sentencing, imprisonment, forced labor,
“reform through labor” (really psychological and physical torture aimed at brainwashing
a person and breaking his will), intimidation, humiliation, mockery, release, house arrest,
more confessions, and disease. Although he was a warrior who had fought nobly and
faithfully for the freedom of the Mongolian people, he ended up losing his own freedom.
This book should, of course, include an account of the calamities he suffered,
the labor he endured, and the questions he considered, as well as the spiritual and corpo
real changes he underwent during this last quarter of his life. But all these things cur
rently remain secrets. I have been unable to obtain any detailed information concerning
these years, and Mongols with whom 1 have talked do not know any more than 1 do. Per
haps in some cases they know, but are unwilling to talk. At any rate, unless the Chinese
government allows its citizens to speak freely and makes the appropriate materials avail
able for public inspection, these last years of Prince De’s life will probably remain blank
pages in Mongolian history. I hope that some day someone will fill in these blank pages
without fear of the political consequences or pressure to remain quiet. With this lack of
available information, I can offer below only the barest of outlines of these last years of
Prince De’s life.
As mentioned in the last chapter. Prince De and three other men were extradited
to Beijing on September 18, 1950. Li Shouxin was one of these three other men; the other
two are unknown. Nothing is known of their interrogation and imprisonment after they
arrived in Beijing. It is only known that in 1959, Ulanfu, then the chairman of the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Region, announced that Prince De had been punished and that
he had been sent to labor at the Fushan coal mines. This, of course, meant imprisonment
or “reform through labor.” Several years ago, Duan Kehe, a war criminal released from
prison by the Chinese Communists, published in America an article entitled “A SelfNarration of a War Criminal” in the Chinese-language World Daily {Shijie ribao). In this
article he said that during his imprisonment, the Chinese Communist authorities brought
Prince De and Li Shouxin to observe the progress of the prison’s efforts at “reform
through labor.” Duan said further that he resented the fact that while he lived in destitute
and bitter circumstances at his prison. Prince De and Li Shouxin were well-dressed and
apparently well-fed.
' There are three different dates given for his death: April 25, May 23, and June 4, 1966. I have
been unable to determine which date is the correct one; perhaps the actual date will never be
known.
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Another account contradicts this one. It maintains that they were tortured con
tinually, that Prince De always refused to speak even one word, and that because Li
Shouxin was so tall, the prison guards constantly forced him to stoop, not allowing him to
stand at the full height of his stature. I find neither of these reports completely believable.
But common sense tells me that they did indeed suffer from the constant interrogations,
confessions, and “reform through labor.”
Both Prince De and Li Shouxin were released on April 9, 1963, by an amnesty
of the Chinese government. It is certain that the twelve years and seven months of his
imprisonment had made Prince De physicially and mentally feeble. His obstinate person
ality and princely temperament more than likely poisoned his soul with anger at the
spiritual torment, physical abuse, and mental cruelty he suffered.
During his imprisonment, all his family members, with the exception of Dugursurung, were returned from Mongolia to China. No information about the whereabouts or
fate of Dugursurung is available at this date. Prince De’s second son was interrogated and
released after his arrival in Beijing. His third son died of the heart ailment caused by the
severely cold climate in Arkhangai. His fourth son survived, but is said to suffer continu
ally from his heart ailment. In the Personal Narrative, Prince De says that he brought
upon himself his punishment at the hands of the authorities of the Mongolian People’s
Republic. But he maintains that “it was unjustifiable to put my children, who were inno
cent and ignorant of my political activities, into military exile and force them to suffer
from severely cold weather.”
There are many different accounts of Prince De’s fate and welfare after his re
lease. One account says that he was assigned to work in the library of the Central Nation
alities Institute. Another says that he worked in the library of the Inner Mongolian Acad
emy of Social Sciences. Yet another account claims that he was kept under house arrest
in Hohhot and was followed everywhere he went by government surveillance personnel.
Still another claims that after his release, he was brought to a place where he could view
the success of the government’s ten-year plan, and was asked his opinion of it. He sup
posedly answered, “1 probably could have done better if I had been able to get ten more
years of time.” This statement led to more difficulties for him. This last account has been
given to me repeatedly by many different people. They maintain that his treatment would
have been more favorable had he commented upon the accomplishments of the ten-year
plan more positively.
After his release. Prince De’s uncompromising attitude and unyielding spirit
produced even more difficulties for him. The Chinese government treated him differently
from Puyi, the abdicated last emperor of the Manchu Qing, who embraced no guiding
ideology nor showed any degree of obstinate temperament. Owen Lattimore informed me
that during his visit in China with Zhou Enlai in 1972, he went to the Central Nationali
ties Institute and mentioned Prince De’s contributions to the Mongol people. A young
man from the Alashan banner asked Lattimore not to mention Prince De again.
At an academic gathering at Berkeley in April of 1982, I met with a Mr. Li, a
member of the Nationalities Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. A
group of scholars and I engaged him in a discussion about Prince De. After a while he
said, “In spite of the views you gentlemen have toward Prince De, from the standpoint of
our country, he was a criminal—a traitor {hanjian) who betrayed the nation and collabo
rated with the enemy.” In other words. Prince De was viewed as a hanjian because he
dared to oppose Han chauvinism. The other scholars at this gathering scorned Li’s stance
and refused to discuss Prince De with him further.
After Prince De’s extradition to Beijing, the Inner Mongolian leagues and ban-
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ners were combined into one autonomous body and given some measure of self-rule.
Prince De had struggled and hoped for this development for years, and he eventually saw
it materialize. Almost all Mongolian areas, except for those in Xinjiang and the Kokonor
region, were placed under the Jurisdiction of this Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region,
with Ulanfu as its chairman. The ensuing socialistic revolution in Inner Mongolia did
produce some progress, especially in the areas of education and health care.
During the first few years after the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Auto
nomous Region, all national construction work in Inner Mongolia was based on the Chi
nese economic plan, though with a nod to the new standards and precedents established
by the Mongolian People’s Republic. Even the old Uighur script used for writing Mon
golian was temporarily (fi-om 1957 to the mid-‘60s) abandoned in favor of the Cyrillic
alphabet, which was used in the Mongolian People’s Republic and the Soviet Union; this
system lasted until the Chinese-Soviet honeymoon ended. The feudalistic institutions and
the prerogatives of the temples and monasteries were all eliminated. Religious freedom
was, however, guaranteed, at least nominally. Many of Prince De’s former followers and
intellectuals, who were supported and educated during his period of leadership, now
threw themselves enthusiastically into the service of the new autonomous region. In order
to protect themselves, many of these individuals outwardly displayed opposition to Prince
De’s former policies.
The great Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia began in 1951, a few years
after the 1947 establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Chinese had
previously lived in Inner Mongolia in scattered centers, but now they came in great
droves and soon made the Mongols a minority in their own “Autonomous Region!” This
inundation of Chinese settlers was definitely a negative development because it seemed
to cancel the positive developments made in the field of education.
Soon the Sino-Soviet honeymoon period ended. China and the Soviet Union
began experiencing seemingly unresolvable disagreements. Mongolia, which had sacri
ficed Prince De to buy friendship from Beijing, followed the lead of the Soviet Union and
changed its attitudes toward China. Prince De, who had worked so long for the good of
his Mongol people, must have viewed these vicissitudes of international politics with
bewilderment and disillusionment.
According to the Personal Narrative, during the last three years of his life.
Prince De left behind seven chapters of his memoirs that had been “recorded and ed
ited—probably the confessions he was required to make upon his release from prison—
and not originally written in chronological order or by topic. They were, however, later
arranged into chronological order. No dates for these chapters are given in the Personal
Narrative. But when Lu Minghui used these chapters in writing his book Menggu zizhi
yundong shimo (Beijing, 1980), he supplied dates for all these chapters as follows:
1.Recalling the Mongolian Autonomous Movement at Bailingmiao—arranged June 1964.
2. How I became involved with the Japanese imperialists (no date).
3. The Mongolian Military Government—arranged 1964 (no month indicated).
4. The Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government—arranged December 1964.
5. The Mengjiang Allied Autonomous Government—arranged May 1964.
6. Three Years in Beiping*—arranged October 1965.
7. My Involvement in the so-called Western Mongolian Autonomous Movement—arranged
1965 (no month indicated).
8. My Experience in the Mongolian People’s Republic—arranged 1965 (no month indi
cated).

I found no account of “How I Became Involved with the Japanese Imperialists.”
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in Prince De’s Personal Narrative. It seems that not all the material Lu Minghui drew on
for his account of the Mongolian Autonomous Movement at Bailingmiao is contained in
the first chapter of the Personal Narrative. This evidence indicates the existence of a
more complete and unexpurgated confession by Prince De. It is also interesting to note
that the Personal Narrative contains only seven chapters, not eight. It is easy to see edito
rial pressure to alter or omit episodes in all of this. It is, therefore, difficult not to con
clude that the Personal Narrative is based on selected materials and not on the complete
oral account as given by Prince De.
Other aspects of the Personal Narrative seem to indicate that it is full of embel
lishments written with a specific Chinese political agenda in mind. Many passages of the
book are thinly disguised attempts to demean the author. These passages do not ring true.
When somebody writes his memoirs, be he a statesman, a thinker, a literateur, a religious
man, or an artist, he may write of his regrets, his accomplishments, or of his becoming
wise too late. His memoirs may even be a type of cathartic confession or expression of
remorse at having done something wrong. But no man writes his memoirs with an eye to
demean and vilify himself! I was intimately acquainted with Prince De; I knew his per
sonality and temperament. I know that he never would have written such things. It is easy
for me to see the ways in which the Chinese editors adulterated this book.
1 am firmly convinced that Prince De did not actually make these confessions
nor do I believe that he ever left behind a written account for posterity. But it is undoubt
edly true that from the time of his arrest until his death. Prince De was continually forced
to make confession after confession. The long-term afflictions and torment he must have
received at the hands of his Chinese Communist captors is difficult for any reasonable
person in the West to accept. Only his religious beliefs and strong will saved him from a
complete nervous breakdown.
Demchugdongrob was bom into a princely family of Chinggisid lineage. He was
made a first-ranking prince in his youth. When he became a young man, he began to de
vote himself to the Mongolian autonomy movement. Although this movement eventually
collapsed, he continued to struggle for the independence and continued existence of the
Mongol people. He became a convicted criminal during the last quarter of his life and
suffered afflictions until the end.
It has been said that on the early morning of May 23, 1966, at the dawn of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, Prince De passed away in Hohhot, the city that had been the
capital of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government under his leadership.
Soon after his death, his virtuous wife, Sebjidma, also died. Immediately thereafter.
Prince De’s beloved homeland of Inner Mongolia became embroiled in the chaos that
was the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Many of the accomplishments he had worked so
hard and so long to achieve were destroyed by leftist fanatics and marauding bands of the
Red Guard. Khafungga and most of his other compatriots who had struggled for Mongo
lian nationalistic aspirations did not escape persecution or death during this calamitous
time. If Prince De had a soul, it certainly departed this world unwillingly and unhappily.
It left behind many unaccomplished objectives and a scene of almost unthinkable domes
tic political madness.
I have been unable to determine whether this tragic, unsung hero of modem
Mongolian history left behind any last will or testament. I have only been able to learn
that after his death, his friends and family cremated his remains and scattered his ashes on
the mountain where the oboo of the Sunid Right Banner was formerly located. The entire
banner is visible from this place. Perhaps from here his spirit keeps eternal watch over
the land and people he so deeply loved.
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Shirahama Yoshiharu £] '{^
ShiYunqing MUM
Shi Yushan S ft ill
Sichuan 0 J11
Song Wanli 5t5 K S
Song Zheyuan ft: JC
Songzhusi
^
Shuihu zhuan 7j<
Shulu 'M IM
shuren zhuyi ^ A
Su, Prince
Su Baofeng
M
Su Bingwen MSuiyuan
Suiyuan cheng
jS
Suiyuan-Xinjiang
Sun Haiming f#, f$ 0^
SunKe
Sun Lanfeng M lll^
Sun Yat-sen fft"hfii|

T
Tai ^
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taiji
Taiyuan :;t!M
Taizong (Huangtaiji)
Takahashi Shigekasu jl5^ ^

U
Umezu Hoshijiro JS
Urga (Ulaanbaatar)
Uyama Heishi ^
±:

mr

Takaki Ichinari
— -tlj
Takatsu Hikoji M
Takehara Kiyoshi
J[i^
Takeuchi Tetsuo t'!T F*il @ H
Takeshita Yoshiharu
T ^ 0®
Tanaka Hisashi EB 4^ X
Tanaka Ryukichi E0 'B ^ —
Tanaka Shinichi ffl
^^
Tangku Agreement
^
Tang Yulin )ir3iK
Tan Tiwu
Tao Libin p® '4. ^
Taolin
Taonan
Tao Xisheng P® ^
^
tenyu mon dai ^
Terazaki Eyu ^ lllf
Terazaki Ryoichi ^lllf ^ —
Three Principles of the People 21
Tianjin ^
Tianjin-Pukou Railway ^
Tian Rubi EB Uc
Tian Yinghuang EH PS
ToJoHideki
tokumkikan }|§
BS
TokyoNichinichi $^0 0
Tongliao j1 jg
Tongmeng hui [r] M #
Toyama Mitsuru
Tuquan ^
dutong
tuyaozuhe
TuYiming

W
Wall Yanghang 5 ^IJ # p/f
Wang Daoyi 2E 11 —
Wang Guicong 2E ti 31
Wang Huaiqing IE
Wang Jingguo H Urn S
Wang Jingwei jf ff
Wang Jitang 2E it 1#
Wang Junhui (E ^
Wang Kemin I
®
Wang Ping 2E 4^
Wang Shenhua IE ^
Wang Shouben IE E
Wang Tongchun IE #
Wangyemiao IE SS HI
Wang Ying IE
Wang Yunwu IE S' it
Wang Zhaoming 31 ^ll
Wang Zhenhua IE ® ^
Wang Zhushu IE 14 Iffj
Wang Ziyang
g #
Wasa Yoshinosuke
iZ. BA
Watanabe
1#
weiyuan “cr
weiyuanhui
Wen Huajun ^ 8 ^
Wenhui Bao
fVo de Quanbansheng
63 it) 4^
Wo suo zhidao de De Wang he
dangshi de Nei-Menggu ^ pjj

^Dlt63ti31fn#0t63l*I
Wu Bailing
Wuchuan jit J11
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Wude Qinwang
Wu Gating
^S
Wu Heling
H
Wu Jingbin .g; |p ^
Wu Junyu ^ g- 5.
Wulanhada ting
M Pp IS Si
Wu Peifu ^ f® ^
wuquan xianfa ji tH
Wutai 5^ □'
Wu Yaochen ^ ^ E
Wuyuan f£ IS
Wu Yunpeng ^ S ®
X
Xia Gong § ^
Xi'an p ^
Xian M
XiaoZhaogeng M'JlS
XiaoZhengyi M IE IS
Xianfeng Emperor (Wenzong) ^
Xikang gg ®
Xinan zhengwu weiyuanhui
XingZhixiang
Xinhua Ribao Itr^ B
Xing Fuli m IS If
Xinjiang trll
Xinjing ^
Xitao Menggu ® ^ “XE"
Xiong Shihui
xuandaotuan
^ [B
Hsuanhua alt
XueXingru
Si
Xu Fulin ^ M ^
xunfli
Xu Ronghou
Xu Shuzheng ^
XuTingyao
XuYongchang ^7I<lb
Xu Zhankui IT pS Sfet
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Y
Yamada Moichi ill E3 ^ —
Yamamoto Nobunaga lll^fHM
Yamawaki Masataka ill IE PS
Yamanouchi |1
Yanakawa Heisuke |fiP JI i 4^
Yan'an
Yanashita Yoshiji ^PP T ^ Z1
Yang Hucheng ti lit
YangJunsheng
^
Yangzi River
Yan Menghua
Yan Xishan
Yao Shan ^ ill
Yao Zong
^
Yasato Tomomichi AS
Yenching
^
Yidechin \f
Yigu
Yi Guohuang
Yin Baoshan ^ ^ llj
Yingtai ji
YinRugeng WLik%^
Yiseikan
Yokosuka
®
YokoyamaJun
ill HIM
Yonghe Gong ^ fD ^
Yoshimura ^
Yuanlai Zhuang
5|5 H±
Yuan Shikai ^ IE M
Yu Bin, Paul ^ 15ft;
Yuchun 5. ^
Yu Dechun
Yu Fugeng
tS ®
Yu Huachen
ft E
YuJishi
Yu Lanzhai T" ^ #
Yulin
II
Yun Jixian
Yun Run § M
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Yun Ze (Ulanfij) S
Yu Pinqing ^ iP
Yushenghui
^#
Yu Shenzheng
Yu Yifu ^ ^ ^
Yu Youren ^
(3;

(B M ^)

Z
Zaifeng tic ®
Zai Tao tSv#
Zeng Houzai # tS
Zen rinkyokai, Chosa-geppo #

) PJ ^ ^

Zhangbei
3b
Zhang Jinghui
®0
Zhang Ji M lii
Zhangjiakou ^ ^ □
Zhang Chun
$
Zhang Shaozeng
Zhang Xueling
^
Zhang Yanqing ^ ^ PIP
Zhang Zhizhong
Zhang Zuolin ^
Zhao Chengbe ® hS ^
Zhao Chengshou ®
Zhao Daiwen S ^
Zhao Dienchen
^S
Zhao Kaixian ® PS yt
Zhao Pilian
^^
Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi jft tp

(^ # ii
Zhejiang jjjf
Zhili IS U
zhou jj'H
Zhou Baihuang
H 'iS
Zhou Enlai
® ?l5
Zhu De 31?:
Zhu Jiahua 3t?: ^ il
Zhu Wenwu tI? jfcb
zizhibang g '?p^[S
zizhiguo g tn ^

zongcai
Zongshedang
Zuihe JiMfif
Zuo Zhuan
f#

INDEX

A
Abaga Banner, 6n4, 23, 63, 71,
328
Abaga Left Banner, 13, 58,
273,328
Abaga Right Banner, 62, 195,
200,271,285,331,371,
372
Abaga Special Service Office,
127, 130, 200, 257, 329,
350
Abaga tribe, 1,6
Abahai, 1, 3
Abkhanar tribe, 2; PLATE 6,
Banner Primay School
Aduuchin, 19
advisors, Japanese, Organiza
tional Law of the Depart
ment of, 196-197
Agdungga, 63, 129, 372,
380n5,396n3, 409n6
Ahmed-jiang, 368
Aisha Beg, 368, 373
Ajia Khutughi, 319
Akiyama, 222
Alashan Banner, 5; PLATE 15,
Banner Temple
Alashan Mongolian Autonomy
Movement, 1949, 392-426
Alashan Mongols, 8/1949, split
among, 420-422
Alashan region, 8/1949, mili
tary organization, 417-418
Alashan, 10/1949, surrender to
communists of, 423
Alashan, 1949 situation in
while Prince De in Nan
jing, 404-406
Alashan, 28,90
albalu, commoners, 3
Almas, 409n6
alian urag. See the "Golden
Clan”
Altanbagana, and IMPRP, 47
Altanchilagu, 409n6
Altangerel, 68, 135, 136
Altanochir (Ifom Sunid Right
Banner), 306,331,336,
372,424,428,429-432,

435,436,442
Altanochir (Jin Yongchang),
see Altanwachir
Altanwachir (Jin Yongchang;
from Khanggin Banner),
22, 25n6, 57, 63n2, 68,
68n6, 71,77, 80, 98, 125,
128-130, 132, 138, 302,
398,398n4
Amakasu, Jutaro, 245
amban (envoy), 6
Aminboke, 280, 305,315, 321,
409n6
Amurchinggeltu, 27, 27n7, 37,
39
Amursana, 428
An Chunshan, 229-230
An Huating, 164
Anan, Tadaki, 315, 320
Anhui faction, 20
animal husbandry, mixed
results of reforms in, 214
anti-Communism, shared by
Japanese and Mongols,
182
Anzai, Kinji, 169-170, 198
Ao Yunzhang, 51n2, 72, 87,
101, 114, 123, 139, 173,
176, 185
Aradun jasag, People’s Gov
ernment, 21
Araikawa, Kanetasuku, 198
Araki, Sadao, 193
Arbijikhu, 101, 110, 174nl,
187,295
Arbinbayar, Prince, 11
aristocracy, evolution of in
Mongolia, 3
army, under 1933 autonomous
government, 77
Asaka, Shiro, 275
Asami, Kikuo, Major, 131,
139, 140
Asao,Tatsuo, 281,339,373
Asian Development Board,
216,263,298
Askhan, 48. 58, 194,269,281282,283,341
assimilation aims of republican
government, 34-35
Association of Students Edu

cated in Europe and
America, 36-7
atom bomb, 314
auto transport, early, 16
autonomous state, Chinese
term for, 248
autonomy compromise by
Mongols, 1933, 84
autonomy compromise of
1933, text, 90-92; student
demonstrations against,
92-93; autonomy com
promise of 1933, text, 9092; resistance to by Chi
nese frontier provinces,
79; final version, 95; gov
ernment duplicity in com
promise, 92
autonomy, 1946, compromise
on, 366-368
Ayulguei. See Ayulugei
Ayulugei, 27, 28, 36, 50, 79,
98, 99,102n2, 133

B
Babudorji, 63nl,71n8, 74, 89,
98, 120, 121n8, 146,
174nl, 177, 265,304
Babujab, “Mongol bandit,”
16n4, 151,417
Badmarabdan; PLATE 3; 105,
269, 278,279,280, 281,
339, 409n6
Bagaturchilagu, 36
bagshi, teacher, 24
Bai Anshan, 409n6
Bai Chongxi, General, 37,108,
361
Bai Dacheng, 354, 369, 381n6
Bai Fashan, 51, 111
Bai Fengzhao, 360
Bai Haifeng (Dugurengsang,
1904-1957), 26, 70, 101,
110, 123,30I,360,369n3,
382, 383, 385, 387, 395,
395n2,396,397,399,402,
405,407,409n6,410,411,
417-419,421-423,425,
435,436, 442

Index
Bai Lama. See Yeshijalsan
Bailingmiao, Battle of. See
Bat-Khaalag, Battle of
Bailingmiao. See Ba-khaalag
temple
Bai Rui, 22, 322,404, 409n6,
410,411,415, 72, 92
Baitashan Incident, 376
Bai Wenhua, 344
Bai Yincang, 300, 301
Bai Yunti (Serengdongrob,
1894-1980), 23n5,25,
25n6, 26, 28, 32, 35, 35n2,
37, 40,44, 49, 51n2,63n2,
92,93,93nl2,98,119,
125, 131, 132,136-138,
281,322-323, 327, 345,
347, 348, 360,364, 368,
375, 380n5, 382, 383, 387,
390, 399, 400; 1928 clash
with Wu Heling, 38, 38n4
Baidangjamsu, 409n6
Balgunjab, 121n8, 174nl
Balgunsumng, 124, 142n7,
174n 1,270, 328, 329, 330,
338
banner construction brigades
of Mongolian Rehabilita
tion Committee, 276-277
banners, 1943 preliminary tax
regulations for, 292,
292nl 1; 1943 reorganiza
tion of 291-293; Mongol,
2; banner-x;ztrt postwar
power division, 375
Bao Guiting. See Buyandelger
Bao Guoyi. Se Unensechen
Bao Shanyi, 350
Baotou, 32
Bao Yinxi, 79
Bao Yonghe, 340
Barretf David, Colonel, 374
Baruun Tusalagchi, 302
Bat-khaalag temple, 66n5, 68
Bat-kliaalag, 1936 Battle of
161-164
Batu, 135, 136
Batubayar, 112, 113
Batubilig, 381n6
Batudorji, Jin. See Jin Batudorji
Batujirgalang, 429-430,430,
432-433,433
Batu-khagalagayin Khural.

See Mongolian Political
Council
Batumongke, Luo. See Luo
Batumongke
Batunasun, daughter of Prince
De, 437
Ba Weisong. See Bayankhan
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Ba Wenjun, 353nl, 354,360,
395, 395n2, 396. See also
Bayankhan
Bayansang. See Bai Yincang
Bayankhan, 67, 353,353nl,
354, 360, 395-399, 395n2,
397n4.405-41 l,409n6,
414,419, 421,425-426.
See also Ba Wenjun
Bayanoljei, 151
Bayantai (Yu Lanzhai), 25n6,
125, 131, 132, 139-140,
142n7, 152, 174nl,219nl,
223
Bayantala League, 182
Bayantogtakhu, 434
Bayar (from Turned), 72,184,
294
Bayar (Ochirhatu, third son of
PrincDe), 429,431-435,
436, 438-441
Ba Yunying, 175, 380n5
Bazargurda. 71n8,129,130,
266
Bean. Ruth, 376,387-388, 439
Beijing, 10/1949, old name
replaces Beiping, 423;
Sino-Russian Treaty of
1860,6
Beile-yin sume, See Batkhaalag temple
Beiping Preliminary Branch
Political Commission, 36
Beiping, change of Beijing's
name to, 34
Belgutei, 2
Bessac, Frank B., 373, 374,
376,410, 439
Blue Shirt Brigade of KMT,
133,137,153
Board for Asian Developmenf
210

Bodibala. See Budabala
Bogda Khan. See Jebtsundamba Khtugtu

Bolshevik Revolution, 17, 21
Bordered Yellow Banner, 332
Borjigid, Prince De’s pilot,
129n2
Borjigin clan, 3
Boxer rebellion, 9
Brigham Young University,
1967, Jagchid begins to
teach af 419
Budabala, PLATE 12; 62, 124,
142n7, 174n 1,254, 273,
291,303,304,306,313,
328, 331,370, 62
Buddhism, and reduction of
martial spirif 270
Buddhism’s political involve-

menf 102
Buddhist impatience with
Mongolian Political
Council in Beile-yin sume,
101
Bugitde Nairamdakhu Monggol Arad Ulus, Mongolian

People’s Republic, adop
tion of name of, 22
Burinbiligtu (Zhang Zirong),
154, 285,286
Burinsain, 312,336
Burintogtakhu, 72
Buriyads in Manchuria, 339
Buu. See He Shouye
Buyan, 285
Buyandalai, 23, 45, 51, 52,
107, 138, 139, 150-152,
168, 174nl, 184, 186, 221,
242,245, 251,286, 306,
307,315,333.335,349.
374, 429,438; murder of
337
Buyandelger (Sainbuyan,
1899-1965), 101, 136,
153, 174nl, 187, 236-237,
278, 308,315-316, 331,
418,422, 435-436
Buyankhan, 423
Buyanmandukhu, 269, 272,
281,339, 340,341,351
Buyannemekhu, 26
Buyanoljei, 153, 174nl, 184,
187
Buyendelger, 331,422
Byrnes, James F., 1946, moves
to block Soviet interven
tion in Inner Mongolia,
351

c

C.C. Clique, 322, 323
Cao Haosen, 52
Cao Kun, 20, 21
Cao Yousan, 423, 425
Catholic missionaries in Inner
Mongolia, 6, 7
Cen Chunxuan, 182n2
Chagan Gegeen. See Jamiyanglegshidjamsu
Chagan Nomun Khan, 109
Chagan Tolugai, 430,433,
435,436,441
Chahar. 1,5, 11, 21,45, 64n3,
90; conflict with Mongo
lia, 115; Southern, 1943,
reclassified as Xuanhua
Province, 284
Chahar Banner, 28
Chahar League, formation of
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95, 132,371-372
Chahar Right Flank banners,
11

Chahar Tribe, fail to Japan of,
120

Chakhar. See Chahar
Chang Xun, General, attempts
Qing Restoration in 1917,
16
Chen Changjie, 299, 300,301,
302
Chen Cheng, 138, 162, 164,
379, 108
Chen Erdeni, 394
Chen Erdcnibatu, 360,415
Chen Guofu, 322,360
Chen Jitang, 108
Chen Kengyang, 101
Chen Lifu, 322, 322nl, 360,
380
Chen Nasanbatu, 142n7, 146,
394,415
Chen Shaowu, See Chogbagatur
ChenSheng, 187, 293
Chen Xlaofan, 360
Chen Yingquan, 409n6, 419
Chen Yousheng, 170, 171,
201,205,228-229,
250nl4,253,285
Chen Yuming, 170, 171,204,
205,219nl,278, 284,286
Chiang Kai-shek, Prince De’s
initial favorable impres
sion of, 52; 10/1935 re
straining of Feng Yuxiang
by, 119; 1935 strategy
against Japan, 120; 131;
1936 authorizes attack on
Bat-Khaalag, 162; meet
ing with Togtokhu in
1934, 104; and 1936 Xi’an
Incident, 164; 1937 ac
cepts alliance with Com
munists, 167; 1939 secret
contact with Prince De
ends in failure, 224-228;
1945, receives two visits
by Prince De, 324; 31-32,
107, 157,218,317, 322,
345,346,351,353,359,
360, 379, 382, 389, 390,
392, 399,401, Chiang
Kai-shek, and Manchurian
Incident, 48,49; 50,94;
ends appeasement of Ja
pan policy, 161; on Outer
Mongolia, national mi
norities, 319-320
Chidaltu, 22,241nl2
Chifeng, 14

chigulgan (convention), 2

Chimedrinchinkhorlowa, 71n8,
121n8, 174nl,202n7,275
Chimedsampil, Prince, 27n7,
37, 39,45,47,49, 53n3,
148, 155
China, republic, establishment
of, 14; tensions with
Mongols over provincial
administration, 60-61;
1945 recognition of Outer
Mongolian independence
by, 346-347;
Chinbudorji, 51n2, 151, 350
Chinese Communists. 1945
attaek on Prince De, 324;
1946 peace talks with
KMT, 350-351; demand
Prince De's extradition,
438; 302, 315-318, 320,
323,333, 338, 340, 349,
351,370,373,376,379,
388, 389, 390, 392, 393,
399, 406,408,417,418,
420, 421,422-423,433
Chinese immigrants, into east
ern Inner Mongolia, 282
Chinese merchants, 11, 73,
195,239,215,230,240,
269-270, 252,289,446
Chinggis Khan, 1,72, 107,
138, 147, 149, 179, 180,
183, 194, 199,216,218,
229,248,257, 261,266,
298, 300, 304, 341,378,
409
Chinjorigtu, 350
Chin Zhichao, 322
Chogbadarakhu, 78, I27nl,
211,226, 227, 231,233,
245, 268n4, 298,303,
306-308,317,442
Chogbagatur, 83nl0, 87,101,
105, 107, 123, 138, 139,
152, 171, 174nl, 186, 202,
202n7, 254,263,284, 285,
288n9,317,321,326, 327,
380n5,38I,383,389,
409n6
Chogmandukhu, 213
Chogtumanglai, 127nl,266,
308
Choguirob, 409n6
Choibalsan, Marshal, 20, 59,
318, 335, 332, 338, 339,
428, 429, 431,432,433,
434
Choijab, 360, 381n6
Choijamsu, 409n6
Choijil, Colonel, 431,438
Christian missionaries. See

missionaries, Christian
Christianity, Catholic, 309-310
Chu Mingshan, 324, 326, 327,
343, 346-347, 349, 354,
359,375
Chu Minyi, 246
Chunde, 37, 148
Churchill, Winston, at Yalta,
310
Circassian, Mr., 410,439
Cixi, Empress Dowager, 6, 7,
9, 11, 12
collaboration with Japanese,
rationales for, 126
collaborators with Japan, leftist
origins of many, 125-126
Comintern, 20, 25,341, 342
Communist Third Interna
tional. See Comintern
Communists vs conservatives,
1946,349-350
Conference on National Ca
lamities, Luoyang, 1932,
48
conscription, 290-291; Mongol
resistance to, 157
Constitutional Convention of
National Assembly, 1946,
solution by of Mongolian
problem, 366-368
Constitutional National As
sembly, 1946, lobbying by
Mongol delegates pror to,
359-360; 1946, statement
by Inner Mongolia Chi
nese provinces, 361-362;
1946, statement by Inner
Mongolia Mongolian
leagues and banners, 362364; 1946, struggles be
tween Mongols and Chahar-Suiyuan Chinese at,
360-366
Cui Qinglan, 286, 293, 174nl
Cui Xingwu, 54, 54-5n5, 55,
153
Cultural Revolution, 370;
effect of on Inner Mongo
lia, 447

D
Da Han Yijun. See Great Chi

nese Upright Army
Dagdan Lama, 112, 113

Dagdanwangchug, Prince, 50,
344
Dagwaodsar, 373, 380n6,386,
389, 396n3, 399,409n6,
425,428,429,432,439,

Index
440,441
Dahur Mongols, 42,45
Dahur, 25
Dai Chuanxian, 53,93nl2, 94
Dai Li, 322nl
Dai Qinglian, 119
Dai Zhongyuan (Chidaltu),
307
Daimo Company, See Great
Mongolian Company
Daimo gongsi. See Great
Mongolian Company
Dalad Banner, support of
Boxers by, 9
Dalai Lama, 12n2, 22, 43
Daiizhaya. See Damzana
Dambadorji (1899-1934), 26,
32, 59
Dainirinjab, 129
Damirinsurung, 64, 134,
134n3, 146, 174nl, 186,
187,309,316,335, 336,
338
Dampii, 11
Damrinwangcbug, 393
Damrindorji. See Hang Jiaxiang
Damrinwangcbug, 381n6, 392,
397n4, 398, 404-405,
409n6,411,415,419, 420
Damzana (Darijayaga), 65,98,
146, 148,381n6, 392,
393-394, 395, 395n2, 396,
398, 399, 402, 404-405,
406,409n6,410,415,4I9,
419, 420,421,423,425
Darijab, 409n6, 417,425
Darijayaga. See Damzana
daruga, head of a league, 2
Dawa, 360, 381n6
Dayan KJian, 1
Dayanchi Lama, 372, 389, 392
De Gulai. See Jirgalang
De, Prince, PLATES 1, 8, 16,
17; early years of, 1, 8-17;
turns more conservative in
1925,26; and 1932 Con
ference on National Ca
lamities, 48, 49; accepts
compromise autonomy
plan in 1933, 85-87; 1933
and after search for auton
omy, if sovereignty not
possible, 2S9nl; 1933 ne
gotiations among Mongol
officials over unity, 66-68;
and Inner Mongolian
Autonomy movement, 60,
62; and 1933 autonomy
conference, 74; objections
to 1933 autonomy com
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promises, 89; limits on
power of in 1933,63;
made Secretary General of
Mongolian Political
Council, 1934, 100; 1934
attempt on his life by Fu
Zuoyi, 107; 1934 KMT
fears he might link to
Japanese, 104; 1934 rela
tions with Japanese, 106;
1934 second visit with
Chiang, 106; 1935 forma
tion of Chahar League,
132; 1935 secret visit to
Manchukuoby, 130-131;
1935, defends Wu Heling
against Japanese suspi
cions, 133; 1935, meets Li
Shouxin, 131; rationale for
negotiating with Japan
after 1931-35, 126; 193638 diplomatic activities of,
155-157; 1935, wins pas
sive support of Prince Yon
for links to Japan, 131;
and third meeting of Mon
golian Political Council in
10/1935, 118-119;
11/1935 response to KMT
appeasement policy with
secret negotiations with
Japan, 131,132; 10/1936,
disastrous attack on Fu
Zuoyi at Bat-Khaalag,
161-164; 1936 attempt to
maintain distance between
both China and Japan,
158; 1936 conversation
with Puyi deplored by Wu
Heling, 156; 1936 coop
eration with Wu Heling at
First Mongolian Confer
ence, 145; 1936 damage to
his prestige because of
Japanese connection, 155;
1936 decision to close
general headquarters, 141;
1936 establishment of
Mongolian Army General
Headquarters by, 138-141;
1936 founding of Mongo
lian Military Officers
Academy by, 154; 1936
moves against by KMT,
121; 1936, hesitates to
take field against Japan,
159; 1936, ManchuMongol Agreement, 155;
1936, sucked into Suiyuan
campaign, 160; 1936, un
willingness to join China

to actively fight Japan,
161; 1936, persuaded to
give up title qinwang, 156;
and 1936 inauguration of
Chahar League Office,
134-135; and 1936 Mon
golian Military Govern
ment, 143; 5/1936, be
comes first general direc
tor of the military gov
ernment, 149; 7/1936 ap
pointment by China as
head of Chahar Mongolian
Political Council proves
meaningless, 158; ap
pointed head of Shilingol
League, 7/1936, 123;
12/1936, attempts to end
Tanaka’s war, 164-165;
1937 reorganization of
and centralization of con
trol over Mongolian
Army, 166; 1937 Second
Congress unsuccessfully
advocates continuing
Military Government,
175; 1937 Second Mon
golia Congress, 173-184;
1937 victories restore his
hopes for independence,
172; 1937, says balance
required to rule under Al
lied League Autonomous
Government, 181; 1937,
caught between Japan and
Fu Zuoyi as recover lost
land, 169; 1937, conflict
with Japan over Monglian
independence, 171-172;
1937, first clashes with
Kanai Shoji, 170; 1937,
leads civil administration
of Allied League
Autonomous Government,
183; 1937, loses control of
Joint Committee members
to Kanai, 189; 1937, pulls
away from Japanese at
tack, coopted by Japanese
back into leadership, 168;
1937, uneasy with Kanai
as advisor, 186; 10/1937
made vice-chairman of
new Mongolian Allied
Leagues Autonomous
Government, 178;
10/1937 opening speech to
Second Mongolian Con
gress, 176-177; 12/1937,
heads Department of Ad
ministration, 184;1938
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audience with Hirohito,
206-207; 1938 Japan visit,
tactful handling of being
taken to Japanese scene of
Yuan Dynasty's thirteenth
century defeat, 208; 1938,
elected chair of and reor
ganizes Mongolian Allied
League Autonomous Gov
ernment, 194-196; 1938,
encourages Wu Heling to
go study in Japan, 193;
1938, forges two plans for
independence with Wu
Heling, 206; 1938, iso
lated by melding of Guandong Army into North
China Army, 190; 1938,
loses control of Second
Army to Japan, 154; 1938,
moderate course urged on
by Wu Heling, 202; 1938,
nearly forced into chair
manship of Joint Com
mittee of Mongolian Ter
ritories, 211; 1938, plot
against by Kanai Sboji,
187-189; 1938, continued
conflict with Kanai Shoji
after Japan visit, 208-13;
1938, reduced to figure
head, 212; 1938, rift with
Wu Heling reopened, 207;
1938, unfazed by threats
of assassination, 205;
1938, unsuccessful resis
tance by to rise of power
of Japanese advisors, 197;
7/1938, elected chairman
replacing Prince Yon, 192;
10/1938 visit to Japan by,
204-208; 1939, and edu
cation reform, 213; 1939,
lack of enthusiam for Al
lied Autonomous Gov
ernment, 218; 1939, re
jects new flag, 219-220;
1939, secret contact with
Chiang Kai-shek ends in
failure, 224-228; 19391941, emotional depres
sion of, 216, 220; 1940
activities in Japan, 238239; 1940, depressed over
lack of reform results for
Mongols he ponders using
Sunid Right Banner as
testing ground for reform,
237; 1940, keeps aloof
from Wang Jingwei, 228;
1940, mildly punishes

Dorji for his misdeeds,
234; 1941, applauds ex
pulsion of Panchen Lama,
but resists basic changes
in lamaist doctrine, 270;
1941, delays full moderni
zation of administration
lest Japanese use it to
penetrate local govern
ments, 255; 1941, deter
mination to modernize by
expanding on his Sunid
Right Banner experience,
244-245; 1941, meeting
with Tojo in Kalgan, 249;
1941, organizes body
guard, 249; 1941, second
visit to Japan of, 245-249;
1941, shrewd political
balancing by in cabinet
shuffle, 251, 251nl5; and
1941 resignation of Prince
Sung, 242; 1942 and 1943,
documents on Asian de
velopment, 298-299;
1942, becomes aware of
Ohashi's bad behavior to
fellow Japanese, 265-266;
1942 meetings of Mongol
ian Rehabilitation Com
mittee, 269-270; and 1942
fall of Ohashi Chuichi,
273; 1/1942, expresses
solidarity with Japan, 266;
1/1942, greeted by Ohashi
Chuichi, 264; 2/1942,
followup meeting with lo
cal rulers, 266; 3/1942
Manchukuo visit by, 26869; 1943 Mongolian Army
problems, 293; 1943 postreorganization problems,
286-291; 1943 recovery of
power by, 283-286; 1943,
aborts Inner Mongolian
military conspiracy, 294;
1943, preserves feudalistic
elements to minimize
Japanese interference,
293; 1943, uses Mongol
ian Army Officer Acad
emy to try to take Army
control fiflm Li Shouxin,
295; 1944, counsels youth
preparing for Japanese and
German defeat, 302-303;
1944, disharmony over
control of army, 305-307;
1944, loses control of
Army again, 308; 1944,
obliged to take headship

of Political Affairs De
partment, replacing Wu
Heling, 307; 1944, post
crisis personnel shifts,
307-308; 1944, problem of
Prince's queue, 304-305;
1944, tries to ignore fac
tional infighting, 306;
1945, attempts to concili
ate local Chinese, 310311; 1945, conversations
with Chiang in Chung
king, and written summa
ries of these, 324-325;
1945, effect on him of
Yalta Agreement, 310311; 1945, family of es
capes harm during Soviet
occupation of Sunid Right
Banner, 331; 1945, his
Kalgan government falls,
317-318; 1945, holds
aloof from KMT faction
alism in Chungking, 323;
1945, hopes for Mongol
ia's future, swears not to
flee to Japan, 311-312;
1945, unfruitful second
meeting with Chiang in
Chungking, 327; 1945,
views on Soviet and MPR
occupation, 333; 1945,
visit to Xi'an on way to
Chungking, 321; 1945,
visit witli Chiang Kai-shek
in Chungking, 323-328;
9/1945, in Beiping, out of
touch with Sunid confer
ence, 335; 1946 contacts
with Mongolian-Tibetan
Affairs Commission, 376378; 8/18/1945 telegram
to Chiang Kai-shek, 317;
8/1942, convenes Fifth
Mongolian Congress, 278279; 8/1945, move of
from Kalgan to Beiping,
Chungking, 319-322;
10/1945, belief of that he
might soon return to
steppes, 342; 10/1945, fo
cuses on unification of
factions in Beiping, 342;
10/1945, favored by most
of Beiping Mongols, 343;
1946, disappointment at
constitutional compro
mise, 370; 1946, hopes to
use Nanjing cabinet re
shuffle to continue reha
bilitation of Shilingol and
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Chahar, 375; 1946, main
tains devotion to increased
autonomy, 353; 1946,
Rong Xiang comes over to
his side, 354; 1946, sees
no immediate solution to
Mongolia's problems, 371;
1946, turns down headship
of Shilingol League, 373;
1946, unsuccessfully cau
tions Khuturungga to not
shed blood, 372; 1/1946,
cuts off queue to cele
brate MPR recognition by
China, 346, 427; 2/1946,
hopes for success in East
ern Inner Monglian auton
omy negotiations with
Chinese, 347; 3/1946, re
alizes China only granting
limited autonomy, 348;
8/1946, recovery of Inner
Mongolia by KMT raises
his prestige, 351-352;
1948 contacts with
American intelligence,
388, 388n7; 1948, advice
to First National Assem
bly delegates, 381; 1948,
finally informed about
existence of Mongolian
Youth Alliance, 388;
1948, withdrawal from
Beiping, 389-391; 1949,
he and Damzana, pass
leadership to Altanochir,
398; 1949, contact with
Americans in Guangzhou,
403; 1949, failure in Nan
jing autonomy negotia
tions, 400-401; 1949, fur
ther contact with MPR
agents at Bayan Shangdu
Temple, 430-432; 1949,
gains only authorization
for Preliminary Commit
tee for Mongolian Auton
omy, 404; 1949, last ditch
possible move to Tibet via
desert and Kokonor, 406;
1949, other contacts in
Guangzhou, 404; 1949,
trip to Guangzhou, 398402; 1949, wants to take
advantage of KMT central
power's disintegration,
395; 1/1949, departs for
Alashan, 392-393; 1/1949,
visits Chiang in Nanjing,
390; still desires to go in
dependently to Northwest,

390; 4/1949, convenes
conference on autonomy,
396; 7/1949, accepts Jagchid's proposal to escape
to Tibet, but Wu Heling
talks others into staying,
407; 7/1949, decision not
to go into exile subjects
him to persecution by
Communists, 407; 7/1949,
return to Alashan by, 406408; 8/1949, appoints Jagchid representative of
autonomous government
to U.S., 419; 8/1949, con
tacts via son, Dugursureng, with MPR, es
chews exile, 418; 8/1949,
elected head of Alanshan
Conference-based Mon
golian Autonomous Gov
ernment, 415; 8/1949,
fails to gain hanging of
portrait of Chinggis Khan
at Alashan conference,
409; 8/1949, farewell to
departing Jagchid et al,
419; 8/1949, keynote ad
dress to Alashan confer
ence by, 409,410; 8/1949,
revives idea of fleeing to
Tibet via Kokonor, and
perhaps then to India, 421;
8/1949, still hoped for
KMT blessing on Mongol
ian autonomy, 416-417;
9/1949, after exile from
Alashan, 422-424; 9/1949,
fails to persuade Alashan
Mongols to retreat to Ti
bet, 422; 10/1949, crosses
back from MPR to Inner
Mongolia and back again,
432- 434; 10/1949, crosses
into MPR, 430-431;
10/1949, in MPR, contin
ued unrealistic hopes for
Mongol unity, 431;
10/1949, jobs of sons and
daughter in MPR, 431;
10/1949, thoughts upon
final crossing into MPR,
433-434; 10/1949, up
braids Altanochir for giv
ing communications
equipment to MPR, 430;
11/1949, in Ulaanbaatar,
first exposure to works of
Lenin and Mao, 434;
11/1949, a guest in Ulaan
baatar, 434-435; 11/1949,

in Ulaanbaatar, passively
refused meeting with
Choibalsan, no right to
leave MPR, 434,435;
11/1949, misses chance to
see most family members,
436; 11/1949, under house
arrest in Ulaanbaatar, 435437; 11/1949-2/1950,
prisoner in Ulaanbaatar,
437-438; late 1949, Bai
Haifeng and He Zhaolin
sent by Communists to
win surrender of, 423; late
1949, still demanding
Mongolian autonomy,
courted by Communists,
424; 12/1949, prepares to
contact MPR agents, 428430; 12/1949, responses to
MPR invitations, 427-428;
12/1949-9/1950, in Ulaan
baatar, 427-442; 9/1950,
extradition to Beijing,
441-442; 15, 17, 142n7;39/1950, interrogation
during imprisonment, 438441; 1963-66, his Person
al Narration likely an in
complete set of "confes
sions," 446-447; 4/1966,
death of, 447, 448; and
Eight Articles establishing
autonomy, 95; and feudal
opposition to Wu Heling,
50; and founding of Khorishiya, 240; and Guang
dong initiative, 107-109;
and journalistic coverage
of 1933 autonomy talks,
81; and Mongolian Auto
nomous State, 259-318;
and Mongolian Delegation
in Tokyo, 266; and organ
ization of the Mongolian
Army, 153-154; and Peace
Preservation Corps, 110;
and Peace Preservation
force rebellion of 1936,
122-123; and revenue
from opium, 113-115; and
Zhangbei IncidenL H8;
appeals for mercy for
Lingsheng, 148; 10, 13,
20,21,22, 23,24, 27,28,
29, 30, 33, 36,40n6,42,
45,46, 50, 53, 56, 58, 70,
78, 80,81,82, 88, 89, 92,
95,98,99, 101, 102, 105,
106, 111, 116,117, 117n6,
119, 122, 124, 128, 129,
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147, 152, 157, 163, 172,
203n8,231,262,271-272,
275-276, 297, 298, 299,
314,315,318, 380,385,
388, 394, 397n4,409n6,
424-426,427-428, 444,
445,
Dechin (b. 1882), 25, 25n6,
98nl3,213,219nl
Declaration of Inner Mongo
lian Autonomy, prelimi
nary, 72-74
ded-daruga, deputy head of a
league, 2
Delgerchogtu, 294, 312, 331
Demchugdongrob. See De,
Prince
Deng Zeru, 108
Dewagenden, PLATE 4; 51,
63, 71n8, 142, 145, I74nl.
284-285, 336,350
De Wang. See De, Prince
Dilowa Khutuglu, 19n2, 108,
129, 130, 134-135,271272, 272n6, 390
DingQichang, 153, 187,
219nl,238,250nl4, 252,
268n4, 278, 293,315; sui
cide of, 343
Dingyuanying, 1949, last hq of
Prince De, 393; politics
among the Mongols of,
394-396
diplomacy, 1936-38, 155
Dobdan,63, 74, 174nl, 142n7,
202n7, 234, 235,236, 330,
409n6,
Doihara, Kenji, 118, 128, 132
Doihara-Qin Agreement, 160
Doloonnor, history of, 15,
55n6; Zhang Zuolin’s
1925 occupation of, 30
Dong Biwu, 167,422
Dong Qiwu, 417, 420, 439
Dorben-keuked Banner, in
demnity payments en
forced on, 7, 7n5; support
of Boxers by, 9
Dordog, 429
Dorgon, Prince, 3
Dorji, 124, 142n7, 234,
234nl0, 236, 330, 360
Duan, Kehe, 444
Duan Qirui, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30
Duan Taldangdai, 429,432
Duchingge, 157
duguilang, spontaneous popu
lar rebellion, 11
Dugur. See Li Shoushan
Dugurengsang. See Bai Hai-

feng
Dugursurung, eldest son of
Prince De, PLATE 8;
174nl,210, 237, 273,312,
331,336, 338, 409n6,418,
424,428,429-430,431,
435, 436-437,442,445
Duingkhorjab, 331, 337, 370371,429, 434,440
Du Yunyu, 170, 189, 201,
219nl,222, 250nl4, 278,
285, 286, 306

E
E Yousan, 305, 309-310
Eastern Hebei AntiCommunist Autonomous
Government, 160
Eastern Hebei Autonomous
Government, 120
Eastern Hebei Autonomous
Government, agreement
with, 15; 2/1946, sends
delegation to Beiping, 346
Eastern Mongolia, 1945,
changing situation in, 339342
Economics, Ministry of, 1943
establishment of, 285
education proposals, 1941,
244; reforms of Prince
Gungsangnorbu, 274; un
der 1933 autonomy rules,
91-92; 1941, in Shilingol
League, 256; 1943 on,
290; female, 237-238;
213-215,283,323-324
Ejine, 90
Ekuchi, Yoshinao, 288
Elechun, 49
elections, and Mongol re
sponse, 378-381
elections, national, 1948,379380
Engkeamur, 72,79,101,138,
139, I74nl, 184, 222, 344
Engkebatu, 92, 98, 102n2. 131
229
Engkeburin, 25, 125,129, 195
Enterprise, Ministry of, 1943
establishment of, 285
Erdenibatu, Chen. See Chen
Erdenibatu
Erdeni, Chen. See Chen Erdeni
ere, probationary soldier, 3
ere, unit of one hundred ablebodied men, 3
Ere’en (Erlian)-dabsu salt lake,
2

Ere’en, 16
Eriyen. See Ere’en
Erkedorji,71n8,112,113,
174nl, 175
Erkejibu, 238
Erkesechenjambal, 175
Erlian. See Mongolia, Inner

F
Feng, Yuxiang, 2n5,11,21,
22.28, 29, 32, 34, 38n4,
39n5,46, 43-44.45, 56,
61, 119, 126
feudalism long since outgrown
by Mongols, writes Jagchid, 358
Fifth Mongolian Congress,
8/1942, 277-279
Finance, Ministry of, 1943
establishment of, 285
First Chinese National Assem
bly, Mongol delegates to,
381-384
flag of Allied Autonomous
GovemmenL 219
flag, changes in during repub
lican era, 34, 149
flag, national, basis for quarrel
during Prince's 1940 Japan
visit, 238
food, trade in, 215
Fu Mingtai. See Fumingtai
Fumingtai, 25,42
Fu Xiande, 166, 186
Fu Zuoyi, 11, 54, 61, 63, 64n2,
66n5, 67, 70. 77, 80, 89,
90, 93,94, 98, 99, 100,
102, 102nl, 103, 112-113,
115, 118, 121, 122, 126,
140, 145, 146, 154, 155,
159-160, 161, 162, 163,
164, 167, 175, 182n2, 186,
187, 192, 196, 199, 201,
222,229-230, 243,299,
300, 301,302,304-305,
309,311,315-316,317318, 332, 337, 349,351353,354,359,361,366,
371,372.377,378,379,
381,388, 389,417,420
Fujii, Gochiro, 242, 250nl4
Fuling, 148

G
Gada meren, 30
Galsangjirmed, second son of
Prince De, 436,442
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Gal sangrolmawangj i Ij amsu,
121n8
gaming, revolution, 14
Gao Rong, 224
Gao Yajie, 402
Gendenjab, 63nl, 67, 71n8, 74,
89
General Affairs Bureau, 263
Giljintei,372,378,381n6, 390,
409n6,415,4l9, 422,425
Go, Minoru, 214
Golden Clan, the, 1
Golminse, 174nl, 278, 280,
332,335
Gombo, 333, 409n6,430, 432433, 434, 436,437
Gombojab (Hangin), 214, 238,
267,321,374-377,
380n5, 381,386,388,
409n6,439
Gonchog, 396n3, 409n6
Gonchograshi, 98, 124, 142n7
Gong, 409,410
Gongdari, Lieutenant, 434
Gong Ziwan, 111
Good Neighbor Association,
127, 130, 202, 256,
256nl7, 438
Great Chinese Upright Army,
159,161
Great East Asian War, effect
on Soviet Union, 262;
outbreak of, 12/1941, 262
Great Mongolian Company,
166n6,215,240, 240nll,
269-270, 289
Greater East Asian Co-Pros
perity Sphere, 298
Guan Baojia, 380n5,383
Guan Zhenduo, 229n8
Guandong Army, 1938, made
Japanese Army in Mon
golia, 190
Guangxi faction, 43
Guangxu Emperor, 9, 12
Guan Jiyu, 400,401,408,420
Guan Linzheng, 117
Guan Qiyi. See Jorigtu
Guan Yinnan. See Jorigtu
Guard Divisions of the
leagues, 290
Gui Yongqing, 50, 52,401
Guifii, 27n7,47
Guihua See Hohhot
Gungasereng, 175
Gungbujab, Prince, 151
Gungga Jurhaichi Lama, 372
Gung, Prince of Kharachin.
See Gungsangnorbu,
Prince
Gungsang, 71n8, 142n7,409n6

Gungsangnorbu, Prince
(1871-1930), 9-11, 13-16,
22-23, 26,28,30,32, 35,
36,40n7,43, 47, 50, 102,
125,213,237,274, 326,
386
Guo Daofii. See Merse
Guo Guangju, 309
Guo Taofti. See Merse

Hai Fuquan, 409n6, 432
Haneyama Yoshiro, Major,
122,201

Han Fenglin. See Kokebagatur
Han Fenglou, 187
Hangin. See Gombojob (Han
gin)
Hangin, G. See Gombojab
(Hangin)
Han Guangsen, 219nl
Han Sewang, 350
Hang Jiaxiang, 327,360,
381n6
Hasanuma Shigeru, 190,197,
208-209,210,211,216,
219,224, 224n3,
Hatano, Yoshikuma 219nl
Hayasaka Fuyo. 250nl4, 252
Hayashi, General Senjuro, 58,
127, 193
Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs
Committee, 157, 160
He Bingwen, 171, 174nl, 186,
306
Hedin, Sven, 267, 374
He Guoguang, 322nl
Hci He, 153
He Jingwu, 100, 104
He Pinwen, 184
He Qigong, 321
He Qishou, 301
He Shouye, 409n6
He Shouye (Buu), 380n5
He-Umeizu Agreement, 116,
120, 157, 160
He Yangling, 83nl0
He Yingqin, 56, 70, 78, 98,
100, 103, 106, 111, 114,
118, 119,322nl,399,400,
He Yunzhang, 174nl, 175,
186, 224, 225,226, 228
He Zhaolin (Nasunmongke),
39,101,323,327,345,
380,382,385, 386,387,
389, 392, 394, 395, 395n2,
396, 398,399,405,406,
406n5,407,410,411,414,
419.423,434,435,442

He Zhuguo, 327, 343
He Zizhang. See Chinjorigtu
Hibino, Jo, 250nl4,252
Hirohito, Emperor, 206-207,
239
Hiroji, 129
Hirota Koki, 193
Hisamitsu, Masao, 201, 238239, 253, 266, 284, 288,
Hitler, 257; Mongolian admir
ers of, 294
Hohhot, 1, Inl, 11; 1937,
begins to be overshad
owed by Kalgan, 189; 30,
64; made capital of Allied
League Autonomous Gov
ernment, 1937, 179, 180;
symbolic significance as
capital, 183
Hong maozi. See also Red Cap
rebels, 4
Flonma Major Makodo. 105
horse trade with Japan during
World War II, 269
Huadc Xian. See Jabsar
Huang Fensheng, 82-83
Huang Fu, 56, 78, 79, 111
Huang Musong, 113
Huang Shaohong, 77, 78-80,
81,85, 88, 89,92, 93nl2,
94, 108, 158,378,380n5,
409n6
Hu Fengshan. See Kokebaga
tur
Hu Hanmin, 107-108
Hulun-buir League, 13, 37, 44
Hulun-buir, 18, 27n7; occupa
tion by Japan, 46
Hurley, Ambassador Patrick,
320, 350-351
Hu Zongnan, 321,392,405

I
Ichijo, Sanetaka, Duke, 127
Ichingga, 71n8
Ihengge, 151, 153, 174nl, 187
Ikh Khuree. See Ulaanbaatar
Imamura, Toyojiro, 150, 260,
278
independence of Mongolia
declared, 13
indirect rule by Manchus, 4-5
Industrial Enterprises, Bureau
of, 1943 establishment,
289
Inmori, Toshisuke, Major, 171
Inner Mongolia, early republic
administrative changes in,
31n9. See also Mongolia,
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Inner
Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Government, 5/1946, sup
plements Communists in
Kalgan, 370; Organiza
tional Law of the, 75
Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Movement, 25n6
Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Region, influence of
Prince De on, 442; Prince
De lives to see, many of
his protdg6s serve in its
government, 446
Inner Mongolian Autonomy
Movement, 30,60
Inner Mongolian Autonomy,
Preliminary Committee
for formed, 396-398
Inner Mongolian government,
1945, creation of, 337-339
Inner Mongolian Kuomintang/People’s Revolution
ary Party, 25, 26, 29, 32,
34, 35n2,40n6,42, 56,
61,63n2, 131, 141, 146,
213,254,370
Inner Mongolian Revolution
ary Forces, 339
Inoue, Aratama, 127, 256nl7
intellectuals, anti-religious
agitation by, 270; modern,
102, 102

international organizations,
1946, contact with, 372376
investments in Mongolia,
Chinese, Soviet and Japa
nese, 166n6
Iron Ring campaigns, 104
Ishimoto, Torazo, 128, 190
Itagaki Seishiro, 128, 130,
133, 138, 150, 155, 158,
167, 169, 203-207, 209,
210-212, 229,438
Itagaki, deputy chief of staff of
Guandong Army, 118
Ito, Tasuku, 201, 204, 205,
219nl,253,201
Itsuna,Ei, 188, 198,219nl,
223
Ivanov, Colonel, 333,334,
336,337
Iwai, Fumio, 227n6
Iwasaki, Tamio, 266, 278

J
Jabsar, site of 1936-38 Military
Government, 154

Jachingjab, 174nl, 187,309,
310
Jagar, 268,268n4
Jagchid, Sechin (Serjimedug),
PLATES 4. 5, 7, 8, 10, 13,
14; accompanies father to
see Ninth Panchen Lama
in 1925,26; Sechin,
1/1936, accompanies Wu
Heling to Mongolia, 134135; 8/1936 visit to Dehua
by, 158; several visits to
1936 Bat-Khaalag battle
field by, 163; statement to
Chiang during 1946 Na
tional Assembly, 359;
10/1937, accused of Com
munist leanings by Japan
ese, 176; 1937 graduation
from Beiping University,
173; 1937 made assistant
to Mandaitu, 185; 1938
tour with Wu Heling of
Tokyo Imperial Univer
sity, 214; 1938, accompa
nies Wu Heling to Japan
until 1939, 193-194; 1938,
hears of threat to Prince
De, 205; 1938, in Tokyo,
202; 1938, urged by
Prince De to return to To
kyo, 211; berated by Kanai, 212; 1939, accompa
nies Wu Heling back Irom
Tokyo, 220; 1939, goes to
work for Prince Sungjingwangchug, 220; and
1940 visit of Wang Jingwei to Kalgan, 231-233;
part of 11/1940 delegation
to Japan, 238-239; 1941
resignation of Prince
Sung, 242-243; 1941 sug
gestions on school curric
ula, 257; 1941, accompa
nies Prince Sung as inter
preter seeing off Kanai
Shoji, 262; 1941, becomes
secretary to Prince Sung,
254; 1943 appointment as
head of Civilian Affairs
Bureau ofShilingol
League, 284; 1943 politi
cal problems in Shilingol,
287; 1945, recollections of
Soviet occupation of
Shilingol, 328-332; 1946
interview in Wenhuibao,
364-366; 1946 publication
of "The Hope of the Inner
Mongolian People," 354-

359; 1946, formation of
Mongolian Youth Alli
ance, 368; 8/1949, depar
ture from Alashan, 419420; 35, 36,51,69, 79,
103-104, 111, 117, 128,
132, 133-134,136, 138,
140, 206, 208,210-211,
218,241-242,264,265,
273, 279, 280, 288, 289,
291,296, 301,302,303,
304, 306,308,311,313,
332, 333, 334, 335, 336,
337-338, 340.344, 345,
347,354, 366,370-371,
373,376,377,381,382.
386, 388, 389,399-400,
402,404-405,409,409n6,
410,411,414,418, 439.
See also his father, Lubsangchoijur
Jagunnasutu, 106, 109, 173,
176, 184, 185,396n3,398,
404, 420,425
Jakhunju, PLATE 13; 123,
146,360, 369, 369n3, 375,
380n5
jakirugchi, 23, 25
Jalgamji, 101, 138, 174nl,254
Jalkhanza Khulugiu, (Damdinbazar;d. 1923), 19, 19n2
Jamyangligshidjamtso, 297
Jana, 434
Janggiya Khutugtu, 24, 43,48,
53, 54n4, 55n6, 78, 79,
111, 185,297
Japan, 1907 secret treaty of
with Russia, 13; study
there by young Mongols,
1931-36, 127; mixed atti
tudes of Mongols toward
in 1931,47-48; 1933 pol
icy toward western Inner
Mongolia, 62; its negative
attitude toward 1933
Mongol autonomy nego
tiations, 69; 1934 spread
of its intelligence work in
north, 109; low posture
taken toward by KMT in
1934, 111; pressures on
Mongolia by, 1934, 104;
1936 death of Prince So
increases power of, 157;
1936 westward expansion
by, 154; undermining of
Mongolian Political
Council in 1936 by, caus
ing splits among Mongols,
122; 5/1936 treated as “the
friendly nation" by Prince
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De, 150; 1937, and Sec
ond Congress, 175;1937
its second thoughts on
Mongol independence,
170; 1937, power of its
advisors in Mongolia in
creased, 183-184; 1937,
reluctance to accept broad
definition of native Mon
gol territory, 181; post1936 clashes with Soviets,
147; 1938 Mongolian
military arrangements,
199-201; motives for 1938
visit of Prince De to To
kyo, 204; Army in Mon
golia Headquarters, 1938,
190-191; 1939-1941,
greater dominance over
Mongols, 220; JapaneseChinesc Basic Treaty of
1940, 245; 1940, presses
Mongols to join Wang
Jingwei, 228; 11/1940
celebration of 2,600th an
niversary, 238-239; 1941
changed attitude toward
Mongols, 245; 1941 reap
praisal of Mongol policies,
243; 1941, draws army
supplies from Mongolia,
255, 255nl6; advisors,
1941, institutionally re
strained on Rehabilitation
Committee, 254; General
Affairs Board, 258; 1941,
quarrels among, 252-253;
Japanese-Chinese-Mongolian Agreement, 1941
draft for, 248; 1942, horse
and other goods purchas
ing by, 269-270; 1943
apogee in power of, 287;
advisors, post-1943 Mon
gol conflicts with, 291,
291 n 10; wartime pressure
brought against Christian
missionaries by, 267, 270272; Japanification of
Buddhism policy, 270271; 1945, does not resist
Soviets after unconditional
surrender, 317; Guandong
Army, 1945, weakness of,
298-299, 339; intelligence
activities of, 125-127, 176,
196-199, 296; 12, 18, 20,
130,32, 133, 152, 1154,
58-161, 169-171, 176,
214, 235,241
jasag toroyin jumvang, sec

ond-ranking prince and
ruler, 1
jasag, ruler of a banner, 2
Jebtsundamba Khutugtu
(Bogda Khan), II, 13, 19,
20,21,77, 427,
Jerim League, 5n2,9, 12, 14,
27n7, 37, 39,44. 45,46
Jiang Huiruo, 250nl4, 251252,280
Ji Chixiang, See Jirgalang
Jin Batudorji, 398, 404,409n6
Jin Chongwei, 323, 354, 382
Jindan dao Rebellion, 4
Jing Dequan, 167
Jing Tianlu, 360,380n5
Jingguleme. See Jin Yanghao
Jingjia, 268
Jin Xianzhang, 163
Jin Yanghao, 354,359, 364,
381n6
Jin Yongchang. See Altanochir, Altanochir
Jin Yongzhang. See Altanwachir
Jin Zhichao, 360
Jin, Yongchang. See Altanwachir
Jirgalang, PLATE 7, 8; 205,
296
Jirgalang (De Gulai), 381n6,
431
Jirgalang (from Dahur),
250nl4,251
Jirgalang (from Jerim),
250nl4,253, 254
Jirgalang (Ji Zhixiang), 433
Jirgalang, 48, 101, 123, 151,
152, 171, 174nl, 175, 177,
184, 188, 195,204,206,
209, 210,211,219nl,223,
241 n 12, 245,247,250nl4,
252, 268n4, 268n4, 277,
281,285,286,307,314,
317, 332, 333,334, 335,
336, 337, 338, 341,344,
379,381n6, 399-400,402,
404, 404-405,406,409n6,
411,414,415,419, 421,
425
Ji Songling, 146
Ji Zenfti. See Jakhunju
Ji Zhixiang. See Jirgalang
Jiyatai, 78
Jodbajab, 51,56, 59, 65n4, 98,
122, 124, 132, 134-135,
137n6, 140, 140, 142n7,
149,155, 158, 170, 174nl,
184, 188, 189, 201,208,
219nl, 223, 231-233,236237,249, 250,250nl4,

264,277, 278,291nl0,
315,332, 333
Joint Committee of Mongolian
Territory, 187-189
Jorigbagatur, 127nl
Jorigtu, 101, 117, 184,353,
354, 369, 380n5, 383, 386,
354
Jorintob, 360,409n6
Josotu Banner, 14
Josotu League, 5n2, 12, 21, 36,
4,44, 45, 48
journalistic coverage of 1933
autonomy talks, 81
Ju Zheng, 93n 12, 160
Jungnai, 18nl, 36, 39,409n6
Jurkhaichi Lama Gungga, 372
Juun Tusalagchi, 301, 302
Juutaibao, 71n8, 175, 174nl
Juu Uda Banner, 14
Juu-uda League, becomes
“Mongolian Autonomous”
Kinggan West Province,
4, 5n2, 12, 14, 16n4,21,
36,44,45, 48, 57
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Kabji Lama. See Lubsang
Kabji Lama; 202n7, 277,
296, 297, 330.See also
Lobsang
Kahoku Kabushiki Kaisha. See
North China Development
Company
Kalachakra Initiation, 42, 70
Kalgan, 5, 10, 16, 1937, begins
to overshadow Hohhot,
189; 1946, recovery tfom
Communists, 370; be
comes capital of Mongo
lian Autonomous State,
280
Kalgan-Ulaanbaatar Automo
bile Company, 16
Kanagawa, Kosaku, Colonel,
201,281,283,339
Kanai Shoji, PLATE 7; 170,
171, 186, 187-190, 191,
193, 199-201,201,202,
203, 204, 206, 207, 208,
208-213,216,218-219,
220, 221,222,223,227,
228, 231-233,236-237,
240,241-242, 243,245247, 248-250, 252-253,
259, 260-262, 262n2,3,
263, 266, 275-276, 283,
286, 307,
Kangi, Masaichi, 315
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Kang Jimin, 123, 353nl
Kang Ren. See Mergenbalor
Kangyu, Kosaburo, 198
Kanjurwa/w/iK/ug/tt, 1913
assassination of, 15, 107,
296, 297
Kanki, Masaichi, 320
Kasame Yoshiaki, 193,198,
263
Kashiwa, Goto, 250nl4, 253
Kataoka, Major General, 268
Katukura, 261
Kawabe, Torashiro, Colonel,
133
Kawasaki, Colonel, 166, 168
Kaya, Okinori, 200
Keshig, 72, 72n9
Keshigdelger, 112
Keshigten Banner, 22
Keshingge (1888-1950), 92,
93nl2,98, 229
Khafengga (1908-1970), and
Mongol nationalist reac
tion to Manchurian Inci
dent, 47; 281, 340-342,
447
Khalkha. See Mongolia, Outer
khambus, high-ranking lama
officials, 27
Khangdadorji Prince (from
Ordos Left Central Ban
ner), 64n2, 121n8, 141,
427
Khangdadorji, Prince (18711915, from Tushiyetu
Khan Aimag), 427
Khara Kilad, black Chinese,
14
Kharachin Banner, 9, 10, 14,
22, 28n8, 45,
khariyad, personal staff of a
banner head,2
khariyalu, 3
Khasbagan, 101, 110
Khashaat (Khashiyatu) and
opium traffic, 113, 114
Khashaat Incident, 117
Kha.sochih, 71,83nlO, 93,
174nl
Khatanbagatur, 78, 127nl,
249, 281,309,312,313,
339,340-341,342, 345,
370,409n6,431,
Khauchid, 1,2, 3
Khorchinbilig, 335, 336
Khorjurjab, Prince, 52, 53,62,
71n8, 98. 100, 174nl,
202-203,251
Khorchin Left Front Banner,
45
Khorchin Mongols, 5

Khorchin Right Center Banner,
9
Khorjorjab, Prince, 52, 53,62,
71n8,98, 100, 124, 139,
140, 149, 152, 184, 185,
195,202,213,223,
250nl4,278,331,
Khorongga, 166, 254
khorshiya (cooperatives),
founding of, 239-241; alli
ance of, 307-308; 166,
I66n6255, 256, 266, 269,
288-289, 290, 306, 307
Khoshoi Dugureng Chin
Wang, Manchu/Mongol

title, 15
Khoshoi Sechen Chin Wang,

Manchu/Mongol title, 2
Khubilai Khan, invasion of
Japan by, 208
khuraliai, as precedents for
1936 First Mongolian
Conference establishing
Mongolian Military Govemmenf 145
Khuturi,45, 57, 58, 129
Khuturungga, 350,352,372
Khuwalintai, 148
khuyagh, soldier, 33nl0
Kichiyeltumergen, Slnl2,343,
347
Kikutake, Jitsuzo, 47
Kimura, Koichi, 329
Kimura, Yujiro, 204,212, 221,
235,241-242, 245,248,
260, 263, 277, 284, 288
Kinggan (Xing’an) General
Bureau, 49
Kinggan East and North Pro
vinces under Japan, 49
KMT(See also Kuomintang)
appeasement policy, end
of, 161; Blue Shirt Bri
gade of, 153; govemmenf
approves constitution,
353; 1946 peace talks with
Chinese Communists,
350-351; 8/1949, last
Mongol negotiation with,
419-420; in 1948 election,
380; stops constitutional
amendments at 1948 First
National Assembly, 385;
weakened by death of
Prince So, 157
Koayin. See Board for Asian
Development
Kogjiku, 344
Kogjintei, 151, 185, 210, 381
Koiso, Kuniaki, 310, 311
koke Sunid, green Sunid, 4

Kokebagatur, PLATE 13;
kidnapping and murder of,
58,69, 79, 101, 103, 104,
106, 107-108, 110, 117,
187, 353nl,2, 368,380n5.
Also spelled Kokebagatar,
Kokebator; also known as
Han Fenglin
Koke-khota. See Hohhot
Kokonor (Qinghai) Mongols,
contacts with other Mon
gols, 109-110
Kokuryukai, 198
Kong Qingzong, 83nl0
Konoyc, Fumimaro, 206,209,
246, 247
Korostowetz, Ivan, 88nl 1
Koyazan sect, and Tibetan
Buddhism, 271
Kuci-hua (Guihua). See
Hohhot
Kugjintei (Kugjintai?), 151,
284
Kuma, Takeshi, 201
Kuomintang, 1928 denial of
self-rule for the Mongols
by, 37,38n4; 1945, at
tempts to recruit Mongol
intellectuals by, 344, 345;
influence of its doctrines
on Mongol nationalism,
61-2; Northern Campaign
by, 32, 34; Northern Ex
pedition of 1926-7 by, 32;
22, 25
Kurosawa, Ryukichi, 199, 284
Kurosawa, Torizo, 239
Kushibe, Masateru, 187, 188,
198, 202n7,203
Kuwabara, Araichiro, Lieuten
ant Colonel, 172, 176,
201,230

L
Lamajab, 28n8
lamas, policy to return many to
lay life, 266
Lama-yin Tamaga, 296-298
land reform, favoring Mongol
herdsmen, 282
Lanyishe. See Blue Shirt Bri
gade
Lan-yi-she. See Blue Shirt
Brigade
Larson, Swedish merchant, 19,
19n3, 77
Lattimore, Owen, 77, 272n6,
373, 388, 390,439, 445
League of Nations, 50
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leagues and banners, consid
ered basic sources of po
litical power in Mongolia,
196
Lei Zhongtian, 160
Lenin, 20
Lenjalnortsan, Prince, (1904
assassination) 9
Lhamujab, 337, 338
Liang Chixiang. See Mergen
Liang Hongzhi, 228,229
Liao, Khitan tombs, pillaging
of, 30
Liaoning. See Fengtian
Li Caigui, 106
Li Chimin, 423
Li Chunlin, 360
Li Dazhao, 32
Li Danshan. See Li Fenggang,
Mandaitu
Li-fan Yuan, 10. See also
Ministry of Dependencies
Li Fenggang. See Mandaitu
Ligdan Khan, abortive alliance
with Ming against the
Manchus, 1
Li Haishan, 173
Li Hanhun, 400
Li Jie’an, 134, 135, 137n6
Lin Biao, 340
Lin Bosheng, 232,233
Lin Sen, 157
Lingsheng Incident, 27,27n7,
37, 39,42,47,49, 147148, 156, 227n6, 280
linguistic biases among Mon
gols, 110
Linxi, 16n4
Li Shizeng, 36, 37
Li Shoushan, 54, 54n5, 55, 56,
59, 120, 126, 131, 132,
135, 138, 139, 142n7, 149,
151. 152, 153 154, 155,
165, 166, 169, 172, 174nl,
177, 178, 183, 184, 186,
187, 194, 195,204, 205,
206,207,211,220,224,
225, 228, 229-230,236237, 243,245, 250nl4,
251nl5.268n4,278,279,
286,293-294, 295,306,
307, 308,315,317-318,
319,305,320,322, 324,
326,343. 389,400,402,
408,409n6,417,418,419,
422, 425,432,433,435436.440,441,444, 445.
See also Dugur
Li Shusheng, 286, 293
Li Songfeng, 80, 83nl0
Li Yishun, 268,278
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Li Yongxin, 322, 323, 327,
344, 348, 354, 360, 360,
368,380,380,381,381n6,
382,383,384,93nl2
Li Youtong. See Askhan
Li Yuanhong, becomes presi
dent of the early republic,
16
Li Zongping. See Liu Lianke
Li Zongren, 43, 108, 322nl,
342, 349,352,371,381,
382, 387, 390, 392, 399,
417
Liu Jianhua. See Namur
Liu Jianqun, 366
LiuJiguang, 132, 153, 174nl,
184, 186, 187,286, 286,
293,319
Liu Lianke (Li Zongping),
300-302, 323,361,367,
368
Liu Puchen, 35, 83nl0
Liu Ruming, 170
Liu Xinghan, 153, 166, 186,
174nl
Liu Yifei, 45
Liu Zongping, 360
Living Buddha of Ulaanbaatar,
16
Lobsangdangjin, 109
Long March, consequences of
for Mongolia, 141
Longyan Iron Mine, 189
Longyu, Empress Dowager, 14
Loroi, 301,302
Lubsang, 333-336,409n6, 431
Lubsangchoijur, father of Se
chin Jagchid, PLATE 9;
14, 23. 24,36,37,45,51,
52, 103, 111, 132, 141,
274;
Lubsangdanjin, 109
Lubsangdorji, Captain, 434
Lubsang, Kabji Lama, 202n7,
234, 234nl0,235, 277,
296, 297, 330
Lubsangnanja, 35
Lubsangnorbu, 374, 428, 429,
432
Lu Minghui, 233, 268n4,
388n7,390n8,419,419n7,
424,425,425nl0,446447
Luo Aldachogtu, 409n6
Luo Batumongke, 394,405,
406, 409n6,418,426,429,
409n6
Luo Dawei, 394,396,405,
410,411,423
Luo Jialun, 361
Luo Liangjian, 322,322nl,

324
Luo Lingjian, 354
Luo Lipu, 167n6,241nl2, 307
Luo Ruiguang, 423
Lytton, Lord, 50

M
MaBufang, 65 109,383,404,
405,410
Ma Buqing, 65, 109
Madai, See Magadburin Hal
ted
Ma Dunjing, 402, 404, 409,
418
Maejima, Noboru, 171, 187,
219nl,250nl4,252, 258,
263
Maekawa, Hirokichi, 256nl7
Ma Fuxiang (1876-1932), 40,
43, 49, 65, 392-393
Magadburin Halted, 373-374,
330
Magino, Masao, 257
Magsur, 409n6
Magsurjab, 62
Ma Hansan, 224, 225, 321
Ma Hongbin, 392, 393nl, 418,
420
Ma Honggui, 65, 146, 301,
392-393, 393nl, 394, 396,
402,417
Maidarjab. See Asau Tatsuo
Maikawa, Hirokichi, 127, 138
Ma Jiyuan, 405
Makhashiri, 138, 139 184, 254,
284, 288n9, 389
Makino, Masaomi, 244, 270,
287
Malinovski, R. Y., Marshal,
340
Ma Mingzhou. Sec Manibadara
Manchu "people," term omit
ted in 1946 Constitution,
368
Manchukuo, establishment of
and Mongolian national
ism, 48; ethnic autonomy
formulation of adopted by
Mongols to appease Japan,
182
Manchu-Mongol Agreement of
1936,155
Manchu-Mongol country, hope
for by some in 1931, 47
Manchurian IncidenL 46-59;
Japanese propaganda in
aftemiath of, 49
Manchus, 1
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Mandaltan. See Li, Fenggang
Mandaltu,25, 131, 132, 133,
134, 173, 176, 184, 185,
254, 284, 288n9
Mandukhu, 354
Manibadara, 269, 281,283,
298, 339, 341,346,347,
348,351,441n3
Manjushiri Bodhisattva, 31
Mao Zedong, 320, 351
Marco Polo Bridge Incident,
167, 179
Marshall, General George,
351,373
Matsui, General Iwane, 58,
193
Matsui, Kyutaro, 201
Matsui, Seikun, 133, 203, 206,
207,210,212
Matsumoro, Colonel, 58, 59
Matsuo, Yutaro, 264
Matsuoka, Yosuke, 239, 246,
247,248, 255-256, 261,
273,
Matsuzaki, Yo, 294
May 4 Movement, 18, 22n5
Mayekawa, 129
Ma Yongkui, 171, 189, 201,
219nl,223,252
Mazumoro Koryo, Major
General, 127
meat for Japanese army, prob
lems of obtaining, 309
Mechanized Transport Com
pany, 166
Mcdcitu, 281, 283
Meitz, Raymond, 388, 403,
410,439
MengChaoyi, 139
Meng Jisan, 309, 316
Meng-fei, 5
Menggu daiyu liaoli, “Regula
tions for the Treatment of
Mongolia,” 14-15
Mengjiang Bank, 189,190,
201,266-277, 320
Mengjiang Company, 269
Mengjiang Daily News, 189
Mengjiang government, 191
Mengjiang Information Office,
267
Mengjiang, new Japanese
name for Mongolia post1937, 189; 203,203n8,
212, 208, 209, 440n2
Mengjiang Railway Bureau,
189
Meng-Zang shiwu ju. Bureau
of Mongolian-Tibetan Af
fairs, 15
Meng-Zang Wei-yuanhui. See

Mongolian-Tibetan Af
fairs Commission, 35
Meng-Zang yuan. MongolianTibetan Ministry, 15
Mengzhenghui. See Mongolian
Political Council
Mergen, 134, 135, 137n6, 173,
224,225,226,228, 343
Mergenbagatur (Kang Ren),
54, 83nl0, 154, 174nl,
175, 186, 265,317
Mergen Gegeen, 113, 155,
202n7,296, 297
mergen janggi, tertiary banner
official, 33
Merse, 25, 25n6,42, 46, 48,
341
migration, of Chinese into
Inner Mongolia, See also
Chinese immigrants, Chi
nese merchants
Mijidjangchubniyambu, 273
Military Affairs Ministry, 305,
308
military system of Inner Mon
golia, 33nl0
Minami, Jiro, General, 130,
138
Ministry of Dependencies, 30
missionaries, Christian, 267
Miyamoto, Major, 205
modernism, conflict of with
feudalistic tradition, 292
modernization, 11
modernizers and feudalizers,
tension between, 255
Moko ronin. See Mongolian
ronin

Moko-ronin. See Morishima
Mokuo. See Mengjiang
monasteries and lamas, 1941
proposed reforms of, 244
money, paper, 1943 accepted
for payment of taxes, 292
Monggol gajar oron-u obesuben yin Khural. See

Mongolian Political
Council
Monggutei, 409n6,411
Mongkebagatur, 173,185
Mongkeochir, 121n8
Mongol Academy, 213
Mongol Army, 1945, disinte
gration of, 315-316
Mongol Banner Academy, 213
Mongol Conference in
Alashan, 8/1949, 408-417
Mongolia, Inner, early effects
of Bolshevik revolution
on, 17; military system of
under Manchus, 33nl0;

social relationships, 3;
limited autonomy of in
1914-15, 15; post-war un
certainty for, 315
Mongolia-Manchukuo Over
land Trade Conference,
failure of, 312-313
Mongolia, Outer, 1,2; 1911
declaration of independ
ence by, 60, 61; 1938 in
formal aid negotiations
with, 190; declaration of
independence by, 67; early
effects of Bolshevik
revolution on, 17
Mongolian Affairs Bureau,
Mongolian Affairs Bu
reau, wartime and early
postwar obstructionism
by, 324, 325-326; postwar,
375
Mongolian Allied Autonomous
Government, 1939-1941,
216-258
Mongolian Allied League
Autonomous Government,
169-215, 184-187
Mongolian Army Liaison
Office, 295, 305
Mongolian Army Officer
Academy, 1943,294-296
Mongolian Army Young Ca
dets' School, 238
Mongolian Army Youth
School, 295
Mongolian Army, 1936, Gen
eral Headquarters of, 138141; 1937 organization of,
153-154; 1940 reorgani
zation of, 223; 1944, dis
harmony over control of,
305-307; problems of,
293-294; 1944, reorgani
zation of, 308-310
Mongolian Autonomous Gov
ernment post-Alashan,
422
Mongolian Autonomous Po
litical Affairs Council,
Eight Articles establish
ing, 95-96,96-98
Mongolian Autonomous State,
roots of, 247; formation
of,259-260;8/19418/1945,259-318
Mongolian Autonomy, Decla
ration of, 8/1949, text of,
415-416; Law of, 411-414
Mongolian Bandit. See Hei He
Mongolian Conference of
1940, 236-237
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Mongolian Congress, First,
1936, 141-143, 145-147;
Second, 1937, 173-184;
Second, 1937, attempt to
convene, 172; Fourth, 216
Mongolian Consolidating and
Rehabilitating Group,
326-327
Mongolian Convention of
1930,44,61,39
Mongolian Cooperatives. See
khorshiya

Mongolian Culture, Institute
of, 213
Mongolian Delegation in To
kyo, 266-267
Mongolian government in
Kalgan, last hours of, 317318
Mongolian League and Banner
Allied Committee of De
fense, 1949, 404
Mongolian Leagues, Tribes,
and Banners, 1931 Or
ganizational Law of, 196
Mongolian Livelihood Asso
ciation (See also khor
shiya), 239-241, 24In12
Mongolian Livelihood Im
provement Association,
282-283, 307,341
Mongolian Military Academy,
316
Mongolian Military Govern
ment Organizational Out
line, 143-144; establish
ment, 149-153; 19371938, improvements in ra
dio and roads, trucks and
busses, 166, 175; end of,
167-168
Mongolian National Founding,
proposal for, 247-248
Mongolian People’s Republic,
2,61,427, 331,329
Mongolian Political Council of
1933, flaws of, 99; third
meeting of, October 1935,
118
Mongolian Preparatory School,
331-332
Mongolian problem, 3/1946,
KMT decision on, 347349
Mongolian proposal to First
National Assembly, 384387
Mongolian Rehabilitation
Committee, 1941,253256,269-270,307,311,
260, 276-277

Mongolian Republic. See
Mongolia, Outer
Mongolian ronm, 199
Mongolian-Tibetan Academy
in Beijing, establishment
of, 15; 19, 26,48, 54,
50213, 229n8,
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs
Commision (Meng-Zang
Wei-yuanhut), 35.44, 70,
376-378, 378; 1946 con
tacts with Prince De, 375,
376-378; wartime and
early postwar obstruc
tionism by, 324, 325-326
Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry,
30
Mongolian Wool and Hide
Export Cooperative, 189
Mongolian Youth Alliance,
1946, formation of, 368369; 1948, contact with
U.S, intelligence, 387388; 373-374, 375, 376,
379,381,382,383,384,
386, 389, 393, 396, 396n3,
399, 429,439,440
Mongolian Youth Allied Party,
294, 294nl2
Mongols in Beiping, 1945,
activities of, 342-345
Mongols in early postwar
Chungking, 322-323
Moratani, Hikojiro, 201
Mori, Ichiro, 284
Moriokia, Colonel, 166
Morishima, 57-58, 66, 130
Morishima, Japanese spy, 49nl
Morishima, Kadofusa. 127,
137, 154, 236-237,438
Morita, Kiyoshi, 201
Moslem Rebellion, 5
Moslem troops outside Dingyuanying, 1949, 394
Moto, Akira, 165, 246, 247
250
Moto, Kohei, 250nl4
MPRP (Mongolian People’s
Revolutionary Party), 20,
21,23n5,25
Muekata, Kyukei, 267
Mugdenbuu, 65, 71, 72, 124,
142n7, 153, 161, 162,
163-164, 165, 174nl,
250nl4,252, 277,285,
314,333,334, 336, 337,
371
Muratani, Hikojiro, 205
Muratani, 236
Muratani, Hikojiro, 150, 152,
172, 175-176, 186, 187,

189,204,219nl,235,
236-237,241-242, 245,
250nl4,253,260,268n4
Murungga (Yao Jingtao; Yue
Jingtao), 24n6, 56
Mutiyi, 387
Muuminggan, 63nl, 71n8.
121n8, 174nl,202n7,275,
288
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Nadna, 409n6
Nagakawa, Kazuo, 219nl
Naidang, 370
Naiji-Toyin Khutugtu of
Hohhot, 18
Nairaitu, 373, 403
Nakagawa, Lieutenant Colo
nel. 305
Nakajima Manzo, 125, 127,
129, 130, 140, 152,
154,187, 188, 199, 204,
222, 228, 236, 268n4, 277,
320,438
Nakamura, Asakichi, Colonel,
198, 200, 235, 256
Nakamura, Gijuro, 190
Nakane, Naosuke, 193, 205
Nakazawa, Tatsuki, 131, 132,
133,134
Namdag, 331,333-334, 336,
369
Namjilsereng, Prince, 30,47,
79, 98, 99, 343, 344
Namjilwangchug, Prince, 1, 4,
5, 6-7; death of, 18
Namkhaijab, 50, 269, 280,
339, 340, 409n6
Namsaraijab, 134, 135
Namsarai, 15,337
Namsereng, 127nl,309
Namur 103, 106, 107, 127nl,
174nl, 153, 186, 224, 225,
409n6
Nanjing Office of the Mongo
lian League and Banner
Delegates, 40
Narangerel. See Bai Lianzhen
Narwa, 332-333
Nasunbayar, 64n2, 135, 136,
350
Nasundelger, 142n7,147,
409n6
Nasunmongke. See He Zhaolin
Nasunochir, 67
Nasutu, 117, 117n6,139
Nayantu, Prince, 14, 16, 43,
79, 98, 99, 102n2
Neimindang. See Inner Mon-
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golian People's Revolu
tionary Party
Neimoto, Hiroshi, 315,320
Neren, 291
Nian Gengyao, 109
Nitnaodzar, 1936 assassination
of, 136-138; 56, 65n4, 80,
89,92,93,93n 12.94,95.
98, 119, 131, 134-135,
140, 146, 148,223,249
Ningxia, categorization by
KMT as province in 1928,
38
Ninth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu,
271,272
Nishijima, Shozo, 263-264,
273,275
Nishio, Toshizo, 138
nobility, 1943, term for abol
ished, 293
Noda, Kiotake, 201
Noda Masao, 201
Nojiri, Tetsuji, 219, 219nl
Nomundalai, 139, 174n 1,285,
294
Nomura Yasuzo, 208n9
Nonaka Tetsuya 130
Norbujana, 65, 142n7, I74nl,
202n7,264,371,409n6
Normal Academy of the
Northeast Mongolian
Banners, 42, 48
North China Development
Company, 200
Northern Expedition of 1926,
31-32
Northern Shanxi Autonomous
Government, 1937
founding of 171
Noyan Khutugtu, 271, 272
noyan, ruling prince of a ban
ner, 2
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Oba Tatsunosuke, 219nl, 221
Obama Ujiyoshi, Colonel,
161,163-164
Ochir, 330
Ochirbatux See Bayar
Ochirkhuyagtu, 63n2, 174nl,
175, 199,301,353nl,398
Office of the Mongolian
League and Banner Dele
gates, 50
Oguro, 328,329
Ohashi, Chuichi, PLATE 8;
155,247,261-262, 272275,263-266
Ohashi, Kumao, 190, 201,204,

205,209,211,212,220,
222,227n6, 228, 231,232,
233,243,245
Okabe, Eichi, 190
Okabe, Naosaburo, 224n3,
225, 226, 227, 245
Okabe, Tsunesuburo, 233
Okamura Seichi, 305, 306,
308
Okamura Yasuji, Major Gen
eral, 125
Oljei, 194,409n6
Oljeibuyan, 354, 369, 375,
403,409n6,419,425
Oljeiochih, 26, 294, 309, 310,
316,333,334,335,336,
339, 350
Oljeitu, 79, 101, 138, 139, 171,
174nl,254,307, 320
Omada Hisayoshi, 187, 188,
198
Ombagatur, 409n6,411,425,
435, 436
opium smuggling trade and
taxation, refusal of Prince
De to enter if 317-318;
30, 113-114, 182,252,
303, 305-306
Opium War, Second, effect on
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Russo-Mongolian Agreement
of 1912, 15

s
Sagarajab, 409n6, 425
Saichungga (1914-1973), 304
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Ulaanbaatar, 13
Sangbu, 101, 147, 148, 173,
185
Sangdagdorji, Prince. 63,124,
142n7
Sangduguieng, 223
Sangduureng, 139,166, 174nl,
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Sodnomrashi, 118
Sogdar, 118
Song Wanli, 309
Song Zheyuan, 56, 70, 71, 78.
80, 100, 107, 110, 115,
118, 120, 132, 134, 160n2,
164, 165, 167,352
Songzhu-si Lamaist temple, 24
So, Prince. See Sodnamrabdan
South Manchurian Railway
Company, 166
Southern Ch^ar Autonomous
Government, 9/1937
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sula noyad, nobles at leisure, 2
Suludai, 78
siimus, banner administrations,
3
Sungdui, PLATE 3; 409n6
Sungjingwangchug (Prince
Sung, 1885-1946)
PLATES 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9;
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Togtakhu Taiji, (1863-1922),
16n4
Tojo Hideki, 1941 visit to
North China and Kalgan,
249; 168, 169, 176, 177178, 181, 193,212,204.
205, 245, 247, 262, 273,
310
tokumo-kikan. See Special
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Sechin Jagchid was bom in 1914 in Inner Mongolia to one of the ancient aristocratic
Mongol fLilies of Inner (i.e. Southern) Mongolia. His father was a loyal ally of Prmce
Demchugdongrob, a descendant of Chinggis Khan, and the young Sec^n J^gohid grew
UD amidst the movement led by the prince to achieve autonomy for the Mongols of Inner
Mongolia. This movement comprised an unstable coalition of the old
^
new. western-influenced intelligentsia. Sechin Jagchid belonged to
fact^^^
or Northern Mongolia broke away from the rest of Mongolia in the decades after the last
Siinese dvn^ty fthe Manchus’ Qing Dynasty) fell in 1912 and eventually had no choic,
b^t to enter the orbit of the Soviet Union. Much of the material Jagchid
^
to narrate the more complex and ultimately unsuccessful attempts of Inner Mongol
gain a similar degree of autonomy from China is drawn from his °wn no^s
Time and from his later writings concerning the events in which he
collected ephemeral broadsides and newspaper clippings from
f
writes Most of alt he relies upon his own capacious memory of events as he served nis
See in Various positions in the several governments organized by the Inner Mongolia
Ltonomy movemLt. After all hope for a truly autonomous Inner Mongolia disappeared
I the wake of the Communist conquest of China, Sechin Jagchid took
Ln in Japan, and ultimately in the United States, where for many y-s he -gh‘ and did
research at Brigham Young University. He is now retired and living m California.

Prince De’s calling card, bearing his signature in Mongol and Roman script.
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